Final Paper: Prospect of Democracy in Post-revolutionary Tunisia

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Introduction

The victory of Ennahda after the first post-revolutionary elections in Tunisia has sparked passionate reactions throughout the world. Some are optimistic while others are pessimistic. The pessimist reactions often draw an analogy between Tunisian Jasmine revolution and the Iranian revolution of 1979.[1] One blogger portrays exactly this view in these terms "Much of the NYT coverage of Tunisia has an eerie similarity to the Time's breathless pronouncements about young Iranians who deposed the vicious Shah in the name of democracy, human rights, and "freedom" in the late 1970s. We all know how that turned out. The "revolution" in Iran … culminated with an anti-democratic, Islamist theocracy that is certainly no less brutal than the Shah's and unquestionably more dangerous".[2] Optimists, however, refer to Turkey as an inspirational model for the young Tunisian democracy. The leader of Ennahda, Rachid Al Ghannouchi has made that clear saying "Turkey is a model country for us in terms of democracy".[3] In fact, the successful rule of the Islamist party AKP over the last decade in Turkey exemplifies a rare successful combination between Islam and democracy.

In this paper, I will examine this debate between optimists and pessimists about the future of post-revolutionary Tunisian politics. I will address the question: Is Tunisia more likely to follow the Iranian model of democracy of is it more likely to follow the Turkish model of democracy? This central question entails others: Why does the comparison between Iran and Turkey matter? What is the difference between the Iranian and Turkish democracies? And what structural conditions in each country explain that difference? How do these structural conditions help us to determine the likelihood of regime outcome in post-revolutionary Tunisia? The central argument of the paper is that Tunisia is less likely to follow the Iranian

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[1] For more information look at: Sergei Balmasov, (2011) Will Tunisia become another Iran? 22.06.2011Pravda.Ru http://english.pravda.ru/world/africa/22-06-2011/118280-tunisia-0/ Khairi Abaza (2011) Tunisia and the Lessons of the Iranian Revolution *The New Republic* January 16, 2011 http://www.tnr.com/article/world/81609/tunisia-ben-ali-iranian-revolution# Evgeny Morozov What if Tunisia's revolution ended up like Iran's? Foreign Policy January 15, 2011 http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/14/what_if_tunisias_revolution_ended_up_like_irans

[2] One Center: http://oncenter.blogspot.com/2011/01/tunisia-iran.html, Last visit 12/17/12

[3] Daily News http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=ennahda-takes-turkey-as-model-for-democracy-democracy-2011-10-27 Last Visit 12/17/12

velayat-e faqih type of regime; Its prospect of democracy are similar to the Turkish model, even though it is expected to adopt a "benign secularism" as opposed to Turkish "aggressive secularism". The explosion of the creation of political parties and civil society associations after the revolution is also expected to generate a vibrant civic engagement, therefore more social capital compare to Turkey's amorphous social capital.

I will make this argument in three stages. In section 1, I will suggest that despite the fact that Iran organizes regular elections, and has peaceful transitions, it still remains an authoritarian regime, while Turkey offers the characteristics of a real democracy. Assimilating Tunisian democracy with Iranian or Turkish democracy is therefore synonymous to predicting whether Tunisia will adopt an authoritarian or a democratic regime. In section II, I will claim that institutions are the determinant factor that differentiate between the success of democracy in Turkey and the failure of democracy in Iran. Determining the type of institutions that are likely to result from the jasmine revolution will therefore help us envisage whether Tunisia will have a Turkish-like successful democracy or whether it will have an Iranian type of "Theocratic democracy". Finally, I will argue that the analysis of the structural conditions that determine the outcome of the critical juncture in Tunisia converge toward discarding the Iranian model in favor of the Turkish, with some slight variations. These variations invite us to surpass the dichotomous character of our question (either Iranian or Turkish model) toward envisaging a Tunisian model of democracy.

THE QUESTION OF ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY

This paper addresses the literature on the debate over the compatibility between Islam and democracy. The question that it tries to answer can be considered as one of the more recent phases in the evolution of this debate. In fact, the study of Muslim countries from the Political Science perspective evolved from disinterest in the period prior to the Iranian revolution to an orientalist interpretation of the relationship between Islam and authoritarianism, and later to a debate between essentialists and contingencists over the compatibility between Islam and democracy (Halliday, 1995; Voilpi 2005). I will review the emergence and development of this debate across time with focus on the prominent authors who animated it.

According to Volpi (2005) prior to the Iranian revolution, the "Muslim world" and the political Islam were not deemed to be very worthy research topics for political scientists. These topics were either matter left to area studies specialists or to orientalist scholars with training in philology (Volpi, 2005: 101). Orientalism is a concept that has been used by scholars in art historians, literary and cultural studies scholars for the representation of Islam and the Middle East. In Said's analysis, orientalist scholars essentialize the Muslim societies as static and undeveloped in opposition` to Western societies which are developed, rational, and superior (Said, 1978; Halliday, 1993; Volpi, 2005). Orientalist studies dominated the scholarship of the Middle East during the period prior to the Iranian revolution. This academic framework came under severe attack from other Middle Eastern Scholars such as Edward Said (1978) and Maxime Rodinson (1972).

After the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the study of Muslim politics blossomed. Early political science work was inspired by orientalist literature to answer such questions as why, despite the 1980s wave of democratization in the third word, Muslim countries still remained under authoritarian regimes. Scholars such as Huntington (1984) used Islam as an independent variable to explain authoritarianism in Muslim countries. Then, during the 1980s and 1990s the debate evolved to separate between two confronting currents: the essentialists and the contingencists (Halliday1995: 401). On the one hand, the "essentialists" assume that the set of values, processes and meanings that dominate Muslim societies find their essence in the Islamic scripts. In other words, Islamic theology explains a great deal of Muslim societies' behavior. On the other hand, contingencists dismiss the essentializaton of Islam approach the Islamist movements not through the lens of religion but rather consider them as products of the contemporary societies. Here I will discuss these views throughout two of the prominent authors in each of them. I will use Huntington (1984) and Lewis (2002) for the essentialists and Inglehart (1977) and White (2002) for the contingencists.

Cultural essentialism is first of all an approach rooted in Weberien tradition that posits culture as the essential determinant of politics. In his book, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*,

Weber (1904) makes the argument that cultural value, specifically religion, is the determinant factor that influences the sociopolitical and economic aspects of a society. This argument had a lot of resonance in the contemporary Political Science analysis influencing such masterpiece as Almond and Verba (1965), or Huntington (1968, 1984, 1993). Huntington (1984), following this weberien tradition, makes the argument that there is a high correlation between political culture and democracy. He says:

"In the contemporary world, virtually all countries with European population and a protestant majority have democratic government. The case of Catholicism, particularly in Latin countries… is more ambivalent… Islam on the other hand, has not been hospitable to democracy… The only Islamic country that sustained even intermittent democracy … was Turkey, which had, under Mustapha Kemal, explicitly rejected its Islamic tradition and defined itself as a secular republic" (Huntington 1984: 207).

For him, the reason is that "Islamic culture" seems to be less favorable to democracy. He argues that in Islam, "no distinction exists between religion and politics or between the spiritual and the secular, and political participation was historically an alien concept" (Huntington, 1984:208).

Bernard Lewis (1988, 1993, 2002, 2003) makes a similar argument. In his book *What Went Wrong?* Lewis (2002) argues that the memory of the confrontations between Muslims and Europe in the medieval era continues to fuel such hostility among Muslim toward the West and things western, that he esteems unlikely that Muslim societies will adopt democracy and Pluralism. He says that Muslims were "willing enough to accept the products of infidel science in warfare and medicine, where they could make the difference between victory and defeat... However, the underlying philosophy and sociopolitical context of these scientific achievements proved more difficult to accept or even to recognize. This rejection, Lewis concluded, "is one of the more striking differences between the Middle East and other parts of the non-Western world" (Lewis 2002: 81 quoted by Hefner 2002: 2). Finally, Volpi (2005: 110) implies that the failure of the Islamic republic of Iran, under and after Khomeini, to adopt a "real democracy" provided a good empirical evidence for this trend.

