Community Stabilization Program

Final Report

January 2010

USAID FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

IRD International Relief & Development

Community Stabilization Program

Final Report

January 2010

Cooperative Agreement Number: CA-267-A-00-06-00503-00

Contributors: **Della McMillan, PhD, Independent Consultant**
Mamadou Sidibe, PhD, M&E Director, CSP (IRD)
Jessica Cho, IRD HQ Iraq Office
Alice Willard, PhD, IRD HQ Senior M&E Officer

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by International Relief & Development. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

On the cover: Participants in a vocational training course in North Babil.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ix
Map A. CSP Operations by City x
Executive Summary xi
List of Acronyms xvii
1.0. Project Overview 1
1.1. Project Goals and Objectives 1
1.2. Socio-Political Context 3
1.3. Beneficiary Selection 5
1.4. Components 10
1.5. Personnel and Administrative Structure 11
1.6. Budget 16
2.0. Methods 17
2.1. CSP M&E and Reporting System 17
2.2. Final Report 18
3.0. Project Components IR 7.1: Unemployment Rate Decreased 21
3.1. Community Infrastructure and Essential Services 21
3.2. Vocational Skills and Apprenticeships 25
3.3. Business Development Program 29
3.4. Project Impact on Employment 39
4.0. Project Component IR 7.2: Conflict Mitigated through Increased Community Activities 43
4.1. Strategy and Activities 43
4.2. Results 44
4.3. Wider Impact 46
4.4. Issues that Emerged and Resulting Lessons Learned 47
5.0. Quantitative Evidence of Impact 49
5.1. Indicator 7.1: Perception of Citizens on the Effectiveness of Local Government to Provide Services 49
5.2. Indicator 7.1.1: Unemployment Rate Decreased 51
5.3. Indicator 7.2: Number of Insurgent Incidents Reduced 52
5.4. Issues that Emerged and Resulting Lessons Learned 53
6.0. Major Cross-Cutting Lessons Learned 59
6.1. COIN Implementation Strategies 60
6.2. Management and Staffing 60
6.3. Monitoring and Evaluation 62
6.4. CSP Lesson Learned Matrix: What Worked, What Didn't Work as Well, and Lessons Learned 63
6.5 Lessons Learned for Future COIN Programs 71

Annexes

Annex 1: Consolidated Indicator Performance Tracking Table (IPTT) 79
Annex 2: Sample Briefing Paper from CSP Communications.....81
Annex 3: Workshop Participants and Persons Interviewed 83
Annex 4: References Cited and Condensed Project Bibliography 87
Annex 5: Best Practices for Partnership with the PRT and Military.....91

List of Tables, Figures, and Boxes by Chapter

Figure A: CSP Operations by City ..... *x*

1.0. Project Overview

Table 1.1 CSP Project Results Framework, Project Components, and Higher Level Indicators to Support USAID/Iraq Strategy SO7 2

Table 1.2 Principle Administrative Units and Governing Bodies in Iraq 5

Table 1.3 Iraq Government and CSP Project Milestones 2003-2009 6

Box 1.1 Case Study: Process of Identifying Beneficiaries and Key Stakeholders in CSP Kirkuk 8

Table A Ethnic Composition and Level of Insecurity in Kirkuk Governorate at the Start of the Project 8

Table B Case Study: Kirkuk Process of Identifying Beneficiaries and Key Stakeholders FY07-FY09 9

Box 1.2 Case Study: Evolution of Project Activities and Targeting in Relation to Changes in Security 12

Table C Case Study Basra: Ethnic Composition and Level in Insecurity per District 12

Figure 1.1 CSP Administrative Structure 12

Table D Case Study Basra: Evolution of Project Activities and Targeting in Relation to Changes in Security 13

Table 1.4 Average Expatriate Posting in Months During CSP 14

Table 1.5 CSP Project Costs by Component (as of September 2009) ... 15

Table 1.6 Evolution of CSP Funding 16

2.0. Methods

Table 2.1 City Lessons Learned Workshops 19

3.0. Project Component IR 7.1: Unemployment Rate Decreased

Table 3.1 Number of CIES Projects by Sector 22

Figure 3.1 Number of Person Months of Employment Generated for Short-Term Employment 23

Figure 3.2 Variation Between Cities in the Cost of Person Months Generated for Short-Term Employment 24

Figure 3.3 Variation between Cities in the Types of CIES Projects Executed 24

Figure 3.4 VoTech Graduates Produced by Quarter 26

Table 3.2 Total Graduates from CSP Sponsored Vocational Training Programs 27

Figure 3.5 Variation Between Cities in the Cost per Project of Implementing VoTech Projects 28

Table 3.3 Average Cost per Trainee by City 29

Figure 3.6 Number of Businesses Receiving BDP Grants Under CSP 32

Figure 3.7 City Shares of CSP Grants Year 1-Year 3 32

Figure 3.8 Shares of CSP Grants by Type of Grant Year 1-Year 3 33

Figure 3.9 City Shares of CSP Grants by Sector Year 1-Year 3 34

Figure 3.10 City Shares of CSP Grants by Gender Year 1-Year 3 34

Figure 3.11 City Shares of CSP Grants Obtained by New and Expanding Businesses Year 1-Year 3 34

Figure 3.12 Percentage of Total Long-Term Jobs by Year Attributed to Different Cities IRD/CSP Program 35
Figure 3.13 Average Number of Long-Term Jobs Created by Size of BDP Grant, Years 1-3 36
Figure 3.14 Average Number of Long-Term Jobs by Economic Sector .. 36
Figure 3.15 Unit Cost of Generating Long-Term Jobs by Size of Grant. 37
Figure 3.16 Unit Cost of Generating Long-Term Employment by Economic Sector 37
Figure 3.17 Structure and Shares of Long-Term Employment by CSP Component Year 1-Year 3 39
Figure 3.18 Number of Long-Term Jobs Indirectly Generated Across all CSP Cities 40
Figure 3.19 Average Cost of Employment Generation 40

4.0. Project Component IR 7.2: Conflict Mitigated through Increased Community Activities)

Figure 4.1 Number of Participants in CSP Youth Engagement activities Year 1-Year 3 44
Box 4.1 CSP Sponsors Tameem Soccer Tournament 45
Figure 4.2 CSP Funding for Youth Activities by Category Year 1-Year 3. 46
Box 4.2 Adult Perception on Changes in the Level of Violence in their Community during the CSP Youth Engagement Program 47
Table 4.1 Issues that Emerged and Resulting Lessons Learned from the CSP Youth Engagement Activities 48

5.0. Quantitative Evidence of Impact

Figure 5.1 Targets vs. Achievement: Indicator 7.1 Perception of Citizens of the Effectiveness of Local Governments to Provide Services... 50
Figure 5.2 Indicator 7.2 Number of Insurgent Incidents Reduced..... 51
Table 5.1 Regression Results: Indicator 7.2 Number of Insurgent Incidents Reduced CSP (Year 1-Year 3) 52
Figure 5.3 Cumulative CSP Cost and the Number of Daily Insurgent Attacks in Iraq 53
Box 5.1 IBTCI Statements Concerning the Difficulties They Experienced with Measuring CSP's Impacts with the Official Impact Indicators 54
Table 5.2 SMART Assessment of CSP Indicators 56

6.0. Major Cross-Cutting Lessons Learned

Table 6.4 Lessons Learned: What Worked, What Didn't Work as Well, and Lessons Learned 63

Acknowledgements

The Community Stabilization Project (CSP) owes a tremendous debt to a number of courageous individuals without whom it would never have been conceived or implemented.

Awni Quandour's courage was critical in developing the public works model, hiring the initial staff, and adapting the Iraq Community Action Program model to a wider scale-up.

The national staff members are the real heroes, risking so much to themselves and to their families under difficult and dangerous conditions, in all of the cities where CSP operated. Their voices continue to inform both the results, and the lessons learned, of CSP.

Travis Gartner's courage was critical in opening up new cities that were still active war zones. Special recognition is due for the leadership and sacrifice of Robert Jacobi, David Elkins, and Karla Bonner. Michele Lemmon worked on the project for many years and has been a critical institutional resource for this report.

Accurate information on development is difficult under ordinary conditions: it is utterly daunting in a war. IRD's ability to document CSP's achievements through a series of weekly reports and success story publications—in the face of tremendous constraints on doing so—is due to the commitment of one woman, Theresa Shope.

Finally, none of this would have been possible without the leadership of Dr. Arthur Keys, President and Founder of IRD, who provided the guidance to design and adapt the CSP project model to major shifts in Iraq's sociopolitical context and USAID funding.

CSP Operations by City



Executive Summary

This report summarizes the results, context, and major lessons learned from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded counter-insurgency (COIN) initiative in Iraq—the Community Stabilization Program (CSP). CSP was implemented with funding from USAID over a 41 month period between May 2006 and October 31, 2009 to support USAID/Iraq's Strategic Objective 7: *Reduced incentives for participating in conflicts in selected communities*. As a three year program designed to complement broader counter-insurgency efforts, CSP is unique and non-traditional for USAID, and, with total funding of $648 million, it is the largest USAID-funded cooperative agreement ever to date.

Although CSP shared many elements of earlier post-conflict stabilization efforts in Iraq, it also focused on reducing the incentives for participation in violent conflict by employing or engaging at-risk youth, ages 17 to 35. To achieve this objective, CSP design focused on two intermediate results (IRs):

- IR 7.1 unemployment rate decreased
- IR 7.2 conflict mitigated through increased community activities.

Each of these IRs the project had four major project components:

- **CIES (Community Infrastructure and Essential Services):** short-term employment generation through community based public works projects;
- **EG (Employment Generation):** Longer-term employment generation through vocational training and apprenticeships;
- **BDP (Business Development Program):** Longer-term job creation through business development programs and training; and
- **Y (Youth):** Short-term engagement of at-risk youth in social, educational, and sports activities.

In contrast to traditional development or COIN initiatives that focused on a single area, CSP was a fluid program that scaled up and down in response to evolving priorities in the most insecure areas of strategic cities like Mosul, Kirkuk, and Basra—many of them in hotly contested oil-producing areas or strategic border areas like Al Anbar. Based on its initial six-month success in generating employment and rebuilding social and economic services in high conflict areas of Baghdad in 2007, CSP expanded through a series of modifications to include 15 city programs in eight of Iraq's 18 provinces (programs lasted from one to three years, see Map 1). Although IRD used the same four pronged components (CIES, EG, BDP, and Y) design in each of the 15 cities, the level of funding, length of engagement, and relative importance (as a percentage of total funding) of the different project components varied widely between cities based on local need, maturity of the economic context, and the security environment.

CSP used a total of 11 indicators to measure performance. Three of these were outcome indicators, using information generated either from secondary sources or from survey information collected by a consulting firm. All of the remaining

information is directly from the M&E staff and database set up to track and monitor performance.

Results: IR 7.1. Unemployment Rate Decreased

Unemployment is a major economic stress factor in Iraq. High unemployment contributes to Iraqi citizens' perception that the Government of Iraq (GOI) is failing to establish the basic preconditions for a functional national economy to exist. CSP's primary focus group of 17 to 35-year-old male youth makes up the highest percentage of the unemployed, marginalized, and disaffected. The male unemployed are also the most vulnerable to joining insurgent groups.

For this reason CSP's major focus—more than 90 percent of its city-specific program funding—was focused on creating short-term and longer-term employment through its three largest components: CIES, Employment Generation (Vocational Education and Apprenticeships), and Business Development Program (BDP).

Long-Term Employment. A total of 57,109 long-term jobs were created over three years, 134 percent of the target.

The BDP grants program produced approximately three-fourths of the long-term jobs. Job placement services and general apprenticeships accounted for the remaining percentage.

Short-Term Employment. A total of 525,121 confirmed person months of short-term employment (120 percent of the target) was created by the project, most of it from CIES initiatives:

74 percent (388,627) of the CIES short-term jobs originate from the CIES essential service projects (rubble and garbage removal and agricultural canal clean up).

26 percent (136,494) of the total came from the CIES infrastructure rehabilitation and construction.

The two types of employment have completely different purposes, however:

Short-term employment is a very effective way of supporting a COIN strategy since it targets the types of unskilled or semi-skilled labor that otherwise would have been targets of choice for insurgency. It also injects much needed capital back into war-torn communities and contributes to recreating a sense of community.

Long-term employment primarily supports the business community and the more skilled type of labor who have been unemployed because of the war situation. This more sustainable type of employment is suitable to medium- and long-term objectives to support a COIN strategy.

Business development grants ranged from micro to small to medium grants, with the smallest grants starting at $150 to the largest of the medium grants going to $100,000. Each of the grants required a community contribution, either in cash, kind, or labor. Over 10,000 grants were awarded, with the vast majority (97

percent) in the micro and small categories that went to family-owned very small businesses. Two main differences over time were noteworthy: 1) the increase in grants awarded to women, which increased to 18 percent during year three, and 2) the shift in sectors from trade to agriculture as the communities stabilized. Once grants were awarded, the businesses tended to remain in operation: 89 percent of businesses were still functioning six months after their start-up.

Complementarity Between Short-Term and Long-Term Employment Generation. Capturing the progression and linkages between the short- and longer-term initiatives is important, so that the shift from service provision to economic development parallels increased stabilization. Large-scale programs like markets and irrigation rehabilitation programs work to fund overlapping integrated initiatives such as:

- Using CIES-funded public works projects to rehabilitate basic infrastructure (like markets and agricultural projects); followed by
- BDP grants to help the pre-existing businesses in the revitalized areas rebuild economically;
- Vocational Training (through the EG program) to help young people acquire the technical and business skills they need to get higher paying permanent employment being created by the CIES and BDP grants; and
- Job Placement (through the EG program) services to link the re-emerging businesses and contractors executing CIES projects hire both unskilled and skilled labor.

IR 7.2: Conflict Mitigated through Community Activities

To address this issue, CSP youth collaborated with local government, community groups, and leaders on a wide array of sports, cultural, and informal educational activities. Although the youth programs represented only 10 percent of CSP's total funding for the city programs (Table 1.3), the activities were high profile with a large number of direct and indirect beneficiaries.

By the end of the project, CSP's Youth activities had engaged 351,668 participants through programs that were 143 percent of the final target for the IPTT indicator used to track this activity.[1] The lower targets in the third year (Figure 4.1) are based on USAID's recommendation that the project place greater emphasis on conflict mitigation training through seminars and peace building training events). By this time, the level of local support for these programs—especially those related to sports—was such that the demand continued even when the project focus changed. Team sports and competitions were the principal focus (41 percent), followed by life skills (31 percent), and arts (16 percent).

Children are able to learn in safe classrooms that have been rebuilt through CSP.

1 The data for this indicator is based on attendance rosters and participant lists from CSP-sponsored youth activities that are part of the project documentation. This information was collected by government staff and monitored by CSP youth and M&E staff.

Quantitative Evidence of Impact

CSP measured unemployment rates, insurgency incidents, and citizens' perceptions of local governments' capacity to provide services in the project's target areas.

Indicator 7.1: Perception of citizens of the effectiveness of local government to provide services. This SO outcome indicator was estimated through a survey measuring Iraqi citizens' level of satisfaction with various local municipal services in each of the regions where CSP projects were implemented. CSP was expected to raise the overall level of satisfaction of the Iraqi citizen from 28.0 to 36.2 percent [2] by the end of Year 3. The actual increase, based on the consolidated results of the Lincoln Group surveys was 26.0 percent, again a net decline.

This level of performance is partially explained by three major constraints:

- First, the overall index used to measure satisfaction is a composite index. It aggregates nine service areas: health, education, security, water availability, safe drinking water, trash collection, debris removal, electricity, and sewage/drainage into one indicator. The majority of these service areas, except trash collection and debris removal, were not supported directly by CSP. Local governments did not consistently provide these services to their citizens. As a result, Iraqis' satisfaction levels did not reach the anticipated predetermined milestone.
- Second, starting from mid Year 2, CSP transferred all trash collection and debris removal projects to the Iraqi government, which negatively affected the quality of these services. This was the year for the greatest decline in citizen satisfaction.
- Third, CSP close out plans significantly reduced peoples' expectations regarding future improvements in the level of local municipal services delivered to them. This further worsened their well-being and negatively influenced their overall level of satisfaction, and the final survey timing picked up on the increase in dissatisfaction in key cities. However, the pace of change in satisfaction from Year 2 to Year 3 (and its improvement) matched the targeted pace, but could not catch up to the initial targets for Year 3.

Indicator 7.1.1: Unemployment rate decreased. The project used annual survey data collected by the GOI and published by the World Bank and UNDP. Baseline levels were estimated by using average unemployment rates for the years covering 2004 to 2006 in the 15 implementing cities. In the Cooperative Agreement, CSP was expected to reduce the level of unemployment by 1.25 percent in three years of program implementation. Instead the rate of unemployment increased from 15.94 percent to 17.7 percent: rather than a decrease of 1.25 percent, there was an overall increase of 1.6 percent in the target cities. There are no data to support a discussion on the contribution of CSP-generated jobs to slow the rate of unemployment. Creating new jobs and businesses alone cannot reduce unemployment

2 This represents a 60 percent increase over the baseline for the increments measured

if older businesses close and when additional job seekers enter the relatively safer urban areas. In addition, the figures represent averages across 15 cities: Baghdad's size works against this type of metric.

Indicator 7.2: Number of insurgent incidents reduced. This indicator was defined as the number of reported security incidents as it related to insurgent activities in CSP targeted cities. It was expressed through changes in the number of reported incidents with respect to the baseline level, using the information from the U.S. Department of Defense daily insurgent attack data published by the Brookings Institution as the source. It was anticipated that CSP would reduce the level of daily attacks from 10.6 to 8.8 (a net reduction of 25 percent after three years). The consolidated reduction rate at the end of the project was calculated at 9.0. While this achievement is outstanding, it clearly can only be associated, not attributed, to CSP alone. The success obtained is a combined effort especially from the military surge, the "Sunni Awakening" effect (tribal leaders), and a host of other contributing factors. It is fair, however, to claim that CSP—by virtue of the size of its investment—did contribute to the achievement of this result.

Key Lessons Learned

CSP Operations	Future COIN Programs
Delivery of aid in a non-traditional USAID operating environment; CIES projects were an effective model for supporting COIN objectives generating short-term employment, catalyzing indirect long-term government employment, and improving local citizens' perceptions about the effectiveness of local government.	Future CIES initiatives should anticipate the need to build the capacity of local partners to execute and maintain CIES supported infrastructure and to avoid transitioning these projects to them until a certain demonstrated level of capacity is in place.
The vocational training and apprenticeship program was a popular component of the program because it provided sustained employment and technical training to vulnerable youth in existing and emerging technical fields.	Future COIN programs should: 1) Prioritize their investment in vocational training to locations with established, functioning programs and areas where the project plans to be active for at least two years. 2) Strengthen their development of "on the job" training programs as well as government and private sector job placement services that link trained unemployed persons with new and existing employers and BDP grants. 3) Link CSP directly with the international community development programs in country to avoid gaps and decrease unemployment.

CSP Operations	Future COIN Programs
The BDP grants (as a general category) were the most effective mechanism for generating quick start longer employment and were a highly effective tool for achieving short term COIN objectives of poverty alleviation for the low income households that were among the most vulnerable for joining insurgent groups.	1) Future COIN programs should include BDP in their strategy for "quick start" longer-term employment and to build their capacity to identify and support development of successful medium scale grants especially in areas with the greatest potential for facilitating indirect job creation, (eg. agriculture and small-scale manufacturing). 2) Future COIN initiatives should consider female heads of household as an important target audience in their design and execution.
The most successful and highly visible CSP city programs were those in which different components were integrated to achieve a focused impact on a particular area like a market or agricultural rehabilitation.	Tight integration of, and synergies between, different project components should be the goal of a COIN initiative. This is not always possible, however, in a war zone where the security situation can change daily.
Strong implementation partners can serve as an extension of USAID competence; Strong effective international staff members were critical to CSP's coordination with the U.S. military, USAID and local government partners. The most effective PODs—i.e. that were most effective in enhancing program impact, mitigating liability, and strengthening program and fiscal/technical compliance in a COIN environment—were those who had strong management backgrounds as well as an employment background that equipped them for working in a post-conflict environment. A working knowledge of the local language (in this case, either Arabic or Kurdish) in either the POO or POD was also an asset.	1) Develop a clear profile for the technical, management, and cultural skills that PODS and POOs need to successfully execute and monitor a COIN program. 2) Anticipate the need for a lengthy, well-organized "book" and "on site" training of new staff on programmatic, M&E, and compliance issues before field placement. 3) Anticipate the need to train administrators in psycho-social support to staff to maintain morale and reduce turnover.
A strong national staff will allow an implementing partner with strong support from USAID to deliver services to conflict areas prior to establishment of a permissible environment. Given the security challenges of visiting field sites, local staff members are the representatives of a COIN initiative to the public. CSP was able to attract very qualified Iraqi citizens to work with the program and provide highly skilled support.	Anticipate the need for basic and continuous training of staff and appropriate mechanisms for providing this training through on-site technical assistance, exchange visits, and formal training programs that can be adjusted to the ebb and flow of insecurity within a region.

