

**A Multi-Partner Evaluation of the Comprehensive Development Framework**

**Evaluation of the Comprehensive  
Development Framework (CDF)**

**Burkina Faso Case Study**

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<i>AFD</i>	<i>L'Agence Française de Développement</i>
CDF	Comprehensive Development Framework
<i>CSLP</i>	<i>Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté</i>
<i>CDMT (MTEF)</i>	<i>Cadre des Dépenses à Moyen Terme</i>
CFAA	Country Financial Accountability Assessment
CFAF	CFA Franc
Danida	Danish International Development Agency
<i>DEP</i>	<i>Direction des Etudes et de la Planification</i>
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTZ	German Technical Assistance Agency
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IDA	International Development Agency
<i>INSD</i>	<i>L'Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie</i>
<i>LIPDHD</i>	<i>Lettre d'Intention de Politique de Développement Humain Durable</i>
MEBAM	Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy
MEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
<i>ONAPAD</i>	<i>L'Observatoire National de la Pauvreté et du Développement Humain Durable</i>
<i>PRGB</i>	<i>Plan de Renforcement de la Gestion des Dépenses Budgétaires</i>
PRSP (CSLP)	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper ( <i>Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté</i> )
<i>PNGT</i>	<i>Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs Villageois</i> (National Village Land Management Program)
PRSC	Poverty Reduction Support Credit
PSR	Poverty Status Report
<i>PSN</i>	<i>Politique Sanitaire Nationale 2000</i>
<i>PNDS</i>	<i>Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2001-2010</i> (National Health Plan)
<i>PRGB</i>	<i>Plan de Renforcement de la Gestion Budgétaire</i> (National Plan to strengthen budget management)
<i>STC-PDES</i>	<i>Secrétariat Technique pour la Coordination des Programmes de Développement Economique et Social</i>
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union

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The study team is responsible for the report, including its errors or omissions.

The team was Dominique Lallement, ESMAP Manager (team leader); Della McMillan, consultant; Kyran O'Sullivan (EWDEN); Patrick Plane, consultant; and Kimsey Savadogo, consultant. Jean-Pierre Ouedraogo organized focus group discussions with the enterprise owners and managers. Begnadeyi Claude Bationo, consultant for CIDA, provided a report on the monitoring system for the *CSLP*. Eight graduate students of the University of Ouagadougou, supervised by Kimsey Savadogo, carried out surveys in four provinces.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This report presents an analysis of the application of the Comprehensive Development Framework Principles to the process of preparation and implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (*Cadre Stratégique de Lutte Contre la Pauvreté*) in Burkina Faso. It is based on the work of the case study team that carried out a fieldwork in Burkina Faso in April and May 2002.
2. Unlike the other five countries that are part of the Evaluation of the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) — Bolivia, Ghana, Romania, Uganda, and Vietnam — Burkina Faso is not a CDF pilot country. Burkina Faso was chosen because it was one of the first countries to have completed a full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the *Cadre Stratégique de Lutte Contre la Pauvreté (CSLP)*, and because it is highly dependent on international aid to finance its public budget.
3. The Poverty Reduction Strategy process is intended to embody the CDF principles. One of the main objectives of the case study of Burkina Faso is therefore to understand if and how the CDF principles — *long-term, holistic development framework; country ownership; country-led partnership; and results orientation* — have been carried forward into the preparation and implementation of the *CSLP* and what lessons can be drawn for countries that want to apply these principles. An objective of the Burkina Faso case study was to identify ways and means to strengthen local capacity to implement the *CSLP* in order to enhance the likelihood of Burkina Faso achieving the Millennium Development Goals. This latter objective was specifically retained in the case study at the request of the government.
4. Burkina Faso has three special characteristics that have profoundly shaped its development experience in general and its implementation of the CDF in particular.
  - (a) *The origins of applying CDF principles in Burkina Faso can be traced back over a forty-year period.* They are anchored in the strong participatory traditions that endured under Burkina Faso's relatively benign colonial regime. The vision for development that emerged in the mid-1990's was greatly influenced by the legacy of the political and economic model of 'total mobilization' that marked the 1983-1987 Revolution under President Sankara. One achievement from this period was to formalize this participatory process that contributed to a series of baseline, regional, provincial, and national level Popular Development Plans – *Plans Populaires de Développement (PPD)*. The *Burkinabé* are justifiably proud of the considerable progress that the country made during that period in developing 'grassroots' sector development strategies such as the National Village Land Management Program – *Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs Villageois (PNGT)* – that set the stage for further reforms in the 1990s. In the late 1980s, Burkina Faso launched a process to prepare long-term sector development plans, focused on poverty reduction that subsequently became the building blocks of the *CSLP*.
  - (b) *Burkina Faso's high dependence on donor aid means that coordination processes with donors need to be made more efficient.* In 1998, aid transfers represented 15.5% of GDP and were almost 4 times the average for sub-Saharan Africa. Project aid has fluctuated between 80% and 88% of total aid with adjustment aid accounting for the remainder. With the proportion of donor aid for direct budget support set to increase in the coming years, donors are supporting the government's efforts to address governance issues by improving public expenditure management. A challenge for the government is for it to sustain its recent progress in public sector reform and governance and for the donor community to build on government efforts to improve governance by making aid transfers more predictable.

- (c) *Very high morbidity and mortality rates attributable to low rates of access and use of health services and proliferation of parasitic and infectious diseases.* Although school attendance has improved, education outcomes lag.

Translating budgetary resources into sustained poverty reduction outcomes will require Burkina Faso and its development partners to address two fundamental challenges:

5. First, the quality of public service delivery will need to improve markedly and will need to engage the process of decentralization and the participation of civil society in implementation and monitoring development efforts at the local level.
6. Second, the diversification of the economy from dependence on agriculture will need to be accelerated and the private sector needs to be enabled to perform better its role as the engine of growth and exports.
7. Addressing these challenges, among other things, entails complex institutional reforms in particular accelerating the decentralization process while ensuring that local administrators are fully accountable. It also implies widespread stakeholder consultation and engagement with an emphasis on the translation of development objectives into concrete results.

## **LONG-TERM HOLISTIC DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK**

### **Achievements**

8. The overarching role of the *CSLP*. The 1995 *Lettre d'Intention de Politique de Développement Humain Durable (LIPDHD)* in which a long-term vision for development was first articulated provides the framework for the – *Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté (CSLP)* in 2000 that ties the vision to operational strategies in the priority sectors for poverty reduction. The *CSLP* is therefore the reference document that set out a holistic vision for development in Burkina Faso. It is more so for the government and the donors than for other stakeholders. For the latter, the *LIPDHD* is better known and to this day, numerous Burkinabé stakeholders consider it as the true starting point for the development of the country's poverty reduction strategy. It first provided the overarching holistic framework from which has come holistic frameworks at the sector level.
9. The *CSLP* is comprehensive in its articulation of goals aimed at poverty reduction. Its targets (indicators) for access to clean water, education, and health by 2003 are consistent with the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) that set targets for 2015. Progress over the last decade; however, indicate that Burkina Faso will fall short of the MDG targets in 2015.

### **Challenges**

- (a) The *CSLP* has practical relevance as it provides the framework for sector development plans covering periods of 5-10 years. It emphasized sectors such as health and education in the first year of implementation but it is now increasingly recognized by other sectors as the reference framework for the development of sector plans. The process that the *CSLP* embodies provides mechanisms for bringing together stakeholders from government, civil society, and donors working in a sector that potentially can result in the formulation of realistic strategies by linking plans with resource availability. Greater effort is needed to ensure that these mechanisms actually work and result in actionable work programs.



- (b) The *CSLP*'s recognition of improved Public Expenditure Management is of critical importance in translating budget resources and donor assistance into sought after results of improved poverty outcome. It will reinforce accountability of government agencies to manage for results within hard budget constraints.
- (c) The *CSLP* is a living framework to be revised periodically to take account of changes in the needs and circumstances of the poor as identified by reliable data. The *CSLP* (PRSP) *Progress Report* serves as the reporting mechanism for these updates. The first Progress Report in 2001 was frank in its appraisal of progress, identifying that more effort was needed to engage stakeholders and ensure participation in implementation of the strategy. It further emphasized the necessity for better monitoring and evaluation tied to sector action plans.

## COUNTRY OWNERSHIP

### Achievements

10. *Commitment to a vision for poverty reduction.* The political leadership in Burkina Faso has shown a firm commitment to macroeconomic reforms and a strategic development plan that addresses poverty. It has also empowered other leaders and institutions within the government to design and deliver on strategies for poverty eradication. It has however been uneven during the 1999-2002 period: it was very strong during the preparation of the document but then weakened and momentum slowed once the first debt relief measures and incremental budgetary contributions were approved by the donors. The more recent efforts by all ministries to continue the dissemination of the *CSLP* as the country's development framework is yielding impressive results, both with a broader range of technical ministries, and with the decentralized administrative and technical structures. In this, the role of the *STC-PDES Secrétariat Technique pour la Coordination des Programmes de Développement Economique et Social* in motivating line ministries is crucial but it needs genuine political commitment to back its efforts.

### Challenges

11. Key challenges to increase ownership of the *CSLP* by multiple stakeholders include:
- (d) Developing a more open political engagement of high-level government officials, the parliament, and political parties in revising and implementing the *CSLP* strategy.
  - (e) Facilitating a more broad-based discussion of the overall strategy and the potential synergies between specific sectors with a broad base of stakeholders including the private sector, NGO's (and the population at large through NGO representatives).
  - (f) Delinking monitoring of the *CSLP* from the focus on sectors that benefit from HIPC resources and operationalizing monitoring and impact evaluation mechanisms that embrace all the dimensions of poverty and all the potential interventions that originate in the different sectors.
  - (g) Implementing decentralization is possibly the greatest challenge facing Burkina Faso in the forthcoming year of implementation of the *CSLP*. Anchored on the democratic principles embedded in the Constitution of June 2, 1991, the *CSLP* provides for both a 'deconcentration' of sector ministries' services and the decentralization of administrative services at the communal, district, and provincial levels. The 'decentralization' should be fully implemented during 2003, after a long progress that

started in 1993, with the creation of the National Commission on Decentralization, followed by the first municipal elections in 33 municipalities in 1995, and the second elections in 49 municipalities in 2000.

12. The major concerns are the design of fiscal decentralization and the availability of sufficient competencies to run the new structure. Whether the various administrative structures will be able to actually design and implement relevant development programs and budgets will be a challenge that will require:

- strengthening weak capacity at local government levels in ways that respond to the needs of the population;
- improved accounting and tracking of the flow of funds;
- better timeliness of arrival of funds to local governments and facilities (e.g. schools); and
- improving conditions of employment for local staff, especially in remote, hardship areas.

## **COUNTRY-LED PARTNERSHIP**

### **Achievements**

13. Donor assistance is aligned with the *CSLP*. Several factors have resulted in better alignment of external aid with the *CSLP*: (1) linking the *CSLP* to the MTEF; (2) increased budget support by donors; and (3) moves by donors still providing project support to ensure alignment with the *CSLP*.

14. The IDA Burkina Faso Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) is consistent with the *CSLP* focus on education, health, and rural development and cross-cutting public sector reforms. PRSC II will be co-financed by Belgian cooperation.

### **Challenges**

15. *Among the donors, there is still room for improved coordination.* Donor agencies and policies differ, either on the principle of providing budgetary support or on providing sector support. Donors are also divided in opinion over the capacity of the *Burkinabé* government to move away from project aid to direct budgetary support. As a result, some parallel coordination processes are still being developed, e.g. between the EU and the European partners that recently proposed a Protocol of Intent to the government, separate from the process adopted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

16. Integration of all financing in the government budget is a goal to which the government and donors aspire. The government and donors recognize that they need to move towards a rationalized process that reduces the transaction costs for government officials of dealing with multiple donor processes of divergent budgeting, disbursement, procurement, reporting, evaluation, and safeguard procedures and practices. Solutions need to be found so that disbursement schedules can be according to predictable multi-year timetables with improved harmonization of procedures between the different donors.

17. Frustrated with the high costs of executing aid programs, some donors have decreased their field presence and increased the proportion of funds that they administer through international NGOs or through “decentralized” projects that are awarded to national or international NGOs, village associations, or municipal governments. This approach creates its own problems, including: poor

alignment with the *CSLP* framework; limited information available on the costs and/or transfers involved, and at times, the programs create additional pressure on the government to provide the complementary resources (e.g. teachers for NGO-built schools).

18. *Mutual performance assessment.* Mutual assessment by both government and development partners of each other's performance, needs to be reinforced in an environment of mutual trust and respect.

## RESULTS ORIENTATION

### Achievements

19. A number of solid foundations for poverty reduction monitoring already existed prior to the *CSLP*.

- Burkina Faso had available an up-to-date diagnostic of poverty from the two Priority Surveys of household living conditions conducted in 1994 and 1998 and a qualitative study of the perceptions of the poor regarding the causes of poverty conducted in 1998 (A 3<sup>rd</sup> Priority Survey was planned for 2002/03).
- Sectors (such as basic education and health) that were to play a primary role in the poverty reduction strategy already had pro-poor sector strategies, including monitoring and evaluation plans.
- The Conditionality Reformulation Test Exercise in the context of the Special Program of Assistance for Africa that was initiated in 1997, and coordinated by the European Community, provided a series of performance indicators for key public sector activities. These indicators for health, education, and budget management were to form the basis for evaluation of the effectiveness of public policies and as such, they provided a ready menu of indicators that could be incorporated into the *CSLP* for monitoring purposes.
- In addition, the consultation arrangements for the conditionality reformulation test exercise provided a model for inter-Ministerial coordination mechanisms for implementation and monitoring of the *CSLP*.
- Improvement of the budget process, a key priority of the *CSLP* process in Burkina Faso, provides a focus for better integration of government and donor efforts and for monitoring the effectiveness of assistance. There is strong government-donor coordination to implement a medium term expenditure framework as a way of linking budget constraints and funding priorities. The budget bill for 2002 was based on ceilings set with reference to the 2002-2004 Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and *CSLP* priorities.
- Institutional arrangements to coordinate the efforts of government to monitor the *CSLP* process are firmly established. Three committees are in place to ensure coordination at the levels of decisionmaking, interministerial technical coordination, and sectoral implementation.

## Challenges

20. *Monitoring and analysis of results on the ground is weak* in the *CSLP* as was recognized in the Joint Staff Assessment (JSA) of the *CSLP* and in the government's 1st and 2<sup>nd</sup> PRSP (*CSLP*) Progress Reports.

21. *Demand to analyze and use results information* is emerging as a key need in order to understand better the determinants of poverty and to make the causal linkages between inputs and processes on the one hand and outputs and outcomes on the other hand.

22. *Transparency in the budget process (especially in budget control and audit phase). The reforms in budget formulation, execution, and reporting* are one element of the improved M&E framework now being constructed. Corruption constitutes an impediment to investment and efficient use of aid transfers. The PRSC program (PRSC II is currently under implementation) will provide additional support to these efforts.

23. *The role of civil society in monitoring results information.* The potential of monitoring public expenditure by communities for improving the quality of services to the poor remains unrealized to date.

24. *Adoption of processes to monitor effective service delivery is yet to be institutionalized in sector ministries.* Key informants in the government reported the need for conducting more "value for money audits" in order to improve delivery of services to the poor. Weak culture and incentives to generate and use results information at the operational level were also cited.

25. *Linkage to the (Millennium Development Goals) MDGs.* The *CSLP* inherited its monitoring framework from the Conditionality Reformulation Test Exercises that focused on health and education status as well as on budget management as a way of ensuring efficiency in service delivery. A challenge that remains is for all sectors/stakeholders to adopt goals and associated indicators that measure progress in all the sectors towards realization of the MDGs. The MDGs should provide a set of first order goals common to all stakeholders. In the context of *CSLP* monitoring it is appropriate for the different sector ministries and other stakeholders to define goals and associated targets linked to these first order goals. With this approach, goals and their associated indicators would cascade through all the programs for national development.

# 1. Introduction

1.2 The four CDF principles are:

- long-term and holistic development framework,
- country ownership
- country-led partnership, and
- results orientation.