In the other side of the debate, contingencists oppose these views by advocating a shift of the analysis of Muslim Politics from the *a priori* Islamic particularism rooted in the orientalist paradigm toward more emphasis on empirical questions related to the role of Islamist movements in the political

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arena of their respective countries. Following this trend, Englehart and Norris (2003) undertook a research project that aimed at comparing the opinion of eleven Muslim-Majority societies with a number of western countries. Their findings show that in all Muslim countries - except Pakistan, public support for democracy was either equal or greater than in western countries, (Inglehart and Norris 2003). The evidences they gathered brought them to the conclusion most of the Muslim societies across the world do not reject modernity and democracy (Hefner: 2002, 2). Coming from a case study perspective, White (2002) argues that the debate regarding democratization in Turkey provides a good illustration of a Muslim majority country not only adopting a successful democratic system but also electing an Islamist political party to power. He says "the fact that the country has been governed by a political party with Islamist inclinations in 1996-97 and since 2002 is a clear indication that democratization can proceed smoothly even in the presence of an Islamic-minded political party and public discourse" (White 2002).

The more recent version of the debate between essentialists and contingencists is whether the evolving democracy in the post-Arab Spring Muslim countries will be Iranian-like democracy or Turkish-like democracy. In other words, the question is whether the Arab-Spring will result in the creation of authoritarian electoral regimes dominated by clerics, as it is the case in Iran, or whether real democratic regimes respectful of freedoms and civil liberties will emerge. This is the continuation of the debate about the compatibility of Islam and democracy. In fact, the question of compatibility between Islam and democracy has become obsolete insofar as many Muslim countries have already adopted democracy and many others are struggling to get there. Now instead of questioning the compatibility, the debate has evolved toward questioning the quality of democracy being implemented in Muslim countries.

I-   THE CASE OF TUNISIA

Tunisia is a Maghrebian country, with an estimated population of about 10.7 million. Tunisians are overwhelmingly Muslim (98%), most of them Sunni belonging to the *Malikite madhhab*. The history of Islam in Tunisia started around the second half of the 7th century when the region was conquered by Arab Muslims, who founded the city of Kairouan, the first city of Islam in North Africa. In the Middle Age, Tunisia fell under the control of different forces in the region: the Almohads, the Almoravids and the Ottoman Empire. In 1881, it passed under the French colonial rule. Tunisia achieved independence from France in 1956 led by Habib Bourguiba, who later became the first Tunisian President. Bourguiba's presidency was widely recognized for its advancing agenda of modernization that set Tunisia beyond its neighbors in many aspects of progress; even though he had become increasingly dictatorial toward the end of his administration (Hermassi 1994; Clement-Henry, 1965[4]). In November 1987, Prime Minister Zine El Abidine Ben Ali led a successful, bloodless coup d'état that brought him to the presidency (Hamdi, 1998). His regime was characterized by massive corruption and massive human right violations, which led eventually to the breakthrough of the Jasmine Revolution in December 2010. After 26 days of protests, on January 14th 2011, Ben Ali fled into exile (Freedom House: 2012).

The history of political Islam in Tunisia started in the 1970s when the then-school teacher, Rachid Al Ghannouchi established a small movement called *Al Jama'al Islamiyya* (The Islamic Group) with the purpose of combatting the westernizing policies of Bourguiba, and promoting the revival of Islamic values among young Tunisians (Hamdi 1998). The movement developed gradually, especially in the universities. In 1981, Al Ghannouchi formed the *Islamic Tendency Mouvement* (MTI). Through the MTI, Ghannouchi and his colleagues engaged in political activities such as supporting workers' rights, criticizing Bourguiba's government and demanding plurality in the political system. They aimed

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[4] Clement Henry Moore. 1965, Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of One-party Government, University of California Press.

at making Islam a meaningful political force in Tunisian life (Davis, 1997; Tamimi 2001). The increasing political activism of the MTI sparked the government crackdown against the Islamists in the mid-1980s, and many of them were sentenced to prison. The crisis between the Islamists and the government of Bourguiba continued until the coup of November 1987. Ben Ali maintained a short period of political courtship with the Islamists and invited them to join the general elections of 1988 (Hermassi, 1995; Hamdi, 1998). Taking advantage of the political opening started by Ben Ali the MTI changed its name to *Ennahda Party* in order to seek accreditation (which it had never obtained under Ben Ali). During the parliamentary elections, *Ennahda* scored 17% but didn't win any seats. The movement contested the results and engaged in confrontation with the regime. As a result, Ben Ali's government dismantled the movement and sent its leader to exile (Hermassi, 1995; Hamdi 1998; Davis 1997; Tamimi 2001).

The Jasmine Revolution and the fall of the regime of Ben Ali opened the door for the exiled Islamists to come back to Tunisia. After more than two decades of exile in London, *Ennahda*'s leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, returned on January 30, 2011[5]. *Ennahda* party led by its secretary general Hamadi Jebali – now Prime Minister - participated in the first post-revolutionary elections and won 41% of the seats. It created a coalition with the secularist parties of the center left: *The Congress for the Republic* led by Moncef Marzouki, who became the President of Tunisia, and *Ettakatol* , led by Mustapha Ben Jafar, who became the speaker of the National Constitutional Assembly[6]. The transitional government is in charge of writing the draft of a new constitution that will be voted through a referendum in the spring 2013, then organizing the parliamentary and presidential elections, expectedly, later in the summer 2013.

The victory of Ennahda sparked passionate reactions throughout the world and particularly in the west. It brought to mind the memory of the scenario that happened in Iran 23 years ago, when in a

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[5] راشد الغنوشي زعيم حركة النهضة يعود إلى تونس اليوم بعد 20 عاما في المنفى, Asharq Al-Awsat. 30 January 2011

[6] Tunisia Live, A Triumphant Ennahda: Jebali for Prime Minister, No Candidate for Presidency, October 26th 2011 http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/10/26/a-triumphant-ennahda-jebali-for-prime-minister-no-candidate-for-presidency/, Tunisia Live, "Who Will be Tunisia's Next President?" 28 October 2011, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/10/27/who-will-be-tunisias-next-president/

similar course of events, the Pahlavi monarchy fell, and the Islamic republic came into being. The analogy is striking. In Iran, a revolution carried out by all the social groups - clerics as well as secularists – to oust the authoritarian monarchy, finished by being hijacked by the clerics and resulted in one of the most turbulent regimes in the world. Similarly, the revolution in Tunisia associated all the segments of the Tunisian population, but in the end, Islamist dominated the post-revolutionary government. Furthermore, right after the revolution, when Ghannouchi declared his intention to leave England to return to Tunisia, automatically that decision invited comparisons to Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was living in exile in France when the Islamic revolution kicked off in his home country in 1979. In an interview with the *Financial Times*, Ghannouchi downplayed the comparison saying "Some are presenting me as a Khomeini who will return to Tunisia," he said "I am no Khomeini."[7] Since the victory of Ennahda, Ghannouchi has multiplied communications to distance the ideology of his party from the charge of radicalism and to dismiss the analogy with the Iranian revolution. He maintains that Turkey is their model of democracy[8].

In the following section I will consider the *bien fondé* of this normative comparison between Iran, representing the "bad" and Turkey representing the "good" and exemplary model. This is necessary to understand why the comparison matters.

II-	DEMOCRACY IN IRAN V. TURKEY: Authoritarianism versus Democracy

This section will establish the puzzle of this study and define the dependent variable that we need to analyze in order to know whether Tunisia is likely to follow the model of Iran or the model of Turkey. Both Iran and Turkey have multiparty and pluralistic political systems; they both organize regular elections; and both have experienced regular and peaceful transitions of power. Yet, one is considered an authoritarian regime while the other is considered a democracy. The first task of this

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[7] Finantial Times "Interview transcript: Rachid Ghannouchi" 18,January 2011
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/24d710a6-22ee-11e0-ad0b-00144feab49a.html#axzz2FHDWty3Z
[8] Gateston Institute, Tunisia Uses Turkey as Model for Democracy, 31 October 2011,
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2549/ennahda-uses-turkey-as-model-for-democracy last visit 1/12/13.

section is to explain why. Why, despite the similarity in their electoral processes, are Turkey and Iran not equally democratic? I will start by giving the definition of democracy that will be used throughout this argument. Then, on the basis of that definition of democracy, I will demonstrate the reason why despite the organization of regular election, Iran is not a democracy while Turkey gives all the signs of a democracy.