Acronyms

AOTR	Agreement Officer's Technical Representative
BDP	Business Development Program
CATS	(United States Military) Civil Affairs Teams
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CIES	Community Infrastructure and Essential Services
CoAg	Cooperative Agreement
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COP	Chief of Party
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CSP	Community Stabilization Program
CSR	Citizen Satisfaction Review
CTO	Cognizant Technical Officer
DAC	District Advisory Council
DCOP	Deputy Chief of Party
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
EG(Y)	Employment Generation (Youth)
E-PRT	Embedded-Provincial Reconstruction Team
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FSO	Focused Stabilization Office
GEC	Grant Endorsement Council
GOI	Government of Iraq
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
IBTCI	International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc.
ICAP	Iraq Community Action Program
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IPTT	Indicator Performance Tracking Table
IR	Intermediate Result
IRD	International Relief and Development
ITG	Iraq Transitional Government
LOA	Life of Activity
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOC	Ministry of Culture
MOEN	Ministry of Environment

MOH	Ministry of Health
MOLSA	Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
MOYS	Ministry of Youth and Sports
NAC	Neighborhood Advisory Council
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PMP	Performance Management Plan
POD	Program Operations Director
POM	Program Operations Manager
POO	Program Operations Officer
PPE	Personal Protection Equipment
PPO	Personal Protection Officer
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
QA/QC	Quality Assurance/Quality Control
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
RFA	Request for Application
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
SAF	Small Arms Fire
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound
SO	Strategic Objective
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats
TAL	Transitional Administrative Law
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
VBIED	Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device
VoTech	Vocational Training
ZAB	Zoned Area Baghdad

1.0. Project Overview

1.1. Project Goals and Objectives

The genesis of the Community Stabilization Project (CSP) in May 2006 was the need to equip communities emerging from the military theater of the Iraq war to succeed in peace and make progress toward normal and productive lives. CSP was conceived as a COIN (counter insurgency) initiative, not as a community development program. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) described the program as "a non-lethal counterinsurgency program aimed at reducing incentives for participation in violent conflict by employing or engaging at risk youth, ages 17 to 35."[1] In short, CSP was designed to address the root causes of the insurgency by a four-pronged strategy that focused on:

- Assisting the Government of Iraq (GOI) at all levels in fulfilling its duties, thereby improving citizens' perceptions of GOI efficacy and legitimacy;
- Mitigating major economic factors contributing to the insurgency;
- Stimulating preconditions for economic stability; and
- Facilitating constructive dialogue and peaceful interactions through civic education and community-oriented activities.

To implement this strategy, CSP developed four operational components. Given the critical link between unemployment, local citizens' perception of their government, and the insurgency, the first three components focused on the creation of short-term (less than three months) and longer-term (greater than three months) employment (Table 1.1).

- **Community Infrastructure and Essential Services (CIES)** focused on large-scale public works projects that created jobs and much needed basic infrastructure reconstruction, rehabilitation, and clean-up services.
- **Employment Generation (EG)** focused on the rehabilitation of vocational training centers and restarting and/or expanding the training, apprenticeship, and job placement services offered through these centers.
- **Business Development Program (BDP)** focused on the creation of longer-term employment by providing the planning, equipment, finance, and management skills that individuals needed to create or expand small businesses.
- **Youth (Y)**, the fourth component, focused on helping to rebuild relationships between youth coming from different ethnic backgrounds and opposite sides of the political conflict in specific cities. This included facilitating sports teams and events, cultural activities, and short-term training activities. Many of these activities had been suspended during



This egg farmer was able to expand his business with a grant through CSP.

1 IBTCI. 2009. Evaluation of USAID's Community Stabilization Program (CSP) in Iraq. Vienna, VA.: IBTCI for USAID/Iraq. Pg. ix.

the war. Starting them up again created a safe avenue for people to interact and return to normalcy. Staff members managing these activities were trained in conflict management skills and civic education themes.

These four components are designed to achieve two strategic intermediate results (IRs) (IR 7.1 and IR 7.2) in support of Strategic Objective 7 (S07) of USAID's Strategic Plan for Iraq (Table 1.1). The global progress toward the achievement of these IRs was tracked by three outcome indicators and eight output indicators.

Table 1.1. CSP Project Results Framework, and the USAID/Iraq Strategy S07

Indicators Used to Track CSP Outcomes	IPTT SOs and IRs	Project Components
USAID Strategy S07: Reduced incentives for participating in conflicts in elected communities		
Perception of citizens of the effectiveness of local government to provide services		
Number of insurgent incidents reduced		
Unemployment rate decreased	IR7.1: Unemployment rate decreased	
	Sub-IR7.1.1: Jobs created	CIES (Community Infrastructure and Essential Services): Cleaning campaigns (including rubble removal) and school, market, and hospital rehabilitation
	Sub-IR7.1.2: Employable skills improved	EG* (Employment Generation): Vocational training, apprenticeships and job placement services
	Sub-IR7.1.3: Business created and expanded	BDP (Business Development Program): Grants, equipment, and Business Development Training (BDT)
	IR7.2: Conflict mitigated through increased community activities	Y* (Youth): Activities (sports, arts, cultural, informal training)

*Initially EG and Y were originally one project component. They were officially separated in 2007 though in some cases the components remained merged.

The CSP program was significant for the following reasons:

- As a three-year program designed to complement other types of counter insurgency programming in Iraq—most of them shorter-term Department of Defense interventions—the CSP integrated model was a novel concept within USAID. Key lessons learned for future COIN programs are elaborated in Chapter 6.
- In contrast to the more conventional COIN initiatives, which focused on direct engagement (either lethal or non-lethal) with insurgents, CSP's focus was the root causes of insurgency. CSP is also distinguished from many traditional COIN programs by the fact that a high percentage of the achievements under CSP—including many of the jobs created, infrastructure rehabilitated, and private sector businesses created—appear to be sustainable within the post-conflict social and economic context of Iraq.
- The project was well-funded (US$648 million over three years) and national in scope, covering 15 city[2] programs in eight of Iraq's 18 governorates (Figure A). To date, CSP is the largest cooperative agreement ever awarded by USAID in the world.
- There is also ample qualitative and quantitative evidence that the project did — with a few notable exceptions (Mosul) — achieve its principal aim of reducing the "incentives for participation in violent conflicts" in the targeted communities. This is reflected by the project achieving 75 percent or greater for all the targets of 10 of its 11 official indicators (see Chapter 5 for a longer discussion of targeting, as well as the IPTT, Annex 1.A).

1.2. Socio-Political Context

CSP's achievements are all the more remarkable in that they occurred against the background of active sectarian conflict, militia and insurgent hostilities, joint multi-national military initiatives, suspicion, and physical insecurity, which discouraged other actors—including the Government of Iraq (GOI) and many international NGOs and bilateral and multilateral donors—from intervening. **In May 2006 when CSP started, the United States had not yet increased its troop levels in Iraq. Insurgent and militia activity was increasing and many areas of program implementation were at extremely high risk levels. Robust security planning was paramount in the ever-changing environment.**

During 2006, a variety of incidents occurred in Karrada, where the first CSP office was located. These incidents included the threat of kidnapping, death threats to national staff, improvised explosive devices (IED) /vehicle born IEDs, indirect fire (IDF), and small arms fire (SAF)[3]. Due to these security threats, in September of 2006, it was mandated that international staff wear Personal Protec-

2 Although USAID, IRD, and the GOI referred to the 15 local projects as "city programs," most of them intervene over a much wider area in specific governorates.

3 *Summary of Current Security Situation in Baghdad*, James Lampley, CSP Security Director - 2006

Training students at a Vocational Training Center.

tive Equipment (PPE) while making any movement either by foot or road, and that they be transported in hard-shell armored vehicles.[4]

In February 2007 the "surge" of U.S. troops began, which eventually increased troop levels by 30,000 in Iraq, with initial emphasis on Baghdad and Al Anbar to address the insurgent and sectarian violence. CSP's progressive roll-out to the other cities after November 2007 was designed to help stabilize the most severely affected communities in the wake of the surge, yet also multiplied the project's risk (Table 1.3).

Local staff and their families were under constant threat of violence. Threat of kidnapping made it difficult and dangerous for national staff to travel back and forth to work from their homes. Many of them were forced to engage in an elaborate "dance" that included crisscrossing bus routes and hiding work identification tags, to deflect neighbors' suspicions about their employment.

In most cases, the international staff charged with setting up the city programs spent their first two months in Baghdad working remotely through their Iraqi staff to set up programs in "hot" areas like Hilla, Basra, and Al-Qaim. On July 23, 2007 the U.S. Department of State issued the following:

> "All vehicular travel in Iraq is extremely dangerous. There have been numerous attacks on civilian vehicles, as well as military convoys. Attacks occur throughout the day, but travel at night is exceptionally dangerous. Travel in or through Ramadi and Fallujah; in and between al-Hillah, al-Basrah, Kirkuk, Baqubah (Diyala Province), and Baghdad; between the International Zone and Baghdad International Airport; and from Baghdad to Mosul is particularly dangerous."[5]

Even once the international staff was cleared to live in the city program area, they had to move with a project-funded security detail. These security details were typically comprised of at least two international and eight national guards. **These security teams protected and moved international staff in low-profile armed convoys**.

In some cities all expatriate staff lived and worked on the coalition Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and "commuted" to the project offices in the "red" zone (i.e. outside a military base). Even this commute was still a security risk that required a project-funded Personal Protection Officer (PPO) be assigned to protect and live with them at all times. The PPOs often accompanied the staff member on any mission conducted off of the FOB in addition as part of the larger security detail.

In 2008, as CSP continued to expand, the security environment, while seeing improvement from previous months, was still extremely volatile in many locations. The threats of newer IEDs, such as under vehicle IEDs, posed new challenges to the continuing threats of VBIEDs, IDF, SAF, and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). At the Basra Air Station location, as many as six IDF attacks

4 *Hard Vehicle Travel between Residences and Offices*. James Lampley, CSP Security Director– September 9, 2006

5 Travel Warning. U.S. Department of State. July 23, 2007

occurred in a one week reporting period in January[6]. By mid to late 2008, there were continuing hotspots across Iraq, such as Mosul, Baquba, and Basra.

During 2009, as CSP began to conclude activities in certain cities, the threats continued, but shifted as new threats began to emerge with the hand-over of power to the Iraqi government and military. Check-points into the former International Zone (renamed the Zone Area Baghdad, ZAB) became more dangerous as Iraqi soldiers demanded all passengers in vehicles disembark while they searched the vehicles. This would leave staff vulnerable and exposed in an insecure location.

In the final months of CSP operations, there tended to be a more targeted attack approach, more spectacular events focusing on Iraq government entities and direct targeting of Iraqi government officials and locales. For example, the following was included in a Sabre Security IRD Daily SitRep on October 25, 2009. "The casualties of the central Baghdad blasts rose to 62 deaths and 180 injuries. Earlier, two car bombs driven by two suicide bombers exploded in al-Salihiya area, the first exploded near Baghdad Governorate while the second exploded near the Justice Ministry in central Baghdad on Sunday morning."[7]

1.3. Beneficiary Selection

1.3.1. Cities and Geographical Area of Intervention within Cities. In contrast to traditional development or COIN initiatives that focused on a single area, CSP was a responsive program that was scaled up and down in the most insecure areas of strategic cities such as Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Basrah—many of them in hotly contested oil-producing areas or strategic cities in Al Anbar like Ramadi and Fallujah (focus of Al-Quaeda and insurgent activity). Based on the initial six-month success in generating employment and rebuilding social and economic services in high conflict areas of Baghdad in 2007, CSP was gradually expanded through modifications to the cooperative agreement to include 15 city programs. The final choice of cities, funding levels, and length of engagement (from 1-3 years) (Map A) was made by USAID based on joint Government of Iraq (GOI), United States Department of Defense (DOD), and USAID priorities.

Table 1.2. Principal Administrative Units and Governing Bodies in Iraq

Administrative Units	Governing Body
Governorate/Province	Governorate/Provincial Council
Districts	District Advisory Council (DAC)
Neighborhood	Neighborhood Advisory Councils (NAC)

Iraq is divided into 18 administrative provinces or governorates; each governorate is divided into administrative districts (Table 1.2). Each district has a different ethnic/religious mix, which influences the level of insecurity (Table A, Box 1.1; Table C, Box 1.2).

6 Sabre International IRD Weekly SitRep. 7 -13 Jan. 2008
7 Sabre Security IRD Daily SitRep. October 25, 2009

Table 1.3. Iraq Government and CSP Project Milestones, 2003-2009

Period	National and Military Milestones	Project Milestones	Average Daily Insurgent Attacks
Mar 2003	Formal start of major combat operations in Iraq known as Operation Iraqi Freedom		-
May 2003	Formal end of combat operations in Iraq		-
Oct 2003	Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) stands up to UN Security Council Resolution 1511		-
Dec 2003	Saddam Hussein captured by U.S. forces in Tikrit		-
Apr 2004	Insurgency escalates by radical Shi'a leader Moqtada Sadr and his "Mahdi Army" with fighting in Najaf, Falluja, and Sadr City		-
Jun 2004	CPA dissolved and Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) takes power with Iyad Allawi as Prime Minister (PM) and operates under the legal framework of Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)		-
Aug 2004	Coalition and Iraqi forces begin attack on Najaf, where extremist Shi'a leader Moqtada Sadr and his Mehdi army have fortified themselves		-
Nov 2004	- U.S. Presidential Election (George W. Bush re-elected) - Coalition and Iraqi forces begin attach against insurgency in Samarra - Coalition and Iraqi forces begin attack against insurgency in Sadr City		-
Nov 2004	Coalition and Iraqi forces begin attack against insurgency in Fallujah		-
May 2005	IIG dissolved and replaced with Iraq Transitional Government (ITG) with Ibrahim al-Jaffari as PM		7.49
Jan 2006	First National Parliamentary Elections held (Nouri al-Maliki wins election as PM)		9.96
May 2006	ITG dissolved and PM Nouri al-Maliki takes office as first PM of the permanent Government of Iraq (GOI)	CSP Roll-Out of Baghdad	11
Nov 2006	Seasonal spike in violence during Ramadan. Fifty-four percent of all attacks occurred in only two of Iraq's 18 provinces (Baghdad and Anbar)[1]	Roll-Out of Falluja, Ramadi, Al Qaim, Mosul, Kirkuk, Basra	17.30
Jan 2007	U.S. "Surge" Operations begin in Baghdad and Al Anbar to help Iraqi Government clear and secure neighborhoods		18.25
Apr 2007	The U.S. military said violence had dropped in Baghdad under the new crackdown, with a 26 percent decline in "murders and executions" between February and March, and a 60 percent fall between the last week of March and the first week of April[2]		-
May 2007	- Contractor deaths soar in Iraq to highest levels[3] - Five British Personnel Kidnapped at Ministry of Finance[4]		-
Jun 2007	Sectarian violence increased with further influence from Iran to the Mahdi army	- Basra Operations Suspended - Rollout Baquba	19.59

Period	National and Military Milestones	Project Milestones	Average Daily Insurgent Attacks
Oct 2007	- UK Iraq troops to be cut to 2,500[5] - On-going threat to local employees in Basra working for western companies and orgs, impacting some organizations and companies ability to do business[6]	- Basra operations resumed - Roll out of Habbaniyah, Haditha, Hit	19.55
Jan 2008	- Operation Phantom Phoenix initiated by multi-national forces to neutralize remaining Al-Quaeda nationwide[7]. - Awakening Council taking on more security response in local communities.	Roll out of Babil	-
Feb 2008	- The Iraqi parliament passed legislation that cleared the way for provincial elections, approved the 2008 budget, and granted a limited amnesty that will affect thousands of detainees[8] - Increase in female suicide bombers	Roll out of Tikrit, Samarra, Beiji	6.68
Apr 2008	Charge of the Knights begins in Basra	Project context for Basra improves	6.71
Jun 2008	- Threat increases of female suicide bombers[9] - Continuing dialogue between U.S. and Iraqi government on time table for handover of power	Internal CSP "Mid-term" Assessment as part of 2008 Activity Plan	6.74
Jul 2008	The U.S. troop "surge" in Iraq ends leaving just under 147,000 American soldiers in Iraq.[10]		-
Nov 2008	U.S. Presidential Elections		-
Jan 2009	- President Barak Obama takes office - Iraq provincial elections held	Close-out Al-Qaim, Habbaniya, Haditha, Hit	1.48
Mar 31, 2009	- 12,000 U.S. troops to leave Iraq - British handover Basra to U.S. military	Close-out of Fallujah, Ramadi, Baghdad proper, Kirkuk, Babil	-
Jun 30, 2009	Turnover of all security to Iraqi forces	Close-out of Baghdad Qadas, Tikrit, Samarra, Beiji	-
Jul 24, 2009		Early termination notice was issued for CSP by USAID/ Baghdad	-
Jul 31, 2009	Three explosions at mosques—two in Baghdad, one in Diyala, killing 24, injuring 40[11]	- Close-out of Basra - CSP HQ relocates to Karrada compound	-
Aug 19, 2009	Major truck bomb explosion at Ministry of Foreign Affairs Building		-
Sep 30, 2009		Closeout of Mosul and Baquba	-
Oct 25, 2009	Twin car bombs target the Justice Ministry and the Baghdad provincial government building, killing at least 155 people and wounding more than 500 in central Baghdad		
Oct 31, 2009		Closeout of CSP HQ office in Karrada	-

Source: T. Shope (CSP Information/Reporting), Tina and Terry Wesbrock (IRD Security) and M. Sidibe (CSP M&E). *Based on data analyzed by the Brookings Institute. (-) Indicates where data was not available. References on page 77.

Box 1.1 Case Study: Process of Identifying Beneficiaries and Key Stakeholders in CSP Kirkuk

In the original project negotiations for Kirkuk, the PRT had identified five hot spots south of Kirkuk city in the southern districts of Al-Hawiga and Daquq for CSP prioritization. By March 2007, the team decided that this would be a serious mistake:

- It would exacerbate the existing ethnic conflicts and suspicions between the neighborhoods, which tended to be ethnically divided (Table A).
- It would create suspicions that the project was politically motivated (by alliances with one or more ethnic groups).
- The resulting conflicts might create obstacles (including sabotage) of project activities, especially construction.

Table A. Ethnic Composition and Level of Insecurity in the Kirkuk Governorate at the Start of the Project

Districts of Kirkuk	Ethnic Composition	Level of Insecurity
Kirkuk city	Mixed	* * * * /* (mixed)
Daquq	Arab#, Turkman, Kurd	* * * * /* (mixed)
Dibis	Arab, Kurd	* *
Hawija	Arab, Kurd	* * * * *

Note: Level of insecurity: *=low; ***medium; *****high
#Arab: Sunni, Shia, Christian

For this reason, the Kirkuk/CSP project established early on (Table B):

- A deliberate policy of intervening in all neighborhoods of the governorate, and
- Developing a system of mapping to ensure that the activities of each project component (CIES, BDP, EG, and Y) were equally distributed by geographical zone and ethnic group.

The senior project management (POD and POO) met weekly with staff to monitor global implementation of their activities as well as the geographical and ethnic distribution of these activities.

Some cities, like Kirkuk, made it an express policy to divide their work (and allocation) equally among all the districts irrespective of their insecurity level in order to avoid accusations of favoritism, which might actually exacerbate insecurity levels (Box 1.1). Other CSP city programs like Basra targeted specific districts that were of strategic importance to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and shifted the focus of their district level interventions over the course of the project in response to new security challenges (Box 1.2). In summary, each CSP city program's geographical targeting was a unique response to the highly dynamic security environments and extremely diverse ethnic and religious composition of specific governorates that was negotiated with a wide range of GOI and United States Government (USG) partners.

1.3.2. Beneficiary Targeting. Each city's POD (Program Operations Director) and a POO (Program Operations Officer) worked with the provincial councils

Table B. Case Study Kirkuk Process of Identifying Beneficiaries and Key Stakeholders, FY07-FY09

Project Component	FY07	FY08	FY09
CIES (Infrastructure and PWP)	PRT reviewed City council proposed projects	City council proposed projects Reviewed by PRT	Same as FY08
	Geographical zoning (4 areas) established to ensure a wide geographical dispersion of the projects		
BDP	GEC (Grant Endorsement Committee) proposed the first grantees	Based on difficulty of controlling corruption of GECs project switched to (a) direct distribution of information to potential grantees and (b) an office review of grantee proposals to ensure transparency	
	Geographical zoning (two areas, north and south) established to achieve a balance of applications from hot (unstable) and stable zones. In the absence of this geographical targeting, most applications would have been from stable areas.		
EG: Employment Generation	Through coordination with general directorates of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and Ministry of Education		
Y: Youth	With youth and sports directorate and other committees		
EG & Y	Geographical zoning (four areas) established to ensure a wide geographical dispersion of the projects		

Source: CSP Final Report Workshop, Kirkuk, June 2009.

and CSP Iraqi staff to establish component-specific strategies and lists of contacts that were necessary for successful project implementation. Although the list of partners varied between cities, CSP had a strong cross-cutting commitment to working through all levels of local governments and leaders. The strategies were then passed down from the provincial ministries to the directorate level. The directorates for a specific city would then submit proposals for consideration.

Once a general planning process was established, each component worked with a city-specific set of partners.

- CIES projects were implemented in coordination with the municipal governments in areas like park and recreational facility rehabilitation.
- The BDP team distributed grant applications through the district and neighborhood level councils. The applicants were then chosen by a committee of BDP staff. Initially, those that passed the first phase went on to get approval by the General Endorsement Committee (GEC), of which the POD and POO were a part. As an added precaution, community committees were often consulted outside the local governments to limit corruption and ensure transparency.[8] The BDP teams also made an effort to work with VoTech graduates (from the CSP supported EG activities) to help them start their own businesses.
- CSP Youth activities were coordinated through local sports clubs and the Directorate of Youth and a limited number of local NGOs in cities where the Directorate of Youth was not fully functional.
- The CSP EG staff worked with local councils, community organizations, and local leaders to recruit students for vocational training programs and apprenticeships.

1.3.3. Gender Targeting. From May 2006 to June 2008 (the date of the project mid-term retreat linked to preparation of the FY2008 work plan) the principal focus of the CSP was on male youth. Even with this focus, a growing number of city programs had quietly begun adding programs to better address the needs of women—especially young widows with dependent children. The justification for this change was twofold. First, many of these women were destitute with children—especially young boys—who would be prime recruits for insurgent activity. Second, CSP city programs found that helping widows was a quick way to reduce local suspicions about the project being a military operation and to gain wider community appreciation and once the number of female suicide bombers (many of them widows) became a strategic concern in late 2008. This gradual shift was supported by USAID.