## METHODOLOGY

1.3 The study team adopted the following methodology:

- (a) an *extensive literature review*, including an analysis of existing government and donor sponsored reviews of Burkina Faso's *CSLP* experience (e.g. by Danida, Swiss Cooperation, and progress reports by the European Union, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), as well as some more focused regional programs (e.g. the French-cooperation co-sponsored program with Ouahigouya District) that were being conducted over the same time period as the case study team's field work.
- (b) a *scoping mission* that took place in Burkina Faso April 8-12, 2002, that provided the opportunity to meet a sample of stakeholders and prepare for the execution of the case study.
- (c) the development of a *reference framework* to be used systematically by each team member: in interviews or focus groups with the *six categories of stakeholders* that were identified - the central government, the technical ministries, the donors, the local institutions, civil society, and the population; for the priority themes and sectors that were grouped into three categories following a detailed analysis of the *CSLP* document: *Group I – Institutional issues*: Partnership with donors, good governance, in particular local government, public finance management including regional integration into UMOA, anti-corruption initiatives, and *CSLP* implementation instruments. *Group II – Social Sectors*: Education, Health, and Water. *Group III - Growth, Employment, Income Generation*: Rural Economy (irrigation water, agriculture, livestock), communications (rural roads, rural electrification), competitiveness, SME development, and telecommunications, themes deemed indispensable for successful economic growth, including diversification, one of Burkina Faso's fundamental needs. The methodology is detailed in Annex A to the Report. Altogether, 150-200 people were interviewed.
- (d) *Questionnaires and Surveys*. Besides the standard set of guides for interviews from the reference framework, the study team used a donor questionnaire akin to the one developed for Ghana – although only a few donor agencies responded. In addition, a random survey of a cross-section of stakeholders was carried out in the districts of Ouahigouya, Kaya, Boromo, and Tienkodogo. These districts were chosen from the poverty map to cover a range of poverty levels and ecological zones. The study team designed the questionnaires and trained the survey team: eight graduate students in economics from the University of Ouagadougou.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Reports by the following individual team members are available on request: Claude Bationo, Della E. McMillan, Jean Pierre Ouedraogo, Patrick Plane, and Kimsey Savadogo.

## THE REPORT

1.4 Following an introductory chapter the second chapter provides a brief overview of the historical context and landmarks leading to the CDF principles and *CSLP* in Burkina Faso. This is followed in Chapter 3 by a more detailed analysis of each of the CDF principles in terms of how the principle is being applied, progress in executing the principle, and the major issues and challenges to be faced. Chapter 4 analyzes some specific issues and challenges of implementation and sequencing – is it more appropriate to talk about the CDF galvanizing the *CSLP* or the *CSLP* galvanizing the CDF principles? – implementation instruments; achieving the Millennium Development Goals; reducing aid dependency; and increasing the ownership of the development challenge by the population at large. The chapter concludes with a discussion of a simple scorecard by which the team attempted to rank the likelihood of achieving specific *CSLP* goals.

## 2. Context and History Leading to the CDF Principles in Burkina Faso

2.1 Burkina Faso has some special characteristics that have shaped its development experience in general and its implementation of the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) principles in particular. Despite many changes in governmental structure, Burkina Faso has never experienced the types of total economic, social, and political breakdown that led to the forging of new national identities in several of the CDF pilot countries, such as Uganda and Vietnam. Even Burkina Faso's revolutionary period (1983-1987) was marked by relatively evolutionary change that built on many of the development models of the previous 14-year regime.

2.2 The origins of applying CDF principles in Burkina Faso can be traced back more than 40 years and are anchored in strong historical participatory traditions. Burkina Faso's unique multi-ethnic struggle to negotiate its reconstitution as an independent country in 1960 set the stage for a model of grassroots participatory development that has continued more or less unbroken to this day. Although each government starting has conceptualized the objectives and strategies for obtaining economic and political development in a different way, each has consistently supported participation in the identification of a long-term development vision.

2.3 Community-based participatory development has continued to be one of Burkina Faso's strengths and is uniquely illustrated by the large number of NGOs (more than 200), and associations (about 14,000), including cooperatives, '*groupements*,' etc. They perform many social and economic functions, enable communities or social groups to undertake their own development projects such as school construction and micro-enterprises, and are an effective communication network between policymakers and the population. Over the years, NGOs have been regrouped in various national structures whose representativeness is at times contested but their legitimacy is nevertheless recognized.

2.4 The long-term holistic vision that emerged in the mid-1990's was heavily influenced by the legacy of the political and economic model of 'total mobilization' that marked the 1983-1987 Revolution under President Sankara. One achievement from this period was to formalize this participatory process of elaborating a 'holistic development vision' for the country into a series of baseline, regional, provincial, and national level Popular Development Plans – *Plans Populaires de Développement (PPD)*.

2.5 The *Burkinabé* are justifiably proud of the considerable progress that the country made during that period in developing innovative 'grassroots' sector development strategies such as the National Village Land Management Program – *Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs Villageois (PNGT)* – that set the stage for further reforms in the 1990s. Lessons were also learned from other revolutionary mechanisms such as the high level of participation of the local population in the fight against corruption through the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs). Although they were considered an effective mechanism for mobilizing popular support for certain national strategies, they were in some instances instruments of repression, which precipitated the *coup d'état* in 1987. This ambivalent legacy of the CDRs has continued to influence the government's ability to engage in an active dialogue with civil society and create a more broad-based understanding of the *CSLP* as the integrative framework to implement the development vision.

2.6 Starting with the lifting of the *Etat d'Exception* in the early 1990s, Burkina Faso has steadily progressed in its peaceful transition to non-ethnic based democratic structures. In this regard, the results of the May 2002 legislative elections that increased to approximately one-third the number of opposition representatives in Parliament represent a major benchmark.

2.7 From the late 1980s onwards, Burkina Faso launched a process of preparation of long-term sector development plans, all intended to bring about poverty reduction, and that subsequently became available to inform the *CSLP*. The 1994 and 1998 Poverty Surveys, in particular for education, health, water, and rural development, further supported these sector plans. The *Lettre d'Intention de Politique de Développement Humain Durable (1995-2000)*, that was prepared for the Third Consultative Group in Geneva, in 1995, became the first comprehensive effort by the *Burkinabé* government to present to donors the country's own vision of its development and poverty reduction strategy; and to this day, it is considered by numerous *Burkinabé* stakeholders as the true starting point for the development of the country's poverty reduction strategy. It first provided the overarching holistic framework from which has come holistic frameworks at the sector level.

2.8 Another benchmark involving the early adoption of CDF-like principles is the Conditionality Reformulation Test Exercise, initiated in 1997 in the context of the Special Program for Africa (SPA). Led by the European Union, this 'Test' was intended to help build a consensus between donors and the government on a common set of performance indicators to be used as a basis for decisions regarding disbursement of financial assistance, preferably in the form of budget support. The experiment led to inclusion in the June 2000 *CSLP* of a number of indicators for use in monitoring strategies in three areas: basic education, health, and budget management. Elaborated on the basis of the lessons learned from the Structural Adjustment experience, this test adopted four specific principles: national ownership of economic policy definition and performance, improved impact of development assistance through outcome monitoring, improved donor coordination, and predictable disbursement of financial aid – the first three of which come very close to the CDF principles.

2.9 The decade preceding the design and adoption of the *CSLP* has also been marked by major changes in the country's economic policies and performance, which made Burkina Faso eligible for the debt reduction initiative HIPC, and put Burkina Faso among the better performing countries in West Africa. GDP growth reached 5% annually over the 1994-1999 period, as compared to 3% on average over the 1980-1993 period, and GDP growth per capita became positive (GDP growth was 2.2% and 5.6% in 2000 and 2001 respectively). These achievements were the result of economic liberalization measures, the positive impact from the devaluation of the CFA in 1994, and prudent monetary, and budget management policy.

2.10 Weaker points include the continued balance of payments deficit of about 10% of GDP,<sup>2</sup> comparable to the pre-devaluation level and largely due to increasing investments by public sector companies; the weak competitiveness of its economy attributable in part to high production costs; and the slow progress of privatizations. Eight years after the beginning of privatization in 1991, two-third of public enterprises are still state-owned, in spite of their unsatisfactory performance. Vested interests, corruption, and a non-performing judiciary system continue to hold back the privatization process, while administrative and other barriers to entry deter the development of new private enterprises and the expansion of domestic and foreign investments.

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<sup>2</sup> The deficit is fully financed with grants and non-concessional loans. As long as imports are mostly for productive investments that meet the market test for profitability, the deficit should not be a matter of great concern.



2.11 Burkina Faso's participation into the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) presents both a challenge and an opportunity. On the one hand, Burkina Faso has positioned itself ahead of its neighbors in complying with WAEMU's five directives harmonizing the legal, accounting, and government finance statistics frameworks. Burkina Faso is the only WAEMU member that has fully implemented all the regulations pertaining to the common external tariff (CET).<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the WAEMU macroeconomic framework, formally referred to as the *Pacte de Convergence*, may prod Burkina Faso to improve its fiscal performance in terms of tax revenues and budget management in favor of the social sectors. The real challenge of the WAEMU framework may be its rigidity, especially in the context of difficult economic and political situations in the Ivory Coast.

2.12 In spite of its overall improved macroeconomic performance in the latter part of the 1990s, the progress in poverty reduction has been slow. In fact, the 1998 Poverty Survey revealed a slight increase in poverty, with 45.3% of the population below the poverty line as compared to 44.5% in 1993, but a substantial increase in urban poverty, affecting 16.5% of the population as compared to 10.4% in 1993. Regional disparities, largely correlated to the natural endowment, prevail.

2.13 With respect to selected social indicators, Burkina Faso is among the worst positioned countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the mortality rates of infants at 105 per thousand and of children under 5 years at 219 per thousand are considerably higher than the Sub-Saharan Africa averages of 91 and 151, respectively. In spite of a major effort to increase school enrollment, the overall literacy rate is only 19% (5.7% for women in rural areas). However, the primary school enrollment ratio of 41%, while low by regional standards, represents a significant increase over the 5% ratio that prevailed in 1983.

2.14 In sum, the application of the CDF principles and the adoption of the *CSLP* take place in a complex environment. On the one hand, the dynamics are impressive: nascent economic liberalization, globalization through the West Africa Monetary Union, the building-up of democratic institutions, the emergence of new political and economic leaders, and administrative decentralization. On the other hand, the challenges are enormous: lack of competitiveness of the economy, corruption, increasing urban poverty, substantial regional disparities in income and welfare measures, the liability of the high rates of child mortality and illiteracy, and a high rate of population growth.

2.15 Key landmarks leading to Burkina Faso's early adoption of CDF principles include the political model of the 1983-1987 Revolution; decentralized and participatory sector dialogues of the late 1980s-early 1990s that culminated in the 1995 Letter of Development Policy for Human Sustainable Development – *Lettre d'Intention de Politique de Développement Humain Durable (1995-2000)*; and the Test to Reform Conditionality (1997–2000).

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<sup>3</sup> However, Burkina's domestic industries are now exposed to greater competition from imports from other countries.

### 3. The CDF Principles and the *CSLP* (PRSP)

#### LONG-TERM HOLISTIC VISION

##### Achievements

3.1 *Working definition.* The *Design Paper* for the CDF Evaluation describes the CDF principles as processes that lead to outputs, outcomes and goals or impacts. The *Design Paper* provides the following working definition for long-term, holistic development framework.<sup>4</sup>

- (h) Identification of a 15-to-20 year vision statement containing monitorable development goals that:
  - take into account the broad aspirations of the population, and
  - include sustainable poverty reduction as an overarching goal and related sub-goals that are in the same areas as the MDGs.<sup>5</sup>
- (i) Formulation of a comprehensive yet realistic medium-term (3-to-5 year) strategy for making progress toward goals, specifically addressing the need for:
  - balance among macroeconomic and financial issues and structural and social concerns;
  - setting priorities in the face of capacity and hard budget constraints; and
  - time-bound, concrete actions, with attention to phasing and sequencing.

3.2 The 1995 *Lettre d'Intention de Politique de Développement Humain Durable (LIPDHD)* in which a long-term vision for development was first articulated provides the framework for the *Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté (CSLP)* in 2000 that ties the vision to operational strategies in the priority sectors for poverty reduction. The *CSLP* is therefore the current reference document of a holistic vision in Burkina Faso for the government and the donors in particular, although the *LIPDHD* has greater name recognition among other stakeholders.

3.3 The development vision set out in the two documents is nevertheless quite consistent.

- The *LIPDHD* aims to remedy five types of insecurity: *economic insecurity*, closely associated with access to education, technical training, and employment; *health insecurity*, determined by access to health/medical services; *food insecurity*, including access to potable water; *environmental insecurity*, given the country's vulnerability to desertification and droughts; and *individual and political insecurity*, inherent to the right to transparency and accountability.

3.4 The *CSLP* is anchored on four strategic goals: *Accelerate the rate and equity of economic growth* through macroeconomic stability, increased competitiveness, rural development, and incentives to productive sectors; *provide the poor with social services*, in particular education, health, potable water, and improved housing; *increase incomes and employment for the poor* in the rural areas, through modernization, intensification, and sustainability of agriculture, and

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<sup>4</sup> World Bank, CDF Evaluation Secretariat, *CDF Evaluation Design Paper* (September 2001), pp. 10-11.

<sup>5</sup> See discussion on relationship of *CSLP* goals and targets to MDGs in the section on Results Orientation.

through the provision of communication infrastructure; and *promote good governance*, including democratic, local, and economic governance, and fight corruption.

3.5 The strength of the *CSLP* is in its use as a reference framework for national development, with monitorable development goals that reflect the broad aspirations of the population for improved social services and income growth. It also generates realistic processes for updating the goals and strategy.

3.6 The *CSLP* has acquired legitimacy, as it capitalizes on the process of democratization of institutions and the liberalization of the economy. It is built on the foundations of solid macro-economic performance and analyses in priority social sectors, including the two national poverty surveys of 1994 and 1998. It targets the delivery of social services, prioritizing the poorest provinces. It also integrates general economic arguments for investing in the health and education sectors that had heretofore been isolated from the main macro-policy debates despite the high priority attached to them by the population. It aims for an annual GDP growth rate of 7.4%, over the first implementation period, and a budgetary surplus of 1.6% of GDP by 2003.

### ***Challenges***

3.7 There is a tension between the long-term time frame of the CDF and the shorter one of the *CSLP* that will need to be resolved. The bias of PRSP documents (not just in the case of Burkina Faso) is on policies and monitoring indicators that will demonstrate immediate results. In the case of Burkina Faso the government incorporated in the *CSLP* long-term quantitative goals while at the same time setting intermediate targets. But in terms of the policies, the government felt that it did not have the opportunity in the *CSLP* to really think long-term as the spirit of the CDF enjoins. Therefore, the links between short- and medium-term policies on the one hand, and long-term goals on the other hand, were not fully established although the government strove to address this when formulating the *CSLP*, linking medium objectives over 3 years with the attainment of 10-year targets in four priority sectors.

3.8 There is also an unresolved tension (and not only in Burkina Faso) between the selectivity that the PRSP demands to choose priority programs and the CDF that recommends a holistic i.e. comprehensive approach that requires the government to design and implement policies that address all-important aspects of the development challenge.

3.9 The major weakness of the *CSLP* is its dependency on a very vulnerable agriculture sector as the main source for economic growth for which it may have set unrealistic expectations. The vulnerability of *Burkinabé* agriculture to uncertain rainfall that affects yields of rain-fed non-irrigated crops is further aggravated by its dependency on a few cash crops, in particular, cotton, themselves subject to the pressures of protectionist measures among competing external producers.

3.10 The difficulty of achieving the targeted growth was already experienced in the first two years of implementation of the *CSLP*, when cereal production declined by 15% because of the drought, prices increased by 20%, and GDP grew by only 2.2 %.

3.11 Another weakness of the *CSLP* is the lack of inter-sectoral synergies, such as the disconnect between the education curriculum, with its emphasis on non-technical subjects at the primary and secondary levels and at the tertiary level on the training of professionals including civil servants, while the demand of the economy is increasingly for technical skills.

3.12 It is difficult to reconcile the goals for poverty reduction and the means to achieve them. A recent study already casts doubts that Burkina Faso will be able to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.

***Link to the Public Expenditure Management***

3.13 The *CSLP* places great emphasis on good governance in the management of public finances as a precondition of operationalizing its vision. The budgetary resources of the state are very little in relation to the social needs of the population therefore necessitating rigorous and transparent budget processes that favor its redistribution to priority sectors for poverty reduction. The *Burkinabé* authorities have improved their budgeting and expenditure management practices over recent years and established a multi-year program to enhance staff capabilities on public financial management matters. In 2000-01, five Public Expenditure Review studies were carried out (Basic Education, Health, Rural Development, Public Investment Program, and Budgetary Deconcentration). In addition, the country benefited from the completion of several important studies. In November 2000, a Country Procurement Assessment Review (CPAR) was finalized in collaboration with the World Bank. A number of this report's recommendations are being implemented and a new Procurement Code was approved on February 6, 2002.

3.14 In September 2001, the authorities adopted the Public Expenditure Management Improvement Plan (*PRGB--Plan de Renforcement des Dépenses Budgétaires*) that aims to address deficiencies in budget formulation, execution, monitoring, control, and auditing. Several of the plans' recommendations are already being implemented. A Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA), involving all major donors, was completed in December 2001. Finally, a Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes/HIPC Assessment and Action Plan (ROSC/AAP), looking inter alia at the country's capacity to track poverty-reducing expenditure, has been recently finalized. The authorities are currently working on the harmonization of the key recommendations of these studies into an integrated framework for implementation.

3.15 These recommendations will also guide the formulation of the 2003-05 Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF, *CDMT*) that is a key instrument for the implementation and monitoring of the *CSLP*. The budget bill for 2002 is based on ceilings set by the MTEF and *CSLP* priorities. National budget expenditure allocations to social sectors have been raised in the 2002 Finance Law. All ministries have presented program budgets. The authorities have approved by law the "regionalization of order payment issuance," through the appointment of "delegated payers" within ministries to empower regional government entities.