1- Definition of Democracy

Scholars of democratization theories have been prolific in creating new concepts that characterize the plethora and diverse political regimes that appeared during the intense political changes of the recent decades: full democracy, semi-democracy (Case 1996), semi-authoritarianism (Olcott and Ottaway 1999), semidictatorship (Brooker 2000), competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2005), hybrid regimes (Diamond 2007), and electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2006).

At the heart of this plurality of concepts lies the controversy over the definition of democracy, namely whether it should be characterized as a set of procedures or as a set of values. This controversy has been central to Political Science, at least, since the beginning of the 20th century. In fact, according to Oren (2003: 12) "during the Great Depression, political scientists often defined democracy as much in economic as in political terms, and as [much] in terms of substantive ideals as in terms of electoral process." He argues that Maerle Fainsod and Charles Merriam, focused on the substantive aspect of democracy whereas scholars such as Joseph Schumpeter and Almond & Verba abandoned substantive visions of democracy in favor of procedural definitions. Robert Dhal (1971), in one of the most influential books of democratization theory, defines democracy as a political process that allows participation and contestation.

Contemporary political scientists inherited and perpetuated the classic dichotomous definition of democracy. Following Dahl's tradition, Huntington (1984:195) defines democracy as "A political system [in which the] most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to

vote". On the other side, Pennock (1979: 7) defines what he called the "ideal" democracy as the "Government by the people, where liberty, equality and fraternity are secured to the greatest possible degree and in which human capacities are developed to the utmost, by means including free and full discussion of common problems and interests."

The stake of this debate is that, the definitions that have exclusive focus on procedures raise serious questions about the substance of the legitimacy acquired by the majority. For example could democracy remains as such even if the majority votes to enslave the minority? If the answer is no - and it should be - then the consideration of values in the definition of democracy become necessary. On the other hand, definitions that emphasize values also, raise questions over whose values matter: universal or local?

Although consensus among svholars on a precise definition of democracy has proven unreachable, as stated by the *Economist Intelligence Unit* [9], most observers today would agree that the following criteria constitute the fundamental features of a democracy: (1) government based on majority rule and the consent of the governed, (2) the existence of free and fair elections, (3) the protection of minority rights and respect for basic human rights (4) equality before the law, (5) due process and political pluralism (EIU, 2011: 27). Democracy understood in this way cannot be considered in dichotomous terms – a state is either democratic or not - but in term of a continuum that allows variations. This will be the definition that democracy will carry throughout this paper. In what follows, I will apply this definition to both Iran and Turkey in order to assess their level of democracy.

2- Iranian v. Turkish democracy

Based on the understanding of democracy in term of continuum rather than dichotomy, researchers have established indexes using multiple indicators to evaluate the degree of democracy achieved by different countries. One of the most compelling indexes is created by The Economist

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[9] the Economists Intelligence Units

Intelligence Unit[10] and it is based on five categories of indicators: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture; these indicators encapsulate all the aspects of democracy as defined above. According to this index in Table 1, Turkey is ranked at 88th position in term of democracy in the world with an overall score of 5.73 over 10. Iran is classified at the 159th position with an overall score of democracy of 1.98 over 10. According to this study, Turkey is considered as a Hybrid regime[11] while Iran is considered as an Authoritarian regime.

Table 1: Index of Democracy for Turkey, Iran and Tunisia (2010-2011)

	Rank	Overall score	I Electoral Process and Pluralism	Functioning of Government	Political Participation	Political Culture	Civil Liberties	
Turkey	88	5.73	7.92	7.14	3.89	5.00	4.71	
Iran	159	1.98	0.00	2.86	2.78	1.88	3.34	
Tunisia	92	5.53	5.33	5.00	6.67	6.25	4.41	

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit

Table 1 gives also the main indexes for the crucial variables that make democracy function. Whereas Iran scores 0.00 in term of electoral process and pluralism, 1.88 in political culture, and 2.78 in political participation, Turkey scores respectively 7.92, 5.00 and 3.89. Tunisia which is the object of this study is situated, surprisingly, in between these two. It is ranked in the 159th position worldwide with an overall score of democracy of 5.53. Despite the authoritarian character of the old regime in Tunisia, it surpasses Iran in all the crucial aspects of democracy and it scores only 0.25 less than Turkey. Tunisia does particularly well in term in terms of political participation and political culture with respectively 6.67 and 6.25 far beyond both Iran and Turkey.

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[10] For more Information: http://www.economist.com/node/8908438 (Last visit 12/13/2012)

[11] Hybrid regimes: Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from being both free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be common. Serious weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies--in political culture, functioning of government and political participation. Corruption tends to be widespread and the rule of law is weak. Civil society is weak. Typically there is harassment of and pressure on journalists, and the judiciary is not independent

In the following, I will analyze individually the political context of these two countries and see if they corroborate the evaluation of the indexes given above. I will use common sources such as Freedom House reports and scholarly production to make my case.

a- The reality of Iranian democracy

In June 2009, Iranians went to the polls to elect or reelect a president. It was the tenth presidential election since the revolution in 1979[12]. Since the post-Khomeini era started (1989) Iran has experienced three transitions in the presidency. According to Gheissari (2006), over the course of the past twenty five years, elections have become increasingly important to the distribution of power in Iranian politics. Elections also affect distribution of power and political office at the national level and increasingly so at the local level. Yet, if there is one consensus among scholars of Iranian politics - including Gheissari, it is that Iran is not a democracy. In fact, the revolution had, in any case, produced a system with the characteristics of democracy as defined above. Conversely, the revolution has only used rhetorically the notions of popular sovereignty, democratic representation, and republicanism as source of legitimacy, while establishing a political system that obstructs the practical fulfillment of these notions. The Iranian regime is a complex system composed of elected and unelected bodies; and in which the unelected bodies are more powerful than the elected ones raising serious questions about the reality of the republican character of the so called "Islamic republic".

First of all, as reported by Freedom House[13], in Iran the most powerful figure in the government is the Supreme Leader (*Vali-e-Faghih*), currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He is chosen by the Assembly of Experts, a body of 86 clerics who are elected to eight-year terms by popular vote, from a vetted list of candidates. The supreme leader, who has no fixed term, is head of the armed forces and appoints the leaders of the judiciary, the chiefs of state broadcast media, the commander of the IRGC (Army of the

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[12] Gloria Center, "Iran's Tenth Presidential Elections: Candidates, Issues, and Implications", 1st September 2009 http://www.gloria-center.org/2009/09/abootalebi-2009-09-01/

[13] Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2011 - Iran, 12 May 2011, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dcbf51a39.html [accessed 13 January 2013]

Guardian of the Islamic Revolution), the Expediency Council, and half of the Council of Guardians. Although the president and the parliament, both with four-year terms, are responsible for designating cabinet ministers, the Supreme Leader exercises de facto control over appointments to the Ministries of Defense, the Interior, and Intelligence. (I will give in the appendix the structure of the Iranian government).

All candidates for the presidency and the unicameral parliament are vetted by the Council of Guardians, which consists of six clergymen appointed by the supreme leader and six civil law experts selected by the head of the judiciary - himself appointed by the Supreme Leader -, all for six-year terms (Freedom House: 2011). It is among the responsibilities of the Council of Guardians to check legislations passed by the parliament to either approve or reject them. In case of disputes between the two institutions, the Expediency Council, which is also an unelected and conservative-dominated body, intervene to settle to find agreement (Vakilian, 2008: 141[14]). Both the Expediency Council and the Assembly of Experts are currently headed by former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

This structure of the post-revolutionary government in Iran has developed undemocratic practices that I will briefly summarize using different sources including Freedom House reports 2011, Azimi (2010) and Vakilian (2008).

1- In Iran popular sovereignty is almost abrogated, even if the constitution has asserted it. Most of the power is held by the clerics who are mostly appointed (Azimi, 2010).

2- The ideal of an independent judiciary and meaningful separation of powers is similarly eclipsed. The Supreme Leader is responsible for appointing the Head of the Judiciary (Freedom House Report 2011).

3- Although the presidents are elected by popular vote, the institution of the presidency enjoys no more effective power. Even though the system is presidential, the role of the president in Iran resembles that of the Prime Minister in a real Presidential system of governance (Azimi, 2010).