1.4. Components

Although the same four-pronged program (CIES, EG, BDP, and Y) was used in each of the 15 cities, the level of funding, length of engagement, and relative importance (as a percentage of total funding) of the different project components varied widely between cities based on local need and the U.S. military priorities (Table 1.3).

Given the short-term dramatic impact of the larger-scale CIES projects (e.g., rubble clearance, irrigation canal clean up, and other clean up campaigns) and youth projects (e.g., supporting sports teams), most city programs started their programs with these activities. This helped validate the project staff with local

8 To minimize corruption, most CSP city programs suppressed the GEC committees after the first year and relied only on CSP staff review with community input from the NACs and DACs.

authorities by assuring them that the project was not a military activity and that it delivered on promises. Once projects were accepted in an area they typically worked with local authorities to identify pre-existing programs for vocational training that needed rehabilitation and expansion. Typically the BDP programs were the last to gear up since they required more intensive planning and start-up support.

1.5. Personnel and Administrative Structure

1.5.1 Administrative Structure. Given the high levels of insecurity and limited communication with some cities, the CSP personnel and administrative structure was highly decentralized, and the bulk of project activities were designed and executed by CSP's Iraqi staff. Each of the 15 city programs—including Baghdad—had a POD (Program Operations Director) and a POO (Program Operations Office) that supervised Iraqi staff specialists grouped into CIES, BDP, EG, and Y administrative units (Figure 1.1). The POD was the principal link between the city programs and CSP's National Office in Baghdad.

After its first pilot phase in Baghdad-Red Zone (Karrada from May-November 2006), CSP created a national office in the Baghdad International Zone ("Green Zone") to provide technical and administrative support to the new city programs being developed starting in November 2006. The initial project model envisioned that this support would occur through a regional team of expatriate and national specialists for each sub-sector—CIES, BDP, EG, and Y—based in Baghdad. A project support team at IRD headquarters in Arlington, Virginia provided support to the Baghdad-based COP (Chief of Party) and DCOP (Deputy Chief of Party). This support paralleled the programmatic growth in the field.

1.5.2. Expatriate Staff. Given the high levels of insecurity, large military presence, and low confidence levels in government institutions that characterized most of the targeted areas in the start of the project, expatriate staff were critical (Table 1.4). At the start of each city program, they were the principal contacts between the programs and local U.S. and British Military, and the PRTs. They also played a critical role in initiating contact between the projects and local governments.

Unfortunately, the rigors and isolation of the work contributed to high levels of expatriate staff turnover in both the city programs and the Baghdad National Office. Table 1.4 shows the relative lengths of stay for different positions. Many of these positions had only one or two incumbents for the life of project, and the overall average service was approximately 14 months. POOs and PODs, besides being the most numerous position categories, also had the most dramatic ranges in lengths of service (between 2-40 or 1-31 months, respectively). What the tables show is that people who were not suited to the assignment tended to be replaced fairly quickly. The second candidate in many of these positions then remained for the duration of the project. This table also does not show the longevity of the local staff, which was critical to institutional memory and programmatic continuity.

Learning dressmaking at a Vocational Training Center.

Box 1.2. Case Study: Evolution of Project Activities and Targeting in Relation to Changes in Security

Table C. Case Study Basra—Ethnic Composition and Level of Insecurity per District

Districts	Ethnic Composition	Level of Insecurity
Basra City (Hayania and Hay Jameat)	Muslim (Sunni and Shia), Christian, and Sabian[1]	*****
Abu Alkhaseeb	Muslims (Sunni and Shia), Christian	****
Azubair	Muslim (Sunni and Shia)	***
Modena	Muslim (Sunni and Shia)	*****
Alfou	Muslim (Sunni and Shia)	*
Alqurna	Muslim (Sunni and Shia)	*****
Shatt Al Arab	Muslim (Sunni and Shia)	****

Note: Level of insecurity: Level of insecurity: *=low; ***medium; *****high
[1]Sabian: Minority religion not connected to either Islam or Christianity.

1.5.3. National Iraqi Staff. A major factor that enabled CSP's quick start-up was the local availability of highly qualified technical staff with appropriate training in key areas where the project intervened. **Especially unusual was the high percentage of staff members who were registered engineers and/or had BS or MS level training in relevant technical fields like sociology, law, or business**[9]. Additionally the ratio of senior level staff to non-technical support staff was extremely high.

Figure 1.1: CSP Administrative Structure



To ensure that staff reflected the ethnic patterns of the population in each particular city, the POOs and PODs were also responsible for all staff recruitment and hiring. Given the relatively high levels of turnover in international staff, CSP began promoting various senior Iraqi staff to serve as Program Operation Managers (POM) and to three managerial positions on the Iraq-wide team after the project's internal mid-term assessment in June 2008.

9 During Final Report workshops held in June and October of 2009 it was found that a high level of national staff had substantial technical education and/or advanced degrees. It was found that at the height of staffing in Babil there were approximately 95 employees. Of those 47 were senior level technical staff who had degrees in engineering, business administration, law, architecture and computer science. A second sample in Basra showed that of the 32 staff members, 21 had bachelors degrees and of those, 12 were engineers. These two examples demonstrate the already high levels of educational capacity in Iraq.

Table D. Case Study Basra: Evolution of Project Activities and Targeting in Relation to Changes in Security

Period	Socio-Political Context	Impact on Project
1991	Rebellion against Saddam Hussein began in Basra due to invasion of Kuwait and eventually covered 14 provinces. Those who fought against Hussein fled to neighboring countries or were jailed in Iraq.	
1993	- Hussein drained marshes to quell insurgents who were hiding there, which allowed Iraqi infantry to fight people who were against the GOI. Destruction of agricultural livelihood base. -Immigration from rural areas that previously depended on farming moved to Hayania (no sewage). Hayania couldn't support large population. -Last governor wanted to bulldoze Hayania and start over.	
May 07		Initial attempt to open Basra office
Jun-Aug 07	-British pulling out. -Shelling and events at airport result in USAID withdrawal.	Project closed, but local national key staff continued training.
Oct 07		Reopened office & training of staff (Oct-Dec).
Jan08		-Permanently back in offices -First project implemented
Mar 25, 2008	Charge of the Knights began—American and Iraqi authorities fought militias to gain control of the city and the ports.	Continued working, but geographical focus shifted to Hayania, and Hay Jameat, the hot areas of insurgency and heavy presence of Mahdi army.
Jun 08	Many insurgents were expelled by Iraqi army to Iran.	Project moving (POD was able to get off the base to observe sites, etc.).
Jul-Aug 08		POD and POO were able to travel to office in Basra on a daily basis. Focus on school and health clinic rehabilitation & linking vocational grads (in metal work and woodworking) to school rehab (acute need).
Jun 11, 2009		Last CIES project turned over to the government.
Jun 30, 2009		Official close-out of project; still doing some monitoring of 20-30 grants (end of grant + three months).

Source: CSP Final Report Workshop, October 2009.

Table 1.4 Average Expatriate Length of Service in Months During CSP

Title	Average	Minimum	Maximum	Count
Reporting Information Specialist	36.00	36.00	36.00	1
Economic Development Advisor	27.00	27.00	27.00	1
Director of Operation	22.00	22.00	22.00	1
Deputy Director of Operation	20.00	20.00	20.00	1
Program Office Director	19.58	2.00	40.00	12
Senior Operation Officer	18.00	18.00	18.00	1
IT Manager	17.50	12.00	23.00	2
Program Coordinator	17.00	13.00	21.00	2
Chief Of Party	16.67	11.00	23.00	3
Executive Assistance	16.00	16.00	16.00	1
IT Network Engineer	16.00	16.00	16.00	1
Program Operation Officer	14.38	1.00	31.00	24
M&E Director	14.00	10.00	18.00	2
Reporting Information officer	12.00	12.00	12.00	1
Senior Accountant	11.00	9.00	13.00	2
BDP Team Leader	10.00	9.00	11.00	2
Director of Finance	9.50	1.00	18.00	2
Director of Finance & Admin	9.00	5.00	13.00	4
EGY Team Leader	9.00	9.00	9.00	1
CIES Team Leader	8.00	3.00	13.00	2
Security Manager	7.50	3.00	20.00	4
Human Resource Manager	7.50	1.00	14.00	2
Deputy Chief Of Party	5.25	4.00	6.00	4
Program Assistant	3.00	1.00	5.00	2
All Positions	13.95	1.00	40.00	78

Table I.5. CSP Project Costs by Component (as of September 2009) in US$

CSP Cities	BDP		VoTech	Appren-ticeship	Employment Linkages	Youth	CIES	All Sources	
	Grants	Training						Value	Percent
Baghdad	31,637,141	1,935,043	13,525,306	1,494,178	333,450	5,293,834	100,470,170	**154,689,122**	40.0
Kirkuk	6,474,963	727,436	4,330,569	947,625	.	578,026	17,117,242	**30,175,861**	7.8
Ramadi	10,527,778	231,212	187,908	99,000	509,810	930,459	24,519,068	**37,005,235**	9.6
Fallujah	3,016,296	95,735	2,008,334	377,935	1,905,931	5,333,767	17,176,045	**29,914,043**	7.7
Al Qaim	1,501,001	90,030	1,059,871	297,340	310,116	622,072	5,012,035	**8,892,465**	2.3
Habbaniyah	1,810,673	71,638	118,192	.	43,140	965,279	2,893,302	**5,902,224**	1.5
Haditha	1,886,979	48,360	279,917	.	.	472,585	4,480,812	**7,168,653**	1.9
Hit	1,090,007	33,791	188,228	.	.	488,468	3,513,981	**5,314,475**	1.4
Anbar	19,832,733	570,766	3,842,450	774,275	2,768,997	8,812,630	57,595,243	**94,197,094**	24.4
Babil	2,965,209	79,840	1,718,162	265,620	105,934	842,657	4,108,879	**10,086,301**	2.6
Basra	3,682,155	127,681	2,125,199	281,511	37,054	1,492,365	6,465,920	**14,211,885**	3.7
Baquba	4,657,131	99,130	630,910	.	.	870,706	5,003,978	**11,261,855**	2.9
Beiji	1,263,865	31,680	.	.	.	1,297,188	4,132,825	**6,725,558**	1.7
Samarra	2,415,648	38,950	811,207	.	.	452,315	2,359,292	**6,077,412**	1.6
Tikrit	1,638,943	50,623	871,086	133,180	.	855,032	1,857,719	**5,406,583**	1.4
Salah Ad Din	5,318,456	121,253	1,682,293	133,180	.	2,604,535	8,349,836	**18,209,553**	4.7
Mosul	1,360,078	608,881	1,427,416	293,944	131,732	4,831,083	28,652,638	**37,305,772**	9.7
Tal Afar	715,648	248,166	401,312	259,043	.	1,024,395	13,539,527	**16,188,091**	4.2
Ninewa	2,075,726	857,047	1,828,728	552,987	131,732	5,855,478	42,192,165	**53,493,863**	13.8
TOTAL CSP	76,643,513	4,518,196	29,683,617	4,449,376	3,377,167	26,350,231	241,303,433	386,325,533	100.0

Source: CSP/M&E, December 2009; based on September 2009 close-out figures

1.6. Budget

The initial cooperative agreement (for US$265 million) was for six months of CSP activities in Baghdad only. The project funding was scaled up through a series of two modifications in response to DOD and USAID demands for new cities to be added and eventually reached a total obligation of US$648 million (Table 1.6). On an average **month** of the project, this meant spending $21 million. USAID projects over a five **year** period can total that amount.

Table 1.6. Evolution of CSP Funding

Modification*	Cooperative Agreement	Total Obligation (not cumulative)
-	$265,000,000	
1		$165,000,000
2		Fiscal data only
6		$190,000,000
8		$300,000,000
9		$340,000,000
10		$544,000,000
12		$594,000,000
13		$644,000,000
18		$675,000,000
20		$648,000,000

*Modifications not listed here did not involve changes in funding levels.

This small stationary shop was opened through a grant from CSP.

2.0. Methods Used in the Monitoring and Evaluation System and the Final Report

The CSP monitoring and evaluation system was primarily responsible for results reporting, coordinating studies, and data quality. USAID used a separate contract for evaluating all its projects in Iraq, creating a parallel structure that was independent from the implementation team. The final report used both sources of information in generating the findings presented in chapters 3-5, and heavily mined the existing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) database for additional analyses.

2.1. CSP M&E and Reporting System

Progress toward implementation of the activities that were designed to achieve the project IRs and sub-IRs was monitored through 11 performance indicators, most of which were tracked through a series of weekly[10] and quarterly reports by the project's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) unit for each city as well as the project as a whole (see IPTT, Annex 1.A).

The data needed to calculate the project's seven performance indicators was collected by CSP's trained M&E staff and jointly reported to the project's M&E and Communication officers in Baghdad, then consolidated into spreadsheets and electronic database. The same reporting system was used to report monthly success stories to the communication officers. This information was summarized in a series of weekly and monthly reports and briefing papers (on sector activities and success stories). More than 144 weekly reports and 20 quarterly and monthly reports in addition to over 100 sector briefing papers and other publications (see samples in Annex) were deposited in the project archive where they were used over the course of the project by CSP and various partners.

The three remaining indicators used both primary and secondary source data. CSP signed a separate contract with an independent contractor (the Lincoln Group) to measure Impact Indicator SO7.1 "Perception of citizens of the effectiveness of local government to provide services" (Annex 1.A). Information generated by the Brookings Institute was used to measure Indicator 7.2 "Number of insurgency incidents reduced." Standard figures from UNDP and other donors were used to calculate Impact Indicator 7.1.1 "Unemployment rate decreased."

USAID/Iraq's evaluation contractor IBTCI (International Business and Technical Consultants, Inc.) conducted a separate set of studies on each major sub-components of the project as well as an external evaluation of the entire project in 2009.

10 The original request for weekly reports came from the military. This weekly reporting system was maintained through the life of the project even though it was not required by the CSP cooperative agreement.

2.2. Final Report

2.2.1. Goals, Objectives, and Methodology. IRD was charged with preparing a final report that summarizes the institutional history of the project based on the IBTCI evaluations as well as the project's internal monitoring data. As per the original cooperative agreement, the document must:[11]

- Contain an overall description of the activities under the CSP during the period of the cooperative agreement and the significance of these activities;
- Describe the methods of assistance used and pros and cons of these methods;
- Present the life of project results towards achieving project objectives and the performance indicators, as well as an analysis of how the indicators illustrate the project's impact on the accomplishment of the program's overall objectives;
- Summarize the program's accomplishments, as well as any unmet targets and an explanation; and
- Discuss issues and problems that emerged during program implementation and lessons learned in dealing with them.

To achieve these objectives for the final report, IRD adopted a four-pronged learning process model that included the following.

- **Statistical Analyses:** Detailed statistical analyses from the project database of performance and higher level impact indicators.
- **Document Review:** A detailed document review of IBTCI's external evaluations and the project's weekly and quarterly reports, M&E plans and reports, and cooperative agreement records and relevant correspondence.
- **City Lessons Learned Workshops:** Seven CSP city lessons-learned workshops (covering nine cities that represent about 80 percent[12] of the total city-level programming expenditure of the project) to review initial results of the statistical analyses and document review and to elicit national staff input into the extrapolation of lessons learned.
- **Other Interviews:** Additional interviews with current and former CSP staff members associated with the project to complement interviews already conducted during the various IBTCI studies and evaluations.

Each of the seven lessons-learned workshops used a standard methodology (using standard descriptive and analytical tables including SWOT (strength, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analyses for specific project components) to facilitate the organizers' preparation of proceedings volumes that followed a standardized table of contents, which fed into the key analyses (of indicators, management,

11 Jeffery Goebel's letter to Jane Thompson, September 29, 2009.

12 Al Qaim was the only city in Al Anbar that was included in a city workshop.

and lessons learned) being addressed in the final report (Table 2.1). These city reports have been used in the preparation of the final report: they are not finalized as separate papers and will remain in draft, rather than as separate publications.

Table 2.1. CSP City Lessons-Learned Workshops Organized as Part of the CSP Final Report Learning Process

City Workshop	Cities Covered	Dates	National
Kirkuk	1	June 22-24	7
Mosul	1	June 22-24	8
Basra	1	July 6-8	6
Baghdad	1	Oct 4-6	16
Al Qaim	1	Oct 7-8	8
Babil	1	Oct 11-12	9
Salah Ad Din (Tikrit, Samarra, Beiji)	3	Oct 13-14	16
Total	9		70

*It was decided that the city workshops would focus on the role and perspectives of the national staff. International staff were interviewed separately so as not to inhibit the local staff from speaking.

2.2.2. Organization of the Report. Four additional chapters present the resulting analysis.

- **Chapters 3 and 4** include:
- Strategy and Activities: Methods of assistance used and pros/cons of these methods for the CSP's two IRs (IR 7.1 and IR 7.2);
- Results: The project's progress toward achievement of the indicator targets that were used to track CSP's activities and reasons for over-achievement or under-achievement of the targets; and
- Issues and Lessons Learned: Major issues that were confronted during implementation and lessons learned from this for future COIN initiatives seeking inspiration from the CSP COIN model.
- **Chapter 5** provides the link between CSP activities (and indicators) and achievement of the project's greater purpose in terms of improving the perception of citizens of the effectiveness of local government and decreasing chronic unemployment and insurgency activity that was destabilizing each of the target cities when CSP activities rolled out.
- **Chapter 6** summarizes the major issues and problems that emerged during implementation and lessons learned for future programming.

This animal feed and fodder factory was able to expand with a grant through CSP.

3.0. Results: Project Components IR7.1 Unemployment Rate Decreased

Unemployment continues to be a major economic stress factor in Iraq. High unemployment contributes to Iraqi citizens' perception that the GOI is failing to establish the basic preconditions for a functional national economy to exist. CSP's primary focus group of 17-35-year-old male youth makes up the highest percentage of the unemployed, marginalized, and disaffected. The male unemployed are also the most vulnerable to joining insurgent groups. Part of the challenge with economic change at the national level was simply moving from a centrally planned economy to a private sector market-based economy.

For this reason CSP's major focus—more than 90 percent of its city-specific program funding —was focused on creating short-term and longer-term employment through its three largest components: CIES, Employment Generation (Vocational Education and Apprenticeships), and Business Development Program (BDP).

This chapter is divided into four sections. Sections 3.1-3.3 describe each component's strategy, principal programmatic results in terms of short-term and longer-term job creation, and major issues that emerged during implementation and lessons learned for future COIN initiatives. The final section, 3.4, compares the cost benefits and impact of the different project components in terms of job creation.

3.1. Community Infrastructure and Essential Services (CIES)

3.1.1. Strategy and Activities. To facilitate local government ownership, the initial CIES programs were chosen from a list of projects proposed by the local governor's council with input from the PRT. All programs were:

- Executed in close collaboration with the government directorates in charge of services for the relevant sector, and
- Required to obtain some level of community contribution (labor, materials, or equipment) from the ministries responsible for the activities.

Most of the city-specific targets for employment were set by the U.S. military working through the PRTs.

Once a project was chosen, CSP worked with the government offices to develop a realistic implementation plan. The project then solicited local bids. CSP was responsible for supervising the quality of the construction. Contractors who did not deliver timely services (based on CSP staff supervisory reports and the quality assurance/ quality control reports once these were started) were termi-

nated. Although primary responsibility for supervising contractors was the charge of CSP city staff, each program made a consistent effort to involve staff from relevant ministries as much as possible.

3.1.2. Results

Targets vs. Achievements. The early CIES projects—which focused largely on trash collection and rubble removal—had a rapid, highly visible and tangible impact greatly appreciated by the local government. The same programs helped validate the CSP to local authorities and opened the door to more diversified collaboration within only a few months.

During the first year, CSP conducted numerous trash removal projects. CSP started transferring these projects back to the municipal governments in the middle of the second year. CSP did continue to fund clean-up campaigns for municipal governments that were willing to support and pay some of the services, as well as a strategy for starting activities in new cities. Beginning in the second year, the emphasis shifted to less labor-intensive infrastructure programs like rehabilitating schools, hospitals, sewage systems, and agricultural infrastructure (e.g., irrigation canals).

Table 3.1. Number of CIES Projects by Sector

Sector	Number of Projects*	Percentage
Cleaning Campaigns	351	21.8
Water/Sewage	108	6.7
Healthcare	73	4.5
Education	443	27.5
Agriculture	110	6.8
Street Repair	135	8.4
Parks, Recreation	208	12.9
Government	110	6.8
Other	75	4.6
TOTAL	1,613	100.0

A total of 1613 projects generated 525,152 documented person months of work—a figure that is 120 percent above the official target for this indicator (Indicator 7.1.1.1, Annex 1). CSP exceeded its targets for "person months employment generated for short-term employment" for every year of operations (Figure 3.1).

Incompletion Rates. Despite problems created by the project's delay in creating standardized training manuals, forms and systems for tendering, only 41 projects (2.5 percent of the total) were not completed.

Other Impacts. While there was a great deal of qualitative evidence (from interviews and even newspaper articles) that the resulting increase in employment

Figure 3.1. Number of Person Months of Employment Generated for Short-Term Employment (Source: CSP M&E Unit)



helped reduce insurgency incidents in very unstable areas such as Howija in Kirkuk (see Box 1.1), this was not captured by the city-specific M&E data. This is because the program's approved M&E plan narrowly focused on CSP's performance indicators. Based on the city reports (done as part of this final report), this is a significant impact that has been grossly under estimated and which, unfortunately, is now impossible to capture retroactively.