3.16 Burkina Faso has set in place an institutional framework for budget control in the General State Inspectorate (*IGE*), Inspection General of Finances (*IGF*), and the Supreme Audit Court (*Cour des Comptes*) with senior jurisdiction over the control of public finances that will be fully operational by the end of 2002. Now that these institutions have been created, the challenge for the authorities is to ensure that they can function effectively. It will also be incumbent on the National Assembly to fully exercise the oversight role mandated to it by the budget execution laws (*loi de règlement*) adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2002. The government properly regards all these measures for improved public expenditure management as key to ensuring that the *CSLP* gains increased credibility among stakeholders. For donors who intend to provide direct budgetary support, it is critical that fiduciary safeguards are in place and are seen to be working well.

### ***The Long-Term Vision and the Sectors***

3.17 Holistic visions at sector level were antecedents of the *CSLP*. In this respect, Burkina Faso differs from other countries such as Uganda where the holistic frameworks at sector level came out of the process of producing the overarching long-term holistic development framework.

#### ***Health***

3.18 In 1996, the Ministry of Health began the process of elaboration of a National Health Policy and National Health Plan (*Politique Sanitaire Nationale 2000, Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2001-2010*). This resulted in a vision for the sector that responds to the aspirations of the population by defining objectives as improving access to health and nutrition services by lowering barriers to health and nutrition care for the poor, improving access and raising the quality and utilization of health and nutrition services, strengthening communicable disease control with a particular emphasis on reducing HIV infection rates and strengthening human resources in the sector. The vision in the current plan corrects the failing of previous sector plans that did not recognize the capacity building that would have to take place for local health operatives to discharge their mandate. The vision contained in the plan could be strengthened by greater recognition of factors – other than improving the supply of health services – that affect people’s access to and use of health services. The plan was elaborated in close consultation with the Ministry of Finance, a process that reinforced budget planning and led to a credible fully costed three-year operation plan (*Plan Triennal de Mise en Oeuvre du PDS 2001-2003*).

#### ***Education***

3.19 In 1997, the government embarked on the formulation of a new 10-year education plan—the Basic Education Ten Year Program (*Plan Décennal de Développement de l’Education de Base 2001-2010*) that was formally adopted in July 1999. Its objective is to increase access to quality basic education. The primary goal of the ten-year plan is to increase the “supply” of primary school services in order to reduce the gross inequity in access to education between rural and urban areas and the lowest and highest income groups. The vision is weak in its lack of focus on demand factors that affect parent’s decisions to have their children attend school. School fees, and the opportunity cost of schooling are frequently cited reasons for lack of attendance. The government however is now focusing more than it had in the past on efficiency and demand factors. The 2<sup>nd</sup> PRSP Implementation Report documents a plan adopted in 2001 to enhance the efficiency of the basic education, and reports that supplementary budget allocation from HIPC made it possible in 2001 to buy food and supplies for schools situated in the provinces registering the lowest enrollment rates. The plan (as its name suggests) is focused on primary level education and as discussed elsewhere in this report an overall vision for education is lacking that would tie together the objectives of education policy at the primary, secondary, tertiary levels and technical and non-technical levels to the human resource needs of the economy. The current vision corrects the previous model two-speed education (*education a deux vitesses*) that focused on expanding primary education in the urban areas and creating a “second class” system of terminal, rural education in the rural areas. One unintended consequence of this was to accelerate labor migration to Burkina Faso’s ill-equipped urban centers and to international locations, primarily *Cote d’Ivoire*. The same inequalities created a political rift between the interests of the small elite that made it through the system into civil service employment and the rural zones that stoked the political upheavals that unsettled Burkina Faso between 1980 and 1987.

3.20 The country’s commitment to developing a more equitable national education system after 1987 was strengthened by the enhanced research capacity building that took place in the

Ministry that enabled it to better monitor results of its education programs. This enhanced capacity then provided the database for the Ministry to mobilize the type of parliamentary, central government (e.g. Presidential) and union support that it needed to develop the more poverty-focused education strategy that is embodied in the Ten Year Basic Education Plan.

3.21 The objectives in the plan are linked to sub-programs that provide three-year action plans that are realistic.

### *Water*

3.22 In 1997, the Ministry of Environment and Water embarked on a major program of applied research to develop a national policy and ten-year action plan for the water sector. The process of research and coordination resulted in its Water Resource and Management Policy document in May 2001, with its vision of a demand-driven model for community well construction and maintenance relying on the private sector. The policy prioritizes alternative policy actions for water. The Ministry of Water has acknowledged that inadequate coordination of its policies with the policies of other sectors to be a major problem in implementing its strategy.

### *Competitiveness*

3.23 The *CSLP* proposes objectives for developing small and medium enterprises (SMEs), in particular, clothing and food processing. Its vision calls for increasing the competitiveness of these industries to increase exports. The conceptual framework for increasing competitiveness is well articulated around five central transversal or sector-specific themes (promoting the private sector, improving the investment climate, and increasing the stock of human and physical capital). Producers associations and private sector representatives pointed to a lack of coherence between government policies for regional integration and national measures that would permit the private sector to adapt more readily to economic opening. In roundtables organized by the case study team they expressed their dissatisfaction with the lack of urgency exhibited by the government in addressing tax issues, availability of credit, the skills needs of the economy, removing constraints to a more efficient air transport system, removing the administrative burden on enterprises, and other measures that would enhance private sector competitiveness.

### *Issues*

3.24 The *CSLP* long-term vision is not yet well known outside the central government and the higher provincial authorities. In particular, the private sector, the NGOs, and the population are not yet fully on board. Although it is seen as an effective framework and as a process to adjust policy directions and orient public expenditure, it is not yet clear whether it will provide an adequate framework to mobilize the full range of stakeholders that must be implicated in implementation.

3.25 Some of the priority issues include the need to foster a diversification of the sources of growth outside of agriculture, and to open-up the dialogue among sectors and institutions to enrich the economic and social development vision. There is a need; also, for identifying clear and realistic impact indicators.

3.26 However, the issue of highest priority is the need for the highest political authorities in the government to engage publicly in supporting the *CSLP* and in committing to the goal of poverty reduction.

3.27 Burkina Faso is privileged to have a new class of intellectuals and of political and entrepreneurial leaders, including women, yet many of the case study team's key informants, including some among the donors, exhibit great hesitancy in publicly indicating what they admit in private are lacunae in the government's vision. They need a 'safe' forum to actively participate with the public authorities in a debate on the long-term vision. The government could capitalize on existing 'think tanks,' e.g. at the university, as well as on the experience of the private sector, and on Burkina Faso's long history of participatory debates to create a more public debate of the development vision. The preparation of *Vision 2020* that the government has recently launched may be an opportunity to do so.

## COUNTRY OWNERSHIP

### Achievements

3.28 As described previously, Burkina Faso has developed by itself its long-term vision, through its own processes over the last forty years of post-independence history. In particular, the *LIPDHD* of 1995 was entirely prepared by *Burkinabé* institutions, and this may be why government representatives are still referring to it as the predecessor to the *CSLP*. Similarly, the long-term sectoral plans for the rural sector (the *Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs*) and the ten year plans for health, education, and water were developed with strong participation from civil society, government, and the various donors that helped finance preparation studies and pilot studies: the French government, GTZ, and IDA for the *PNGT*, the OMS, the Swiss and IDA for the 2000-2010 health strategy, and Danida and the Netherlands for the formulation of the government's water strategy issued in 2001. Overall, the process of developing goals and formulating the sector strategies has been country-led with regular and sustained stakeholder participation and sustained high level political commitment. The government needs to both insist on its responsibility and accountability for public policies while ensuring the maximum participation of stakeholders in consultation processes to ensure widest country ownership of these policies.

3.29 By contrast, the preparation of the *CSLP* was not as participatory as previous national or sector development plans, at least in terms of supporting a bottom-up process of consultations from local communities to the governmental groups in charge of carrying out the final analyses and preparing the final document. Given that such a process is difficult to organize and time consuming, and second, that Burkina Faso was under pressure to have the *CSLP document* ready in order to be able to access the HIPC resources, there was little choice but to get the job done quickly. The *CSLP* was prepared in about 7 months, between November 1999 and June 2000; the government opted not to go through an interim PRSP as it deemed it had sufficient macroeconomic and sector analyses readily available.

3.30 To test the CDF ownership principle, the study team systematically questioned stakeholders about their perceptions of the *CSLP*. The results are summarized in Table 3.1 below.

3.31 Perceptions of different stakeholder groups regarding the *CSLP*.

**Table 3.1: Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté**

Stakeholder Group	As a Document	As a Process	As a Tool for Management and Monitoring Results	As a Tool for Mobilizing and Better Coordinating Investment Resources
Central Government Leadership <sup>6</sup>		++		+++
Central Technical Ministry Offices		+++	Strong impact (+++) on 10 year plans for education, health rural water  Others: weak	+++ : health, education rural water  Others: weak
Regional Offices Technical Ministries		++		
NGOs—central offices		++ (helpful in developing country strategies)	+++ (but not connected to national M&E efforts)	+++
NGOs—project offices outside capital	Little or no awareness	Little or no awareness		
Private Sector—small and medium enterprises	Little or no awareness	Little or no awareness		
Private Sector—large enterprises	Little or no awareness	Little or no awareness		
Press	+ (as most recent fashion)	+	+	+
Rural village based populations	No awareness	No awareness		
Donors	+++	+++	+++	+++

n.a.=non applicable;  
 0=not aware of document or initiative;  
 +=aware of but perceived of as having little use;  
 ++= perceived as useful or potentially useful;  
 +++=strong impact

3.32 *Country ownership of the long-term vision and of the CSLP process by government and administrative bodies*, both at the Ministerial and provincial level, has been uneven during 1999-2002. It was very strong during the preparation of the document under the leadership of the then Minister of Finance, who ensured the significant involvement of social sector ministries through the inter-ministerial committee. Momentum weakened once the first debt relief measures and incremental budgetary contributions were approved by the donors. The more recent efforts by all ministries to continue the dissemination of the *CSLP* as the country's development framework is yielding impressive results, both with a broader range of technical ministries (e.g. the Ministry of

<sup>6</sup> Senior officials (see Annex B) interviewed by the case study team.



Interior and Territorial Administration), and with the decentralized administrative and technical structures.

## Challenges

3.33 Key challenges to increase ownership of the *CSLP* by multiple stakeholders include:

- (a) Developing a more open political engagement of high-level government officials, the parliament, and political parties in revision and implementation of the *CSLP* strategy.
- (b) Facilitating a more broad based discussion of the overall strategy and the potential synergies between specific sectors with a broad base of civil society, private sector, and ministry leaders that takes into account the need for intra<sup>7</sup> as well as inter-group communication and ownership.
- (c) Working through the pre-existing structures for regional and provincial level coordination between sectors, village groups and producer associations including those associated with the *PNGT* to bring about more regular broad based stakeholder participation in program revision and evaluation.
- (d) Organizing a series of focused sessions on developing non-agricultural and agriculture related income growth opportunities that would include broad based participation from the private sector, civil society, and the major national centers of excellence in economic analysis for agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises.

### Specific challenges are:

3.34 *Delinking the CSLP from the HIPC initiative.* In line with the thinking of the Conditionality Reformulation Test Exercise, priority in the *CSLP* has been given to addressing and providing incremental resources to the social sectors, namely health and education. The risk exists, however, that ownership of the *CSLP* remains primarily with those sector ministries that are privileged with HIPC resources. A key challenge for the government is therefore to consolidate ownership of the *CSLP* across a broader range of sector ministries so that it can be de-linked from the HIPC initiative and that it continue to be the Development Framework *beyond* the duration of the HIPC initiative.

3.35 *Operationalizing monitoring and impact evaluation mechanisms* would be a powerful way of building up ownership. Priority has been given to setting up the macroeconomic and budget monitoring institutional structure, in part because of the demands from the donors who provide budgetary support and/or assess the performance criteria under the HIPC initiative, as well as to establishing quantitative supply-driven targets in the social sectors. Less attention has been given from the start to monitoring the other components of the *CSLP*: the performance indicators initially identified in the *CSLP* (Table 17) are few. The effectiveness of the Inter-

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<sup>7</sup> Many farm group and association leaders decried the current strategy's emphasis on mixing stakeholder groups as naïve. They argued that a series of separate meetings for *groupement* and village association leaders, private sector leaders, civil society leaders, NGO representatives, and regional ministry officials would be more likely to elicit these individual groups' open input into the revision and/or adaptation of project designs, program policies and national laws. This type of intensive "intra-group" communication would then set the stage for more open "inter-group" communication at a second stage.

ministerial Committee under the Ministry of Finance, and that of the technical/sector committees in charge of monitoring the *CSLP* implementation has been mixed. The sector monitoring committees were only set up recently. By the time of the case study team visit, most had met only once.

3.36 *Implementing the decentralization strategy* is possibly the greatest challenge facing Burkina Faso in the forthcoming year of implementation of the *CSLP*. Anchored on the democratic principles embedded in the Constitution of June 2, 1991, the *CSLP* provides for the decentralization of financial resources and competencies as the solution to generate “democratic value-added,” in the sense of providing the population with the opportunity both for local initiatives and for local populations to control the performance of their elected representatives. It provides for both a ‘deconcentration’ of sector ministries’ services and the decentralization of administrative services at the communal, district, and provincial levels. The ‘decentralization’ process progressed with the creation of regions in 2001 and the municipal elections in 49 municipalities in 2000.

3.37 By 2003, Burkina Faso should have 350 fully established rural and urban municipalities, i.e. one per district. At the same time, the 45 provinces are to be regrouped into 13 Regions. The major concerns are the financing of the decentralization and the availability of sufficient competencies to run the new structure. At the time of the case study team’s visit, the design of the fiscal decentralization was not completed. The provinces were concerned that they would depend on the Regions for the budgetary transfers, that their staff is extremely limited. The case study team’s assessment of the municipalities’ capacities (administrative and political) is that they vary widely, ranging from very ‘traditional’ mayors and municipal counselors, to a new ‘class’ of very competent and well-trained municipal secretaries. Whether the various administrative structures will have the capacity to actually design and implement relevant development programs and budgets will be a challenge that will require careful monitoring.

## Issues

3.38 *Inter-sector coordination for implementation and monitoring* is one of the key areas for improving ownership of the *CSLP*. In line with the experience on the Conditionality Test, the Ministry of Finance has been very involved through its various departments. However, it is still difficult to get the technical ministries to participate in monitoring committees that are not directly related to their primary function. The Ministry of Finance that continues to lead the *CSLP* implementation monitoring, is aware that some improvements are needed in the workings of the three institutional levels of the *CSLP* implementation monitoring structure: the technical committees, led by the General Secretary of the relevant ministry, the Technical Inter-ministerial Committee, and the Ministerial Committee. Since information is supposed to be assembled from the bottom-up, the quality of the work of the sector committees (whose composition includes representatives from various stakeholders – other ministries, civil society, donors) is critical. They are the ones to propose possible solutions to improve the results of the *CSLP* and to formulate adaptations to the current objectives and means.

3.39 The issue of *who represents the population and how to define civil society* is still much debated. The government has indicated that any non-profit organization and non-political organization belongs to civil society. This therefore excludes any organization representing the private sector, and any political party. This definition also excludes the *National Assembly*, which is a political institution but represents the population since the deputies are elected. Similarly, the Economic and Social Advisory Board (*Conseil Economique et Social*) is also a consultative political body, although it is mandated to provide an independent view on the government’s economic and social policies.

3.40 *Greater involvement of National Assembly and other political bodies in the CSLP process is important.* The former chairman of the National Assembly regretted that the government had only had a limited and rushed consultation with the National Assembly in the drafting of the *CSLP*, and that there was little debate on its implementation. It would require a finer analysis of the election campaign themes than the case study team could undertake to understand whether the various political parties had integrated the *CSLP* among their main campaign themes. Some of the deputies whom the study team met were definitely well informed, but the sample is not representative.

3.41 *Ownership by Civil Society is weak and needs to be reinforced.* Given the short time-frame for preparing the *CSLP* document, time was limited for broad consultations with civil society (NGOs, trade unions and farmers' associations, human rights and women's organizations, and the media). Nevertheless, two regional validation workshops/focus groups (Ouahigouya, February 25, 2000, and Bobo Dioulasso, March 3, 2000) were held to receive feedback on the draft document; they were attended by a broad range of local institutions and representative organizations of civil society (NGOs, professional associations, community-based organizations, and local government representatives, traditional chiefs, and such other stakeholders as local donor representatives).