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[14] Hassan Vakilian 2008 "The Impact of the Iranian Constitution on the Law Making Power of the Parliament (Majlis)" Dissertation Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Hull.

4- Popular representation remains restricted and ineffective. The electorate is given only the choice of voting for candidates acceptable to the regime. All the candidates to the popular vote, namely, presidency, national assembly, and Expediency council are selected by the Guardian Council. In the presidential election of 2005 the Council of the Guardians disqualifies some thousand would-be candidate and approved the candidacy of seven (Azimi, 2010: 400; Freedom House Report 2011);

5- The Guardian Council also checks all the laws and resolutions passed by the *Majlis* (the popular assembly) to certify their conformity to Islamic principles. In this sense the *Majlis* appears more as a "consultative body rather a legislative authority (Azimi, 2010: 371). The rate of rejection of legislations approved by the *Majlis* can go as high as 31% in one legislature (Vakilian 2008: 138).

6- Mass-based organized political parties have failed to emerge, leaving open door for factionalism, clan politics, and patronage to prosper. Opposition parties disappeared or became inactive; the pro-regime parties that emerged are organizationally weak, ideologically vague, and without a solid base of popular support (Azimi, 2010: 413).

7- There are no meaningfully free and fair elections and for many the option of not voting is impracticable given official mobilization, coercive tactics, or threatened punishment of various kinds (Azimi, 2010: 414). The elections of 2005 and 2009 were considered to be stolen by the religious establishment[15].

Consequently, the dominance of the unelected over the elected bodies, the restrictive contours of the regime's electoral politics, together with numerous ways of tampering with the voting procedures, are clear indications of the authoritarianism in Iran that is portrayed by the index of the Economic Intelligence Unit.

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[15]Ahmad Salamatian, 2009 "Between religious and democratic legitimacy: Iran's stolen election" Le monde diplomatique, July 2009, http://mondediplo.com/2009/07/02iran

b- The reality of Turkish democracy

Turkish democracy is differently appreciated by analysts. While Freedom House (2011) considers Turkey as an "electoral democracy", Saglam (2012) qualifies it of "semi-democracy" and the Economist Intelligent Unit (2011) considers the Turkish government as a "hybrid regime". The reason of this slight difference comes from the interpretation of the tumultuous cohabitation between, on the one hand, the democratic institutions exemplified by the political parties, the civil societies and the electoral system, and on the other hand, the kemalist state structures – military, Constitutional Court, Republican People's Party (CHP) – who are self-appointed guardians of the aggressive form of secularism established by Kemal Ataturk.

Turkey has a long history of democratic elections and pluralism. Democracy has been, however, constantly hijacked by the military through recurrent coups - in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 (Yavuz 2009:14-16). Since the victory of AKP in 2002, rumors of two attempts of coups (2003[16] and 2007[17]) have shaken the political landscaped of the country. In almost all these occasions, the military intervention into the political arena is justified by the threat of Islamism and the protection of the secular character of the state. However, despite these setbacks, the Freedom House report (2012) describes Turkish democracy, political right and civil liberties in quite praiseful terms. Turkish constitution has guaranteed basic freedoms and rights, including the right of free expression, the freedom of religion, of association, the gender equality, the protection of minorities and an independent judiciary… (Freedom House rport 2012) Furthermore, civic engagement is increasing in Turkey. Judging from the report of OCDE Better Life index, Turkey has achieved a voter turnout of 83% of registered voters during the elections of 2011 and the level of populations' trust toward their government has also increased to reach 57% (OCDE, 2011)[18]

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[16] Ihsan Bal, , Balyoz Operation II: Squash Blossoms, The Journal of Turkish Weekly, 31 March 2010 http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3321/balyoz-operation-ii-squash-blossoms.html Last visit 1/13/13
[17] Saglan 2012.
[18] OCDE Life Index 2011, Civic Engagement, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/civic-engagement/

Despite this positive depiction of the political system in Turkey, there exist nonetheless important shortcomings including in the respect of basic freedoms and the alleviation of corruption.

1- The most important critiques against Turkish democratic government are related to the freedom of expression and its treatment of the Kurdish rebellion. Regarding the former, the Freedom House (2012) reports that since the antiterrorism law that restored jail sentences for journalists was adopted in 2006, approximately 100 journalists have been imprisoned in Turkey; around forty of them were also arrested and accused of affiliation to Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), in December during a series of raids targeting suspected members of the Union of Kurdish Communities (KCK).

2- Apropos the marginalization of the Kurdish population, several critiques have been addressed against the Turkish government, some identifying it with "apartheid" and "racist" state (CSCE, 1994: 13; Manafy, 2005). According to Manafy (2005: 99), "The Kurdish deprivation of their own culture, language, and tradition is incompatible with democratic norms. It reflects an apartheid system that victimizes minorities";

3- The struggles with corruption in government and in daily life seems partial insofar as Prime Minister Erdoğan himself has been accused of involvement in several scandals related to political and economic cronyism and nepotism (Freedom House Report, 2012). Turkey was ranked 61 out of 183 countries surveyed in Transparency International's 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index.

4- The aggressive form of secularism adopted by Kemal Ataturk as core element of his modernization policies has led to considerable abuses against observant Muslims and others. Wearing headscarves in universities and government offices by women is banned; and observant men are expelled from the military (Freedom House Report, 2012);

5- Although the recent amendment of the constitution grants Turkish women full equality, gender gap still persists in Turkey. The World Economic Forum ranked Turkey 122 out of 135 countries surveyed in its 2011 Global Gender Gap Index (Freedom House Report 2012).

In summary, Turkey has made considerable progress toward democracy, the respect of civil liberties and political rights. However, the recurrent interventionism of the military, the abuses of certain freedoms as well as the Kurdish issues constitute serious setbacks against this progress. Perhaps the overwhelming electoral victories of AKP since the elections of 2002, the ongoing political reforms, and the trial of high ranking military including several generals in the so called "Sledgehammer" plot[19], foreshadows a victory of democratic institutions over the reactionary kemalist structures, and an advance toward "full democracy".

III- FACTOR OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY: Defining The Dependent Variable

From the last subsection, it appears clear that the political system in Iran and Turkey are different. While the former has an authoritarian regime that uses elections and the rhetoric of a representative democracy as source of legitimacy, the later can be considered as a semi-democracy. In this section, I will examine the reason why democracy seems to work in Turkey while it failed to work in Iran. I will argue that, that specific reason will be the dependent variable of this study. It will be the defining factor that differentiates between Iranian authoritarianism from Turkish democracy. Therefore it will be the factor that we need to study in the Tunisian case to make an idea about the likely political outcome of the Jasmine revolution in Tunisia.

There exist in political science massive literatures that explore the factors that make democracy works. I will examine three of the most prominent theories developed and apply them to the case of Turkey and Iran. These three theories are: the theory of affluence, civic engagement and institutions.

1- Affluence

Many political scientists – Barrington Moore and Robert Dahl among others - have long argued that the prospects for a stable democracy depend on the social and economic transformation. According to this argument, "the level of economic development has a pronounced effect on

[19] Ihsan Bal, , Balyoz Operation II: Squash Blossoms, The Journal of Turkish Weekly, 31 March 2010
http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3321/balyoz-operation-ii-squash-blossoms.html Last visit 1/13/13

democracy, even when noneconomic factors are considered. GNP is the dominant explanatory variable" (Quote form Putnam 1993: 84). The famous statement of Barrington Moore (1965) "No Bourgeoisie, No Democracy" makes affluence a *sine qua non* condition for democracy. Taking the argument further, Dahl (1971) claims that the foundational components of democracy are inclusive participation and contestation. For both these aspects to occur there is a need of literacy among citizens and widespread availability of information. These can only be fully attained by affluent societies.

According to this theory, economic development determines whether democracy works in a country or not. If this theory is to be consistent with our case, we should expect to have higher economic conditions in Turkey as compare to Iran. In order to test this hypothesis, I compare two indicators of economic performance in both countries: the GDP (Gross Domestic Index) and the HDI (Human Development Index). The GDP is an indicator that gives the countries standard of living in terms of purchasing power, while the HDI is an aggregate of multiple indicators - such as level of education, Health, life expectancy – that evaluate the real living conditions of the populations. In Table 2 that compares the GDP of these countries it appears that between 2007 and 2009, Turkey had a higher GDP than Iran meaning an average Turkish has a higher purchasing power than an average Iranian.