Cost Analysis: Total costs per job varied widely between cities—ranging from $564/person months of short-term employment in Habbaniyah to $2,970/person months of short-term employment in Al-Qaim (Figure 3.2). This variability is mainly attributed to the types of projects implemented (Figure 3.3). Short-term job creation was more costly on more skilled labor-intensive CIES interventions like rehabilitating government buildings, schools, hospitals, and water systems, although the actual costs also varied based on labor costs in the different cities. These activities were greatly appreciated by the communities and contributed to the higher achievement in the indicator measuring citizens' perceptions about the effectiveness of local government.

3.1.3. Issues that Emerged and Resulting Lessons Learned.

- One of the constraints on implementation was the difficulty in getting some ministries that did not have funding to make a community contribution.
- Another constraint was the need for an efficient and effective approval process for the CIES projects from both USAID and IRD Headquarters (HQ).
- A third constraint was the need at program level to readily adapt and migrate the bidding, contracting, and compliance systems of the Iraq Community Action Program (ICAP) to a more expansive scale.

Lessons learned that could strengthen future COIN programs based on the CSP model include:

- More efficient procedures for the required review of project proposals;

Figure 3.2. Variation between Cities in the Cost of Person Months Generated for Short-term Employment (Source: CSP M&E Unit, December 2009)



Figure 3.3. Variation between Cities in the Types of CIES Projects Executed (Source: CSP M&E Unit, December 2009)



- Program start-up or technical assistance to include Community Contribution Specialist/Accountant and a Tendering and Procurement Specialist;
- Enhancement of country-wide systems for training staff in documentation requirements and procedures for bidding, contract review, file documentation, and project monitoring;
- Development of creative strategies to help local governments better comply with requirements for community contribution;
- Expanding involvement of local governments in design and execution of CIES projects to facilitate sustainability and program success;
- Consideration of the flexibility to construct new facilities as well as reconstructing damaged ones;
- COIN requires city-specific analysis of project indicators in order to better link labor intensive public works programs and the COIN initiatives' broader goals; and
- Stronger communication at the field level between USAID and the implementing partner will improve the flexibility of COIN implementation.

3.2. Vocational Skills and Apprenticeships

3.2.1. Strategy and Activities. CSP's principal partner for VoTech during the first year of the project was the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA). Tuition for such training was free and trainees received a stipend and a toolkit upon completion. Once training was completed, CSP supported half the costs of trainees' apprenticeships with local businesses. It was anticipated that the apprenticeships would provide the bridge into the community that trainees needed to find permanent employment.

In the second year, CSP started a second alliance with the Ministry of Education, which enabled it to expand the total number of individuals trained and to make up some of the short-falls in its first year targets. This link enabled MOE, with CSP's intervention, to offer a wider array of courses including new curricula that were not offered previously such as hairdressing and cell phone repair.

There was a process for setting up vocational education training. CSP identified an appropriate training facility. Trainers[13] were recruited and trained, as necessary. Many of the standard curricula were condensed to allow them to be taught in a shorter period of time, thus generating more trainees and, at times, additional teaching materials were developed. Parallel to these activities CSP worked with MOLSA and the local governments to recruit and screen[14] students.

13 In most cases CSP paid the cost of its trainers although many of them were faculty of pre-existing vocational training facilities.

14 Each student had to pass a security clearance. The project also attempted to screen out applicants who had gone through other training programs or who were taking the courses simply for the stipend.

Figure 3.4. VoTech Graduates Produced by Quarter (Source: CSP M&E Unit)



3.2.2. Results.

Targets vs. Achievements. **Altogether 41,443 graduates completed vocational training under CSP**—over half of them in Baghdad. Baghdad had particular success because it had an established vocational training program.

CSP was successful in graduating 41,443 trainees, representing 112 percent of the revised program target. The project met its annual targets for every year except the first. Project demand was huge, with demand far exceeding supply in the most popular training courses.

A challenge of the program was translating the high demand from local people for vocational training into longer-term employment within the short timeframe of the project.

- Only 9,932 of the trainees (less than 25 percent) received apprenticeships, mainly due to the difficulty that city programs had in getting employers to accept apprentices, even with the project's 50 percent subsidy of the apprentices' stipends. Although this number of trainees placed is 93 percent of the revised final target for apprenticeships, it is less than what the project originally proposed to achieve.
- The rate of long-term employment was higher for trainees who got apprenticeships (1,955 or 20 percent of trainees) than for trainees that did not get apprenticeships (565 or 1.4 percent of trainees).

Other Impacts. One under-documented impact of CSP is the institutional impact it had on certain vocational training institutions throughout Iraq. CSP helped revise the curricula of each institution they supported and introduced new systems for training and tracking the time students and professors' spent together. These changes improved instructional programs. A substantial number of these programs continue to operate and produce vocational graduates. A small number of programs—like the vocational training center at Al-Qaim—folded once CSP funding ended because they were not supported by a government body. Some CSP training programs were used by the Ministry of Education after the buildings were returned to their original owners for other types of longer-term training

programs. With the exception of the Al-Qaim building, it appears that all renovated infrastructure is being used for some sort of training purposes.[15]

Cost Effectiveness. The average cost per training project ranged from $21,348 in Samarra to $356,854 in Mosul (Figure 3.5), while the average cost per trainee ranges from $239 in Baquabah to $1499 in Fallujah (Table 3.3). A major factor affecting the high training cost in Mosul is the extent to which the project had to renovate pre-existing MOLSA structures used as training facilities. However, the extra costs continue to provide benefits by allowing training programs to continue after CSP ended.

3.2.3. Issues that Emerged and Resulting Lessons Learned. Not surprisingly, in this post-conflict environment, most employers preferred to hire family members rather than hiring an unknown person as a new trainee. To address this issue, CSP expanded its focus at the end of the second year to facilitating job placements through several city-specific strategies.

Table 3.2. Total Graduates from CSP-Sponsored Vocational Training Programs

CITY	GRADUATES (Cumulative)		
	Male	Female	Total
Baghdad	15,431	5,861	21,292
Mosul	3,401	482	3,883
Kirkuk	3,500	740	4,240
Baquba	800	1,202	2,002
Basrah	1,617	168	1,785
Babil	2,042	593	2,635
Tikrit	747	200	947
Samarra	900	140	1,040
Beiji	0	0	0
Fallujah	720	500	1,220
Ramadi	119	120	239
Al Qaim	1,092	469	1,561
Habbaniyah	99	0	99
Haditha	150	75	225
Hit	275	0	275
Subtotal	30,893	10,550	
TOTAL	41,443		

15 As another indicator of the confusion of operations in a not-quite post-conflict environment, the Ramadi (Al-Qaim) building was the subject of a November 2008 letter from USAID to IRD; ownership of the building was contested by the Ministry of Defense. MOLSA, despite repeated requests, was unable to confirm their ownership of the facility from the Ministry of Finance. Work was therefore suspended on the renovations to the facility.

- In Baghdad, CSP helped renovate, staff, and improve service delivery at several of MOLSA's pre-existing job placement centers.
- The CSP team in Baghdad also developed an innovative program to strengthen the capacity of the local council offices to offer job-placement services for trainees in their neighborhoods.
- Each CSP city program facilitated CSP-funded programs hiring more VoTech graduates, especially to contractors executing CIES and other DOD programs in their region.
- There was also a concerted effort to encourage apprentices and new graduates to apply for BDP grants to start their own businesses. Unfortunately, very few apprentices could acquire the community contribution (from 25 to 50 percent of the grant) needed to receive a micro, small, or medium sized grant.

Although CSP's vocational education clearly had a positive contribution—one which over time could yield huge returns—future programs need to consider whether the length of time in a COIN initiative is sufficient to reap these returns. Short-term programs of less than two years should consider focusing on on-the-job training. The objective of COIN is to engage youth in productive

Figure 3.5. Variation Between Cities in the Cost per Project of Implementing VoTech Projects (Source: CSP M&E Unit)



and positive activities; training programs may be more valuable in achieving that objective as opposed to specific educational attainment objectives.

Other lessons learned that could strengthen future COIN programs based on the CSP model include:

- Making grantee access to the larger BDP grants conditional upon hiring VoTech graduates.
- Anticipating the need for a more complex benefits analysis that takes into consideration the post-project level of use of buildings and curricula developed under the project.

3.3. Business Development Program (BDP)

3.3.1. Strategy and Activities.

Target vs. Achievements. Like vocational training, the BDP program focused on the development of more long-term employment. Grants were awarded in three categories: micro grants (under US$150-$3,000); small grants ($3,000-25,000); and medium grants ($25,000-$100,000).

Micro-grants were largely designed and used for stabilization purposes to provide Iraqi households with activities able to assure their food security while the COIN program was unfolding. However, the maximum amount of $3,000 allowed under this grant type cannot support a great range of activities outside the service sector. Small grants, allowing a maximum amount of $25,000, provide grantees with more flexibility to invest in a wider, more diversified range of income generating activities. Medium grants, covering a maximum amount of $100,000, were designed to assist businesses willing and able to invest in the industry sector.

To secure a grant, applicants had to prepare a proposal that included a detailed business plan and list of start-up and basic operating costs. One strength of the BDP program was that BDP staff—most with specialized training in the areas being funded such as business, agriculture, manufacturing—helped applicants refine the plans and review the proposed business sites to avoid over-saturation of a site with one particular kind of business. In lieu of tuition, applicants helped with the actual purchase of any equipment they needed.

Each proposal was required to show its projected impact on employment, which was a critical factor in determining which grants were funded at which levels. Given the intensive monitoring of the grant development and implementation process, there was a relatively long delay (minimum two months; average six months) between the conception and execution of a grant.

The prospective grantees also received business training through CSP's subcontracted local NGOs. Based on lessons learned during the first year, all grant recipients were required to attend a business skills training program. The length of training and its contents depended on the grant size: two days for micro grants; three to four days for small grants, and five days for medium grants. In order to

Table 3.3 Average Cost per Trainee by City
(Source: CSP M&E Data January 2010)

City	Total
Baghdad	$635
Babil	$652
Samarra	$780
Kirkuk	$1,021
Fallujah	$1,499
Basra	$1,190
Al Qaim	$679
Baquba	$239
Tikrit	$1,031
Haditha	$1,244
Hit	$684
Ramadi	$786
Habbaniyah	$1,194
Mosul	$444
Beiji	NA
Average Cost	$863

insure that all grantees received business skills training, the project anticipated the need to train a higher number of participants than those receiving grants.

The BDP agents in each city conducted a rigorous semi-independent site review (by the CSP M&E staff) of the proposal to verify the locations as well as the projected impact on employment. To minimize corruption, the project organized a strict process of random site visits to verify the investments and number of workers at each site. Each BDP grant was independently verified three months after funding by an unannounced visit from a member of the quality assurance/ quality control (QA/QC) team.

The basic model changed little over the course of the project. The chief difference was the evolution of stronger systems for monitoring BDP execution and impact as measured in jobs in the second year. This shift coincided with the promotion of one of the most experienced Baghdad BDP staff members to head the Iraq-wide team. The Iraq-wide team member increased regular supervision and training missions for each of the BDP city programs, undertaken simultaneously with regular audits.

The individual grantees faced a number of specific challenges:

- Community Contribution: The most significant challenge was the community contribution in cash or in kind, which was equivalent to 25-50 percent of the grant depending upon the funding level.
- New/Innovative/Competitive Business Ideas: The second most important challenge was coming up with new ideas. If community members heard that grants were being awarded for grocery stores, there would be a rush of applications for grocery stores. To avoid saturating the market and making grantees' businesses uncompetitive, the BDP staff had to work with grantees to analyze potential markets and develop alternative ideas.
- Location: Location was critical. Even a good idea—like developing an aluminum workshop—might not be viable if another store existed nearby.
- Business Application: Completing the application was rarely easy. In most cases, the CSP business development staff had to sit down with the grantees two or three times before they could complete the application.

3.3.2. Results.

Target vs. Achievements: Over the three years of the project CSP (Figure 3.6):

- Awarded 10,139 BDP grants (83 percent of target); and
- Trained 15,138 participants through the Business Development Training (BDT) (92 percent of target).

Over 50 percent of the grants awarded were in three of the earliest participating cities in CSP: Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Ramadi (Figure 3.7).

Variation Between Grants:

- *By Size:* The vast majority of the BDP grants awarded (97 percent) continued to be "micro" or "small grants" and to favor service activities (Figure 3.8). In contrast to what was expected, the supply of medium grants decreased rather than increased over time: from 4 percent in Year 1, to 3 percent Year 2, and 1 percent in Year 3. This decline in medium grant shares can be attributed to several factors including CSP's emerging awareness about the difficulty of managing bigger investments, fulfilling the required contribution, and overall greater risk and uncertainty associated with these larger investments. By contrast, the percentage of small grants went from 48 percent of all grants to 56 percent in Year 3 (Figure 3.8).
- *By Sector:* The largest number of BDP grants was for trade at 42 percent (4,269) followed by agriculture at 23 percent (2,283) and the industry sector at 14 percent (1,448). The percentage of grants devoted to the trade sector gradually decreased from 55 percent to 27 percent while agriculture increased in importance from 11 to 36 percent (Figure 3.9).
- *By Gender:* The share of grants given to women gradually increased as well: from 8 percent in Year 1 to 18 percent in Year 3 (Figure 3.10).
- *New vs. Expanding Businesses:* As the program matured, the support provided to expanding existing businesses—as opposed to creating new businesses—increased (Figure 3.11). In Year 2, over 90 percent (9,120) of the grants were allocated to start-up businesses while 10 percent (1,157) of the grants were allocated to existing businesses (Figure 3.11). The number of grants allocated to existing businesses continued to increase in Year 3 to 16 percent.

Impact on Employment: **By the end of the project, CSP had generated 57,109 documented long-term jobs**.[16] This was recognized by Ambassador Ryan Crocker who praised CSP, noting in his Congressional testimony that "USAID community stabilization funds provide tens of thousands of jobs throughout the country." The business grant component of CSP generated about 74 percent (33,496) of all the long-term jobs created by the project. Given the critical importance of BDP grants, CSP conducted a more in-depth analysis in order to highlight some of the important shifts in results and outputs over time.

One surprising element of this impact was that, even with the long start-up time for grants, the BDP grants—once the system was up and running in a new city—were able to produce these long-term jobs fairly quickly: 23 percent (7,790) in Year 1, 52 percent (17,454) in Year 2, and 25 percent (8,252) in Year 3.

The wide variation between cities both in the terms of the number of grants (Figure 3.7) and the number of long-term jobs produced can be explained by several factors including the relative importance given to BDP, the overall size of the budget, and the particular composition and skill set of the individual city teams. Some programs that started late—like Samarra—or that were making up for



A dentist is able to provide patient care after receiving a small business grant through CSP.

16 Long-term employment was defined as employment exceeding 90 days.

Figure 3.6. Number of Businesses Receiving BDP Grants under CSP
(Source: CSP M&E Unit, December 2009)



Figure 3.7. City Shares of CSP BDP Grants, Years 1-3
(Source: CSP M&E Unit, December 2009)



Figure 3.8. Shares of CSP BDP Grants by Size of Grant, Year 1-3
(Source: CSP M&E Unit, December 2009)



earlier delays—like Baquba—decided to prioritize BDP over VoTech and even CIES in order to have a quick, highly visible impact within a very short period of time.

Total Job Creation by Category of Grant:

Size of Grant: Micro grants, because of their size, generated an average of two long-term positions per grant; small grants, four long-term positions; and medium grants an average of 10 (Figure 3.13).

- *Grant Sector:* Industrial grants (for small-scale manufacturing) generated the most long-term jobs (five) followed by agriculture (four) and trade (three) (Figure 3.14)

Efficiency of Job Creation:

- *Size of Grant:* The medium grants produced the most long-term jobs, but they had the highest unit cost per job created, beginning at $9,000 and decreasing to $5,000 at the end of the project (Figure 3.15). The micro grants had the lowest average unit cost ($1,400). This is also an artifact of the size of the grants and the relative number of employees at these two—if the medium grants had more employees, then the average cost per job would have decreased. The size of the grant divided by number of employees is the calculation for average cost/job: if the denominator increases and the numerator does not increase, then the average decreases.

- *Grant Sector:* On average, the BDP trade grants had the lowest unit costs ($1,843) followed by the service sector ($1,925) (Figure 3.16) The spike in unit costs for agriculture in Year 3 is related to the drop in the number of grants in agriculture in Year 3 without a significant increase in the average number of jobs.

Non-Operational Rate. The BDP sector's impact on employment is even more striking given its high success rate. Based on a sample survey of CSP's main data base, 89 percent of grant recipient businesses were still be in business three

Figure 3.9. City Shares of CSP BDP Grants by Sector, Year 1-3 (Source: CSP M&E Unit)



Figure 3.10. City Shares of By CSP Grants by Gender, Year 1-3 (Source: CSP M&E Unit)



Figure 3.11. City Shares of CSP BDP Grants Obtained by New and Expanding Businesses, Year 1-3 (Source: CSP M&E Unit)



to six months after their grant was initially completed[17]. This is a remarkable percentage, given the inherently risky nature of small businesses, which are prone to economic failure. Small business failure is often due to the larger economic picture or the individual grantee's performance, rather than the granting organization's procedures, as well as the absence of additional credit opportunities outside of the program.

The 89 percent figure is biased by the greater difficulty CSP experienced in finding grantees in the third year in Baghdad (56.5 percent) which can be attributed to: a) a large number of agricultural grants allocated in Baghdad in Year 3 that the project had difficulty locating as the program was closing down; and b) less cooperation from grantees and local leaders who were upset about the CSP closing down in Baghdad and Basra. One hundred percent of grantees could be located in seven of the 15 cities for these monitoring visits; as well as greater than 80 percent in the remaining cities.

The principal reasons given for grantee lack of completion by the CSP M&E officers were:

- The grantee changed the business location;

Figure 3.12. Percentage of Total Long Term Jobs Created by BDP Grants in Different Cities, Years 1-3 (Source: CSP M&E Unit)



17 This percentage differs from earlier reports because it includes all projects at the time of close-out: some of the businesses had not yet been in operation for six months.

- The grantee migrated to another country;
- The investment sector was not profitable;
- The grantee sold the business and equipment, in some cases starting a new one;
- The grantee died; or
- The grantee or his family was threatened to be killed if the business continued operation.

3.3.3. Issues that Emerged and Resulting Lessons Learned.

Size of Grant: Micro grants had the lowest cost of creating one direct long-term job, but did not necessarily lead to further employment generation. This type

Figure 3.13. Average Number of Long-Term Jobs Created by Size of BDP Grant, Years 1-3 (Source: CSP M&E Unit)



Figure 3.14. Average Number of Long Term Jobs Created by BDP grants by Economic Sector, Year 1-3 (Source: CSP M&E Unit)



of grant targeted poor and vulnerable households without a reliable source of income. Very small family businesses, such as in-home beauty shops or kitchen restaurants, do not have strong backward and forward linkages with the rest of the economy. Therefore, their indirect and induced employment effects are very low compared to the small and medium grant types. It should however be recognized that micro grants are very supportive of the COIN strategy precisely because they target the more vulnerable.

Grant Sector: Based on this analysis the trade and service sector grants appear to be the most efficient in terms of generating the types of quick impact longer-term employment needed in a COIN initiative. Care should be taken not to fund only these two sectors, as they have fewer linkages with the rest of economy and therefore provide less opportunity to create indirect and induced employment than investments in agriculture and small-scale manufacturing.

Figure 3.15. Unit Cost of Generating Long-Term Employment by Size of BDP Grant. (Source: CSP M&E Unit)



Figure 3.16. Unit Cost of Generating Long-Term Employment by Economic Sector of BDP Grants, Year 1-3. (Source: CSP M&E Unit)



Expanded farm businesses mean more jobs and more locally grown food.

Implementation: The process of review and approval by USAID and IRD/HQ of grantee applications for grants totaling over $100,000 or for grants with equipment exceeding $5,000, especially those with high community contribution,[18] was lengthy to ensure necessary compliance.

- The community contribution eliminated many vulnerable households, especially vulnerable youth such as those targeted by the CSP vocational training.
- Training in basic accounting skills and business planning is essential. IRD did this directly and by subcontracting through a local NGO.

Lessons Learned: Future BDP projects could be strengthened by:

- Conducting detailed assessments (both baseline and annual updates) to determine the most relevant types of businesses needed by local populations that eliminate some of the trial and error during the first year.
- Strengthening linkages with local government and technical ministries such as agriculture to identify emerging needs such as small-scale milk processing plants as farmers reinstated cattle herds.
- Hiring at least one staff member per city program to design and execute the relevant business training instead of relying on local NGOs or private companies to conduct the training.
- Anticipating the need and developing a system for independent verification of the businesses from the start.
- Providing regular supervision and on the job training to insure that staff understands USAID rules and regulations for documentation clearly. In this regard the CSP/BDP model on the Iraq-wide team was an example of best practice that dramatically reduced the number of compliance and financial issues that had to be sorted out once the project ended. The fact that BDP had "fewer moving parts" than other CSP technical sectors—like the youth and vocational activities—no doubt also played a role.

3.4. Project Impact on Employment

3.4.1. Relative Contribution of Different Project Components.

Long-Term Employment. A total of 57.109 long-term jobs were created during the three years of program execution (Figure 3.17).

- The BDP grants program produced the most: 74 percent;
- The EG Employment Linkages (Job Placement)[19] sub-component of EG sector ranked second with 21 percent of the total.

18 Community contributions are an important way to gauge host country commitment. At the same time, the level of contribution requires some additional care to ensure that potential grantees are not eliminated because of failure to meet that commitment, either through the possibility of waivers or a sliding scale of contribution based on individual assets.