3.42 Consultations on the *CSLP* have continued beyond the finalization of the document that is itself seen as a tool that should evolve and will be updated. Four thematic and regional participatory workshops were conducted in 2001 in order to broaden the topical and geographical coverage: *Human Resources and Development* (Tienkodogo, July 2001); *Rural Development and Poverty Reduction* (Ouahigouya, July 2001); *Competitiveness* (Bobo Dioulasso, August 2001); and *Good Governance and Poverty Reduction* (Ouagadougou, August 2001). A study carried out for Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) found that only 25% of participants at the four regional workshops were representatives from civil society with almost 60% of participants being from government. The study found fault with the way in which the workshops were organized, in particular, the absence of simultaneous interpretation in local languages, the technical character of the presentations, short notice to non-government participants who gained the impression that their participation was in order to validate what was already decided rather than to take part in its elaboration. The authorities have learned that the format of future workshops needs to better accommodate the representatives of civil society by creating a more interactive environment that encourages everyone to speak up. Other concerns expressed include the under-representation of women (15% of participants), although the *CSLP* has a strong gender focus, and doubts that the information generated by the workshops will be integrated into the revisions of the *CSLP* now planned for the end of 2002. More recently, some organizations such as the Women's Communication and Information Network of NGOs have taken upon themselves to champion the *CSLP* by organizing their own series of information sessions throughout the country.

### **Ownership in the Sectors**

3.43 *Ownership of the CSLP by the population is limited.* Unsurprisingly, among the population, there was little recognition of the *CSLP* as a document. However, among individuals surveyed (c.f. Annex C) 87% responded positively when asked about their perception on the motivation of the state in efforts to reduce poverty. Ownership of the poverty reduction strategy (as opposed to recognition of the *CSLP* document) is stronger among workers in health and land management. Among teachers that were interviewed in focus group discussion by the cases study team, discontent was expressed with their living conditions (especially in rural areas). They interpreted lack of progress in improving their living conditions as lack of seriousness on implementation of the education objectives of the *CSLP*.

3.44 The study team's interviews with village leaders and rural development cooperatives (*groupements*) revealed that, with the rare exception of Ouahigouya and Tengodogo that benefited from two of the regional information workshops, there was almost no awareness of the *CSLP* as either a document, a process, or an implementation strategy, and that there was no expectation that the *CSLP* would actually help them in any direct way. This is not to say that the population is not committed to its own development. To the contrary, there was a tremendous sense of determination and optimism that self-initiative through local groups and/or NGOs created by local leaders is the way out of aid-dependency. Much hope was placed in the implementation of administrative decentralization planned for 2003.

3.45 *Involvement of Small and Large Private Sector Enterprises.* Despite the *CSLP*'s endorsement for reducing the state's involvement in the economy, there was very little direct involvement of either small or medium, or large sized enterprises in either the initial design or implementation of the poverty alleviation program. Some of them were consulted, but their recommendations for follow-up action were ignored. Greater mobilization of the business sector is indispensable given the extreme importance of enterprises in developing the types of post-harvest "value added" and non-agricultural employment that Burkina Faso needs to raise incomes and living standards. The small business owners' perception is not only that they are not helped, but also that they are often harassed by attempts to enforce inefficient government regulations and controls. Some government bodies have recently engaged in a more active (and potentially more constructive) dialogue with enterprises.

## **COUNTRY-LED PARTNERSHIP**

3.46 The *CSLP* clearly specifies the government's role and responsibility for coordinating donors, and requires that donors' programs fit within the country's strategic framework and not be developed in parallel. The onus is on the government to define the implementation instruments and to design a consultation process to evaluate the impact of its poverty reduction policies and programs.

3.47 Besides the sector programs based on multi-stakeholder participation (e.g. the *PNGT*), the Conditionality Test framework created a precedent for more effective donor coordination with government. Through five meetings held during the implementation period (1997-2000), the government provided all the financial information necessary for the donors to understand the implementation progress and apply their disbursement criteria.

3.48 On their part, the donors undertook to support the government's economic management program and to work on harmonizing their disbursement procedures.

### **Achievements**

3.49 The government perceived that it was in the driver's seat in preparing the *CSLP*, and this greatly motivated the government team tasked with preparing the document to be ready within the short time-frame available. However, this process was accompanied by some tensions among donors, with some criticizing the overwhelming role of the World Bank in pressing the government to include certain components/aspects in the *CSLP*. These criticisms marred the early implementation of the *CSLP* but have largely disappeared today, thanks to the efforts of the present World Bank country team and other donor representatives, to ensure a more open dialogue and generally, a positive sense among donors that the *CSLP* is a unique framework and process through which they can and should all work together.

3.50 There is also a wide recognition that the project approach is not viable if not integrated into the broader framework, and that the sustainability of sectoral investments is likely to be jeopardized if these investments are not supported by an adequate macroeconomic framework, and strong institutional capacity at all levels.

3.51 There seems to be an increasing understanding between the government and its donor partners, in particular at the sector level. Tensions remain with respect to the ability of the government to implement sound economic and public resource management, which in turn affects some donor's willingness to make timely disbursements of direct budget support. Burkina Faso has so far managed to meet its macroeconomic targets. Maybe because of these tensions, the present case study team initially encountered wariness on the part of some government officials that its work could lead to the imposition of additional conditionality.

3.52 One major achievement of the *CSLP* is to have helped direct the HIPC resources towards the social sectors down to the local levels. An additional 800 primary school cadres have been hired, and equipments and materials for health centers are finally being procured. The government has also been successful in mobilizing significant additional resources to support decentralization with support from France, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and NGOs such as the *Volontaires du Progrès*.

3.53 Country-led partnership is strong at the local level. From the experience gained through the *PNGT* and its precursor the *PNGTV*, the local Development Committees chaired by the Provincial Governors are (in some provinces) an effective vehicle for coordinating the various donor or NGO-supported development programs, including for building-up inter-sector linkages, water development linked to the training of small- and medium-size enterprises, etc. The performance of these Development Committees varies significantly from province to province.

## **Partnership in the Sectors**

### ***Health***

3.54 An enormous number of donor-assisted programs has characterized the health sector during the last 20 years. The multiplicity of donor financed operations in the sector complicated attempts at coordination. The tendency of actors to focus on their respective areas of expertise (e.g. vaccination, infant and child health, nutrition) contributed to the difficulty of implementing the 1979 Basic Health Plan. One of the Ministry's major goals in creating the Technical Secretariat for the National Health Plan in 1998 was to better coordinate donor partnership in the development of the Ten Year Health Plan for 2001-2010.

### ***Education***

3.55 Uncoordinated donor assistance in the past has led to a high concentration of primary schools in certain areas where the international NGOs are very active and low concentration in areas where the NGOs are less active. An additional problem is that NGO assistance has often been for school building (for example, 88% of the infrastructure currently under construction in many departments of the Central East Regional MEBA office in 2001/02 was paid for by NGOs or village associations) with the Ministry of Basic Education then taking on the responsibility for teacher staffing. The resulting ad-hoc approach to decisionmaking on school building did not take account of the impact on the recurrent education budget. The new MEBA "Basic Education Sector Project's" proposal to subcontract many of the basic literacy training activities through NGOs, opens the window to more effective collaboration with NGOs, but only if it is followed by

more solid participation of MEBAM in the pre-existing *regional cadres de coordination* organized by the Ministry of Plan and/or PNGT. A good example is the regional level coordinating body (*cadre de concertation*) in the Tenkodogo region, which is used to map out the school construction program, and provides for an efficient division of responsibilities between the NGOs and MEBAM. The new multi-donor funded program for primary education offers an opportunity to address many of the financial and accounting issues that have plagued the basic education programs and discouraged local ownership in the past.

### **Water**

3.56 One major impact of the creation of regional-level water management offices has been to strengthen the Ministry's capacity for regional and provincial level management. The same structure has provided a basis for negotiating grants with NGOs, bilateral, and multilateral organizations that support water infrastructure investments and studies associated with each of the three stages. The strong harmonization of approaches to rural potable water development that has emerged in Burkina Faso over the last decade is the direct result of a series of donor-supported workshops and seminars that the government used as a vehicle for harmonizing approaches and testing "lessons learned" from earlier projects.

3.57 Beginning in the late 1990s a regular series of government-led coordination meetings of donors that intervene in the sector has been organized. This type of donor coordination has been facilitated by their partnership in sector research and analysis associated with the preparation of the new national policy. This coordination needs to be sustained and broadened to better integrate the NGOs that heretofore have not tended to coordinate their interventions in the sector with the other stakeholders.

### **Challenges**

3.58 *Among the donors*, there is still room for improvement in coordination. Donors are divided over the capacity of the *Burkinabé* government to move away from project aid for specific sectors to greater direct budgetary support. As a result, some parallel processes are still being developed, e.g. between the EU and the European partners who recently proposed a Protocol of Intent to the government, separate from the process adopted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. With aid transfers likely to continue to be significant for years (over 10% of GDP) and that in order to increase transparency and scrutiny of these transfers these funds should be factored into the budget then it is incumbent on the donors and the government to agree to new and better mechanisms to improve transfers. Under the present system that imposes great demands on the time of government officials, delays occur in negotiating the timely release of external funding and thus delays in the use of the funds by line ministries. To date, the government seems reluctant to request one single process although it would reduce transaction costs of dealing with multiple-donor processes of divergent budgeting, disbursement, procurement, reporting, evaluation, and safeguard procedures and practices. Solutions need to be found so that disbursement schedules can be according to predictable multi-year timetables with improved harmonization of procedures between the different donors.

3.59 A high percentage of the donors that the team interviewed made direct or indirect reference to the need for the headquarters of the World Bank to better understand the critical role that it plays in setting the tone for inter-donor relations due to the size of the volume of loan and technical direct assistance it provides. Many donors noted that in the past, many of the Bank officers would often deal directly with the government and then announce new policies and reforms as a "*fait accompli*" for the other partners.

3.60 At the same time, most of the donors interviewed expressed their respect for the hard work and competence of the Ouagadougou-based World Bank staff. The local Bank staff was also applauded, in many cases, for their commitment to stepping back from direct leadership of many of the inter-donor coordinating bodies that they themselves helped create. One major recommendation stemming from this analysis, also made by Danida's initial evaluation of the *CSLP*, was to grant these local staff greater latitude in supervising Bank loans and financial monitoring systems. One proposal was that some expansion of the local Bank staff might be needed in order to ensure that the Bank is better represented in the major national and regional level thematic coordinating groups.

### ***Private Sector***

3.61 Private sector representatives in roundtable discussions with the case study team noted that there is a need to transform the consultations that take place between the private sector and government into fora where the private sector genuinely influences economic policy. Up to now, the character of consultations has been to defend the interests of narrow sectoral groups or of individual enterprises that lead to short-term palliatives rather than sustainable economic policies.

3.62 *Intermediation through NGOs.* Frustrated with the high costs of executing aid programs, some donors have decreased their field presence and increased the proportion of funds that they administer through international NGOs or through "decentralized" projects that are awarded to national or international NGOs, village associations, or municipal governments. These programs do not necessarily fit within the *CSLP* framework; limited information is available on the costs and/or transfers, and at times, they create additional pressure on the government to provide the complementary resources (e.g. teachers for NGO built schools).

3.63 *Accountability for fund allocation and use.* Despite progress in the area of budget formulation, execution and reporting, there is still a widespread distrust by most donors of the capacity of Burkina Faso to track current expenditures. One of the most widespread weaknesses of earlier assistance was weak systems of control and accounting. The result of these weak systems was to escalate the opportunities for diversion of funds. Some donors—like the Japanese, for example, in the education sector—responded to this by implementing their own systems of follow-up on their particular sector investments. Both education and health ministries have responded by installing much stricter systems of independent accountants, with supervision under semi-autonomous units attached directly to the minister, as a tool for combating the problem.

3.64 The computerization of budget management has already improved the transparency of expenditures and is now being extended to the payment system for civil servant salaries. That the programming of expenditures in the *Cadre des Dépenses à Moyen Terme (CDMT)* is based on increasingly realistic projections also gives more credibility to the government's program under the *CSLP*.

3.65 Efforts are still needed to improve the budget control systems, the strengthening of the capacities, and public accountability for results. The issue will assume greater importance with the addition of new levels of administrative complexity through decentralization.

### ***Issues***

3.66 *Need for Better Government-Led Coordination of Visiting Supervision and Evaluation Missions.* Several partners noted the high transaction costs of *CSLP* supervision and evaluation missions to the various governmental, NGO, multilateral, and bilateral *CSLP* partners. One

solution would be to encourage donors to organize more joint government-multi-donor supervision and evaluation missions.

3.67 *Need for donors to recognize Burkina Faso's remarkable achievements over the past decade and to respect its talent and potential.* Assessment by both government and development partners of each other's performance needs to be reinforced in an environment of mutual trust and respect.

3.68 *Need for the Burkinabé government to be more forthcoming in providing information and taking action to fight corruption.* Concerns about trustworthiness can be lifted if/when the government will make information readily available to its donor partners, as well as to the National Assembly and to the public through the press when there is tangible evidence of reduced corruption. The establishment of anti-corruption observatories, such as the *RENLAC*, is a step in the right direction, but the judiciary now needs to act.

## **RESULTS ORIENTATION**

3.69 Monitoring of results in the *CSLP* context in Burkina Faso continues to pose a considerable challenge as was described in the first annual PRSP (*CSLP*) Progress Report<sup>8</sup> that stated that “*for each strategic objective, the PRSP (CSLP) review process will seek to identify indicators with respect to inputs (resources), processes (to measure progress achieved in implementation), outcomes (immediate results obtained in the sectors), and impact (progress achieved in the relatively long term). This is a vast undertaking that calls for the mobilization of substantial resources and multidisciplinary expertise.*”

### **Achievements**

3.70 A number of solid foundations for poverty reduction monitoring already existed prior to the *CSLP*.

- Burkina Faso had available an up-to-date diagnostic of poverty from the two Priority Surveys of household living conditions conducted in 1994 and 1998 and a qualitative study of the perceptions of the poor regarding the causes of poverty conducted in 1998.
- Sectors (such as basic education and health) that were to play a primary role in the poverty reduction strategy already had pro-poor sector strategies, including monitoring and evaluation plans.
- The Conditionality Reformulation Test Exercise in the context of the Special Program of Assistance for Africa that was initiated in 1997, and coordinated by the European Community, provided a series of performance indicators for key public sector activities. These indicators for health, education, and budget management were to form the basis for evaluation of the effectiveness of public policies and as such, they provided a ready menu of indicators that could be incorporated into the *CSLP* for monitoring purposes.

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<sup>8</sup> *PRSP Progress Report* September 2001, government of Burkina Faso.



- In addition, the consultation arrangements for the conditionality reformulation test exercise provided a model for inter-Ministerial coordination mechanisms for implementation and monitoring of the *CSLP*.

3.71 Improvement of the budget process, a key priority of the *CSLP* process in Burkina Faso, provides a focus for better integration of government and donor efforts and for monitoring the effectiveness of assistance. There is strong government-donor coordination to implement a medium term expenditure framework as a way of linking budget constraints and funding priorities. The budget bill for 2002 was based on ceilings set with reference to the 2002-2004 Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and *CSLP* priorities. All ministries have presented program budgets. To improve budget formulation the government has emphasized the important role of the Public Expenditure Reviews to: (i) analyze the efficiency in the utilization of resources and their coherent allocation with respect to sectoral priorities, (ii) measure the equity of public spending, and (iii) improve transparency and good governance and (iv) make a convincing case for the mobilization of external aid.

3.72 Institutional arrangements to coordinate the efforts of government to monitor the *CSLP* process are firmly established. Three committees are in place to ensure coordination at the levels of decisionmaking, interministerial technical coordination, and sectoral implementation.

- *Ministerial Commission for Supervision of the CSLP*. The Prime Minister presides over the Committee with the Minister Delegate for Finance and the Budget acting as coordinator. It should meet at least quarterly, consider reports of the inter-ministerial technical committee, and should have periodic coordination meetings with bi/multilateral agencies;
- *Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee* is responsible for technical decisions. Its membership includes the Secretaries of Ministerial Departments and heads of other structures implicated in the implementation of the *CSLP* (e.g. INSD). It is presided by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The Executive Secretary of STC-PDES, Vice President of the Committee is the secretary to the committee. It should meet quarterly and multi/bilateral agencies are observers at its meetings.
- *Sectoral Monitoring Groups* are responsible for implementation. Led by secretary-generals it meets twice quarterly and regroups planning services of ministries (*Direction des Etudes et Planification*) and representatives of the Ministry of Economy and Finance intervening in sectoral policies. Multi/bilateral agencies participate. Sectors represented are budget management, macro management, basic education, health, competition, and governance.
- *STC-PDES* is the body that assures coordination in implementation of the *CSLP*.
- *ONAPAD (l'Observatoire National de la Pauvreté et du Développement Humain Durable)* is charged with coordination of the national stakeholders in designing a monitoring and evaluation system to respond to the needs of the *CSLP*.

3.73 It was indicated however to the case study team that meetings of the committees are not as frequent as planned and that there is a need to ensure better participation of the private sector and of all the sector ministries with a potential to contribute to the goals of the *CSLP* in these institutional arrangements. The first and second Progress Reports of implementation of the *CSLP* by the Ministry of Economy and Finance revealed a shortcoming in the current monitoring system stemming from confusion about the role of the various organizations. Detailed specifications setting out the responsibilities of the sector groups and efforts to establish a timetable and standard reporting format should be pursued.