Table 2: GDP or Iran and Turkey

	2007	2008	2009
Islamic Republic of Iran	10,346	10,446	10,496
Turkey	11,973	11,904	11,209
Tunisia	7,102	7,358	7,512

Source : World Bank

However, when it comes to the translation of this economic performance into the real living conditions of the population in terms of HDI, as Table 3 shows, Iranian populations seems to enjoy better living conditions than Turkish populations. In other worlds, Iranian are better educated, and

healthier than Turkish populations; hence the expectation that democratic participation in Iran will be higher than in Turkey, making, as a result, democracy work better in Iran. But as demonstrated above, it was the exact opposite that happened. Consequently, I discard affluence from the factors that makes that make democracy work in Turkey and not in Iran.

Table 3: HDI of Iran and Turkey

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Islamic Republic of Iran	0.694	0.699	.0.703	0.707	0.707
Turkey	0.681	0.688	0.692	0.698	0.698
Tunisia	0.688	0.691	0.69	0.696	0.699

Source: World Bank

2- Civic Engagement

Following the tradition of Alex de Tocqueville (1841), many political scientists including Putnam (1993), make the argument that civic engagement and especially the social capital is the determinant factor that makes democracy work. Tocqueville sets the basis of the argument by claiming that one of the most important factors that sustain democracy in America is the "American propensity to form civil and political organizations. Putnam (1993) elaborates the theory of social capital building on this argument and the argument of Dahl - mentioned above. In *Making Democracy Work*, he makes the claim that associational life increases the level of social capital (networks and interpersonal trust) among members, fosters democracy by mobilizing ordinary citizens in the political process and serves as political catalysts, bringing constituents into mainstream politics (Putnam, 1993). The social capital is vital for democracy insofar as it generates trust in political institutions and among political actors (Putnam 1993). Trust is therefore the best indicator of civic engagement.

If we apply this theory to our cases, we should expect to have more trust in the political institutions in Turkey compared to Iran. Using World Survey Data I run a logistic regression to compare the level of trust in both country. The result, as portrayed in Table 4, show no significant difference

between the two countries in term of trust of important political institutions such as the press, the parliament and the Political parties. For the remaining variables, trust is almost equally split between the two countries. While Turkish population have more trust than Iranian in their armed force, Labor Unions, Civil Service, Major companies and Justice system, the Iranian, on the other side, enjoy more trust than the Turkish when it comes to religious institutions, the Police, and some International organizations such the United Nation and the NGOs.

Overall, it appears clear that, in these cases, civic engagement is not a valid variable that can explain the success of democracy in Turkish or its failure in Iran.

Table 4: Trust in political institutions in Iran v. Turkey (2007)

Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
					Lower	Upper
Trust in Church	-1.034***	.119	.000	.356	.282	.449
Trust in Armed Forces	1.432***	.132	.000	4.188	3.236	5.419
Trust in Press	.065	.127	.610	1.067	.832	1.369
Trust in Labor Union	.527***	.112	.000	1.693	1.358	2.111
Trust in Police	-.316**	.124	.011	.729	.572	.931
Trust in Parliament	.085	.123	.489	1.089	.856	1.385
Trust in Civil Service	.538***	.123	.000	1.713	1.347	2.180
Trust in Television	-1.351***	.125	.000	.259	.203	.331
Trust in Government	-.236**	.123	.054	.790	.621	1.005
Trust in Political Parties	.141	.118	.231	1.152	.914	1.451
Trust Major Companies	.913***	.119	.000	2.491	1.971	3.149
Trust Environment Protect	-.638***	.121	.000	.528	.417	.669
Trust Women Movements	1.140***	.123	.000	3.126	2.455	3.981
Trust in Justice System	1.159***	.120	.000	3.187	2.519	4.031

Trust in United Nation	-1.103***	.110	.000	.332	.268	.412
Trust Charitable Humanita	-.324***	.118	.006	.724	.574	.912
Constant	.295***	.102	.004	1.343		

Source: World Survey Data

Critics of this theory (such as Jamal, 2008) have argued that civic engagement can have a positive effect on democracy only if the existing institutional framework within which civic associations operate is democratic. Jamal (2008) made a convincing argument that civic engagement in an authoritarian state tend to be manipulated to serve the interest of the authoritarian regime. Consequently, I will agree with the positive effect of civic engagement for democracy in Turkey, because of the existence of democratic institutions that allow it to prosper and encourage participation, thus consolidate democracy.

3- Institutions

The institutions have been another focus of political scientists, including Sartori (1994), Huntington (1968), and Bunce (1999), in their attempt to understand the factor that makes democracy work. The argument, as Sartori (1994) puts it, is that "the particular choice of executive structure (presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary), of legislature (single or double chamber), of political parties (adversarial or consociational, and their effective number in parliament) and of electoral system (majoritarian, mixed or proportional), as well as the combined effects and concomitants of these institutions, has influenced the overall performance and stability of political democracies world-wide"(Quoted from Andreev 2003: 3)[20]. According to this view, in order to have a working democracy, a country needs to have democratic institutions that reflect the will of people. Here my analysis focuses on three major institutions: the constitution, the government and the political parties.

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[20] Svetlozar A. Andreev, 2003, The Role Of Institutions In The Consolidation Of Democracy In Post-Communist Eastern Europe, *Centre for the Study of Political Change* N. 13/2003.

a- Institutions in Iran

Iran has a peculiar system of government in which all the elected bodies are put under the tutorship of unelected institutions dominated by clerics

b- Institution in Turkey

first, the 1982 constitution provides for a 550-seat unicameral parliament, the Grand National Assembly. Constitutional reforms approved in a 2007 referendum provided that the president would be elected by popular vote for a once-renewable, five-year term. The prime minister is head of government, while the president has powers including a legislative veto and the authority to appoint judges and prosecutors. The June 2011 elections were widely judged to have been free and fair, with an 83 percent voter turnout. They also featured the first legally permissible campaigns in Kurdish, the reduction of the minimum age for candidacy from 30 to 25, and upgraded ballot boxes.

When examine through the case of Turkey and Iran, this theory seems to be more relevant in explaining the democratic success in the former and the shortcoming of the later. The major problem of Iranian democracy lies in its institutional system that, first, gives more power to unelected clerics over the elected president and parliament; second, lacks of the separation of the different layers of power - the executive, the legislative and the judiciary - placing all the institutions directly or indirectly under the control of the clerics, and third promotes a single ideology and discourages real participation and contestation. On the other hand, the success of Turkish democracy can also be explained by its secular and republican institutions. These institutions have allowed participation and contestations of political parties from different ideological background. Through participation Islamic political parties, which used to be outlawed for fear of its ideology, came to be accepted and, even more, became the leading party governing the country over the last decade with an overwhelming majority.

Therefore, my theory can be summarized in these terms: for democracy to work in any country there should be first the presence of democratic institutions. If this condition is achieved, the

development of the civic engagement will contribute to the emergence and ultimately the consolidation of democracy (evolution and revolution). Consequently, the institutions that will emerge from the Jasmine revolution will determine whether Tunisia will follow an authoritarian theocracy similar to Iran or a Turkish-like pluralistic participatory democracy.

So far, this analysis has helped to determine the dependent variable that we need to study in Tunisian case in order to answer the puzzle that posed in the introduction. The next section will deal with question of what are the structural conditions that produced the democratic institutions in Turkey and authoritarian institutions in Iran and that will help us explore the likelihood of the Tunisian post-revolutionary regime?

Tunisians have elected an Islamist government, but the institutional design that will shape the political future of the country is yet to be defined. Therefore our analysis of the prospect of democracy in Tunisia can only be based on the assumption of likely outcomes of the revolutions. What are the institutions that are likely to result from the current revolution will be the subject that I examine in the next section.