19 To facilitate job placement, the CSP units created various job placement services that are referred to as the "employment linkages" unit. This figure includes apprentices, VoTech graduates and other persons who found employment through these units.

- Apprentices placed and vocational training graduates who did not get apprenticeships not counted as part of the EG Employment Linkages figure rank three and four with respective shares of 4 percent and 1 percent of total employment generated by CSP.

Figure 3.17. Structure and Shares of Long-Term Employment by CSP Component, (Year 1-3) (Source: CSP M&E Unit)



Long-term Employment Indirectly Created: Indicator 7.1.3 (Number of long-term jobs indirectly created) measures the number of long-term jobs created by the GOI through CIES, EG, and Y rehabilitation projects. For example, nursing staff increased after the completion of hospital renovations. As more children attended newly-refurbished and expanded schools, additional teachers and maintenance workers are hired. As new parks open, municipalities hire permanent groundskeepers and guards. This indicator was not part of CSP performance measures during Year 1 of the program.

CSP generated 1,699 long-term jobs indirectly through the GOI as a result of rehabilitation projects, 79 percent of its target. This lower level of achievement is caused by the difficulties to anticipate the GOI labor hiring decisions. Since this type of employment is not rigorously planned, the expected levels are quite different from the realized values. For example, during 2008, the Iraqi government adopted a national policy to reduce its interventions in the labor market by freezing all hiring activities. With the tightening of the labor policy, the targeted values were higher than expected. Because of the uncertainty caused by government labor policy the targeted levels of indirect long-term jobs were consistently below the anticipated targets. (Figure 3.18)

Long-term Employment for Women. One critical undervalued impact of the project's vocational training and BDP programs was to help many women –including young widows with dependent children—to develop the job skills that they need to support themselves and their families. This evolved since the original focus of the project was males ages 17-35. Ten percent of the long-term jobs that were either directly or indirectly created by the project went to women.

Figure 3.18 Number of Long-Term Jobs Indirectly Generated Across all CSP Cities (Source M&E Unit)



Figure 3.19. Average Cost of Short-Term and Long-Term Employment Generation (Source: CSP M&E Unit)



Short-term Employment. A total of 525,121 confirmed (i.e. verified) person months of employment was created by the project, most of it from CIES initiatives (Figure 3.19):

- 74 percent (388,627) of the CIES short-term jobs originates from the CIES essential Service projects (rubble removal, town and agricultural canal clean up)
- 26 percent (136,494) of total came from the CIES infrastructure rehabilitation and construction Projects.

3.4.2. Relative Efficiency of Employment Generation of Different CSP Components. Not surprising, the cost of producing one equivalent month of short-term employment is about half the cost of producing one long-term job (Figure 3.20).

The two types of employment are completely different, however, so it is irrelevant to compare them.

- Short-term employment was a very effective way of supporting a COIN strategy since it targets the types of unskilled or semi-skilled labor that otherwise would have been targets of choice for insurgency.
- Long-term employment primarily supports the business community and the more skilled type of laborers who have been unemployed because of the war. This more sustainable type of employment is suitable to medium- and long-term objectives to support a COIN strategy.

3.4.3. Synergies between Short-term and Long-Term Employment Generation. CSP attempted to optimize the synergies between short-term and long-term employment generation by integrating various program components. They include:

- *Market Rehabilitation:* One of the best illustrations of this type of integration (and the resulting synergies) is several market reconstruction campaigns. Projects would typically start with a CIES cleaning campaign followed by a CIES rehabilitation to rebuild destroyed market infrastructure. Different types of BDP grants would then be used to help the pre-existing businesses in the revitalized market area to rebuild their stock and services.
- *Agricultural Projects:* CIES canal cleaning projects were critical to restarting commercial agriculture in many areas of Iraq. These CIES-sponsored projects were often combined with business development grant projects to support agricultural development in several cities. Once rehabilitated, the commercial farms created a demand for trained agricultural labor and equipment repair. In several cases, the youth employed in CIES public work projects were given the opportunity to participate in vocational training and apprenticeship programs that equipped them for these skilled, better paying agricultural jobs.

Participants in a business skills training course.

4.0. Results: Project Components IR 7.2. Conflict Mitigated Through Increased Community Activities

The third prong of S07 in USAID Iraq's Performance Management Plan (2006-2008) focused on the promotion of "communal activities" to reduce sectarian conflict. To address this issue, CSP collaborated with youth, local government, community groups, and leaders on wide range of sports, cultural, and informal educational activities under CSP's IR 7.2 (Conflict Mitigated through Increased Community Activities). The stated objective of these activities was to help the Iraqi youth in the city programs to (IBTCI 2009: 3):

- Connect to their own identity, culture, and community;
- Engage community leaders on issues important to them; and
- Come together with other youth from different ethnic and religious backgrounds to learn coexistence and tolerance.

Although the youth programs represented only 10 percent of CSP's total funding for the city programs (Table 1.5), the activities were high profile with a large number of direct and indirect beneficiaries.

To facilitate comparison between CSP's youth engagement activities and CSP's other project components; this chapter follows a similar format as Chapter Three. Sections 4.1-4.3 describe the global strategy and activities of the youth programs, quantitative and qualitative evidence of results, and major issues that emerged during implementation and lessons learned for future COIN initiatives.

4.1. Strategy and Activities

CSP's Youth Component funded a wide range of activities including organized sports (soccer, swimming, volleyball), arts programs (pottery, drawing), theater, and music. To facilitate local ownership and control corruption, these activities were designed and executed in close collaboration with a wide array of government partners including the Ministry of Youth and Sports (MOYS), Ministry of Culture (MOC), Ministry of Environment (MOEN), and Ministry of Health (MOH). The principal exception to this partnership model was Mosul which made extensive use of local NGOs. The youth programs varied widely between cities based on local priorities and the willingness and interest of different local partners.

Once a joint activity or event was identified, the CSP youth staff worked with local partners to develop a reasonable proposal, timeline, and budget. The consolidated lists of equipment and supplies were then put out for competitive bids to local businesses. When the equipment arrived, CSP would supervise its distribu-

Figure 4.1. Number of Participants in CSP Youth Engagement Activities, Year 1-3.
(Source: CSP M&E Unit)



tion and train local partners to track beneficiary participation and costs. CSP's QA/QC staff audited any equipment distributions as well as all participant lists to ensure accountability. A separate audit of at least 20 percent of the activities was conducted by the project's M&E staff.

The original target for these activities was youth from 17 to 25 years of age. CSP then recommended—and USAID accepted—expanding the age range from 12-35 years. Lowering the age range to 12 allowed the program's youth activities to better interact with secondary schools while raising it to 35 captured significant numbers of unemployed physically active young men and harmonized the program's parameters with Iraqi labor laws that currently consider persons aged 17-35 as vocationally challenged (IBTCI 2009: 3). All youth were assumed to be "at risk" youth, although they were assessed on the basis of the community they lived in rather than any individual characteristics that might identify them as more likely to join a militia (IBTCI 2009: 1).

4.2. Results

4.2.1. Targets vs. Achievements.

Number of participants: The youth engagement activities were typically the last activities to "roll out," hence they had lower targets in the first year than most of the CSP city programs (Figure 4.1).Staff attributed this to the higher priority that local governments attached to the CSP employment programs and the initial reluctance of many families and religious leaders[20] to support the youth programs (Box 4.1). Once started, the activities unleashed a pent up demand for structured youth programs, especially sports. Some of the sporting events attracted large crowds and were widely publicized on TV and in local newspapers.

20 Close coordination with local political and religious leaders was critical to program acceptance as well as female participation in these programs.

Box 4.1. CSP Sponsors Tameem Soccer Tournament

According to the Ramadi City Mayor, organizing and supporting youth programs is "the key to preventing insurgents from making their way back into the community. Boys have nothing to do. They are angry when they hear from their fathers about how things used to be, when they see photographs of sports competitions at places that used to be respectable. What do they have now? What should they do with their time?"

Just before the final match between Tameem Quarter and Qadasiya neighborhoods got underway, the mayor walked across the soccer field and greeted the young men. "You are the future of Ramadi," the Mayor told them. "You should never forget what you have seen and what we have been through. This is our way forward. This is how we shall meet in this place today and every day in the future. The terrorists will not stop you from having soccer competitions and from enjoying yourselves. That is in the past."

This activity also illustrates the type of synergy that exists between youth engagement and other program components. Four months before the tournament, a CSP-sponsored CIES clean up campaign removed the garbage, junk cars, and other debris that prevented local youth from using the field. CSP, working through local community leaders, sports union members and local teachers, organized many of the young men that worked on the clean up campaigns into neighborhood soccer teams providing them with uniforms and equipment. Over a four-week period neighborhood teams competed with one another at local soccer fields recently cleaned up by projects sponsored by CSP or CATS (U.S. Military Civil Affairs Teams).

Source: IRD Information and Reporting Unit. CSP Briefing Papers. Project Title Tameem Soccer Tournament. Project Date May-June 2007.

By the end of the project, CSP's Youth activities had engaged 351,668 participants through various youth programs. This was 143 percent of the final target for the IPTT indicator used to track this activity (Annex 1).[21] The lower targets in the third year (Figure 4.1) are based on USAID's direction to place greater emphasis on conflict mitigation training through seminars and peace building training events (IBTCI 2009: 38). By that time, the level of local support for these programs—especially those related to sports—was such that the demand continued even when the project focus changed.

4.2.2. Activities. Team sports and competitions were the principal focus (41 percent), followed by life skills (31 percent), and arts (16 percent) (Figure 4.2).[22] Several youth centers were rehabilitated and revitalized with the basic supplies and equipment that they needed to be fully operational. CSP also sponsored a series of successful scout camps which brought together hundreds of youth from Al Anbar and other provinces throughout Iraq. In addition to the youth directly engaged, these activities attracted thousands of community members as fans or as teachers and audience participants. Programming was very flexible and varied widely

21 The data for this indicator is based on attendance rosters and participant lists from CSP sponsored youth activities that are part of the project documentation. This information collected by government staff and monitored by CSP youth and M&E staff.

22 Typical offerings under "life skills" were Arabic and English language training and writing courses, computer skills, and sewing classes. The "arts" courses included painting, theater, and music classes and performances.

Figure 4.2. CSP Funding for Youth Activities by Category (Years 1-3)
(Source: CSP Information and Reporting Unit, October 2009)



between city programs and between years based on the interest and support of local partners. When Iraq won the Asia cup, for example, CSP rolled out soccer tournaments that capitalized on the swell of enthusiasm for the sport.[23]

CSP's youth and conflict methodologies fell into the "soft violence and encounter program categories" of conflict mitigation methodologies with the primary purpose of changing attitudes of youth toward other people from different ethnic groups, religious, or tribal affiliations (IBTCI 2009: 14). Toward the end of the project, the program included a larger number of peace education activities.

4.3. Wider Impact

4.3.1. Institutional Impact. **Prior to IRD's intervention there had been a five-year gap in organized sports in most of Iraq's cities**. Although the local directorates of the Ministry of Youth Services (MOYS) had staff, they had no operating budget. CSP funded programs and helped the local directorates of the MOYS develop its private sector funding through a series of "corporate" sponsors. Each of the program's partners, including MOYS, developed new systems for managing program data like participant lists and costs with CSP assistance. There is anecdotal evidence from the CSP Final Report city workshops and IBTCI's evaluation that a high percentage of these corporate sponsorships and sports teams that CSP instituted are still functioning.[24] This is a major under-documented impact that continues to promote post-conflict stabilization.

4.3.2. Wider Impact on Conflict Mitigation. Although it is clear that CSP's youth activities were well received by the local communities, it is not possible to document their broader impact on conflict mitigation or attitudinal change based on the existing data sources (IBTCI 2009: 11)(Box 4.2). CSP had originally planned to document this impact through Indicator 7.2.1: "Percent of youth participants who indicate a positive change in their attitude toward conflict." USAID directed IRD to delete this indicator.

23 Cited as an example of best practice by IBTCI final evaluation of the youth component (IBTCI 2009: i).
24 The chief exception to this trend appears to be Mosul.

Box 4.2. Adult perceptions on changes in the level of violence in their community during the CSP youth engagement program

When asked if the decrease in violence could be attributed to CSP, everyone said it was not possible to directly attribute the decrease to the CSP program. However, they said they know that it was at least one of several contributing factors. They believed that CSP contributed to the decrease in violence and to other results. In fact, one member of a youth and sports committee council said that CSP had a greater role in decreasing the violence than the government. All groups said that the program taught tolerance and conflict mitigation. As a result of the program youth improved their skills, made new friends, and obtained a sense of normalcy, hope, and pride.

Source: IBTCI 2009: 10.

4.3.3. Cost Effectiveness. Efforts to compare the cost effectiveness of the CSP youth activities with other program components such as CIES, EG, and BDP (IBTCI 2009: 11-12) based on CSP's data spreadsheets were hampered by the lack of comparable units for tracking project engagement.[25] The same data constraints made it impossible to measure any "multiplier effect that sports events may have had in attracting crowds of spectators to these events and whether this resulted in any added normalizing /stabilizing benefit" (IBTCI 2009: 11).

4.4. Issues that Emerged and Resulting Lessons Learned

4.4.1. Issues. The principal issues were raised both by IBTCI's final evaluation and the participants attending the seven CSP final report workshops focused on:

- *Funding Levels*: The low funding levels (when compared with other activities such as CIES);
- *Activity Selection:* The concentration of these activities on "traditional" youth activities (sports, art programs) rather than new emerging areas or areas that responded to assessed needs like developing computer, language, and writing skills;
- *Staff Recruitment and Training:* In most cases one person in a city program and one person on the Iraq-wide team covered the VoTech/ Apprenticeship component and Youth. Given the size of the VoTech/ Apprenticeship budget relative to Youth, the person in charge was usually someone with an appropriate background to manage the VoTech component. This staffing pattern meant that there were few senior staff with experience in the design and management of youth programs in post-conflict zones;
- *Local Partnership:* Inadequate attention for the need to build the capacity of local government and to a lesser degree NGO partners about USAID standards for documentation and compliance as well as other skills that

25 The cost effectiveness of CIES's engagement was tracked using person months of short-term employment. The cost effectiveness of BDP and the VoTech and Apprenticeship programs activities was tracked based on the cost of creating one long-term job. The cost effectiveness of the youth programs was based on the person's engagement in a specific activity, which could range from one day to several months or a year depending on the type of activity.

might be needed to operate and monitor youth activities once CSP funding ended; and

- *Monitoring and Evaluation*
- Inadequate indicators and systems for monitoring the wider impact of the program;
- Inadequate indicators and systems for monitoring the execution and impact of the different conflict mitigation methodologies being used; and
- The lack of an effective methodology for assessing impact through external evaluations.

4.4.2. Lessons Learned.

Table 4.1. Issues that Emerged and Resulting Lessons Learned from the CSP Youth Engagement Activities

Issues	Lessons Learned
Funding Levels	--
Soft vs. Hard Investments	--
Activity Selection	Conduct baseline needs and interest surveys and monitor these regularly [12]*
Staff Recruitment and Training	Insure that the country wide team is led by an expert with experience in the design, implementation, and monitoring of youth programs or provide appropriate and consistent technical backstopping on these issues
Local Partnerships	Anticipate the need for working with local government partners to build their ability to develop corporate sponsorships and to track project participants and funding*
	Develop more formal transition strategies to ensure that local government agencies develop the organizational capacity and sources of funding that they need to maintain and build on the activities initiated by the COIN program as it phases out.*
M&E	Anticipate the special constraints and opportunities of evaluating the impact of youth programs that are designed to promote attitudinal change[13]
	Develop and track indicators that show a clear link between program interventions and resulting changes in youth behavior and attitudes in the official project IPTT*
	Consider supporting applied research (through the program) that examines the relationship between the change in behavior with those of adults in their communities*
	Employ a more comprehensive and systematic M&E of activities that continuously tracks participants over time and includes observations and interviews with spectators, audiences, and parents.*

*Included in IBTCI recommendation list. References on page 77.

5.0. Quantitative Evidence of Impact

CSP should be viewed as a COIN effort from the start, and not as a traditional development program. A successful CSP was expected to reduce unemployment rates and insurgency incidents and improve citizen perceptions of the local governments' capacity to provide services.

These indicators were developed by USAID officers and CSP during a three day workshop in June 2006 with its major implementing partners in the International Zone of Baghdad to discuss its strategic objectives (SOs) and develop Performance Management Plans (PMPs) with performance indicators and intermediate results for each SO. The project's progress toward achievement of these aims was measured through three indicators (Annex 1):

- **Indicator 7.1:** Perception of citizens of the effectiveness of local government to provide services;
- **Indicator 7.2:** Number of insurgent incidents reduced; and
- **Indicator 7.1.1:** Unemployment rate decreased.

This chapter describes the results based on these indicators and the issues and lessons learned from measuring project achievements.

5.1. Indicator 7.1: Perception of Citizens of the Effectiveness of Local Government to Provide Services

This SO outcome indicator was estimated through a survey-based index measuring Iraqi citizens' level of satisfaction with various local municipal services in each of the regions where CSP projects were implemented. The consolidated results were expressed in terms of the percentage of citizens satisfied with the level of services provided to them. The primary data was generated from the Citizen Satisfaction Review (CSR) surveys conducted by Lincoln Group utilizing baseline, 6-month, and 12-month time frames, implemented in the neighborhoods targeted by CSP.[26] A sample size of 400 households was used in neighborhoods where CSP was implementing activities. This sample size was determined based on a 5 percent acceptable margin of error.

CSP was expected to increase the overall level of satisfaction of Iraqi citizens from 28 to 36.2 percent[27] by the end of Year 3 (Annex 1.A). Based on the analysis of

26 A total of 55 surveys were implemented by the Lincoln Group between August 2006 and June 2009. Three surveys were performed for each city except Baghdad where surveys targeted its districts. In the Anbar cities of Hit and Haditha, only two surveys were conducted due to early close-out. Data was collected at three times (with 6-month separation) in all locations except Basra, Hilla, Tikrit, Samarra, and Beiji, where delays were experienced due to contracting issues.

27 In the CoAg, CSP was assigned the milestone of improving the overall level of citizen satisfaction by 20 percent on each survey period. This represents a target of 20 percent increase over the baseline level (28 percent) during the 6th month follow-up and 40 percent during the one year follow-up. The consolidated target of 36 percent is estimated as the average level between the six month follow-up (34 percent) and the one year follow-up (39 percent), derived from when cities entered the CSP portfolio at different points and at different stages of stabilization.

Figure 5.1: Targets vs. Achievement: Indicator 7.1: Perception of Citizens of the Effectiveness of Local Government to Provide Services (Source: CSP M&E Unit)



the Lincoln Group 6-month and the 12-month follow-up polling, the level of satisfaction actually decreased: from 28 to 26 percent (Annex 1).

This lower-than-expected-performance is attributed to several factors. First, the index used to measure satisfaction is a composite index. It aggregates nine service areas (health, education, security, water availability, safe drinking water, trash collection, debris removal, electricity, and sewage/drainage) into one indicator. The majority of these service areas, except trash collection and debris removal, were not supported directly by CSP and local governments were not consistently providing the other services to their citizens. As a result, Iraqis' satisfaction levels did not reach the anticipated predetermined milestone.

Second, starting from the middle of Year 2, CSP transferred all trash collection and debris removal projects to the GOI.[28] Since these were the only two service areas directly supported by the program this shift in program emphasis negatively impacted satisfaction levels. Finally, CSP close-out plans significantly reduced citizens' expectations regarding future improvements in the level of local municipal services delivered to them. The combined effects of these three constraints hindered progress and achievements.

Future CIES programs should anticipate the need for early and consistent capacity building of local government partners before turning these services over to them if building citizens' perception "of the effectiveness of local government" to provide these services is an important COIN objective. The rate of improvement from six to 12 month increments matched the targeted rate. Modifying

28 CSP's explanation of the transfer in its 2008 program proposal was: "The experience in Year 1 has demonstrated…that trash removal projects are often highly vulnerable to fraud. For this reason and to encourage municipal governments to take charge of this responsibility we began to transfer all trash removal projects in Baghdad in the first half of the year [Year 2] to local government…..CIES has also moved into more productive projects, which has a direct effect on the economy and job creation." (CSP 2008: 40).

targets at the six month mark based on performance results would have kept CSP projects closer to results within their own manageable interests, as well as compensating for external factors affecting satisfaction rates.

5.2. Indicator 7.1.1: Unemployment Rate Decreased

This IR-level indicator tracked the changes in unemployment rates in the CSP cities. The annual survey data collected and published by the World Bank and UNDP were used to measure this indicator. The baseline measurement for the indicator in the IPTT (15.94 percent) is based on the average unemployment rates for the years 2004 to 2006 (Appendix 1).

The Cooperative Agreement expected CSP to reduce the level of unemployment in the targeted cities by 1.25 percent in three years (from 15.94 percent to 15.8 percent). CSP was directly responsible for creating 57,109 long-term jobs through program implementation and 525,125 months of short-term employment in the 15 city programs. There were also a number of jobs created that were not directly associated with or measured by the program. Despite these major employment impacts, the recorded levels of unemployment in the affected cities increased rather than decreased: from 15.94 percent in Year 1 to 17.7 percent (Annex 1) Unemployment figures were reported by each Iraqi Governorate, and the baseline and endline measurements are averages derived from GOI statistics. Since CSP worked only in cities, governorate-wide unemployment figures absorb the positive variation in the increase of other unemployment factors.

Figure 5.2: Indicator 7.2. Number of Insurgent Incidents Reduced
(Source: CSP M&E Unit)



5.3. Indicator 7.2: Number of Insurgent Incidents Reduced

This SO-level outcome indicator measured the number of reported insurgent activities in the CSP targeted cities. The Department of Defense (DOD) daily insurgent attack data published by the Brookings Institution was used to measure this indicator.