## Challenges

3.74 The priority programs for poverty reduction are described in a number of documents.<sup>9</sup> It remains a drawback of the original *CSLP* document that by trying to be comprehensive (by including reference to a great number of potential actions and interventions), its use as a reference document that would provide a clear narrative of priority programs and their associated anticipated outputs and outcomes is diminished. A further weakness of the *CSLP* document and of the first annual *CSLP* Progress Report is that they are silent on monitoring and evaluation methods.

3.75 The priority programs, their objectives and issues relating to their monitoring and evaluation are detailed below:

- *Macroeconomic Stability.* Policies in support of macroeconomic stability are set out in the government's Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies (METF) and the objectives are clearly spelled out i.e. *real GDP growth of 7% pa in 2000-02, inflation of less than 3% and current account deficit of 13% of GDP.* The weakness of existing macroeconomic models in Burkina Faso to establish the link between the growth (macro) and poverty (micro) frameworks is recognized by the authorities. As a result, the impact on poverty and inequality of currently forecasted growth rates and selected policy packages cannot be analyzed within a consistent framework. A program has been elaborated with the World Bank to analyze the impact of alternative policies that will allow policymakers to analyze the dynamics that affect the transmission channels of adjustment policies at the micro level and simulate the impact of alternative policy packages on growth, poverty and distribution across socioeconomic groups.<sup>10</sup>
- *Reform of the cotton sector.* The objective is clearly spelled out *end the SOFITEX monopoly and open up cotton producing regions to private investment in ginning* and the SOFITEX monopoly was ended on December 27, 2001. It is not evident that the anticipated outcome *increased employment for the poor* will in fact result from the policy measure. A better monitoring indicator may be the level of private investment that will result.
- *Opening up isolated areas - rural roads.* The priority rural roads *CSLP* program is not reflected in the *CSLP* monitoring framework even though the program receives HIPC resources.
- *Private sector development and privatization.* The privatization program is expected to advance more rapidly with World Bank assistance. The anticipated outcome of the program—reduction of factor costs through elimination of monopoly structures in telecommunications, water, and energy—are capable of being easily monitored. The M&E plan for the program will need to take account of poverty impacts.
- *Public expenditure management.* The *CSLP* defined a number of indicators (social sector's execution rate, share of budget reaching decentralized departments, gap between unit prices obtained under public bidding compared to those obtained by the private sector) to monitor the impact of improved budget formulation and execution. It proposes monitoring these by

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<sup>9</sup> *PRSP*, 2000 and *PRSP Progress Report* September 2001, government of Burkina Faso; *Completion Point Document*, March 2002 IDA and IMF; *PRSC II*, IDA, April 2002. *Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies (METF)*, government of Burkina Faso, March 2002.

<sup>10</sup> Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC).

means of surveys. Although to date, some surveys have been carried out; the results obtained were ambiguous, raising some questions whether the monitoring plan for these policies is well adapted to measuring the anticipated impacts. A direct indicator of impact (e.g. incidence of misappropriation of public funds at national and provincial levels) to monitor this reform might be considered for inclusion in the M&E framework in addition to somewhat indirect indicators of outcome now in the *CSLP*.

- *Health.* The National Plan for Health articulates higher-level outcomes of reduced morbidity and mortality that have been defined in terms of eight intermediate objectives and the monitoring plan associates indicators with each of these. However, the number of indicators retained (56) in the plan, the inclusion of some indicators of dubious value (number of meetings held) and their unstructured nature suggest that the health monitoring plan could better delineate between input, output and outcome (intermediate and final) indicators. In addition, the health-monitoring plan is only concerned with monitoring inputs, activities and outputs that are funded from the health budget and not with changes in the exogenous environment or with the inputs and activities of other sectors. It is therefore not well adapted to providing policymakers with an improved understanding of non-health program factors that bear upon the reach of health services. The recent Ministry of Health decision to create a *Secretariat Permanent de Suivi du Plan Sanitaire National* by June 2002 is an attempt to recreate the same sort of focused stakeholder participation that characterized the conception of the plan into its implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. The Ministry has disseminated a “*Circulaire*” in 2002 requesting health authorities at the regional and district levels to post information on a regular basis so that all stakeholders are kept well informed of budgetary allocations.
- *Education.* The 2<sup>nd</sup> 10 Year Plan for Development of Basic Education clearly articulates its objectives, performance targets for each objectives and strategies to meet the objectives. A weakness of the monitoring plan is the focus on the supply side (schools equipped and built, books supplied, teachers trained) at the expense of monitoring factors on the demand side. Total public expenditure on education rose from 1.9 percent of GDP in 1996 to 3 percent of GDP in 2001. Despite this increase, it is still below the average of 4.0 percent of GDP for the HIPC Initiative African countries. The projection for 2002 is to attain a figure of 3.8 percent of GDP. Expenditure needs to be made more equitable: public expenditure per child in primary schooling is 2.6 times higher in urban than in rural areas on average. There is also a considerable scope to improve performance within the existing resources, as unit costs remain relatively high. In primary schooling, public expenditure per student is equivalent to 0.24 times GNP per capita, compared with 0.15 for other French-speaking African countries. The cost of producing one graduate of primary school is twice as much as it should be, owing to the high rates of dropout and repetition. Completion rates are only 49 percent in rural areas and 41 percent for rural girls. Repetition rates average 18 percent, and can be as high as 37 percent in grade 6. The case study team learned in focus group discussion with teachers that in their opinion—procedures, guidelines, data, and information sharing are weak at all levels. They mentioned inadequate personnel planning, weak monitoring of budgets and inadequate procedures to identify poor performing schools for remedial action. The monitoring information system needs improvement, and managers are not well trained. One important development since 2000 has been special training courses in data collection and analysis for *MEBAM* and *MESRES* staff in regional education offices. This type of decentralized training should be encouraged and expanded. The enrollment rate targets in the *CSLP* should be complemented with completion rate targets, and measures to ensure that the target of 40% literacy by 2011 is reported on in the second PRSP Progress Report should be encouraged. Efforts to integrate literacy programs in health and credit programs (and other services) need to continue and be reinforced through better program design.

- Water and Sanitation.* The MDG target of halving by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water was not reflected in the *CSLP*. However, the *CSLP* 1<sup>st</sup> Progress Report does report on proxies for the MDG target (creation of new water points, reduction in breakdown rate of manually operated pumps, and increase in water equipment for secondary centers). The M&E framework should adopt outcome indicators of safe drinking water access that explicitly reflects the MDG target. Access to improved sanitation, another MDG target also missing in the present *CSLP*, should also be adopted as an outcome target in the M&E framework. As far as intermediate indicators are concerned it may be extremely difficult to accurately and reliably monitor the rate of pump breakdown. Alternative intermediate indicators should better reflect the vision of demand-driven community, well construction, and maintenance with private sector involvement. This hinges around community capacity for planning and management oversight of system operation, including preventive maintenance, collection of tariffs, payments for repairs, keeping records of financial transactions, manuals and blueprints, sanctioning people for non-payment, ensuring that repairs are undertaken, and support in the form of training, logistical support and simplification of procedures to encourage participation of small-scale entrepreneurs. Suggested intermediate indicators therefore focus on measuring community capacity and community support. It implies a highly participative M&E approach with communities themselves providing monitoring and evaluation. Such an approach undertaken in the water sector would have synergies with M&E of all other services provision.
- Agriculture and Rural Development.* Given the dominant role of agriculture in the economy and the concentration of the poor in rural areas the Joint Staff Assessment (JSA) of the *CSLP* noted that the action plan for rural development lacked a broader strategy for rural growth and poverty reduction. It also noted that there is little indication of measures to diversify rural incomes and increase competitiveness of agriculture exports.

## **Issues**

### ***Toward a Poverty Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy***

3.76 Monitoring has the potential for learning about the use of resources, increasing accountability and enhancing effective decisionmaking in the planning process. The first purpose of PRSP monitoring is to enable a two-way flow of information between beneficiaries, service providers, and policymakers to ensure that implementation is on track as planned. A second purpose is to build accountability, by revealing the degree to which declared objectives and agreed performance standards have been met. By responding in a timely way to these two kinds of need for information on the poverty reduction process, the poverty monitoring and evaluation system has a great potential to contribute to improving the *CSLP* and its effectiveness. This potential is at present only being partially realized in Burkina Faso. The design and implementation of a Poverty Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (PMES) are key challenges. The PMES would be the national monitoring and evaluation framework providing guidance to sectoral management information systems, to the deconcentrated and decentralized administration and that would ensure good collaboration and coordination in the efforts of civil society organizations, policymakers, and the private sector.

3.77 Annex D provides a discussion of issues in preparing a Poverty Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy for Burkina Faso. It discusses improving the relevance of the M&E system for decisionmaking, ensuring that the M&E system contributes to accountability for achievement of results, improving the institutional arrangements by clarifying the roles of the sector agencies

and of the umbrella statistical and coordinating agencies in sustaining the M&E system, and extending the use of monitoring indicators so that a comprehensive set of relevant indicators for all sectors that have a direct or complementary role in poverty reduction will be in place in time for the 2003 *CSLP* review.

## 4. Implementing the *CSLP*: The Way Forward

### IMPLEMENTING THE *CSLP*: THE WAY FORWARD

4.1 Burkina Faso continues to be on a fascinating development path, constantly capitalizing on previous institutional and economic management experience, progressively strengthening its institutions and building-up its human capital. Its steady efforts to strengthen its economic management, to adjust to the global market economy, and to move towards democracy have secured a flow of foreign development assistance that also contributes to securing some political stability.

4.2 Overall, the *CSLP* does constitute a solid framework both for domestic development policy and for internal and external resource mobilization. Although Burkina Faso was not a CDF pilot country, the evaluation shows that the CDF principles are embedded in the country's sociological and cultural values. The trend of the 1990s would suggest these values are progressively permeating the political arena as well. In this sense, it appears that the *CSLP* has become an opportunity to confirm the CDF principles.

### SHORT- TO MEDIUM-TERM CHALLENGES

#### The missing CDF principle: Financing Instrumentation for Implementation

4.3 The case study leads to the question whether there is not a “missing” CDF principle, or a missing ‘chapter’ in *CSLP* documents, i.e. *Financing Instrumentation for Implementation*. Although the *CSLP* document did include an assessment of the financing needs, at least during the first three years of implementation, there is no clear scheme of financing instruments.

4.4 The case study suggests two elements: on the one hand, it seems that the choice of financing instruments is pretty much donor-driven, and on the other hand, some potential sources are left out, in particular the population's financial and in-kind contributions, private sector investors, local financing institutions, and NGOs. As a result, Burkina Faso is missing out on opportunities, including excess liquidities in the banking sector and capital flight that could be invested for development purposes, and there are continued tensions between the choice of financing instruments.

4.5 For example, it is clear that the HIPC resources have permitted an increase in the investment budget for Health and Education. Yet, it is not clear whether budget support financing through PRSCs or other donor instrument is adequate to sustain the needed increments in operating budgets, let alone the needed increments in the investment budgets beyond what is available through HIPC resources. As a result, some donors, including the World Bank, are considering the continued adequacy of programmatic sector loans; while others have indicated they would only support sectors (France, Canada).

4.6 A systematic analysis of the financing instruments needed to achieve the goals of the *CSLP* would also be a way of mobilizing a greater array of stakeholders.

### ***From Government-led to Population-owned Development***

4.7 One of the sequels of Burkina Faso's post-independence history is the heavy presence of government in all aspects of the country's socioeconomic life. At one end of the spectrum, the state is the major initiator of new thinking and new ideas. The public debate is still very much subdued, except in a structured context such as the legislative elections. Private media are limited, largely because of insufficient financial resources (there is only one private TV station, and a few radio stations and newspapers and magazines with limited readership) and there no longer is a School of Journalism at the university. The educational standards at the university appear technically quite good, but its resources are not fully tapped for fresh ideas and thinking.

4.8 In the middle of the spectrum, there is a need to engage a broader range of stakeholders, and enhance their representation and participation in economic policy formulation and decisions. The state still is the main owner and employer in services and non-agricultural sectors, and is the main contractor for the nascent formal private sector. Divestiture and devolution of economic activities to the private sector should still be government priorities in order to broaden the participation of the population in the country's economic and social development. At the same time, as previously indicated, the government needs to adjust the burden it imposes on existing formal sector enterprises while getting more informal sector enterprises to join the formal sector.

4.9 At the other end of the spectrum, the government relies on a largely illiterate but extremely hard working rural population for the preservation of the country's land (and surface water) capital and for the future growth of the economy. The main investors in the country have in fact been the hard working farmers, who have invested massively in land and water conservation and land development works. Yet, a high number is confronted with land tenure insecurity due to the deep-rooted problem of internal migrations, and their representation at the local levels is often questioned. This is a very tough and potentially explosive issue for the government on which little progress has been accomplished since the mid-1980s. A similar pattern may emerge in peri-urban areas with the acceleration in the rate of migration from the rural to the urban areas (about 12-15% annually). In this context, it may be difficult to evolve to a 'population-owned' development model.

### ***Insecurity***

4.10 Violence in the rural and the urban areas is a growing problem for Burkina Faso. It was cited in some regions as the number one problem in retaining civil servants in the rural areas. Teachers and health workers have been killed to be dispossessed of their motorbikes; traders have been assaulted on their way to collecting export commodities. The economic recession in Côte d'Ivoire has had a major impact on Burkina Faso, and the pressure of the political instability and drug traffic is also felt. To date, the police have not been associated in discussions of the *CSLP*. Yet, their role could be significant in finding solutions to the security issue, which itself can endanger the success of the *CSLP*.

4.11 Insecurity and violence in the urban areas is largely associated to the rapidly growing flow of immigrants from the rural areas who settle in peri-urban areas in very precarious conditions and find limited job opportunities. Adolescents and young adults are the most vulnerable groups who turn to crime for survival. Targeting professional training and job market insertion programs may become a priority.

## MEDIUM- TO LONG-TERM CHALLENGES

### From Aid-Dependency to Aid Independence

4.12 Aid transfers to Burkina Faso contribute about 50% of public expenditures, and Burkina Faso has benefited relatively more than other countries in the region from foreign aid: 15.5% of GDP in 1998, i.e. four times the average transfers to Sub-Saharan African countries (4.1%). In a way, this is coherent with the country's needs for and commitment to poverty reduction programs. The shift in the application of the funds from projects (87.7% in 1997, 79.6% in 1999) to budgetary support is noteworthy and will increase with the *CSLP*. This aid dependency rate is nevertheless risky, and does raise the question of efficiency in resource use.

4.13 Should the size and wage bill of the civil service be so high? Burkina Faso's civil servants have been the highest paid in the region (even though salary levels are extremely low by any world standard). Are there means to increase the efficiency of the civil service and reduce its size? Implementing the decentralization, which itself is core to the *CSLP* implementation, raises the added risk of further expansion of the civil service.

4.14 Reducing aid dependency should be a theme reflected upon for the updates of the *CSLP* as it implies medium- to long-term strategic options linked to the *CSLP* goal of improving public finance management. Some of these options include the reduction of public expenditures, an increase in tax revenues (while Burkina Faso is the only WAEMU country that saw a decline of its tax revenues in 2001), incentives for increasing remittances and targeting their use (e.g. in Sri Lanka, remittances are the main source of local financing of rural household lighting services; in Rwanda, computerized systems are being developed through expatriate Rwandese businesses), and improving the incentive environment for private sector investments.

### *Economic Diversification and Competitiveness*

4.15 With the economic liberalization and the devaluation of the CFA, Burkina Faso has benefited over the last decade from some diversification of its economy. The salient features include the penetration of telephony (although not as high as in neighboring countries), an expanding banking sector, the development of private medical services, at least in Ouagadougou, and the development of other services. Services already contributed a higher share of GDP (40%) than agriculture (32%) in 1998. Within agriculture, there has also been some diversification, in particular the rapidly expanding fresh vegetable export market towards coastal countries, although Burkina Faso seems to have lost some of its market share towards European countries.

4.16 Economic diversification is key to the success of the vision in the *CSLP* in terms of securing and increasing incomes, offsetting the risks to the climatic insecurity and the limited carrying capacity of the land, and for creating employment. Economic diversification is also essential for the country to move out of aid dependency. The efforts of the past decade, while commendable, are not enough. For a sustainable economy, Burkina Faso's comparative advantage *may not* be in producing low-productivity rainfed cereals but in diversifying out of agriculture towards exportable services or products.

4.17 Burkina Faso is a highly densely populated small country whose *economy should be largely oriented towards external* in order to develop its comparative advantages, maximize the returns from its scarce land resources, and tap the competencies of expatriate *Burkinabé*. It is interesting to note, for example, that Burkina Faso has lost out to Togo and Ghana in technical



skills for the construction industry; Ghana is also becoming a significant export of computer skills in the region.

4.18 More aggressive ‘out of the box’ thinking is needed to shape the next phases of the *CSLP*, as a different vision of the economy would also call for significant changes in priorities – the content of education, the development of energy and other input services to enterprise development, and a more aggressive transport policy.