IV-   PROSPECT OF POST-REVOLUTIONARY TUNISIAN DEMOCRACY

In the last section, I made the argument that institutional design of Turkey and Iran constitute the fundamental difference between the two; and it is also the determining factor that make democracy work in Turkey and fail to work in Iran. Democratic institutions lay the ground for participation and contestation that increase social capital and consolidate democracy, while non-democratic institutions obstruct participation and suppress dissent and opposing ideologies. Thus, while democratic institutions are necessary starting point, for democracy to emerge and get consolidated there should also be participation and contestation that increase social capital and trust among citizens. In this section I will examine the structural conditions that determine whether post-revolutionary Tunisia is likely to have democratic institutions and follow the example of Turkish democracy or whether

authoritarian institutions are likely to emerge from the revolution in a similar fashion to what happened in Iran 23 year ago.

1- Methodology

I will use consecutively two theories to build my argument; one help to identify how new institutions come into being, and the other one predict the type of institutions that are likely to come into being.

The first is the theory of Historical Institutionalism that use critical junctures to explain the origin of macro-phenomena - such as the founding of new institutions. Critical junctures are period in which actors enjoy greater autonomy to choose between alternative historical paths. Through a variety of mechanisms, such choices become locked-in and actors have difficulty affecting anything other than evolutionary or incremental change as time passes (Katznelson 2003, 274). At such critical junctures, actors possess autonomy from the constraining weight of big structures and can set political development in radically new directions (Katznelson 2003, 283-3). The ultimate end of critical juncture is the lock-in of the new institution and the creation of path dependency. As Bernhard (2012) suggests, not all critical juncture create path dependency. In certain case critical juncture open the door to a period of "Institutional syncretism" which is a situation of institutional instability where the newly generated set of institutions is not capable of effectively managing the inherent logic of social cleavage and conflict in society (Bernhard, 2012).

Second, I will use the theory of Scokpol to analyze the factors that determine the outcome of critical junctures. In *States and Social Revolutions*, Skocpol (1979) identifies three major factors that determine the outcome of a revolution:

(1) The specific way in which the Old Regime broke down politically. This is important because it determines the initial pattern of political conflict during the revolutionary period and gives insight to the political solution needed to stabilize the situation.

(2) The political leadership of the revolution: The leadership of the revolution is the representative of social groups who are struggling to realize economic or status interest, and/or as actors attempting to implement a certain ideological vision of the ideal social order. They are also state builders who struggle to maintain power and they may succeed or fail according to how successful they are in bargaining within the revolutionary conditions. From this account, it is important to know both the social background of the leaders, notably their ideology, but also their political activities.

(3) The influence of the international Relation upon the emergent revolutionary regimes: the world historical timing and sequence of the Revolution affect the models of political parties organization and ways of using state power that were available to the successive revolutionary leadership.

I will first test the validity of this theory by applying it to the cases of Iran and Turkey, and then use it to explain in depth the types of institutions that are likely to emerge from the revolution in Tunisia.

2- Critical Juncture in Iran: The birth of authoritarian Institutions

The critical Juncture in Iran happened in 1979 when a coalition of religious and secularist movements engaged in a revolution that ended with the overthrow of the Monarchy of the Shah Pahlavi and its replacement by an Islamic republic under the leadership of Ayatollah Rohullah Khomeini (1902 – 1989). The revolution replaced the westernizing monarchy with a theocratic regime elaborated on the basis of an idea developed by Khomeini 10 years earlier, *The Guardianship of the Islamic Republic* "*velayat-e faqih*" (Azimi 2008: 361). This is a theory in Shia Islam which holds that Islam gives a faqīh (Islamic jurist) custodianship over people. The institutions that were created after the revolution were elaborated in a way that accommodates this clerical custodianship with democracy. Democratic institutions such as the parliament and the presidency where created and submitted to universal suffrage, but at the same time, these democratic institutions are subjugated to the control of unelected clerical institutions. The Supreme Leader controls the president and the key ministries as well the army, the Judiciary and the media…, the Council of Guardian controls and certifies

the laws passed by the parliament and vet all candidates to popular elections, the ICGR is a powerful army controlled by the clerics…

What are the structural conditions that produced these institutions during the critical juncture of 1979 in Iran?

(1) The international context: two aspects of international politics had determining effect in the outcome of the Iranian revolution: the western relationship with Iran and the Iran – Iraq war. The pro-western policies adopted by the Shah undermined his image domestically, whereas his active role in the 1970s oil price crisis distanced him from his western allies. It was an already isolated Shah that succumbed in 1979 to the revolution that started two years earlier. Second, the secularists were active during the revolution and after the revolution. In fact, the 1st prime minister and the 1st president were both secularists even though they were both under the authority of Khomeini, the Supreme Leader. During the first two years after the revolution, the secularist struggled to counter the dominance of the clerics. However, the breakout of the Iran – Iraq war calmed down the domestic political turmoil, gave legitimacy to the religious leaders and allowed for the revolutionary institutions to quickly lock-in and create a path dependency.

(2) The Old regime: The Pahlavi dynasty consisted of two Iranian monarchs, the father and son Reza Shah Pahlavi (reigned 1925–1941) and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (reigned 1941–1979). The regime of the shah was oppressive, brutal, corrupt, and extravagant; it also suffered from basic functional failures – an over-ambitious economic program that brought economic bottlenecks, shortages and inflation. The Shah was perceived by many as a puppet of a non-Muslim Western power. He was installed on power by an invasion of an allied British and Soviet troops in 1941, also with the help of the British and US military he run a coup against an elected prime Minister. The Shah's regime was known for its autocracy, its focus on modernization and Westernization and for its disregard for religious and democratic measures in Iran's constitution.

(3) The Political leader of the revolution: the major political leader of the Iranian revolution was

Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini's political activism started in the 1960s when he engaged in

criticizing the Shah's policies regarding religion and the relationship with western countries

which he saw as destructive to Islam. In 1963, he qualified the Shah as a "wretched miserable

man" who had "embarked on the [path toward] destruction of Islam in Iran. (Nehzat by Ruhani

2000: 75)[21] he also criticized the Iranian relationship with Israel and the United States. The

Khomeini's ideology influenced heavily on the revolution of 1979. Some of the slogans of the

revolution were: "Western culture was a plague or an intoxication to be eliminated" (Mackay,

1996: 264–5)[22], also "Neither East, nor West, Islamic Republic!". His idea of the (velayat-e

faqih) translated exactly in the post-revolutionary government. Other groups participated in the

revolution such as the constitutionalist liberals, the democratic reformists, Islamic Freedom

Movement of Iran, and the more secular National Front, but all these group were eclipsed by the

religious.

To summarize my argument, the Iranian revolution was largely a cultural revolution. It aimed at

overthrowing the Shah who shown disregard to Islam and adopt westernizing policies that are

considered damaging to Islam. The International context characterized by the isolation of the Shah

facilitated the quick success of the revolution whereas the Iran-Iraq war shortened the period of

institutional syncretism and allowed for the Islamic institutions to quickly lock-in. According to Taheri,

(1985: 238)[23] the revolution replaced the monarchy and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi with Islamism

and Khomeini, rather than another leader and ideology, is credited in part to the spread of the Shia

version of the Islamic revival that opposed Westernization, saw Ayatollah Khomeini as following in

the footsteps of the beloved Shi'a Imam Husayn ibn Ali, and the Shah in those of Husayn's foe, the

hated tyrant Yazid I.

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[21] Nehzat by Ruhani vol. 1 p. 195, quoted in Moin, Khomeini (2000), p. 75
[22] Mackay, Iranians (1996) pp. 215, 264–5
[23] Taheri, The Spirit of Allah (1985), p. 238

3- Critical Juncture in Turkey: The birth of democratic institutions

In Turkey, the critical juncture goes back to the Young Turks' Revolution in 1908 when the coalition of the unionists and the military forced the Sultan to reestablish the constitution of 1876. The revolution ultimately evolved in the dissolution of the Monarchy in 1913. After fifteen years of institutional syncretism made of internal turmoil, World war I, and the independence war, the institutions in Turkey finally locked-in in 1923 with the modernizing reforms adopted by Mustapha Kemal Ataturk – institutional reform among other. These reforms lay the ground for the emergence of a modern, secular and democratic Republic of Turkey. Since then Turkey has gone through incremental changes passing from single-party republic (1923-1945) to a period of limited multipartism (1945-1983) and later to a democracy (1983- to the present). Despite four coups since 1960, one can argue that the process of learning democracy has been rather incremental.