The Cooperative Agreement expected CSP to reduce the daily level of insurgent attacks by 25 percent in three years. This represented a target of 8.33 percent reduction in daily attacks per year or 8.33, 16.66, and 25 percent, respectively, for Year 1, Year 2 and Year 3 of the grant. With respect to the baseline figure, 10.6 daily insurgent attacks, the estimated targets were 9.7, 8.8, and 8.0 percent, respectively, for each of the three years. The consolidated target of 8.8 in the CSP IPTT (Annex 1) is the average of the three years' targets.

The LOA achievement for this indicator was 9.0 average daily attacks (Annex 1). While this achievement is outstanding, it is obviously not due to CSP alone. The success obtained was the result of a combined effort associated with CSP activities, in particular the military surge, the "Sunni Awakening" effect (tribal leaders), and potentially a host of other contributing factors. This noted, it is fair to claim that CSP—by virtue of the size of its investment—did contribute to the achievement of reducing the number of daily attacks.

Table 5.1. Regression Results: Indicator 7.2: Number of Daily Insurgent Attacks in Iraq during the Time Period Covered by CSP (Year 1-3)

	Daily Attacks	Cost	Cumulative Cost
Daily Attacks	1		
Cost by Quarter	-.37027	1	
Cumulative Cost	-.95056	.56044	1

Between the baseline and Year 3, the average number of daily attacks dropped by about 87 percent—from a daily average of 18.7 attacks at baseline to 1.4 at the end of Year 3 (Figure 5.2). Like the consolidated target of 8.8, the consolidated LOA achievement (9.0) is an average of these three-year trends. This time period coincides with CSP's activities, the military surge, and other relevant factors. Results also support that after Year 1, achievements always exceeded the targets (Figure 5.2).

The coefficient of correlations between the total and the cumulative program cost of CSP and the number of daily insurgent attacks shows that CSP costs are negatively correlated with the daily number of attacks (Table 5.1). As the level of CSP spending increased, the number of daily attacks decreased.

A regression model expressing the number of daily insurgent attacks as a function of the cumulative program cost reveals that every $100 million invested lowered the number of daily attacks by 5.6 (Appendix 1). This estimate is robust even

Figure 5.3: Cumulative CSP Cost and the Number of Daily Insurgent Attacks in Iraq
(Source: CSP M&E)



with a tolerated level of error of less than 1 percent. The overall model is significant with a coefficient of determination of about 90 percent.

Figure 5.3 illustrates the relationship between the cumulative program cost and the number of daily attacks by quarter since the beginning of CSP. The trend reversal in the number of daily attacks occurs when the rate of spending reached a maximum (between Quarter 4 and Quarter 6). That period corresponds to the time when the military surge was implemented so it is difficult to disaggregate the impact of CSP from these other factors. The impact would have been even greater had the project been able to disaggregate the numbers for the specific areas where CSP intervened rather than the entire governorate. Future COIN programs need to supplement this type of macro-level indicator with more "micro" level indicators that measure insurgent activity in the actual target areas and are able to filter multivariate causes.

5.4. Issues that Emerged and Resulting Lessons Learned

In conclusion, despite ample anecdotal evidence that was confirmed by official USAID/Iraq M&E contractor (IBTCI) during its external reviews that CSP had had an impact on the achievement of the principal COIN objectives in the target areas where it intervened, neither the IBTCI nor IRD could very accurately document this impact except with one of the official indicators—Indicator 7.2: Number of insurgent incidents reduced (Box 5.1). The critical question for this report and future COIN initiatives is why? If so, what is the lesson learned for COIN? If not, what is the lesson learned for the monitoring and evaluation of future COIN programs?

Box 5.1. IBTCI Statements Concerning the Difficulties They Experienced with Measuring CSP's Impacts with the Official Impact Indicators

"Measures employed by those responsible for CSP (and at times imposed on them…) too often reflect outputs rather than the extent to which program components impacted coalition and host national objectives." (IBTCI 2009: 16)

"A more viable set of impact indicators is needed to assess CSP effectiveness and causal/correlative linkages (attribution) between CSP projects and program objectives. These indicators will likely vary according to local conditions and the level of security in place. The set of impact indicators for CSP needs to be commonly agreed from the on-set by the three main U.S. government actors—DOD, DOS, USAID—at field (PRT) levels with a view toward transition and eventual handover of each CSP component to the local authorities concerned." (IBTCI 2009: 20).

5.4.1. Issues.

Indicators: One of the challenges illustrated by the project results reported was simply the initial choice of indicators. Most of the CSP output indicators were taken verbatim from the PMP indicators for USAID SO7 without a fully comprehensive review prior to adopting them, and were development metrics as opposed to COIN-specific metrics.

During the first and second year when the emphasis was on short-term job creation, there was very little interest or concern with tracking the project's higher level indicators. As the USAID portfolio became more focused on post-stabilization planning (February 2008), this emphasis shifted. It is at this point that both USAID and CSP realized the difficulty of tracking CSP's COIN results based on the third-party output indicators that they had. IRD then began to strengthen its commitment to experienced staff leadership and technical assistance for the CSP M&E unit: a new director and additional Iraq-wide staff were added, as well as an IRD headquarters M&E position.

While these indicators expressed the global objectives of SO7 on the USAID strategic plan, all but one—the number of insurgent incidents—did not meet the M&E objectives of being "SMART" (i.e., "Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound," meaning they have a clear beginning and end). The way the data were collected for all three indicators meant that it was impossible to compare intervention areas with non-intervention areas or to examine the link between project activities being tracked by the performance indicators and COIN objectives being measured by the outcome indicators 7.1, 7.2 and 7.1.1 (Table 5.2).

Targets: When USAID/FSO assigned various CSP milestones in the original Cooperative Agreement, neither the causal links nor critical assumptions justifying the milestones were spelled out. This lack of clarity made the process of revising annual targets frustrating for everyone involved: USAID, IBTCI, and IRD.

Indicator 7.1.1.1 relative to the "Number of person months (PM) of employment generated for short-term employment" achieved under CSP is exceeded by 20 percent. This performance should however be linked to the methodology used to estimate PM. It was assumed that levels of short-term average daily employment follow a uniform distribution. Accordingly, PM determination should be based on the maximum level of effort reached every week using the daily average employment achieved. This methodology is more easily applied to calculate PM but has the potential to bias results upward the more the real distribution of labor deviates from a uniform distribution. This might have been true with some infrastructure projects that were labor-intensive initially and then became progressively more capital-intensive during the last phases of the project life. An alternative way to measure PM would be to avoid the concept of level of effort and to measure the average daily employment achieved every week and use it as the base of estimating the PM. However, this method would also suffer from extreme values of average daily employment.

Indicator 7.1.1.2 relative to the "Number of long-term jobs directly created" is overachieved by 34 percent. While this performance is remarkable, one should keep in mind that unlike what was originally planned, long-term employment generation comes from several program components. This includes BDP grants, post-apprentices employed under an employment agreement, VoTech graduates employed, and CSP local national staff. While the planned BDP grant employment accounted for about 75 percent of total long-term jobs, the contribution of the other components significantly added to total achievement. Long-term jobs generated from those other sources are more challenging to predict since they depend on others factors beyond the control of CSP, for example the real employment potential of the Iraqi labor markets. These positive spill-over effects on total long-term employment have contributed to the 34 percent overachievement.

Indicator 7.1.2.1 relative to the "Number of participants completing vocational skills training" is overachieved by 15 percent. From the lessons learned of Year 1, vocational training was perceived as an efficient tool to gain longer-term benefits in stabilization programs. This overachievement is largely associated with the reallocation of CSP resources in response to requests by the U.S. military, PRT teams, and local officials who advocated for more vocational training activities.

Indicator 7.2.1 relative to the "Number of youth participating in non-formal education programs" is overachieved by 43 percent. Initially, during Year 1 of the program, the lack of clear definitions on the methods of estimating the number of participants, in association with the lack of historical data sets on the nature of the sport activities (soccer, volley-ball, ping-pong, etc.), lead to the over-counting of quarterly outputs. This might have led in turn to an overachievement of results. Moreover, shifting youth strategies because of the increasing violence in many CSP cities have increased the number of youth activities in several cities. For example, following recommendations made after coordination meetings with the PRT and the U.S. military, the number of youth activities has been increased in cities like Mosul and more recently Baquba. The decision of extending youth activities to

more vulnerable insurgent targets including widows has also contributed to the increase in the number of youth participants.

5.4.2. Lessons Learned.

Initial Indicator Choice: Future COIN programs should match indicators with activities more closely in terms of measuring project results. Analytical comparisons using third party (or national level) data are helpful for contextualizing results, but not for reporting on project results. Implementing partners should work with USAID to identify a reasonable list of indicators to start with that provide a direct measurable link between the COIN programs activities and the desired outputs. Both USAID and its partners need to anticipate that some indicators will work and others will not. For this reason it is advisable to start with several indicators rather than just one for each of the critical program intermediate results.

Table 5.2. SMART Assessment of CSP Indicators

Indicator 7.1: Perception of citizens of the effectiveness of local government to provide services;

Indicator 7.2: Number of insurgent incidents reduced; and

Indicator 7.1.1: Unemployment rate decreased.

SMART Objectives for Outputs and Indicators	CSP Outcome Indicators			Why?
	7.1	7.2	7.1.1	
Specific	No	No	No	Several factors affect outcome
Measurable	No	Yes	No	Measurement hard to standardize between sites
Measurable	Yes	Yes	Yes	Third party measurement and sample frame did not permit comparison of areas with and without project intervention
Achievable (based on project inputs and within project time frame with normal risk levels)	No	No	No	Given the impact of other factors on output hard to see a direct link between output and project activities
Relevant	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Time-bound	No	Yes	No	Hard to time active measurement or insure that third party making measurement (World Bank, UNDP) collected the data at the same point in the project cycle for each city program (to assess impact)

Source: IBTCI 2009: 20-21.mandated indicators (Box 5.1.).

Applied Research: Future Requests for Applications (RFA) need to anticipate the staff time, budget, and flexibility in reporting that implementing partners will need to determine whether or not an indicator is working. Within a relatively short time, this type of applied research should generate the types of validated indicator lists and guidance for specific stability operations that the DOD and

USAID need to track and compare COIN program components and different activities to support different COIN components.

Staff Training: Staff need M&E training if they are to work as active partners in identification and tracking of output indicators. This means having trained staff on board from the start and making sure that staff members understand the critical importance of periodic reports that analyze the link between their performance indicators and the higher level indicators being used to measure the COIN outputs of a specific program.

Playing soccer at a CSP-sponsored youth tournament.

Harvesting the first crop after receiving a business expansion grant from CSP.

6.0. Major Cross-Cutting Lessons Learned

Given the scale of CSP there was a great deal of interest in extrapolating major lessons learned. Although CSP's indicators measured outputs, USAID was interested in:[29]

- Identifying the critical issues that affected CSP's achievement of these outputs (i.e. "Why outputs were the way they were?"); and
- Identifying major lessons learned from dealing with these issues (i.e. "What could future programs do differently?").

This chapter summarizes the major issues that affected CSP's principal outputs under the two IRs it was to achieve as well as the global crosscutting lessons learned from dealing with these issues in three areas:

- 6.1. COIN Implementation Strategy
- 6.2. Management and Staffing:
  - 6.2.1. Human Resources (Staffing)
  - 6.2.2. Critical Partnerships
  - 6.2.3. Management Systems
- 6.3. Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting

To facilitate the formulation of general lessons learned, the analysis focuses on providing a brief overview of what was successful, what was unsuccessful (and why) and lessons learned. This analysis is based on:

- The data and lessons learned analysis in Chapters 1-5 of this report;
- The SWOT analyses of specific project sub-components that were conducted as part of the seven CSP Final Report city workshops in June and October 2009;
- The "lessons learned" and "best practice" analysis that CSP's international staff conducted during at three day retreat and one month learning process that fed into the preparation of the FY08 program plan for the project;[30] and
- IBTCI's external evaluations of each of the project sub-components and final evaluation of the entire project (Annex 3).

More specific lessons learned with specific recommendations for future projects are described throughout the report in relevant sections.

29 Letter from Jeffery Goebel to Jane Thompson. September 29, 2009.
30 IRD. 2008. USAID/Iraq. Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Modification. Program Description. June 29, 2008. Arlington, VA: IRD. Pages 19-32,

6.1. COIN Implementation Strategies

The CSP four components were an effective vehicle for achieving its principal COIN objectives, which included:

- **CIES** (Community Infrastructure and Essential Services): Improving citizens perceptions of local governments ability to rehabilitate basic infrastructure and rehabilitation essential social and sanitation services;
- **EG** (Employment Generation): Mitigating short-term unemployment and the opportunities for more long-term unemployment, which were two of the principal economic causal factors contributing to the insurgency;
- **BDP** (Business Development Program): Stimulating the preconditions to economic stability by helping revitalize the small business sector through small business development programs; and
- **Youth:** Facilitating conflict mitigation through large-scale programs to engage youth in civic education, sports, life skills, and arts programs.

The analysis of project data and variation between programs in project effectiveness and impact shows that:

- *Implementation Strategies*: Certain CSP project components (CIES, VoTech, BDP, and Youth) and sub-components like micro, small, and medium sized BDP grants were more cost effective than others in achieving these important COIN objectives;
- *Component Integration*: The most successful, cost-effective programs were those in which there was tight community and national level coordination between the different program components in order to build on project synergies; and
- *Gender Patterns of Participation and Impact*: Although women were not initially targeted by the project, their progressively greater incorporation into activities enhanced the project's achievement of important COIN objectives.

6.2. Management and Staffing

6.2.1. Human Resources. Given the security situation, Iraqi national staff members were the face, ears, and eyes of a COIN project: this is likely to be the case for any COIN initiative. They cannot perform their jobs properly, however, without well trained, motivated expatriate managers who have the background and management experience needed to manage a large staff and sizeable budget under difficult conditions. The most successful CSP city programs were those that benefited from consistent expatriate leadership from a POD with sufficient program and financial management experience to develop the national staff hiring, management and reporting systems needed to manage the city program. Future COIN programs modeled on CSP need to:

- Strengthen systems for recruiting, training, and backstopping international staff to help minimize staff turnover; and

- Anticipate the need for decentralized recruitment and training of national staff and, once the project is established, a clearly enunciated pattern of national staff promotion and advancement to build staff capacity and increase project impact.

6.2.2. Critical Partnerships. A critical factor that contributed to CSP's successful implementation of its city programs was the PODs' development and management of strong partnerships with multi-national coalition forces, the PRTs, and E-PRTs, and local government partners in the areas where they worked. These partnerships were a mixed blessing however, since too close a partnership with any one partner could jeopardize the project's effectiveness within these areas. Also, coordination was important to the success of the city programs, and yet collaboration without management direction can pull a project out of its planned design. Future COIN programs should model CSP's examples of best practice within its program for:

- *Military:* Routing all coordination with the military through the PODs to minimize any direct association, which can jeopardize civilian implementers activities.
- *PRT:* Encouraging more active coordination and review of project proposals and reporting data by the non-military PRTs; and
- *Local Government:* Strong collaboration with local governments that is informed by:
- In-depth knowledge of the social, political, tribal, cultural, and resource realities fueling the insurgency in their particular area of operation; and
- Solid systems for monitoring social parity in the areas where the project intervenes in order to: 1) increase the effectiveness of project communication with the local governments and community leaders, and 2) achieve COIN objectives of the delivery of essential services, reduced unemployment, and insurgency.

6.2.3. Management Systems. Basic project systems for any development project include basic management, anti-corruption, quality assurance and quality control, finance, contracts, bidding, and archival systems. During the first two years of CSP, significant progress was made on the clarification of operational procedures through updates of the field manual, on environmental compliance issues, and on the separation of functions like QA/QC and M&E. Several cities, including Bagdad, Kirkuk, Hilla, and Basra, had their QA/QC units separated from their M&E units. Others cities, because of their particularities, separated the two units but for practical reasons, kept the same manager to operate them.

Future COIN programs should:

- Anticipate the need for having in place a harmonized system of basic management systems, tools, and training manuals (e.g. anti-corruption, QA/QC, financial management, contracting, bidding, and archival systems).

- Consider having a city program "start-up" team that will work with PODs and POOs for the first three months of a city program to oversee: a) hiring and recruitment; and b) the creation of basic management and training systems.

6.3. Monitoring and Evaluation

One of the strengths of the CSP project was its attention to the development of an independent M&E system and a rigorous system for insuring the quality of the data being reported to USAID. The chief weaknesses of CSP's M&E system were:

- The project's failure to develop a separate set of outcome indicators, that could be measured that would parallel USAID's PMP outcome indicators; and
- The lack of effective M&E leadership in the design of data collection and data entry methodologies until the middle of the second year.

USAID needs to ensure that future COIN programs highlight the critical importance of implementing partners' developing an effective M&E system and the necessary staff positions, training programs, and data management systems to support this.

Future projects should:

- Anticipate the need to have senior M&E staff, staffing models, data collection and data entry, and analysis methodologies in place prior to rolling out field programs.
- Anticipate the need to develop appropriate indicators that are capable of tracking site specific impacts as well as national level impacts and train project staff to collect and/or participate in the collection and analysis of this information.
- Anticipate the need for appropriate reporting and archive systems that are compatible with donor expectations for timely reporting and analysis of project trends and impacts.

6.4. Lessons Learned

Table 6.4 presents the key lessons learned derived from what worked well and what did not work as well.

Table 6.4 Lessons Learned: What Worked, What Didn't Work as Well, and Lessons Learned

What Worked	What Didn't Work or Worked Less Well	Lessons Learned
6.1. Implementation Strategies		
6.1.1. CIES		
Delivery of aid in a non-traditional USAID operating environment; CIES projects were an effective model for supporting COIN objectives generating short-term employment, catalyzing indirect long-term government employment, and improving local citizens' perceptions about the effectiveness of local government.	The effectiveness and impact of the CIES supported services was reduced once the execution of these programs was transitioned to Iraqi government agencies. This in turn effected the "perception of citizens of the effectiveness of local government to provide essential services," which was a major COIN objective.	Future CIES initiatives should anticipate the need to build the capacity of local partners to execute and maintain CIES supported infrastructure and to avoid transitioning these projects to them until a certain demonstrated level of capacity is in place.
6.1.2. EG Vocational and Apprenticeship Programs		
The vocational training and apprenticeship program was a popular component of the program because it provided sustained employment and technical training to vulnerable youth in existing and emerging technical fields.	This project component was, however, less efficient in generating direct and indirect long-term employment due to: 1) the need for extensive up front investment in training infrastructure, curricula, and teacher recruitment and training; and 2) the amount of effort needed to place apprentices and facilitate trainees gaining long-term employment.	Future COIN programs should: 1) Prioritize their investment in vocational training to locations with established, functioning programs and areas where the project plans to be active for at least two years. 2) Strengthen their development of "on the job" training programs as well as government and private sector job placement services that link trained unemployed persons with new and existing employers and BDP grants. 3) Link CSP directly with the international community development programs in country to avoid gaps and decrease unemployment.

What Worked	What Didn't Work or Worked Less Well	Lessons Learned
6.1.3. BDP Business Development Programs		
The BDP grants (as a general category) were the most effective mechanism for generating quick start longer employment and were a highly effective tool for achieving short term COIN objectives of poverty alleviation for the low income households that were among the most vulnerable for joining insurgent groups.	Although the medium grants ($25,000-$100,000) were less cost effective (in terms of cost per job created) the successful grants —especially those in manufacturing—had the greatest impact in terms of creating longer-term employment.	Future COIN programs should include BDP in their strategy for "quick start" longer-term employment and to build their capacity to identify and support development of successful medium scale grants especially in areas with the greatest potential for facilitating job creation (eg. agriculture and small scale manufacturing).
6.1.4. Youth Engagement Programs		
CSP Youth engagement activities helped reinvigorate a wide range of community-based youth programs that were appreciated by local citizens and political leaders.	Although peace and civics education was central to the design and execution of the community based youth activities, there was no consistent model for assessing the effectiveness or impact of the different methodologies. As a result it was not possible to assess the impact of these activities on the achievement of the wider COIN objectives.	Future COIN programs should anticipate the need for more effective systems for assessing the success of these programs through the design of appropriate indicators, applied research, and assessment methodologies.
6.1.5. Coordination Between Program Implementation Components		
The most successful and highly visible CSP city programs were those in which different components were integrated to achieve a focused impact on a particular area like a market or agricultural rehabilitation.	This type of integration was not always achieved due to: 1) failure on the part of PODs to plan effectively; or 2) insecurity.	Tight integration of, and synergies between, different project components should be the goal of a COIN initiative. This is not always possible however, in a war zone where the security situation can change daily.

What Worked	What Didn't Work or Worked Less Well	Lessons Learned
6.1.6. Gender Issues		
Vulnerable women were not one of the original target groups for CSP. Over time, the CSP programs increased female participation in the EG and BDP sectors. These activities had a higher impact on vulnerable women's short-term and longer-term employment. These activities were greatly appreciated by USAID and local governments as a way to counter the emerging trend of more and more women—especially war widows—joining the insurgency.	Had the project been more effective in developing vocational and job placement services for women, these positive impacts could have been greater.	Future COIN initiatives should consider female heads of household as an important target audience in their design and execution.
6.2. Management and Staffing		
6.2.1. Human Resources		
6.2.1.1. International Staff		
Strong implementation partners can serve as an extension of USAID competence; strong effective international staff members were critical to CSP's coordination with the U.S. military, USAID and local government partners. The most effective PODs –i.e. that were most effective in enhancing program impact, mitigating liability, and strengthening program and fiscal/technical compliance in a COIN environment—were those who had strong management backgrounds as well as an employment background that equipped them for working in a post-conflict environment. A working knowledge of the local language (in this case, either Arabic or Kurdish) in either the POO or POD was also an asset.	Frequent rotation of international staff due to the stress of the environment created management issues at the central level and occasionally frustration and inconsistent reporting at the city level. Given the need for very quick start-up, management systems were not fully up and running during the first year.	1) Develop a clear profile for the technical, management, and cultural skills that PODS and POOs need to successfully execute and monitor a COIN program. 2) Anticipate the need for a lengthy, well-organized "book" and "on site" training of new staff on programmatic, M&E, and compliance issues before field placement. 3) Anticipate the need to train administrators in psycho-social support to staff to maintain morale and reduce turnover.