### ***Human Resources and Capacity Building***

4.19 Burkina Faso’s human resources are both its greatest asset and a liability. *Burkinabé* are notorious for their hard work, entrepreneurship through migrations, and, for the schooled ones, for their administrative competencies. When given the opportunity, the entrepreneurial and technical competencies are evident, e.g. through the growth of the informal sector and the emergence of a new modern private sector.

4.20 Yet, Burkina Faso has to face serious constraints. The *high rate of population* is a serious threat to its development (about 2% p.a.). This is evident in the slow rate of progress – in relative terms – in primary school enrollment, and the decline in productive land per capita. It has been disappointing to the study team to discover *the regression in family planning programs* as compared to the 1980s, when the government was very forthcoming and committed to this issue. Government officials seem satisfied that family planning is addressed as part of overall family health programs that have been developed in relation to the Aids Epidemic. Health workers, however, are concerned that they can only provide family planning services on demand – and largely women’s demand – and that they barely reach 10% of the women who come to consult at health clinics. Birth control devices are available but expensive and often used without the husband’s consent, hence putting the wife in risky conditions.

4.21 Much progress has been made on the management of the AIDS epidemic, at least in terms of public commitment, resources, diagnostic, availability of care, and social support – thanks again for Burkina Faso’s strong tradition of community support and local associations. Current estimates indicate that the rate of reported HIV cases is declining. AIDS education – in particular of adolescents and young adults is insufficient. Enlightened family members are the main source of information. There are no formal programs in schools, including high schools, although the rate of unwanted teenage pregnancies reaches at times 40% of the high school population.

4.22 The study team suggests that unless the political authorities confront the population growth issue publicly and with strong commitment, it will be difficult to achieve the Millennium Development Goals: the population increase will continue to erode any progress made in the provision of social services and in achieving economic growth.

### ***Human Capacity Building***

4.23 should therefore be one of the *CSLP*’s top priorities, not only in terms of ‘social indicators,’ availability of health and education services, but also in terms of endowing people with productive capacity. The liability of the *high rate of adult illiteracy* (70-80%) will continue to constrain economic and social transformation unless it is as aggressively pursued as some other ‘themes’ (e.g. the notable expansion of compost pits achieved thanks to an aggressive campaign by the president himself!). For future generations, one of the greatest challenges is *to adapt the content of education to the needs of the changing economy*. Resistance to primary school enrollment persists, as parents do not perceive the relevance of what their children are taught.

Post primary school professional training is virtually non-existent, while more and more young people leave the rural areas to migrate to the cities where they become homeless and jobless. Higher-level and university-level technical education is also extremely limited, while the market demands technical skills.

## CONCLUSION: A SIMPLE SCORECARD

4.24 Looking ahead, the study team asked itself: given the present state of internalization of the four CDF principles by the *CSLP* in Burkina Faso, what is the probability that the *CSLP* will enable the country to achieve the Millennium Development Goals? Reviewing the analysis of the findings, the study team concluded that provided Burkina Faso sustains its current commitment to poverty reduction and continues to improve its economic management, there is a good probability of a successful implementation of the *CSLP*, i.e. of making solid progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It may take longer than 2015, but at least the current foundations are sound and can be further consolidated. To sum up this conclusion, the study team used the simple scorecard presented in Table 4.1 below with a ‘nominal rating’ on a scale from 1-5 for low-high probability of the internalization of the four CDF principles by the *CSLP* in Burkina Faso, and therefore of the probability that the *CSLP* will permit to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

**Table 4.1: Performance Rating of CDF Principles in their Conception, Implementation to Date, and Likely sustainability.**

CDF Principles	Conception	Implementation to date	Likely sustainability
Long-term Holistic Vision	4	3	2
Country Ownership	5	4	5
Country-led Partnership	3	3	4
Results Orientation	2	3	3

## Annex A: Conceptual and Methodological Approach for the Study

1. The study team developed a reference framework that each member used to ensure consistency in interviews and analysis of the documentation. It became clear to the scoping mission that various sets of stakeholders have different interpretation or visualization of what the PRSP is or represents. The study team therefore attempted to systematize these perceptions, as summarized on Table A.1.

**Table A.1: Clarification of Perception of PRSP amongst Stakeholders**

	Stakeholders									
	Central Government	Technical Ministries	Donors	Local Institutions		Civil Society			Population	
				Decentralized	Deconcentrated	ONG	Private Sector	Press	Urban groups	Rural Communities
Is the PRSP:										
A Process?										
A Document?										
A Business Instrument to mobilize resources?										
An Implementation Framework for other instruments?										
A Management & Results Monitoring Instrument?										

2. **Stakeholders.** The horizontal axis of Table A.1 sums up the main group of stakeholders whom the study team consulted. As the CDF principles encompass topics that are very global and deal with political and strategic issues and others that are very operational, the scoping mission had highlighted the need for the study team to consult institutions and groups both at the central and at the local level, in order to interact with decentralized political and administrative structures, with ‘deconcentrated’ (rough translation from the French expression used in Burkina) government services (health, education, etc.), and to consult with local communities. For civil society, the scoping mission had concluded that the study team should consult with three main groups: NGOs, Private Sector (individuals and professional associations), and the press. The CDF principles were also tested with each category of stakeholders.

3. **PRSP Priority Sectors and Themes.** The study team also tested the internalization of the four CDF principles for each of the main categories of expected results from the implementation of the PRSP. The identification of the expected results was difficult because in the current PRSP document, these were presented in four ways: under Main Principles; under Global Strategy; in

Table 13 on Incremental Costs; and in “Table 17,” which has become in Burkina the cause célèbre of the PRSP Monitoring Indicators for 2001-2003. A comparison in the treatment of the priority sectors, themes, and expected results is provided in Table A.2 below. In order to identify the priority themes and sectors for the study team, the scoping mission used two sets of criteria: 1) the frequency of treatment in the PRSP document and 2) what in its view are the basic requirements for successfully achieving results. Applying these criteria, the study team established that the study should focus on the following themes and sectors:

- Group I – Institutional: Partnership with donors, good governance, in particular local government, public finance management including regional integration into UMOA, and anti-corruption. Since Partnership is already included as a CDF criterion, the study team did not include it as a theme. In addition, the study team reviewed the implementation instruments of the PRSP.
- Group II – Social Sectors: Education, Health, and Water.
- Group III - Growth, Employment, and Income Generation: Rural Economy (irrigation water, agriculture, livestock), communications (rural roads, rural electrification). In addition, the study team should include the themes of competitiveness, SME development, and telecommunications, which are deemed indispensable for successful economic growth, including diversification, one of Burkina’s fundamental needs.

**Table A.2: Comparison in the Treatment of Sectors and Themes in PRSP Document**

Sector/Theme	Main Principles	Global Strategy	Table 13: Incremental Costs	Table 17: Monitoring Indicators	Recommended By Scoping Mission
Redefining the government's role	X				
Sustainable Natural Resources Management	X				
New Partnership with donors	X	X			X
Good Governance	X				
Promote democracy	X				
Local government	X	X			X
Public Finance Mgt.	X	X		X	X
Anti-corruption Fight	X	X		X	X
Gender	X				X
Reduction of Regional Disparities	X				
West Africa Regional Integration	X				X
Increase Growth		X			X Competitiveness
Privatizations			X		
Increase the Poor's Access to Social Services		X			X
Education		X	X	X	X
Health		X	X	X	X
Water		X	X		X
Living standards/ Housing		X			
Employment & Income Generation		X			SMEs
Irrigation Water			X		Rural Development
Agriculture			X		
Livestock			X		
Communications			X		
Rural Roads			X		X & Telecoms
Rural Electrification					Rural Energy
Support to Professional Associations			X		

4. **CDF Principles.** Under each theme or sector, the study team reviewed four criteria for each CDF principle: whether the principle itself is reflected, the progress of implementation, the issues, and the challenges. The thematic and sectoral analysis of the CDF principles is summarized in Table A.3 below.

Table A.3. Thematic and Sectoral Review of the CDF Principles

		Good Governance			Social Sectors			Growth, Employment, Income				
		Local government	Public Management	Anti-corruption	Health	Education	Water	Competitiveness	Productive Sectors		Communications	
									Irrigation Agriculture Livestock	SMEs	Rural Roads	Rural Electricity
<b>Vision</b>	Principle											
	Progress											
	Issues											
<b>Ownership</b>	Principle											
	Progress											
	Issues											
	Challenge											
<b>Partnership</b>	Principle											
	Progress											
	Issues											
	Challenge											
<b>Implementation Instruments</b>	Principle											
	Progress											
	Issues											
	Challenge											
<b>Results</b>	Principle											
	Progress											
	Issues											
	Challenge											

Note: Implementation Instruments have been added as a key principle needed to achieve results

5. **CDF Principles Performance Rating in PRSP.** Information gathering and analysis was done with the aim of concluding on a ‘nominal rating’ (e.g. on a scale from 1-5, from low to high probability) of the internalization of the four CDF criteria by the PRSP in Burkina Faso; the rating was supported by the analysis of the findings and a narrative. The results were summarized in Table A.4 below.

**Table A.4.: CDF Principles Performance Rating in PRSP**

<b>CDF Principles</b>	<b>PRSP Preparation</b>	<b>PRSP Implementation</b>	<b>Probability for future PRSP Implementation</b>
<b>Long-term Holistic Vision</b>			
<b>Country Ownership</b>			
<b>Country-led Partnership</b>			
<b>Results Orientation</b>			

6. *Questionnaires and Surveys.* The survey team used a standard set of guides for interviews with the various categories of stakeholders; a donor questionnaire akin to the one developed for Ghana (Attachment 1), to which only five donors responded. In addition, a survey was carried out by the University of Ouagadougou in four provinces: Ouahigouya, Tienkodogo, Kaya, and Boromo. They interviewed individuals from rural and urban communities, as well as representatives from decentralized administrative structures, deconcentrated services of technical ministries, local NGOs, private sector entrepreneurs and other representatives of civil society.

## Annex B: List of People Met

### GOVERNMENT

Name	Title	Organization
	Minister	Ministry of Finance and Economy
Daniel Bambara	Consultant (Macro Economist)	Ministry of Finance and Economy
Abdoulaye Zongo	Head of Budget Service	Ministry of Finance and Economy
Francois M. Didier Zoundi	Executive Secretary	<i>(STC/PDES Secretariat Technique pour la Coordination des Programmes de Développement Economique et Social – Secretariat for Coordination of Programs for Economic Development, Ministry of Finance and Economy</i>
Maimouna Sangare	Director Social Programs	<i>STC/PDES</i>
Malgoubri Marie Eugenie		<i>STC/PDES</i>
Karim Traore	Deputy Executive Secretary	<i>STC/PDES</i>
M. Konate		<i>STC/PDES</i>
Tenrebsom Boniface Zongo	Secretary General	Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy
Karim Kamba	Technical Inspector	Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy
Alidou Sanfo	Head of Mission	Prime Minister's Office, National Commission on Decentralization
Marie-Therese Drabo	Executive Secretary	Prime Minister's Office, Executive Secretariat for Good Governance
	Secretary General	Ministry of Health
Issa Boniface Ouedraogo	Director of Research and Planning	Ministry of Health
Lalsomde Emmanuel	Director of Administration and Finance	Ministry of Health
Michel Soumbie	Monitoring Committee Official	Ministry of Health
Abel Tigasse	Director General, Hydraulics	Ministry of Environment and Water
M. Dabire	Director General	Ministry of Environment and Water
Laurent Kabore Sibiri	Director, Research and Planning	Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy
Mahamad Michara	Jurist	Ministry of Administration of National Territory and Decentralization
Marcel Kabre	Director	Directorate for Rural Roads

### MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

Name	Title	Title/Position/Constituency
	President	National Assembly
Mariam Pitraipa	Director for International Cooperation	National Assembly

### DONOR AGENCIES

Name	Title	Organization
Paul Bonnefoy	Economic Counselor	European Union
Christian Lemaire	Resident Coordinator	UNDP
Henriette Keijzers	Representative	UNDP
Stig Barlyng	Ambassador	Royal Embassy of Denmark
Peter Eilshow Olesen	First Secretary	Royal Embassy of Denmark
Mr. Ulla	Division Chief	SIDA, Copenhagen



<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Organization</b>
	Director, Operations Evaluation and Energy Advisor	SIDA, Copenhagen (Phone Interview)
Marian Klokkers	First Secretary	Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
Niels Richter	Deputy Head, Dept. of Multilateral Development	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark
Francis Saudubray	Head of Service (Cooperation and Cultural Affairs)	Embassy of France
Verana Frick	First secretary	Embassy of Germany
Jimmy Kolker	Ambassador	United States of America
Denis Briand	Ambassador	Embassy of Canada
Aime Magliore Teindrebeogo	Economist	ACDI (Canadian Agency for Development)
Jean Mazurelle	Country Manager	World Bank Office, Ouagadougou
Sakia Coulibaly	Senior Economist	World Bank
Celestin Bado	Senior Operations Officer	World Bank
Ibrahim Nebie	Senior Agriculturalist	World Bank
Maghazi Ibrahim	Senior Health Specialist	World Bank
Eustache Oayoro	Sanitary Engineer	World Bank
Makha Ndao	Senior Education Specialist	World Bank
Andrea Bahm,	Counselor (Natural Resources)	GTZ
Sylvestre Bagre Ouedraogo	Program Advisor	UNDP
Dr. Stanislaus Paul Nebie	Resident Advisor	Family Health and AIDS Prevention, Regional Project for West and Central Africa, USAID

## **CIVIL SOCIETY**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Organization</b>
Ernestine Sanogo/Okoko	Coordinator	RECIF (NGO for Communication, information & capacity development network for women)
Norbert Zongo	President, Board of Directors	SPONG (Permanent Secretariat for NGOs)
Yameogo Simon	Public Relations and Communications	SPONG (Permanent Secretariat for NGOs)
<i>Moustapha Ouedraogo</i>	President	Commercial Vegetable Producer, Association, Komienga
Moussa Dominique Bangre	Coordinator, Services and programming	Catholic Relief Services
Ouedraogo Adama	Director	CECI ( <i>Centre Canadien d'Etude et de Coopération Internationale</i> ) Canadian Center for Cooperation
Harold Tarver	Country Representative	Africare/Burkina Faso
Issa Konda	Coordinator, Project	ZFSI/Africare/Gourcy
Moustapha Niang	Deputy country representative	Africare/Burkina Faso
Abel Abga	Livestock Specialist	Zandoma Food Security Initiative (ZFSI)/Africare/Gourcy
Toni Adama,	Project Coordinator (M&E Specialist)	ZFSI (Food Security Initiative) Africare, Gourcy
Aguiratou Savadogo	Hydraulic Specialist	ZFSI (Food Security Initiative) Africare,

<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Organization</b>
		Gourcy
Francois Lecarpentier,	Regional Delegate	AFVP NGO ( <i>Association Française des Volontaires du Progrès a Burkina</i> )
Eugue Some,	Head of Program	AFVP
Abdoulaye KOADINA	Official	AFVP
Dominique Irigaray	Official	AFVP
Dieudonne Yameogo	Permanent Secretariat	Ren-Lac (National Network against Corruption)
Kalefa Rigobert Sanon	Head of Investigations	Ren-Lac

### UNIVERSITY & RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS

<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Organization</b>
Professor Souleymane Soulama	Director, Economic Science and Management	University of Ouagadougou
Dr. Claude Wetta		University of Ouagadougou
Dr. Abdulaye Zonon		University of Ouagadougou

### PRIVATE SECTOR

<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Organization</b>
Jean-Pierre Ouedraogo:	Consultant	Ouedraogo Consulting
Gaspard Ouedraogo	President	National Bank
Nestor Belem	Director	AMG (Metal Enterprise)
Didier Yameogo	Director	BATIMAT (Transport)
Mme Chantal Nikiema	Director and President of the Foundation <i>Entreprendre</i>	CC3D (Construction)
Serge Kompaore	Director	<i>Ferme NOOGO</i> (Dairying)
Delphine Kabore	Director	KARNOLD (Food distribution)
Abou Ouattara	Director	MOABLAOU (Aviculture)
M. Yeye Ousseini		PAPME (Project of support for the creation of SMEs)
Fora Traore	Fonde de pouvoir	BCB (Bank)
André Vallais	Director commercial	BICIA-B (Bank)
Evariste Siry	Treasury	BICIA-B (Bank)
Jean-Marie Grosbois	Member of Chamber of Commerce	Brakina (Brewery)
Dr. Yameogo Jean-Baptiste		CNPB (Employers Association)
Mahamadi Sawadogo	President/Director General	<i>Groupe ESMAF</i> (President of Club for Young Executives of Enterprises)
Jean-Claude Starczan	Director General	MABUCIG (Cigarettes)
Alain Coeffe	Director General	NOKIA (mobile telephony)
Roger Ilboudo	Accounting and Finance	SOMIMA (Metal works)