The structural conditions:

(1) The International Politics: In the 18th and 19th century, several revolutions happened in Europe. The Turks observed their European neighbors and rivals modernize by getting rid of the old system of Monarchy and religious establishment. In the 19th century these modern European countries grew stronger while Turkey was mired in decay. They learned that pre-modern Ottoman political and social structures would not be able to survive the onslaught of modern societies until similar sociopolitical and economic changes happen in Turkey as well. France and England supported the revolution and they both had significant role in organizing it. Germany, however, opposed it because of its good relationship with the Monarchy.

(2) The Old Regime: the old regime in Turkey was the Ottoman Monarchy. The Turks lived under the Ottoman monarchy for more than six century (1299–1923). The Sultans used Islamic religion as source of legitimacy. Their rule was characterized by the use of absolute power in an 'oriental type of despotism'. Their power recognized neither the sanctity of private property nor the

dignity and honor of the propertied classes. They refused to recognize that the subjects enjoyed certain fundamental rights and freedoms. This absolute despotism in an era and area of nascent modernity was just anachronistic; and the civilian elite and the army organized the revolution to change the political system.

(3) The Political Leaders of the revolution: There are two important actors in the revolution of 1908 in Turkey: The army and the Young Turks. The army's involvement in Politics started when a group of officers conspired with high civilian officials and imposed a constitution on a reluctant sultan in 1876. Later, when the sultan, Abdülhamid II (1876–1909), shelved the constitution and ruled as a despot, officers began to prepare for his overthrow and for the restoration of constitutional government. They set up a secret society, known as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1889, and officers like Enver Pasha, Jemal Pasha, and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who all played critical political roles in modern Turkish history, were its members. The CUP-led rebellion in the army took place in June-July 1908 and, as a result, Abdülhamid was forced to restore the constitution he had shelved 30 years earlier. This was the beginning of the Young Turk revolution that change the system from an absolute Monarchy to a constitutional Monarchy (1980-1923), then to a secular Republic (1923-1950) and Finally to a Democratic (1950 to the present)

In summary, all these factors contribute to make sense of the outcome of the Young Turks's revolution. The International context was dominated by the abolition of monarchies and the separation of religion from politics in Europe. Although the Turkish Monarchy survived the 19th century without serious challenges, it remained reactionary to change; Sultan Abdulhamid II continued with the same absolute despotism anachronistic to the political context of the era. The most important fragments of the society (the military and the middle class) mobilized and carried out the revolution with the aim of moving Turkey gradually from pre-modernity into modernity.

Consequently, they adopted strong secular and republican institutions that open the door for democracy to emerge.

4- Critical Juncture in Tunisia: The Prospect of a consolidated democracy

The critical juncture in Tunisia started with the Jasmine Revolution or what Tunisians call the Dignity Revolution (2011) that ousted the authoritarian regime of Ben Ali. While the revolution has achieved its primary goal of overthrowing the Old regime and its institutions, it is yet to establish new formal institutions that will govern the post-revolutionary Tunisia; therefore the critical juncture continues. In October 2011, the interim government organized election to appoint the members of a Constituent Assembly charged with rewriting Tunisia's new Constitution and organizing the parliamentary and presidential elections. The formerly-banned Islamic party Ennahda won by capturing 41% of the total vote. The discussions over the constitution are ongoing but, already, consensus has been reach on many of the contentious articles. For example Ennahda accepted to withdraw its proposal of introducing the sharia as source of law. The main heated debate now is the form of the future government: Ennahda opts for a parliamentary government while the other forces opt for a presidential government.

(1) International Context: Prior to the outbreak of the protest, the International context was largely favorable to Ben Ali. Despite the authoritarian character of his rule he enjoyed the support of France and the US notably. This international context was for a great deal influenced by the instability in the Middle East and the concern over the growing terrorism. Many western countries supported dictators in the Middle East by fear of the Islamist alternative. In fact, the experience of Algeria in the early 1990s and Palestine in 2005 have demonstrated that Islamists are very likely to win the majority in most of the Arab World should free and fair elections be organized. The tragic course of events in both Algeria and Palestine intimidated supporters of democracy in the region who, afraid of the chaos that may result from the advent of Islamists on

power in the Middle East, favor the maintenance of the lesser evil meaning the status quo. Second, after the election and the victory of Ennahda, the international reaction especially in the west was manifested through an outcry that expressed the fear that not only Tunisia may turn in an another rogue country in the Middle, but also it has the potential to serve as a pedagogy for the other countries going through the Arab Spring. This same context of fear of Islamism played a great role in influencing the behavior of Ennhada Movement. Ennahda leadership strived to define themselves as moderate Islamists committed to democratic principles. More importantly, they argue that they represent the best remedy for radical Islamism and terrorism because they exemplify the alternative of the Al-Qaida's method of seeking change by means of violence. Hamad Jebali (the secretary general of Ennahda and current prime Minister) claimed in an interview that the victory of Ennahda represents the most important threat to AlQaeda[24]. In an attempt to reassure both the national and the international community Ennahda has substantially moderated its discourse and its political positions. This appear clearly in the important concessions they made during the negotiations for the writing of the new constitution.

(2) Old regime: Ben Ali came to power on November 7, 1987, in takeover ousting Tunisia's first president, Habib Bourguiba. Bourguiba, who led Tunisia to independence from French colonial rule, had become increasingly dictatorial toward the end of his administration, but he is widely credited with advancing an agenda of modernization and progress that set Tunisia apart from its neighbors. President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had ruled Tunisia since 1987. His government was characterized by the development of Tunisia's private sector in favor of foreign investment, and the repression of political opposition. Under Ben Ali, Tunisia had acquired the reputation of wealthy and stable as compared to other countries in the region. Tunisia's per capita GDP more than tripled from $1,201 in 1986 to $3,786 in 2008.(United Nation: 2010) It has the highest GDP of all African countries. Scholars such as L.Chomiak and J.P. Entelis (2012) consider the contrast

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[24] TV5 Monde Interview with Hamadi Jebali http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JhVBmiEx2SY

between the country's high level of economic development with a robust middle class on the one hand, and the illiberal and repressive political system established by Ben Ali on the other hand as the Tunisian Paradox. They said, "Ben Ali regime puzzled analysts and scholars alike in its persistent unwillingness/inability to transform its impressive market-oriented reforms, which have created the Arab world's most socioeconomically progressive societies, into a genuine political democracy" (L.Chomiak and J.P. Entelis 2012: 75)[25]. However despite, these economic performances, Tunisia continued to suffer from a high unemployment, especially among youth and more dramatically in rural area and the impoverished south. The small businesses also suffered from the competition with the world market. These conditions added to the repression of freedom where the root causes of the revolution. The accidental immolation of Bouazizi was just the drop of water that overflowed the vase in the sense that the regime of Ben Ali was reputed for its violation of basic freedoms and human rights and mistreatment of opposition which resulted in a popular political apathy among Tunisians (Entelis, 2005). Perhaps this is the reason why Tunisians prefer to call their revolution The Dignity Revolution (ثورة الكرامة).

(3) Political leaders: The Jasmine revolution started as a spontaneous expression of anger in response to repression, poverty and unemployment. At its beginning in the countryside, it was not coordinated by any specific actor. However as it emerged and reached the big cities, the movement got the support of the Unions. Among the more active unions, there is the Tunisian General Labor Union, the independent trade union activists, the Federation of Labour Unions, Tunisian National Lawyers Order, the students Unions. Lately, the Islamists, especially the salafist of Hizb ut-Tahrir, joined the demonstrations, after the Friday prayer of the 14th January 2011, the day the president Ben Ali left power. While the leadership of Ennahda supported the revolution from the exile, their formal participation as an organized group was virtually absent.

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[25] L.Chomiak and J.P. Entelis 2012, "The Tunisian Paradox" in F. Cavatorta ed. Civil Society Activism under Authoritarian Rule: A Comparative Perspective)

However, after the first post-revolutionary election Ennahda won the overwhelming majority (41% of the seat, while its second had only 8%). This victory of Ennahda was interpreted by the fact that it has been the only credible and organized opposition to Ben Ali's regime, and after the fall of Ben Ali, it remained the only organized political party that can present real alternative agenda for the country. After, their victory, the Islamists of Ennahda created a coalition with the secular parties of the center left Congress of The Republic and the leftist leaning Ettakatol to rule over the transition government in charge of writing the constitution and organizing the general elections. The absence of the Islamists among the leadership of the revolution suggests that the revolution did not have any Islamist character; the election of Islamists was not motivated by religious purpose but by the need of change and the aim of moralizing politics. The increasingly moderate stances taking by Ennahda, anticipate a positive end of the transition period which perhaps will lay the ground for a peaceful and consensual democratic process in the future.