What Worked	What Didn't Work or Worked Less Well	Lessons Learned
6.2.1.2. National Staff		
A strong national staff will allow an implementing partner with strong support from USAID to deliver services to conflict areas prior to establishment of a permissible environment. Given the security challenges of visiting field sites, local staff members are the representatives of a COIN initiative to the public. CSP was able to attract very qualified Iraqi citizens to work with the program and provide highly skilled support.	Not all areas within a country will have the same base of educated staff given historic inequities in the placements of universities and schools.	Anticipate the need for basic and continuous training of staff and appropriate mechanisms for providing this training through on-site technical assistance, exchange visits, and formal training programs that can be adjusted to the ebb and flow of insecurity within a region.
Given the wide range of variation in ethnic groups and the need for staff that are known and respected locally, recruitment was highly decentralized.	Central project oversight by expatriate staff is necessary to ensure that hiring processes are transparent.	Anticipate the need to decentralize recruiting with technical oversight from international staff.
Staff faced many threats in executing their work that the PODs and POOs tried to minimize by tight coordination with the CSP security detail.	Experience showed that these risks were higher at project sites without dedicated international security specialists to oversee the security of the national staff. This problem coincided with more remote management and offsite POD and POO supervision.	1) Anticipate and try to reduce the security risks to staff at four levels: a) in their home community, b) commuting to work, c) at the project office, and d) during field visits. 2) Empower one member of the national staff to provide the international POD and head of the international security detail continuous feedback on security issues from the perspective of the national staff.

What Worked	What Didn't Work or Worked Less Well	Lessons Learned
Considerations of staff concerns and administrative changes (like creating on-site canteens and regular staff meetings with international staff, and creating senior Iraqi staff management positions) improved staff motivation, productivity, and impact in some of the CSP city programs.	Conversely, failure to address these issues had a negative impact on staff morale and turnover and project execution and impact in some of the city programs.	Anticipate the need for creating more senior national staff positions in the second phase of a project to motivate staff and minimize the negative impact of international staff turnover.
6.2.1.3. Headquarters IRD Staff		
IRD headquarters provided valuable technical assistance to the project.	During the first year, the demand for field staff was too often met by redeploying HQ backstop staff to the field. This limited HQ backup and slowed the development of key management systems.	Future COIN initiatives need to anticipate an adequate budget for headquarters staff and technical assistance of field programs.
6.2.2. Critical Partnerships: Military and PRT's		
Military: IRD could not have executed its city programs without close collaboration between the PODs and the multinational coalition forces. This same collaboration with the U.S. military facilitated the project's access, safety, and supervision in dangerous areas and accorded a greater degree of protection (for national staff) in dangerous areas. In a few cases, the U.S. military supplemented program funds on specific projects from non-CSP sources. There were several examples where the military was asked to check on activities (i.e. whether they were being executed as they were supposed to be through local contractors) in areas that the project staff couldn't access to due insecurity. Most PODs were very careful, however, to maintain the autonomy of the project and to minimize site visits by military partners in order to differentiate CSP and continue to earn the respect of the local population.	Many of the initial projects and goals were chosen in response to military objectives. This in turn impacted projects on all levels, including metrics, types of projects, and cost. The lines of authority and responsibility between the implementing partners, USAID, and the PRT were complex. Seeking necessary approval from USAID created additional steps prior to project implementation.	1) Active communication between the POD and the military can increase staff safety and improve project supervision in dangerous areas. 2) PODs need to buffer their national staff from direct contact with the military (however well-intended) in order to protect their staff. 3) Inform PRTs of the requirement to work through CTOs to provide direction to implementing partners. Implementing partner staff should ensure that the CTO has approved actions. 4) For discussion of best practices, see Annex 5.

What Worked	What Didn't Work or Worked Less Well	Lessons Learned
PRTs: In each city, PRTs and e-PRTs were active partners. This collaboration facilitated the paperwork that the sub-directorates needed to submit to get projects approved. This collaboration was more important in the first year of the program.	In many city programs, the PRTs were merely a "transit zone" for documents prepared by the government "Directorates." Lack of active review of the project proposals they presented to CSP meant that there was often duplication. PRT members were not always briefed about CSP activities prior to their deployment.	1) Future programs should encourage the PRTs to take a more active review of the projects and sites when they are still in the stabilization phase. Once stabilization is achieved, the PRTs' continuing involvement is a non-issue since they are dissolved.
Local Governments: CSP's active involvement with local governments distinguished it from most of the other community development and relief activities that were active in Iraq. This involvement helped facilitate the identification of project sites and individuals to be involved in public works and vocational training. Since local government officials were always better versed at identifying at risk individuals and youth, their participation helped target CSP's activities in ways that reduced insurgency.	At the same time, local governments were less democratic in their treatment of different ethnic groups (i.e. tending to favor the ethnic groups that they belonged to or the ones in the districts that elected them). The local governments' slow administrative review process was the source of many delays in project execution. If the local governments are not consulted, they can block execution; if they are too involved they can distort the project.	1) PODs and POOs need extensive briefings and updates from the local PRTs, military, and central management of their project to insure that they understand the social, political, tribal, and cultural resource realities fueling insurgency. 2) PODs need to anticipate the need for active monitoring of parity between rival social and political groups to ensure that COIN activities do not inadvertently inflame them. 3) Close monitoring of local socio-political issues is critical to effective negotiation with local governments.
6.2.3. Management Systems		
CSP's city programs developed a wide range of management systems such as anti-corruption, QA/QC, financial management, contracting, bidding, and archiving that are well adapted to a COIN environment.	The majority of these systems were fully developed during the first and second year of project execution. The process of developing appropriate management systems was the source of financial and programming complications.	1) Anticipate the need for having in place a harmonized system of basic management systems, tools, and training manuals (e.g. anti-corruption, QA/QC, financial management, contracting, bidding, and archival systems). 2) Consider having a city program "start-up" team that will work with PODS and POOs for the first three months of a city program to oversee a) hiring and recruitment; and b) the creation of basic management and training systems.

What Worked	What Didn't Work or Worked Less Well	Lessons Learned
6.3. Monitoring and Evaluation Systems		
	The original Request for Assistance (RFA) for the CSP project did not make M&E a priority.	Future USAID RFAs should require implementing partners to develop detailed M&E plans (if PMP indicators exist) and/or outline a process for collaboration with USAID in the development and reporting of appropriate performance and impact indicators.
A major strength of the project was the development of an autonomous M&E staff in each city program. During the second year, the responsibilities of this unit were clearly separated from the QA/QC compliance role.	The first M&E Director was unable to develop an adequate reporting system. This led to the development of a parallel reporting system using spreadsheets through the project's information and reporting unit. Project models for reporting indicators on the spreadsheets changed several times over the course of the project (Annex 3).	1) Ensure that the project has a M&E Director with an appropriate background, preferably in conflict and post-conflict situations on the senior management team from the start. 2) Integrate all senior management and HQ staff affiliated with the project in the conceptualization and "roll out" of a project reporting and M&E system in conjunction with the basic management system "roll out" of each city program. 3) Require basic training and retraining in the project's M&E system—including the measurement and analysis of performance and impact indicator of all project staff at least once a year. 4) Facilitate senior national staff's analysis of project M&E data in quarterly reports.

What Worked	What Didn't Work or Worked Less Well	Lessons Learned
The CSP project's performance (monitoring) indicators were designed to be compatible with the indicators being used to track USAID's PMP for Iraq. These performance indicators were the primary focus of reporting to USAID during the first 1.5 years of the project when both USAID and CSP were focused on developing rapid short-term employment.	Data collection for the project's impact indicators was subcontracted and/or "borrowed" from ongoing USAID-funded or other donor-funded data sets. This meant that the city program staff had little understanding of the impact indicators and no analysis of the link between the project's performance indicators and the achievement of the project's global impacts until the CSP Final Report workshops.	Indicators 1) Supplement donor required outcome indicators in the project IPTT with outcome indicators that can be measured by project staff using local project or contractor resources to facilitate more region-specific analyses of project impact. 2) Build staff capacity to collect and analyze the data needed to measure the programs' outcome indicators (both donor mandated and project developed) either independently or in collaboration with outside contractors. 3) Encourage M&E staff to conduct city-specific analyses of project data that can be shared with program staff in order to a) compare the cost effectiveness and impact of project components in different cities; and b) facilitate early identification of implementation problems.
At the request of the military, CSP developed a series of weekly briefing papers that reported on the project's performance indicators and success stories.	The weekly reports became the engine driving city programs reporting and detracted from staff's capacity to develop more in-depth analyses of city program effectiveness in terms of cost and the achievement of the project's outcome indicators in the quarterly reports.	Develop a project system for archiving city specific documents as well as all official reports and complementary data systems and "roll" this system out as part of the basic start-up management package in each city program. The CSP archive, which was developed by the CSP reporting and information officer, is an example of best practice.

6.5 Lessons Learned for Future COIN Programs

This report summarizes the results, context, and major lessons learned from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded counter-insurgency (COIN) initiative in Iraq—the Community Stabilization Program (CSP). CSP was implemented with funding from USAID over a 41-month period between May 2006 and October 31, 2009 to support USAID/Iraq's Strategic Objective 7: Reduced incentives for participating in conflicts in selected communities. As a three-year program designed to complement broader counter-insurgency efforts, CSP is unique and non-traditional for USAID, and, with total funding of $648 million, it is the largest USAID-funded cooperative agreement ever to date. Although CSP shared many elements of earlier post-conflict stabilization efforts in Iraq, it also focused on reducing the incentives for participation in violent conflict by employing or engaging at-risk youth, ages 17 to 35. To achieve this objective, CSP design focused on two intermediate results (IRs):

- IR 7.1 unemployment rate decreased
- IR 7.2 conflict mitigated through increased community activities.

There are a number of lessons learned, based on IRD's implementation of the Community Stabilization Program, which can guide any subsequent COIN programming. The IBTCI July 22, 2009 *Evaluation of USAID's Community Stabilization Program (CSP) in Iraq: Effectiveness of the CSP Model as a Non-Lethal Tool for Counterinsurgency* (referenced in the report bibliography) was tasked with not only evaluating CSP directly, but also in evaluating the model itself. This section of the CSP Final Report uses that report as a resource, as well as lessons learned from IRD's own implementing teams (local and expatriate) for CSP as well as other large-scale war zone environments.

6.5.1. Project Structure. Having a single cooperative agreement provides the implementing partner the flexibility to quickly coordinate between components and achieve synergies, which are critical to the success of a program faced with implementation across a large number of project sites and a variety of program channels. A single implementing partner also permits the close coordination that is required in insecure zones between the military, the donor, and the implementer. Furthermore, a single implementing partner is able to provide project management systems that offer the advantages of economies of scale (a single structure for common good resources, particularly with critical issues such as security) and scope (experience in one region or city may be utilized in another region or city).

6.5.2. Project Management. There are three key lessons learned from project management on CSP. The first of these is the importance of the start-up function. The second is the relative volume of management required, and the third is the quantity and quality of managers required.

A vital part of managing a project—be it national or regional—is the importance of a start-up team. Basic systems of logistics, finance, compliance, IT, administration, and HR can and should be the "first out of the gate" elements put into

place. As staff members come on-line, they can find systems already functional and fine-tuned to the country realities. Putting an experienced field team in place with a start-up manual means getting systems into place much faster, and training staff who can then implement as soon as they deploy to their posts.

One of the hardest skills to acquire is the ability to manage projects effectively. A project responsible for thousands of grants, hundreds of thousands of financial transactions, hundreds of staff requires a team commensurate with the volume of work so that details are known and issues are effectively addressed. Establishing this team requires significant investment in recruiting people and training them to manage both at the field level and at headquarters. Routinized workload assessments can help the program determine whether and when additional staff may be required (or removed), or used as indicators for additional training.

Recruitment of staff in a conflict zone presents unique challenges. Few staff will have a background in working under such conditions, and frequent rotation is required given the stress of the environment. Ensuring the continuity of program implementation requires broad-based training to give staff the flexibility to cover additional responsibilities as relatively experienced colleagues depart and to train newcomers as they arrive. Standardizing processes helps create a supportive environment by providing structure and facilitating the provision of both formal and on-the-job training. Such structure is a key to ensuring positive psycho-social support and permits a steady pattern of R&R rotation with minimal programmatic impact.

6.5.3. Finance. A finance start-up team starts with robust systems, trains incoming staff, and establishes periodic controls and oversight mechanisms. In some cases, existing banks were available while in others, cash management systems had to be implemented. There should be finance officers who routinely work with the field/regional teams to improve skills, review reports and processes, and make the necessary changes on a routine basis. There need to be internal audit teams that review all of the documentation at the start of the project to make sure that the process is correct and adequate, and then on at least an annual basis. Projects over a certain resource threshold should also institute periodic and unscheduled financial reviews, as well as routine internal audits on a rotating basis.

6.5.4. Compliance. Compliance is critical throughout all activities. It represents a consistent challenge, particularly when access is problematic. Compliance needs to permeate the organization. The implementer must work with the donor agency and under local law. It is also important that the different compliance elements (for contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements) are both clearly spelled out and conveyed to other stakeholders. When the military, PRTs, local governments, and others request the implementing partner to take on a specific activity, USAID approval must be obtained. Any change to the project (scope, cost, or coverage) needs to be documented.

The implementing partner must be capable of effectively controlling hundreds of thousands of documents in a location sufficiently isolated from the conflict

zone so that auditors, USAID and implementing partner personnel, and others can complete required reviews. Massive programs are going to generate massive amounts of paper. Each activity should have a checklist of required documents so that a QA/QC function can note what has been received or what is pending (with a system to manage delinquencies). There are software packages that can help with both the tracking and managing the stored documents. An early determination should be made as to whether documents will be kept in original paper-based form or in electronic versions, and how and where they will be archived.

6.5.5. The Challenge of Corruption. Corruption is always a challenge in development scenarios, and especially so in the middle of a conflict area. The vast sums being spent in Iraq, by the military as well as civilian authorities, naturally attracted the attention and avarice of a variety of "bad apples," and extraordinary efforts were made during implementation to compensate for the temptation presented by so much ready cash. The war had damaged banking capabilities, forcing the project to use cash rather than checks for payment in many instances, and requiring the project to develop careful control mechanisms.

The need for strong, consistent controls including frequent internal audits and timely external ones was never more urgent—and seldom more difficult to execute. Because of the security challenges, it was not always possible to conduct "normal business" control efforts such as spot checks, unannounced visits to subrecipients, and forensic auditing. Many audit firms refused to set foot in Iraq because of the dangers inherent in moving around the countryside, and local staff were threatened and intimidated by local militia and fellow staff members who warned of retaliation if their corrupt practices were reported. The Mission and the RIG were also hampered in exercising their normal level of oversight by the insecure conditions on the ground. Inter ethnic rivalries and tribal loyalties continue to play a large part in Iraqi life even today, and balancing staff composition and compensation to reflect tribal, gender, and racial diversity as well as to avoid conflicts of interest and nepotism continues to be a challenge in implementing projects, particularly when they must be scaled up quickly.

6.5.6. Security. A critical feature of working in a war zone is the requirement for expending considerable resources to ensure the safety of personnel. The ability to move freely is curtailed based on logistics and intelligence. Different levels of training or preparedness (body armor, etc.) became standard over the duration of CSP, as the need varied from city to city and over time based on the kinetic activity. The cost of operating security teams is astounding: local and expatriate staff, equipment, specialized vehicles, additional structures or support (safe rooms, etc.) all contribute to a different order of expenses. The cost of moving from one project site to another is also significant, often requiring advance planning for convoys of armored vehicles and additional security personnel.

The need to travel to the field for project implementation and monitoring creates a dichotomy of interests between program management and security needs, necessitating strong communication and coordination between management and security personnel. Whether or not a trip is actually taken, though, depends

Children and teachers are enthusiastic about the new classrooms and supplies that CSP has made possible.

on situational intelligence – it may have become simply too dangerous to travel. Because of the need to coordinate travel, different functions may find that they are being scheduled at the same time, simply to accommodate the security requirements. This can increase the profile of traveling to a site, and also, in the case of (for example) a compliance, M&E, and finance visit being combined, contribute to a high degree of resistance from the field teams at the time "taken away" from implementation.

6.5.7 Working with the Department of Defense while working for USAID. CSP was in some ways a social experiment as well as an innovation in development programming. The stylistic dissonance encountered in coordinating with a very fast-paced, command-centered, rapid results-driven entity like the Department of Defense as represented in the PRTs, all the while interfacing with the program direction (and rules of engagement—that is, the OMB circulars) coming from USAID required considerable agility and diplomacy. Sometimes the implementing partner got caught in the "cross-fire" between the contrasting styles of the agencies. The most successful and adroit program staff in the field offices tended to be unusual development professionals with at least some military service—and maybe a stint in the Peace Corps as well. In any case, those who were comfortable with military procedures, willing to take measured personal risks, but committed to the community based framework of more traditional development approaches were more successful in navigating the space between the partners. General David Petraeus noted that CSP is "precisely what we need to do" and is "a wonderful program and we applaud it." (Battle Update Assessment, October 12, 2007).

6.5.8. Monitoring & Evaluation. M&E is a separate function from implementation and QA/QC. Managers use M&E to determine if the project is on track. Setting up indicators from the start that measure project achievements against stated targets is the first step. Aggregating results across multiple sites with varying portfolios blurs the distinctions between individual cities or by regions; these are both important metrics. Implementing partners need to work with the donors to establish appropriate M&E indicators so that as the situation evolves, additional information may be captured. An important aspect of any M&E analysis is establishing an appropriate baseline against which changes may be monitored. Using third party data is more often acceptable (especially if the source is well-respected and used for specific data), as are shared surveys to minimize the dangers of community access or of survey fatigue.

One of the challenges with separating M&E, implementation, and QA/QC will be the transport logistics – it may simply not be possible to have three teams traveling separately. More basic logistics can also come into play, when space is limited at forward bases for staff, and it may be that even having separate teams for these three functions may not be possible. Having 'defined lanes' – that is, forms and protocols for each function, can help manage overlaps between the teams. However, this does speak to the need for routine monitoring that provides information used by management (donor, project management) to query results

in as timely a manner as possible, so that the questions and answers reflect the current field reality.

Working with an M&E contractor can help standardize the indicators and the general approach, and can provide a more independent perspective for evaluations. Projects should conduct their own M&E to the highest possible standards, with the acknowledgement that highest possible do not necessarily mean highest technical – extreme situations call for creative and still legitimate approaches. At the same time, donors also need specific metrics that they can report to their constituencies, and these metrics should be calculated in the same way across implementing partners. So there needs to be a continuing dialogue about the types of information gathering possible, planned coordinating activities as possible to help minimize risk to both the communities and the data collection teams, and more consistent information sharing to help understand why results differ from one area to the next.

6.5.9. Communications. There were multiple audiences for information about CSP. Satisfying immediate information needs is different from M&E, and yet the two are often intertwined. An additional factor to consider is the information requests from different sources. The military may want information on a different timeframe than standard reporting, and USAID operating in a COIN environment also tends to need more frequent reporting. The Embassy may also want information on project results and activities. Deciding early on what reports are required and then making sure the information is standardized (and validated before dissemination) may mean that the pace of that dissemination slows. It will definitely mean that there is a single project source of results reporting, critical to avoid misunderstanding and even more important when there are multiple audiences for the information. What products one can then generate from those results can vary for the audiences.

6.5.10. Donor Relations and Responsibilities. The interaction between USAID and implementing partners needs to be very strong and clear, with open communication, so that CSP programs can be delivered quickly to conflict areas. Consistency is important to maintain even though it is often difficult to ensure, as staff changes.

Changes can certainly be discussed over the phone, but anything that affects cost, scope, or duration should be written up formally and approved. Requests from other stakeholders (the military or civilian authorities) are simply requests until they are officially vetted and approved by USAID.

Because the environment is fluid, the annual workplan structure becomes almost more of a guideline. Weekly, and sometimes daily, reviews on direction, content, and process should be incorporated into the relationship between donor and implementing partner. The workplan needs to be frequently updated and these updates communicated both between the implementing partner and USAID and within the implementing partner's organization, so both USAID and implementing partner incoming staff know when changes occurred, and what caused



Receiving a sewing machine, marked with an Iraqi Ministry logo, after completing a dressmaking course.

the change, and what was at play at the time. Changes in project dynamics affect all of the data collection and reporting, as well.

6.5.11. Conclusion. A key challenge driving the establishment of CSP was the need by USAID to deliver aid in a non-traditional USAID operating environment. That challenge was met by finding an appropriate implementing partner able to bring aid into conflict zone communities, and act as a bridge between civilian aid and military activities. The CSP model demonstrated that with strong USAID support, an implementing partner could deliver effective community stabilization services in support of COIN initiatives in conflict areas prior to establishment of a more conventional development environment. The program "is generally thought of as one of the most effective counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq" Deputy Secretary of State Jacob Lew told USA Today (July 27, 2009). [31]

31 USA Today, "U.S. pulls $644M Iraq jobs program", by Ken Dilanian, July 27, 2009 A.1

Endnotes

1 Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq. Report to Congress. November 2006.