## PROVINCES, DEPARTMENTS, and MUNICIPALITIES

### Ouagadougou Municipality

Name	Title	Organization
Zenabou Drabo	Health attache	Bogodogo Arrondissement, Ouagadougou
Alfred Gouba	Secretary General	Bogodogo Arrondissement, Ouagadougou

### Ouahigouya Province

Name	Title	Organization, District, Village
Issa DIALLO Joseph	Mayor	Ouagadougou
Bruno Malaurie,	Manager	<i>Hôtel de l'Amitié</i> , Ouahigouya
SAVADOGO Justin	Consultant, Agronomist	Ouahigouya
Salam Ouedraogo	<i>President</i>	Vegetable Producer Association, Ouahigouya
Sawadogo Boukary	Vegetable Producer	Vegetable Producer Association, Ouahigouya
El. Hadji Sawadogo Lassane	Vegetable Producer	Vegetable Producer Association, Ouahigouya
Adama Kazam,	Vegetable Producer	Vegetable Producer Association, Ouahigouya
Pamoussa Patrice	Program Manager (FILAJ)	Direction Regionale du Plan/Nord
Doussa Boubakar	Direction Regionale du Plan/Nord	DREP/Nord
Batiebo Sosthene	Regional Directorate ( <i>Direction regionale de l'Action Sociale et de la Solidarite Nationale</i> )	DRASN/Nord
Dembele Francois d' Assises	Regional Director	Regional Office of Ministry of Economy and Planning ( <i>Direction Régional de l'Economie et de la Planificatio</i> )
Dakio Loubs	Manager	Regional Office of Ministry of Agriculture <i>Direction Provinciale de l'Agriculture du Yagenga</i>
Boro Adama	Service Suivi-Evaluation	Regional Office of Ministry of Agriculture <i>Direction Regionale de l'Agriculture du Nord</i>
Zida Bernard	Journalist	AIB/Yatenga (journal)
Korotoumou Ouattara	Hospital Manager, Ouahigouya	Ministry of Health, <i>Direction Générale du Centre Hospitalier Régional de Ouahigouya</i>
Sib Maxime	Tax Official, <i>Direction Régional des Impôts du Nord</i>	Regional Office, Ministry of Economy and Finance
<i>Drabo Adama</i>	Fiscal Controller, <i>Controle financier Yatenga/Zandoma</i>	Regional Office, Ministry of Economy and Finance
Soumaila Sawadogo	Manager, Direction Régional Environnement du Nord	Regional Office, Ministry of Environment
Ganame Amidou	Manager of food stockage ( <i>Cellule Banque de Céréales et moulins</i> )	NGO ( <i>Fédération nationale des Groupements Naam (ONG)</i> )
Sawadogo Ousseini	Provincial Directorate <i>Direction Provinciale de l'action Sociale</i>	Ministry for Social Affairs <i>Ministère de l'Action Sociale</i>

<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Organization, District, Village</b>
Kere Issa	Manager	MESSRS
Ouangraoua Raymond	Manager,	MEP (DREP)
Abdoulaye Ouedraogo	Manager	DPEBA-YTG
Bayala Jean-Lous	Haut Commissariat	
Sawadogo S. Julien	Manager	Regional Direction for Water Management
Barry Souhaibou	Manager	MEBA (Regional office, Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy)
Siguibeogo Tilata Raoul	Manager Direction	Regional Office for Cooperation, Ministry for Economy and Finance
Guiraud Sahnduna	Service for Cooperation	Mayors' office
Samuel Kabre	DAR/HU-OHG	
Diallo Djeneba Bangarba	Manager, Association AMMIE	Community Development <i>Programme Intègre de développement Communautaire</i>
Ouedraogo Tidane	Manager	<i>DRRA Direction Regionale de Ressources Animale du Nord</i>
Heina Kito	Manager	Fire Department, Ouahigouya
Boukary Moryoure	President	City Development Groups <i>Groupements du Province et Coordinateurs Groupements</i>
Sama Ouedraogo Awa	Manager	<i>Groupement Secteur 10, Ouahigouya</i>
The village committee in Sector 10 of Ouahigouya		

### **Kaya Province**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Organization, District, Village</b>
Representatives of women's associations		
Merchants and civic leaders		

### **Ganzougou Province**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Organization, District, Village</b>
Traore Athanase	Under Prefect	Commune of Mogtedo, Ganzourgou

### **Tenkodogo Province**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Organization, District, Village</b>
Olivier Sawadogo		Regional office of the Ministry of Economy and Finance
Pare L. Ernest	Statistician	Regional office of the Ministry of Economy and Finance
Sanogo Boulaye	Economist	Regional office of the Ministry of Economy and Finance
Traore Tiemoko	Regional Director	Regional Office, Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research ( <i>MESSRS du Centre Este</i> )
Louis Pierre Foro	Chief, Service Examinations	MESSRS du Centre Este
Lankoande T. Narcisse	Attendance Service	<i>MESSRS du Centre Este</i>
Zombre Daogo	Chief, Personnel Service	<i>MESSRS du Centre Este</i>
Kaoundouaou Yacouba,	Chief, Educational Division	<i>MESSRS du Centre Este</i>

<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Organization, District, Village</b>
Joseph OUBDA	Regional Director	MEBA, Regional office, Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy, Central East (Ministère de l'Enseignement de Base et de l'alphabétisation du centre-est)
Charles Alfred Yoni	Principal and Assistant Director	MEBA, Regional office,
Janvie Ouedraogo r	Head of Service – Planning and Monitoring	MEBA, Regional office,
Simeon Kanazoe		DPEBA
Sawadogo Jean-Paul	SRNEI (Service for Financial Resources, equipment and infrastructure)	DPEBA
Roamba Youssouf, Haut	<i>Commissaire</i> of Boulgou	<i>Haut Commissariat</i> , Province du Boulgou
Mahamad Michara	Administrator	<i>Haut Commisariat</i> , Province du Boulgou
Segda Mathias	Administrator	<i>Haut Commisariat</i> , Province du Boulgou
Philippe Compaore		Ministry of Health, Regional Office
Diallo Alizeta	Chief	SAF
Sanon Ouedraogo Djeudba		MCD
Zongo Pierre Mesmin	Chief	SLMPGS/PI Regional Office (DRS)
Yonli Evariste	Chief	CRESA DRS
Somda Christian	Chief	SPNNT
Somtouma Frederic		
Ouedraogo Mme	Nurse Health Center (CSPS)	
Palle Smith Peterson	Consultant, Water Project	

## **Annex C: Survey of Individuals and Officials in the Government, Local Administration and in Municipal Organizations**

1. Two questionnaires were administered, one to officials of centralized and decentralized administrative structures of government, NGO's, and associations of civil society (*groupements*) and the other to individuals.
2. Four survey teams of postgraduate students from the University at Ouagadougou administered the questionnaires under the direction of Kimsey Savadogo. The four teams went to four towns: Tenkodogo, Boromo, Ouahigouya and Kaya to the north, south, east and west of Ouagadougou. The teams sought respondents within a 15 km radius of these towns. The survey was carried out between April 9 and 13, 2002.

### **Survey of Administrative Structures**

3. Valid responses from officials of centralized and decentralized administrative structures of government, NGO's, and associations of civil society were Tenkodogo (NA), Boromo (23), Ouahigouya (32), and Kaya (27). The interviewers also noted comments of respondents and these can be read in detail in the reports from each interview team that are in Table C.1 below.
4. Some of the notable findings that emerged from the survey of representatives of central and decentralized government structures, NGO's and associations of civil society were:
  - Poverty Reduction Strategy: A great majority of respondents said that the government had adopted a poverty reduction strategy and was able to name at least a few of its objectives. A majority also said that the *CSLP* is widely used among the administrators as a reference document and that it is evolving over time. Some commented further and said that it represents a global vision and as such an opportunity for coordination of sectoral programs.
  - Coordination: A majority of officials (except those in Kaya) said that coordination between central, decentralized, and deconcentrated structures are poor. Some said that consequently, people have the habit of making representation to local "men of influence" in obtaining public services rather than on the administrative structures. Although a majority thought that the role of the donors was important, many were of the opinion that their role complicated rather than facilitated poverty reduction interventions and that they do not coordinate their project interventions. Some thought that donors impose their programs often without due regard to the most urgent needs. As evidence, respondents in the Tenkodogo region said some districts have more than sufficient school buildings financed by donor programs whereas other districts lack them altogether.
  - Role of the State: A large majority of respondents said that the state should assert itself in coordinating poverty reduction interventions. Interviewers noted many comments from respondents on measures that the state needs to promote to make decentralization work efficiently including better training of officials, good communication, real devolution of powers and financial resources.
  - Thievery and violence: Officials spoke both about the danger that lawlessness, especially theft and violence against the person, represents as well as its effect in reducing their

efficiency. One official said that it was better that he travel on an old push pedal bicycle rather than on a new motorized bicycle in order to present a less inviting target to thieves.

**Table C.1: Results of the Survey of Officials**

Note: "NA" indicates missing or unavailable data.

Questions		Boromo	Ouahigouya % Respondents	Kaya	Tenkodogo
Q1. Does the government have a long-term strategy for poverty reduction?	Yes	87	84	96	94
	No	13	16	4	6
Q2. Do you know its principal objectives?	Yes	65	91	NA	82
	No	34	9	NA	18
Q3. Can you name the principal objectives? (Respondents naming two objectives were deemed to have replied positively.)	Yes	65	NA	NA	82
	No	34	NA	NA	18
Q4. Are the objectives attainable?	Yes	60	91	NA	83
	No	-	3	NA	17
	No opinion	39	6		
Q5. Do you think that results (e.g. of service delivery) should be used to reorient public spending?	Yes	52	81	88	70
	No	48	13	12	30
	No Opinion		6		
Q6. Is information on the delivery and quality of services available and easily accessible?	Yes	65	65	67	NA
	No	35	25	4	NA
	No Opinion	-	9	19	
Q7. Have representatives of the population associated themselves with the strategy?	Yes	26	41	70	53
	No	56	31	30	47
	No Opinion	17	28	0	0
Q8. Is there good coordination between government agencies and local structures?	Yes	43	47	70	36
	No	57	47	30	64
	No Opinion	-	6		
Q9. How important is the role of the donor community in elaboration of the governments' poverty reduction strategy?	No role		3		NA
	Modest (many respondents who said that the role of donors was "modest" said that donors imposed their projects which often do not respond to needs).	52	13	37	NA
	Large	48	38	51	NA



Questions	Boromo	Ouahigouya	Kaya	Tenkodogo
	% Respondents			
	Very Large			
	47			
Q10. Are the interventions (projects) of donors coordinated?				
	Yes	30	47	48
	No	70	73	37
	No opinion			15
Q11. Should the role of the state in assuring coordination of interventions be primordial?				
	Yes	74	88	93
	No	26	9	7
	No opinion		3	
Q12. Are you implicated in results evaluation?				
	Yes	26	41	48
	No	74	59	52
Q13. Is the <i>CSLP</i> spoken about?				
	Yes	83	100	100
	No	17	0	0
Q14. Is the <i>CSLP</i> evolving?				
	Yes	78	84	96
	No		13	4
	No opinion	22	3	

### Survey of individuals

5. In all, more than 200 individuals were interviewed; Ouahigouya (42), Kaya (45), Tenkodogo (NA), and Boromo (51). About 40 percent of respondents were women. Individuals had a variety of occupations and a number were unemployed. However, the results were not analyzed by gender or by occupation. The interviewers noted any commentary that respondents volunteered.

6. Some notable findings and comments of respondents were:

- Individual's perception of change in general living conditions over the last few years varied greatly according to the region of the country they live in. This presumably reflects unequal growth and development between regions with some such as Kaya showing improvement that is more marked.
- Kaya scored higher (better) than all other regions on all the measures of people's perceptions that were surveyed.
- Health: Many individuals in Tenkodogo said that although the number of health centers had increased, actual health care services had not increased due to lack of trained personnel. One consequence that respondents cited is that many women still choose home birth and do not have access to trained personnel in cases of labor and birth complications. The living and work conditions for health personnel in rural areas (lack of good lodging, radio and TV) are such that they soon move to urban centers.

- Situation of Women: Respondents alluded to the persistence of practices that usurp the right of women and to which poor women are particularly vulnerable (polygamy, forced marriage and excision).
- Education: Respondents said that the primary school curriculum was not a passport to a job. Training in technical skills should be offered as more trained masons, electricians, motor mechanics were needed. Representatives of employers said that lack of skill in the technical professions in *Burkinabé* was a constraint for businesses. The cost of education was cited as a major hurdle for poor families. As with health-care workers, teachers are unwilling to stay long in their posts in rural areas, preferring to move to urban centers where they can improve on their living conditions.
- Drinking Water: The perception of a majority of individuals is that there has been improvement in availability of clean drinking water in recent years.
- Zeal of the State in addressing Poverty: Perceptions varied greatly by region. In Ouahigouya individuals were greatly skeptical whereas in Kaya their responses indicated much greater confidence both in the zeal and effectiveness of state institutions. Kaya would seem to be the exception. In all other three regions, the majority of individuals had an unfavorable opinion of both the zeal and effectiveness of state institutions.

**Table C.2: Results of the Survey of Individuals**

	Marked deterioration %	Some deterioration %	Unchanged %	Some improvement %	Marked Improvement %	Total %
<b>Living Conditions</b>	Perceptions of individuals on the evolution of living conditions					
Kaya	2	16	0	29	53	100
Ouahigouya	12	50	14	24	0	100
Boromo	18	29	6	45	2	100
Tenkodogo	16	42	0	37	0	100
<b>Agriculture</b>	Perceptions of individuals on the evolution of conditions in agriculture					
Kaya	13	27	0	29	31	100
Ouahigouya	10	33	26	26	5	100
Boromo	12	25	4	51	8	100
Tenkodogo						
<b>Education</b>	Perceptions of individuals on the evolution of conditions in education					
Kaya	4	11	0	13	71	100
Ouahigouya	5	17	2	74	2	100
Boromo	27	43	6	20	4	100
Tenkodogo						
<b>Health</b>	Perceptions of individuals on the evolution of availability and quality of health services					
Kaya	9	18	4	22	47	100
Ouahigouya	7	45	10	36	2	100
Boromo	16	27	2	53	2	100
Tenkodogo						
<b>Drinking Water</b>	Perceptions of individuals on the evolution of availability and quality of drinking water service					
Kaya	0	4	16	16	64	100
Ouahigouya	0	12	10	43	36	100
Boromo	0	8	10	76	6	100
Tenkodogo						
<b>Employment Opportunity</b>	Perceptions of individuals on the evolution of availability of paid employment opportunities					
Kaya	9	11	2	20	58	100
Ouahigouya	0	5	57	38	0	100
Boromo	2	25	12	59	2	100
Tenkodogo						
<b>Modern Energy</b>	Perceptions of availability of modern energy					
Kaya	0	0	69	7	24	100
Ouahigouya	0	10	76	14	0	100
Boromo	0	14	16	63	8	100
Tenkodogo						

Table C.2 (continued)

	None %	Some degree of motivation %	Great motivation %	Total %
<b>Motivation (zeal) of the state in reducing poverty</b>	Perceptions of individuals on the motivation of the state in efforts to reduce poverty			
Kaya	13	16	71	100
Ouahigouya	48	45	5	100
Boromo	27	69	4	100
Tenkodogo	32			
<b>Effectiveness of the state in reducing poverty</b>	Perceptions of individuals on the efficiency with which the state addresses poverty reduction			
Kaya	2	38	44	100
Ouahigouya	64	35	0	100
Boromo	53	47	0	100
Tenkodogo	44	64	0	100

## **Annex D: Preparing a Poverty Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy**

### **Increasing Ownership and Participation in Monitoring**

1. The consultation process for the *CSLP* was perfunctory as has been acknowledged in the first Annual PRSP (*CSLP*) Progress Report. This carried through to the monitoring arrangements that were put in place that failed to provide for any significant role for non-government organizations (the private sector, NGO's and community organizations) or for local government in monitoring the *CSLP*. The PMES should redress this by recognizing the role of the different stakeholders in monitoring and evaluation both as users and providers of information. Community participatory poverty monitoring mechanisms would need to be developed in the medium-term and after testing, be fully integrated into the PMES. The PMES can draw from some solid community and NGO experience gained in specific programs in providing for their greater participation in a national monitoring system. For example, the National Land Management Program (*Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs –PNGT II*) launched early in 2002 that targets productive investments in 3000 villages envisages decentralized monitoring of living conditions in rural households in provinces where the program will intervene. Monitoring will be carried out in close cooperation with village committees (*Comites Villageois de Gestion des Terroirs – CVGT*). The monitoring program has the potential to provide important lessons for a more participative approach generally to *CSLP* monitoring in the country. Other examples of the experience that PMES can draw from are NGO programs that have adopted pertinent monitoring and evaluation of their programs. For example, a food security program (*Africare Project de Sécurité Alimentaire de Zondoma*) has tracked an array of input and intermediate outcome indicators over time in the beneficiary communities such as their capacity for organization, participation, planning and implementation and individuals capacity to acquire and apply technical knowledge, as well as output indicators of food and infrastructure supply leading to outcome indicators of nutrition. Potential synergies between a national program of monitoring the *CSLP* and NGO monitoring of their programs could conceivably start with structured knowledge interchange between the two. To date, there is little evidence that the national monitoring program being designed has made a systematic effort to learn from experience gained in monitoring programs of NGO interventions. The PMES should address this explicitly.