In summary, the international context dominated by the fear of terrorism and radical Islamism and the isolation of rogue states such as Iran, discourage any Islamist party seeking power through elections to adopt a radical Islamist system comparable to the Iranian *velayat-e faqih*. Second, the main charges against the old regime in Tunisia relate, on the one hand, to the deteriorating socioeconomic conditions of Tunisians, and on the other hand, to the lack of freedom. The mandate of the government of transition is to create institutions that will adequately respond to these issues. Any diversion from these expectations toward a religious or ideological dispute risks to be self-destructive to its author. Third, the revolution was spontaneous and popular; no political, religious or ideological body could claim its paternity. If there is any leadership to be recognized, it would be the unions. Ennahda's victory could hardly be justified on religious ground but rather on the need of change. This may be the reason why Ennahda shows so far flexibility and willingness to compromise on many vital articles of the new constitution in order to reach to consensus with its secular allies.

For all these reason, the future institutions that will come out of the Tunisian critical juncture are very likely to be democratic, republican and secular, therefore very favorable to democracy.

5- Prospect of democracy in Tunisia

Is post-revolutionary Tunisia more likely to follow the model of Iranian democracy or Turkish democracy?

There is reason to believe that Tunisia is likely to follow Iranian model more than the Turkish one. In fact, the context of the critical juncture in Tunisia is analogous to the context of the Iranian revolution. In Iran the Islamist dominated the period of the critical juncture and used their dominance to established institutions that reflected their political ideology. In Tunisia also the Islamist are dominating the period of the critical juncture and could also impose institutions that reflect their Islamist ideology. However, based on the argument that I developed above, I suggest that Tunisia is unlikely to follow Iranian democracy for one simple reason: the institutions that are being created in Tunisia are unlikely to follow the Iranian *velayat-e faqih* system of governance. The examination of the three structural factors that determine the outcome of the critical juncture demonstrate that the institutions that are likely to come out of the Tunisian revolution will be secular, republican and democratic. Challenging the dichotomous character of our question (either/or), I will suggest that Tunisia is likely to be a democracy not necessarily following exactly the model of Turkish Republic. Here I will identify two major differences between Tunisia and Turkey. First, I will argue that the institutions being debated in Tunisia are likely to be secular but not in same understanding of secularism in Turkey. Second, it is likely that the institutions in Tunisia lock-in very quickly creating a path dependency and a vibrant evolutionary process made of intense civic engagement.

Starting with the secularism, Schmid (2003) distinguished between two categories of secularism rooted in the political philosophy: first, "aggressive secularism" originated from Marx and Nietzsche refers to a doctrine that rejects the significance and value of religious faith; and second, "benign

secularism", rooted in the philosophy of St Augustine and Tocqueville, represents a belief that ecclesiastical matters should remain distinct from state functions. Turkish secularism exemplified the "aggressive secularism". In fact, in Turkey, Secularism (or laicity) was first introduced with the 1928 amendment of the Constitution of 1924, which removed the provision declaring that the "Religion of the State is Islam", and with the later reforms of Atatürk, which set the administrative and political requirements to create a modern, democratic, secular state, aligned with Kemalist ideology. Even though Turkey's "laïcité" does not call for a strict separation of religion and the state, the interpretation that has been done of it reflected this extreme understanding of secularism. In fact, Turkish constitution states that the religious communities cannot become involved in the political process (by forming a religious party for instance) and no party can claim that it represents a form of religious belief. Under this understanding of "laicite" two parties have been ordered to close (Welfare Party) in 1998 and Virtue Party in 2001 by the Constitutional Court for Islamist activities. Also, In 1998 Recep Tayyib Erdogan the current Prime Minister, received a prison sentence for 10 month and was obliged to give up his office of Mayor od Istanbul for reciting a poem in which it is said "The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers....". [26] Accroding to a report by Freedom House, the state's official secularism has led to considerable restrictions on the Muslim majority and others. Observant men are dismissed from the military, and women are barred from wearing headscarves in public universities and government offices" (Freedom House)[27]

Tunisia, however, typifies the benign secularism. In fact, during the discussions over the draft of the new constitution, the different actors have reached to a consensus to maintain the Article 1 of the former constitution of 1959 unchanged. The article says "Tunisia is a free, independent and sovereign state. Its religion is Islam, its language is Arabic and its type of government is the Republic". There have been intensive debate over the addition of the clause that states "Sharia is its source of Law, but

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[26] "Turkey's charismatic pro-Islamic leader". BBC News. 4 November 2002. Retrieved 23 July 2006.
[27] Freedom House

Ennahda finally backed up on its request. Furthermore, the draft of the constitution maintains that the

religion of the President shall be Islam. Tunisia also has a political party law, passed on May 3, 1988,

which stipulates that "no party may fundamentally base its principles, activities, and programs on a

religion, language, sex, or region"[28] During Ben Ali's era, a number of Islamist political parties were not

granted party accreditation including under this law, including Ennahda and *Hizb Al-Tahrir.* But after,

the revolution both parties received accreditation. In all account, it seems that the Tunisian notion of

secularism resembles that of the United State which Tocqueville appreciated as being a successful

relationship involving secularism, religion, and democracy. Schmid (2003) says "Today, many still

believe that this trinity contributed to the success of the democracy in the United State and the rest of the

Christian West." The implication of this on my argument is that a polity that adopts a benign secularism

could be expected to have higher participation and contestation than a polity that adopt "aggressive".

Second, as demonstrated above, in the index of democracy elaborated by the Economist,

Turkey scores only 3.89 over 10 while pre-revolutionary Tunisia scores 6.67.Tunisia however, the

perspective of participation and contestation in the post-revolutionary Tunisia is very high. In fact, the

measures taking after the revolution inspire hope that political parties and civil society organization will

blossomed. For instance, whereas only nine registered political parties contested elections under Ben

Ali's regime, post-revolutionary Tunisia boasted 113 registered political parties and independents,

representing a wide spectrum of political ideologies[29]. Furthermore, civil society is an additional

guarantor of Tunisia's new political openness. While the number of voluntary and national

organizations exceeded 9,000 in 2009, few of these associations were permitted to operate

independently under Ben Ali. This was especially the case for human rights groups and associations

promoting civil liberties.[30] According to civil society leaders, between 7,000 and 10,000 new

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[28] "Tunisia's Repressive Laws: The Reform Agenda," Human Rights Watch, November 2011.
[29] Freedom House, Countries at the Crossroads 2012:
[30] Lilia Weslaty, "Plus de 9700 Associations en Tunisie!" www.tunisvisions.net,
http://www.tunivisions.net/28266/152/149/plus-de-9700-associations-en-tunisie.html.

associations, unions, and professional organizations were registered within 10 months of the revolution. Civil society organizations no longer need to go through the Ministry of the Interior's laborious registration procedures, but can register at the municipal level.

CONCLUSION:

This paper examines the current debate concerning the prospect of the post-revolutionary Tunisian politics. I more specifically emphasize, on the one hand the pessimistic view that looks at Tunisia through the lens of the Iranian revolution of 1979; and on the other hand the optimistic view that sees in Tunisia a potential Turkey that will successfully combine Islamist ideology and democracy. I argue that this debate is a recent version of the controversy that opposed essentialists and contingencists over the compatibility between Islam and democracy. In fact, since many Muslim majority countries have adopted democratic system of governance, the debate over the compatibility has become obsolete. Now, the new version of the debate is what kind of democracy do Muslim countries adopt. The model of comparison became Iran exemplifying a failure of democracy versus Turkey representing a successful democracy. In this paper I demonstrated that it is unlikely that Tunisia follows the Iranian model of theocratic democracy. Although the prospective Tunisian post-revolutionary institutions resemble those of Turkey, the adoption of a benign secularism and its high potential of civic engagement anticipate a higher level of participation and contestation therefore a hire vitality of democracy.