2 Reuters AlertNet. FactBox-Security Developments in Iraq, April 8. April 8, 2007.

3 Contractor Deaths in Iraq Soar to Record. *The New York Times.* May 18, 2007

4 Five Britons Abducted in Baghdad. BBC. May 29, 2007

5 UK Iraq Troops to be Cut to 2,500. BBC. October 8, 2007

6 Sabre International Security IRD Monthly Risk Assessment-Basra

7 Operation Iraqi Freedom-Official website of MNF-I. January 8, 2008

8 Iraqis Pass three Key Bills, Pleasing All Parties. *The Washington Post*. Feb. 14, 2008

9 Another Female Suicide Bomber Strikes Iraqi Province, Killing 15 Near Courthouse. *The New York Times.* June 23, 2008

10 Timeline of The Iraq War. Think Progress.org. July 22, 2008

11 War News for Friday, July 31, 2009. *Iraq Today.* July 31, 2009

12 An example of best practice for this type of assessment survey is one conducted at the end of the project closeout in Kirkuk. The purpose of the survey, which was entitled "Youth Voices from Kirkuk," was to gather opinions from youth for private and government sector decision makers. The extremely high level of response (most of the 1,500 surveys distributed were returned) was more than three times what the project expected. The responses, which included requests for greater investment in education, computer training, and sports facilities (not just games) showed a high level of awareness that could be harnessed in future programs.

13 Constraints: Youth programs present a host of special challenges because the former participants are often harder to reach than adults. Turnover on some activities—like cultural events—can be very high and many of the youth are constantly changing their contact information.

Opportunities: There are other elements of these programs that make them less difficult to evaluate than employment programs. In most cases a respected teacher or coach will have direct or indirect (through other youth) with their former players/students that can be used to assemble focus groups. For these networks to be activated, however, the mentors/coaches need to see a direct link between the information being gathered and the ongoing sports and cultural programs they support. Failure to make this connection raises suspicion that the information could be used for police or military purposes.

Learning TV and electronics repair.

Annex I: Consolidated Indicator Performance Tracking Table (IPTT)

Indicators	Unit of Measure	Base-line Year	Base-line Value	Consolidated Performance		
				Targeted	Realized	Achieved
SO7: Reduced Incentives for Participation in violent conflicts in selected communities						
7.1: Perception of citizens of the effectiveness of local government to provide services	Percent Satisfied	2006	28.0	36.2	26.0	71%
7.2: Number of insurgent incidents reduced	Number of daily Incidents	2006	10.6	8.8	9.0	99%
IR 7.1: Unemployment rate decreased						
7.1.1: Unemployment rate decreased	Percent	2004-2006	15.94	15.8	17.7	***[1]
Sub-IR 7.1.1: Jobs Created						
7.1.1.1: Number of person months generated for short term employment	Count	2006	0	436,222	525,121	120%
7.1.1.2: Number of long term jobs directly created	Count	2006	0	42,749	57,109	134%
7.1.1.3: Number of long term jobs indirectly created	Count	2007	0	2,140	1,699	79%
7.1.1.4: Weekly Employment Summary**	Aggregate	2007	0			
Sub-IR 7.1.2: Employable skills improved						
7.1.2.1: Number of participants completing vocation skills training	Count	2006	0	36,115	41,443	115%
7.1.2.2: Number of apprentices placed	Count	2006	0	10,661	9,932	93%
Sub-IR 7.1.3: Business created and expanded						
7.1.3.1: Number of businesses receiving assistance	Count	2006	0	12,256	10,139	83%
7.1.3.2: Number of people completing business skills training	Count	2006	0	16,448	15,138	92%
IR 7.2: Conflict mitigated through increased community activities						
7.2.1: Number of youth participating in non-formal education programs	Count	2006	0	246,778	351,668	143%
7.2.2: Percent of youth participants who indicate a positive change in their attitude towards conflict*	Percent					

* USAID Requested IRD remove this Indicator in February of 2009.

**Calculated Value

For 7.1, 7.2 and 7.1.1, the consolidated targets and realized performances are calculated by averaging year 1, year 2, and year 3.

1 Unemployment increased over these years based on the data obtained from GOI city-level statistics.

Annex 2: Sample Briefing Paper from CSP Communications

USAID FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

IRD International Relief & Development

COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM
WOMEN'S INITIATIVES

International Relief and Development (IRD) implements the Community Stabilization Program (CSP), a $644 million US Government initiative awarded to IRD by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 2006 to help stabilize and economically revitalize Iraq.

High unemployment is a major factor contributing to instability in Iraq. While CSP's primary focus is on unemployed males who are most vulnerable to joining insurgent groups, its programs also reach out to women, primarily widows that seek assistance to improve the living conditions for their suffering families.

As insurgent groups are known to recruit the children of men killed n the violence they sponsored, CSP's job training and employment assistance programs help women gain or restore financial independence and provide stability to their children who may be at risk for later recruitment by extremist groups.

Skills Training and Apprenticeship Program

Collaborating with the Iraq's Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA), CSP currently supports vocational training courses for women in computer maintenance, cosmetology and sewing/tailoring and mobile phone repair. Courses are tuition-free and women are provided a stipend while they attend classes. CSP continues to assist women find long-term sustainable employment upon graduation.

CSP also sponsors non-formal education classes in computer software, first aid, English language, handicrafts and other useful skills which can help women gain employment.

Business Grants Program

A large part of CSP's focus is to boost economic development through business grants that lead to sustained employment in the private sector. For women who desire to own their own business, CSP offers grants ranging from $500-$100,000.

CSP also offers grantees follow-on business management training courses in accounting, management, human resources and marketing. The combination of the grant and training equips women with the necessary capital and management to become a successful entrepreneur.

CSP Women's Initiatives

- 8,800 women have graduated from CSP-sponsored VoTech courses with 1,750 enrolling in follow-on apprenticeships;
- 3,460 women have gained sustainable employment either by directly receiving a CSP grant or being hired by a CSP grantee;
- 19,000 young women, have participated over 500 CSP-sponsored sports, arts and life skills programs.

Youth Programs (Conflict Resolution)

CSP youth programs are a great way to provide young Iraqi females with positive role models and teach religious and ethnic tolerance.

Activities include sports such as soccer, volleyball, fun runs and fencing, while arts programs allow young females to creatively express themselves through performances in plays, as well as painting, calligraphy, music and poetry.

Young females also participate in CSP-sponsored peace camps, public debates and other civic forums where they learn how to be productive community members and leaders.

Community Stabilization Program *January 2009*

Annex 3: Workshop Participants and Persons Interviewed

Annex 3.A. List of Participants in the CSP Final Report City Workshops

City Workshop	Dates	National Personnel	International Personnel
Kirkuk	June 22-24	Nabeel Zaki Shwan Wais Zena Bahnam Sabah Fatih Asmaa Al-Ameen Osama Poalis Dalia Ishaq	Marinka Baumann
Mosul	June 22-24	Saifudden Ibrahim Mahmood Shakir Sa'ad Hamoody Laith Abdul Jabbar Mohmood Ali Sumer Adel Mohammed Salih Saif Samy	Mohamed Odeh
Basra	July 6-8	Summer Almudhaffar Raad Salman Hussein Mohsin Ahmed Azawi Shetha Ibrahim Malik Noori	Fabiola Flores
Baghdad	Oct 4-6	Adnan Aziz Alaa Khalil Basil Anwar Muhammad Abdul Raheem Ahmed Abdullah Hasoon Barzan Khaleel Iqbal Al Jibouri Haider Ahmed Salam Mohammed Maffaza Noori Figgin Ibrahim Haider Zubaidi Isaam Yusif Falah Mohammed Abdullah Saad Baker Muthana Kamil	Theresa Shope

City Workshop	Dates	National Personnel	International Personnel
Al Qaim	Oct 7-8	Ayad Hamed Khalifa Saad Atallah Ibrahim Nameer Abdulsattar Shafeeq Essam Turki Jadhan Mahmood Salah Samer Fakhri Bassam Hamed Al-Aseel Basher Abdullah Humadi	Bob Bassak
Babil	Oct 11-12	Usama Merry Salih Hassanin Hamid Ahmed Jasim Mohammed Diaa Aman Abdul Tholfeqar Sabah Gharkan Oday Amer Salih Assil Hamid Al Omaier Sabah Hassan Abid Ali Fadhil	Jane Thomson
Salah Ad Din (Tikrit, Samarra, Beiji)	Oct 13-14	Dahir Abdullah Yusif Yaser Mutlag Abdullah Israa Ali Hussein Fawaz Muhammed Jumaa Omar Faisal Esmiael Aibr Kreen Zuheir Al Jboori Baida'a Mudher Fadhil Kayser Salih Ajaj Ahmed Mudar Hussein Abass Fadhel Salum Ahmed Hussein Ali Raqeeb Hammad Nawaf Ammar Nahedh Sattar Hassan Falih Nazeer Ajeel Jassim	Theresa Shope

Annex 3. B. Persons Interviewed

Dr. Arthur Keys, *President and CEO of IRD*

Elmer Owens, *Advisor to the President*

Karla Bonner, *Director of Special Projects*

Michele Lemmon, *Senior Program Officer*

Alice Willard, *Director of Monitoring and Evaluation*

Mamidou Sidibe, *Director of Monitoring and Evaluation*

Claudia Pastor, *Program Officer, Former CTO*

Awni Quandour, *Chief of Party*

David Elkins, *Chief of Party*

Jane Thomson, *Chief of Party*

Bob Bassak, *Deputy Chief of Party*

Travis Gartner, *Deputy Chief of Party*

Theresa Shope, *Information and Reporting Officer*

Mohamad Odeh, *Program Operations Director, Kirkuk and Mosul*

Marinka Baumann, *Program Operations Director, Kirkuk*

Nicholas Haricourt Leftwhich, *Program Operations Director, Mosul*

Zarko Draganic, *Program Operations Director, Baqubah*

Dar Warmke, *Program Operations Director, Basra*

Fabiola Flores, *Program Operations Officer, Basra*

Dulce Janice Herrera, *Program Operations Officer, Baghdad*

Brian Grady, *Program Operations Officer, Baghdad*

John McGuire, *Program Coordinator*

Alaa Khaleel, *CIES Technical Advisor*

Barzan Khaleel, *Youth Technical Advisor*

Isaam Yousif, *Business Development Advisor*

Annex 4. References Cited and Condensed Project Bibliography

Annex 4.A. References Cited

IBTCI. 2007. USAID Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Counterinsurgency (COIN): Report on Community Infrastructure and Essential Services Projects in Mosul and Kirkuk. Vienna, Va.: IBTCI for USAID/Iraq. (September 19, 2007)

IBTCI. 2007. USAID Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Counterinsurgency (COIN): Report on Business Development Projects in Kirkuk. Vienna, Va.: IBTCI for USAID/Iraq. (October 30, 2007)

IBTCI. 2008.a. USAID Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Counterinsurgency (COIN): Report on Employment Generation and Youth Projects in Ninewa. Vienna, Va.: IBTCI for USAID/Iraq. (March 22, 2008)

IBTCI. 2008.b. USAID Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Counterinsurgency (COIN): Report on Employment Generation and Youth Projects in Kirkuk. Vienna, Va.: IBTCI for USAID/Iraq. (March 22, 2008)

IBTCI. 2008.c. USAID Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Counterinsurgency (COIN): Report on Employment Generation and Youth Projects in Baghdad. Vienna, Va.: IBTCI for USAID/Iraq. (March 22, 2008)

IBTCI. 2008.d. USAID Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Counterinsurgency (COIN): Report on community Infrastructure and Essential Services Projects in Ramadi and Falluja. Vienna, Va.: IBTCI for USAID/Iraq. (May 8, 2008)

IBTCI. 2008.e. USAID Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Counterinsurgency (COIN): Data Quality Assessment, Va.: IBTCI for USAID/Iraq. (September 11, 2008)

IBTCI. 2009.a. USAID Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Counterinsurgency (COIN): Special Study on Business Development Component. Vienna, Va.: IBTCI for USAID/Iraq. (January 5, 2009).

IBTCI. 2009.b. USAID Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Counterinsurgency (COIN): An Examination of the Youth Engagement Program. Vienna, Va.: IBTCI for USAID/Iraq. (January 18, 2009).

IBTCI. 2009.c. USAID Evaluation of USAID's Community Stabilization Program (CSP) in Iraq: Effectiveness of the CSP Model as a Non-Lethal tool for Counterinsurgency. Vienna, Va.: IBTCI for USAID/Iraq. (July 22, 2009)

Lincoln Group. Community Stabilization Surveys. Washington DC: Lincoln Group for IRD and USAID.

CSP City	District	Number of Households Surveyed	Baseline Month	6 Month Follow-Up	12 Month Follow-Up
Baghdad	Rusafa	400	Aug-06	Feb-07	Dec-07
	Adhamiya	420	Sep-06	Mar-07	Dec-07
	Doura/Rasheed	390	Nov-06	May-07	Dec-07
	Mansour	400	Nov-06	May-07	Dec-07
	Kadhemiya	405	Nov-06	May-07	Dec-07
	Karada	400	Mar-07	Sep-07	May-08
	Al Sadr	400	Mar-07	Sep-07	May-08
	Abu Ghraib	400	Mar-07	Sep-07	May-08
Mosul		400	Mar-07	Sep-07	May-08
Tal Afar		405	Mar-07	Sep-07	May-08
Kirkuk		420	Mar-07	Sep-07	May-08
Fallujah		400	Mar-07	Sep-07	May-08
Hit		400	May-08	Jan-09	
Haditha		400	May-08	Jan-09	
Basra		420	May-08	Jan-09	May-09
Hilla/Iskandariya		400	June-08	Jan-09	March-09
Tikrit		400	Jan-09	March-09	May-09
Samarra		400	Jan-09	March-09	May-09
Beiji		400	Jan-09	March-09	May-09

Monitoring and Evaluation Plans

IRD 2008. Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for the Iraq Community Stabilization Program (CSP). Arlington, VA: IRD M&E Unit for USAID/Iraq. (July 31, 2008)

IRD 2008. Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for the Iraq Community Stabilization Program (CSP). Arlington, VA: IRD M&E Unit for USAID/Iraq. (August 9, 2008)[1]

IRD 2009. Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for the Iraq Community Stabilization Program (CSP). Arlington, VA: IRD M&E Unit for USAID/Iraq. (February 2009)

1 The M&E Plan submitted in July of 2008 was a consolidated draft of all previous plans. The M&E Plan submitted in August of 2008 was the official deliverable to USAID.

Annex 4. B Condensed Project Bibliography

Category of Document	Number of Documents on File in Project Documentation System
Cooperative Agreement 267-A-00-06-00503-00 Community Stabilization Program May 29, 2006-October 31, 2009. (Modifications 1-20)	20
Weekly Reports: September 17, 2006-September 26, 2009	144
Monthly Reports: March 2009-September 2009	7
Quarterly Reports: June 2006-September 2009	13
CSP Briefing Papers (Best Practice and Technical Sector)	1
Monitoring and Evaluation Plans	2
Monitoring and Evaluation Special Reports	2

Annex 5: Best Practices for Partnership with the PRT and Military

(CSP Mid-Term Assessment June 2008)

#1 Best Practice: Participate in PRT coordination meetings and Task Forces if requested by USAID and PRT agencies.

Comment: CSP and the PRT should regularly share project information to avoid a duplication or overlap of projects. CSP and PRT usually start discussing projects from the planning/designing phase until the completion phase. Surprisingly, PRT usually does not put pressure on CSP to implement specific projects; on the other hand, IRD has seen an integration of efforts from the PRT to the projects implemented by CSP. The PRT serve as a mechanism through which to ensure the activities of the separate e-PRTs do not conflict with a larger provincial objective.

#2 Best Practice: PRT can advise CSP on security information and Post Incident Recovery

Comment: CSP usually asks for an update on the security situation when implementing projects in the hot areas. CSP played a very active role in responding to the security incidents "car bombs, IEDs, etc that hit some areas in Kirkuk" once asked by PRT. IRD/CSP restored market places by reopening business from the grants program, clean-up, and renovating schools damaged as a result of these incidents.

#3 Best Practice: CSP provided USAID the flexibility to participate and receive PRT projects developed in cooperation with the Deputy Chairman of Municipal Affairs to identify urgently required community services to be funded by the international community; many of these would normally have been submitted for Quick Reaction Force (QRF) funding consideration.

#4 Best Practice: Ensure that the PRT is either informed or takes part in meetings with GOI officials that are critical to the successful implementation of CSP initiatives. Strong cooperation between CSP and the USAID representative on the PRT permitted an effective avenue to advocate at the Provincial level with the GOI to help work with various provincial level politicians, particularly on budget items and the coordination of CSP activities with the broader coalition strategy.

Cooperation with the e-PRT

#1 Best Practice: Regularly meet with the e-PRT in order to share project information. In areas where it is physically possible to meet in person, it is encouraged, whether expatriate or local IRD staff.

#2 Best Practice: Open communication between CSP and the e-PRT regarding completed, ongoing, and developing projects. CSP involves the e-PRTs starting from the identifying stage of a project until the completion of the activity

#3 Best Practice: Combine efforts to complement each other's capacity and make a greater impact with a project.

The e-PRT is the central link for networking key USAID implementing partners in the North Babil region to brainstorm critical collective solutions for key community challenges in the North Babil region.

#4 Best Practice: Welcome briefings should be given to the e-PRTs to discuss the grant requirements (especially the community contribution aspect). USAID staff should also brief newly posted e-PRT representatives on the general operations of CSP, timelines for projects and the do's and don'ts of communicating with local staff.

#5 Best Practice: E-PRT members can provide a valuable monitoring function and they can be extremely useful in grantee identification. They also can assist CSP to identify areas of need for the district and put together macro-projects that incorporate the different programmatic elements of CSP.

#6 Best Practice: CSP should work closely with the USAID representative embedded in the e-PRT to coordinate strategy and to communicate with the military.

#7 Best Practice: All questions/inquiries received by local staff from non-USAID representatives on the e-PRTs should be filtered through the USAID representative rather than directly to the POO/POD.

#8 Best Practice: USAID e-PRTs should brief the military on the processes and timelines of CSP activities to mitigate expectations.

Comment: The military timelines are much shorter than CSPs due to the requirement to obtain the necessary GOI approvals. CSP works within the GOI framework in order to support and legitimize the institutions.

#9 Best Practice: Use e-PRT members to facilitate interaction with neighborhood and local level officials.

Comments: The e-PRT works on a local level, the PRT at the provincial level. CSP needs local municipal approval for projects and needs the buy-in of city councils. The e-PRT works closely with these entities and knows which ones will be most cooperative.

#10 Best Practice: Use the e-PRT for strategy development.

Comments: The e-PRT works closely with the U.S. military and knows what areas are permissible and what services are in need (they also coordinate U.S. military efforts to deliver essential services). The e-PRT will work with CSP to coordinate needed essential services.

Cooperation with the Military

#1 Best Practice: Military brigades are briefed by the USAID PRT representative on the communication policies in regards to CSP expatriate and local staff.

Military Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds are not monitored and can create unrealistic expectations on the part of the grantee of IRD.

#2 Best Practice: Traveling with the military in the field allows the POO to visually inspect certain areas that the BDP program officers cannot due to security i.e. market areas.

#3 Best Practice: Unity of effort between MNF-W and CSP to achieve AO goals.

Challenge: CSP Baghdad largely limits its direct contacts to the e-PRT USAID reps to avoid confusion and wasted efforts. USAID reps need to convey and enforce their communication protocol with their military colleagues.

#4 Best Practice: Regular and open communication about each other's completed, ongoing, and developing projects.

Comments: The military often contact CSP staff, or vice versa to coordinate the implementation of CSP projects to avoid duplication of efforts. Another aspect of regular communication is that the military are out on the ground everyday. As a result, they have good knowledge of what is happening in the province. They report this information back to CSP and it is compared with information from the local national staff to benefit the program.

#5 Best Practice: Independence (including perceived independence) of CSP as a civilian US effort and not as an MNF-W effort.

#6 Best Practice: Attend weekly "effects" coordination meetings, where applicable, in order to integrate, coordinate and prioritize CSP, GOI, CA and CERP programming.

#7 Best Practice: Where applicable, have U.S. military vet CSP local national staff and issue Biometrics Automated Tracking System (BATS) cards. The US Military and Iraqi Police recognize these cards and facilitate ease of movement for CSP local national employees.

#8 Best Practice: Strong support by the U.S. military can greatly assist in a rapid roll-out in new field sites.

#9 Best Practice: Assistance with distribution of in-kind contributions (soccer balls) gives military a more humane face among the population.

Example: In Mosul, the use of the IA to distribute humanitarian goods provides access for the army to areas where they were previously unwelcome.

#10 Best Practice: CSP staff members should understand the military culture in order to improve coordination and communication to achieve common goals.

Comments: It is important to assume that the military counterparts are unfamiliar with the traditional development processes; therefore it is critical that USAID familiarizes and educates its military counterparts on the development strategy practiced by CSP and other USAID implementing partners.

#12 Best Practice: Expat red zone movement with the military should be coordinated through Sabre Security.

Comments: Sabre Security, CSP's security advisor, maintains the final green light on any and all CSP expat staff movement in the red zone with the military. Expat red zone movements with the military require a Sabre PPO to accompany the CSP expat.

#13 Best Practice: Ensure the military is fully briefed on CSP programs and repeatedly emphasizing the importance of them not mentioning CSP to the community.

Comments: This type of communication has placed staff at risk both in their communities and in the workplace. The USAID representative should fully brief units and develop a strategy for U.S. military to provide suggestions on projects through the e-PRT. The USAID representative should also ensure the U.S. military knows to never mention CSP to the local community.

International Relief & Development

1621 North Kent Street
Suite 400
Arlington, VA 22209

P 703.248.0161
F 703.248.0194

www.ird.org