### **Improving the Use of Monitoring and Evaluation for Decisionmaking**

2. It is critical that the PMES provides for monitoring in Burkina Faso that is more responsive to providing decisionmakers with a continuous flow of actionable information about the interrelationship between operational activities and poverty related results. The aim should be to determine the relevance of the objectives, efficiency, effectiveness, and immediate effects so as to incorporate lessons learned into the decisionmaking process.<sup>11</sup> In these evaluations, combined qualitative and quantitative research methodologies would be used. It is evident that a number of

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<sup>11</sup> Traditionally, impact assessment has been regarded as the province of Evaluation, which has been seen as a distinct activity from Monitoring—carried out by different agents on a different basis. However, a hard-and-fast distinction between monitoring and evaluation does not seem appropriate to the needs of the PRSP. This calls for a form of “process monitoring” and a result/action oriented monitoring, in which rapid feedback of experience on what seems to be working and what doesn't is built into the system. Deciding “what is working” involves forming a view not just on what results are being achieved but on how and why (i.e. the causal links all along the chain from inputs to poverty outcomes) which are evaluation-type questions. In Burkina Faso this will require much better integration of the monitoring and evaluation systems now managed by different line ministries with little attempt to develop synergies between sectors in data collection, reporting, and interpretation of results.

these evaluations should be case studies to illustrate; explore; assess program implementation; assess program effects; or critique and explain differences. The type of case study to be conducted may be identified using national survey data; sectoral implementation reports; or research reports.

3. Ex-ante analysis before policies/programs are implemented should be developed as a tool of decisionmaking. By simulating the impact of alternative policy packages on growth, poverty, and distribution across socioeconomic groups, policymakers will have a firmer basis on which to assess the options (such analysis is planned and a first set of estimates should be available during 2002 c.f. section above). This will open up the possibility of discussing the impact of alternative policy stances on poverty, perhaps with the aid of simple projections of income distribution and other indicators of impact under alternative scenarios. This should strengthen the poverty focus of government policies and promote a process that leads to broad-based buy-in from different stakeholders.

4. Therefore, the PMES should ensure that the monitoring system is integrated with the policy process. This entails having an institutional framework that facilitates the interaction between the population, “information workers,” and policymakers. The PMES needs to ensure cooperation between *INSD*, research institutions (in the University at Ouagadougou for example), the planning agencies of the sectoral ministries (*DEPs*) and policymakers. The involvement of civil society organizations in monitoring the use of funds should further be an important element as well as the involvement of civil rights organizations and workers representatives. This calls for comprehensive information covering the multi-dimensional aspects of poverty and for the different information sets to be integrated (combining both quantitative and qualitative information) much better than has been hitherto done in Burkina Faso.

### ***Accountability for Results***

5. There is little evidence so far of any effort in Burkina Faso to align the *CSLP* monitoring framework with performance reviews and incentives for program managers in the public service. The PMES should propose mechanisms to include use of M&E data as a performance indicator for public officials at different levels.

### **Improving the Institutional Framework for Monitoring and Evaluation**

6. As noted earlier (section 4.4) the institutional arrangements seem well conceived. In practice, meetings of the three committees have been irregularly held. Furthermore, cooperation between the institutions involved in monitoring is not as good as it should be. Already, confusion about the roles of the different groups (*ONAPAD*, *STC-PDES*, *INSD* and *DEP/MEF*) has emerged (e.g. in the roles of synthesis and briefing work, and the commissioning of research and evaluation studies on topics relevant to *CSLP* learning and accountability). Their roles need to be clarified. The efforts of these institutions will need to be strengthened, as no new structures should be established for purposes of data collection and data reporting to monitor poverty. The PMES should provide an overall framework for monitoring and evaluation. However, like the *CSLP*, the strategy is broad and should incorporate detailed sectoral M & E strategies that must indicate how the different sectors intend to conduct monitoring and evaluation activities in a decentralized framework with a view to feeding into the national data collection and reporting mechanisms.

7. Furthermore, decisions about information needs and ways of meeting them cannot be divorced from the process in which the sectors justify their budget bids in terms of *CSLP*

objectives. While it is possible to define certain specific responsibilities for collecting different kinds of data, in most instances the key thing is the relationship between the institutions that are demanding, and those within or outside the sectors, that are able to supply the needed information or analysis. This calls for flexibility and close cooperation between the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and the sectoral *DEPs*. In this context, the Poverty Reduction Support Credit monitoring system (the PRSC policy matrix and triggers) should inform the PMES. It is necessary to avoid a situation where a parallel system is instituted to meet the PRSC information demands.

8. In the medium- and long-term, the PMES must take into account the M&E system needs in local governments, and an institutionalized mechanism for participatory monitoring within communities. Capacity building for sub-national administrative districts in the areas of information collection, analysis, and use should be major activities of the PMES in the medium term. It will be important to pay attention to issues of efficiency so that for example local capacities are not overwhelmed with administering expensive large surveys.

### **Improving the Capacity of Government Agencies to Generate Statistical Data**

9. A study carried out for UNDP in 2001 noted major weaknesses in the production of national accounts and of economic and social information more generally and identified weak coordination and poor capacity in the statistical apparatus as a cause. The third pillar of the *PRGE* project – the putting in place of an efficient system of information for monitoring the impact of national policies – is designed to address these coordination and capacity weaknesses.

10. *INSD* has not yet succeeded in establishing sustainable operations that are compromised by lack of resources and high turnover of professional staff due chiefly to its financial constraints. It should be noted however that staff are dedicated and that *INSD* is exceptionally active in organizing competitions between statistical colleges in West Africa and it also provides training for its staff with the aim especially of reinforcing their skills in economic statistics. One consequence of *INSD*'s weak capacity on the quality of survey data can be illustrated by citing the weakness of its cartography service that is critical to maintaining a reliable sampling framework, the basis of all statistical surveys in Burkina whether by *INSD* or others. The frequently cited problem of uncertainty in calculating the denominator in indicators of performance outcomes (e.g. a literacy indicator) derives in part from *INSD*'s difficulty in keeping up to date its files of localities containing lists and spatial mapping of habitations and households. The conditions of employment of the professional staff in *INSD* need to be reviewed and improved to reverse the present situation where salaries and working conditions in other institutions (e.g. *BCEAO*, *UEMOA*, *AFRISTAT*) are better than at *INSD* causing a high turnover of *INSD* staff departing for these other institutions, thus compromising its efficiency.

11. There are a number of difficulties across the sectors in meeting the data needs of priority indicators. Some of these have to do with the fact that the monitoring system is not a single system but a cluster of more or less autonomous data-gathering efforts. There are differences in concepts and definitions used in data collection by the different institutions. This makes it almost impossible to integrate data sets from different sources. Also, timing of data collection differs for various stakeholders. For data sets that are complementary but are generated by different institutions, at different times, integrating the data becomes very difficult. *ONAPAD* has compiled a compendium of statistical definitions for more than 100 indicators. It represents a good start that will have to be improved on with analysis of the quality of the data by which indicators are constructed and indicator reliability and an analysis that will permit selection of those indicators that poverty analysis demonstrates are most relevant for poverty monitoring.

12. Other set of problems arises from some well-known institutional constraints on timely and accurate data collection. Constraints the institutions responsible face include: inadequate logistical support, in terms of equipment, transport facilities, and allowances, which have resulted in poor supervision of many routine monitoring activities; inadequate skills and weak incentives to collect and analyze data, especially at the local levels, with the result that most administrative data are not properly recorded.

***Improving the selection of priority indicators for monitoring the CSLP***

13. The indicators retained in the *CSLP* document were those “inherited” from the conditionality test exercise (section 4.2) i.e. they predated the *CSLP*, which may account in part why some priority programs of the *CSLP* are not acknowledged in the monitoring indicators for the *CSLP* (Table 17 of the *CSLP* document). The PMES should reexamine the priority indicators with a view to harmonizing them with the priority programs of the government and especially with those with HIPC resource funding. In proposing a new set of priority indicators (i.e. a revised Table 17), the PMES should select indicators that range across the different monitoring levels so that they can achieve their purpose. In other words, PMES should select priority indicators that correspond to the outcome targets that have been agreed for the priority programs, and to the key policy areas that have been identified as the necessary steps (intermediate outcomes or outputs) to achieve those results.<sup>12</sup>

14. It must be noted, however, that the list of priority indicators for monitoring the *CSLP* does not detail all the indicators of implementation in the various sectors or of the various stakeholders.<sup>13</sup> Each sector/stakeholder should have a detailed list of indicators for assessing the implementation of programs, and therefore its performance. These indicators should cover inputs, activities, processes, outputs, and reach to indicate access by the beneficiaries. Without a clear and common set of first order goals and targets, it is not clear that all stakeholders are working in the same direction. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provide a common set of first order goals common to all stakeholders. In the context of *CSLP* monitoring, it is appropriate for the different sector ministries and other stakeholders to define goals and associated targets linked to these first order goals. With this approach, goals and their associated indicators would cascade through all the programs for national development being pursued by all stakeholders.

15. Table D.1 provides a suggested list of indicators corresponding to the four pillars of the *CSLP*. It includes some indicators that have been prioritized until now i.e. some of the indicators included (Table 17) in the first version of the *CSLP* and in the first Annual PRSP (*CSLP*) Progress Report. It proposes additional indicators not hitherto identified as priority indicators but which it is felt are necessary to include in order to harmonize priority programs with priority indicators. It proposes dropping some of the original indicators that are either not useful for measuring impact on poor beneficiaries, have methodological problems with their calculation or do not communicate well to the non-specialist.

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<sup>12</sup> Poverty monitoring and evaluation is intended to investigate patterns and changes in the distribution of poverty. Evaluation is concerned with tracking the final outcomes or impacts that a poverty-reduction strategy is aiming to bring about. In its broadest definition, poverty monitoring and evaluation concerns the whole chain of conditions that are the means of achieving the objectives of a poverty-reduction policy, including the tracking of financial and other inputs (i.e. the implementation of poverty-oriented public expenditure policies) and monitoring of the resulting immediate outputs. Global experience of poverty monitoring and analysis has illustrated that it is useful to draw together information on the linkages between the different levels, so as to identify positive chains of causation and important policy-implementation snags that involve several different levels.

<sup>13</sup> Sector/stakeholder in this context is broadly defined as any group or organization capable of producing a poverty outcome. It includes therefore the police and judiciary, volunteer organizations (associations collectives), municipal councils, the media as well as the central and decentralized line ministries of government.



16. Table D.1 draws on the list of indicators contained in *ONAPAD*'s analysis of potential indicators for monitoring the *CSLP*, contained in its report of December 2001.<sup>14</sup>

17. The priority indicators selected from *ONAPAD*'s long list are those that assess the critical outcome and output conditions for each goal. The assessment of the proportion of the national budget used for poverty-focused programs will suffice as the single input indicator for all goals. It must be noted that for all indicators (where feasible) information will be disaggregated by sex, age, and location.

**Table D.1: Poverty Monitoring Priority indicators**

	<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Frequency of Reporting</b>	<b>Currently in <i>CSLP</i>? Yes/No Retain/Discard</b>
<b>I.</b>	<b>Accelerate equity based growth</b>		
	GDP growth rate	Annual	<b>No</b>
	Proportion of national budget used for poverty focused programs	Annual	<b>No</b>
	Inflation rate	Annual	<b>No</b>
<b>II.</b>	<b>Promote good governance</b>		
	Social sector ministries budget execution rate	Annual	<b>Yes/Retain</b>
	Share of budget effectively reaching decentralized departments	Annual	<b>Yes/Retain</b>
	Incidence of misappropriation of public funds at national, district level	Annual	<b>No</b>
	Beneficiary assessment of quality of police and judicial services	Annual	<b>No</b>
<b>III.</b>	<b>Expanding opportunities for employment and income-generating activities for the poor</b>		
	Employment rate of unskilled laborers by location in non-farm activities	Quarterly	<b>No</b>
	Volumes of traffic (produce and people) on new rural roads	Annual	<b>No</b>
	Yield rates of major crops by location	Bi-annual (every two years)	<b>No</b>
<b>IV.</b>	<b>Guarantee that the poor have access to basic social services</b>		
	Life expectancy in years by sex	Five years	<b>No</b>
	Infant mortality	Five years	<b>No</b>
	Maternal mortality	Five years	<b>No</b>
	Nutrition	Five years	<b>No</b>
	<i>Health</i>		
	Vaccination coverage (BCG, DPT3, Measles, Yellow fever)	Annual	<b>Yes/Retain</b>

<sup>14</sup> *Indicateurs de Suivi du CSLP et des Objectives Internationaux, Project d'Appui au Renforcement de la Gouvernance Economique (PRGE).*

	<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Frequency of Reporting</b>	<b>Currently in CSLP? Yes/No Retain/Discard</b>
	Percentage of approved posts filled with qualified health workers in public and PNFP (Private Not-for-Profit) facilities.	Annual	
	Rate of use of health facilities – number of new contacts per person per year	Annual	<b>Yes/Retain</b>
	Essential drugs breakdown	Annual	<b>Yes/Retain</b>
	Cost of medical interventions in 1 <sup>st</sup> level centers		<b>Yes/Retain</b>
	Rate of HIV/AIDS incidence by location, gender and age	Annual	<b>No</b>
	<i>Education</i>		
	Literacy rate by sex, location	Bi-annual (every two years)	<b>Yes /Retain/Modify from annual to biannual</b>
	Gross school enrollment rate by sex and location	Annual	<b>Yes/Retain</b>
	Gross school completion rate by sex and location	Annual	<b>No</b>
	Pupil/trained-teacher ratio	Annual	<b>No</b>
	Pupil/textbook ratio	Annual	<b>No</b>
	Participatory assessments targeting groups with no access to safe water to explore causal chain		
	Survey of teacher satisfaction with living conditions	Annual	<b>No</b>
	<i>Water and Sanitation</i>		
	Increase in the number of provinces with better coverage rate (defined as the number of provinces with one water points per 300 habitants)	Annual	<b>Discard</b> <sup>15</sup>
	Rate of pump breakdown	Annual	<b>Discard</b>
	Number of new water points	Annual	<b>Discard</b>
	Participatory assessments targeting groups with no access to safe water to explore causal chain	Annual	<b>No</b>
	Proportion of the population within a determined distance (e.g. 1 km ) of safe water by location	Bi-annual (every two years)	<b>No</b>
	Number and proportion of population with good sanitation facilities	Bi-annual (every two years)	<b>No</b>

### ***Complementary Priority Indicators***

18. The priority indicators provide a comprehensive picture when used with other supporting indicators that have not necessarily been listed. This section notes the potential supporting (complementary) indicators under each pillar of the *CSLP*.

- *Accelerate equity-based growth.* The GDP growth rate should be reviewed in light of the real sectoral growth rates. The structural transformation envisaged should lead to a reduced share

<sup>15</sup> The rate of breakdown of manually operated pumps, the increase of equipment for secondary centers and the creation of new water points do not by themselves provide any indication of access by the poor to safe water (although they may be meaningful to Ministry planners and provide them with useful information on progress of their activities).

of agriculture in the GDP. The growth must increasingly be generated by the private sector – and there is therefore a need to monitor the share of the private sector in GDP. This should be complemented by a review of factors that impinge on private sector development: interest rates, level of contract enforcement, condition of infrastructure (roads, power, telecommunications), availability of relevant skilled manpower, due process in judicial matters.

- *Promote good governance.* Different socioeconomic groups should complement beneficiary assessment of the quality of service in the police and judiciary indicator, with information on access to due process in judicial matters.
- *Expanding opportunities for employment and income generating activities for the poor.* Rural energy and electrification supply, provision of vocational education, and micro-finance facilities, can be leading indicators of households diversifying from total dependence on farm activities. Yield rates could be an indication that farmers are increasing their production levels through enhanced productivity. Other indicators that should be reviewed to explain productivity efforts should include; farmers contact with extension workers, rates of adoption of new farming techniques, availability of agricultural inputs, access to markets and support infrastructure (e.g. telephone and electricity service).
- *Guarantee that the poor have access to basic social services.* Use of soap for regular hand washing and increased use of modern fuels used to replace biomass fuels in cooking could be complementary indicators under Health.

### ***Different Data-collection Instruments***

19. Poverty monitoring draws on data from a wide range of sources, collected on the basis of a variety of methods. It does so partly because of the range of different poverty dimensions and intermediate processes that have to be covered. But it is also useful to have information from a diversity of sources, because each major type of source and method has significant limitations under current conditions. A combination of different data-collection instruments is vital to getting the valid and reliable understanding that *CSLP* monitoring requires. In cases where there is conflicting evidence from different sources of information, the choice of the “valid” source should be made after an assessment on a case-by-case basis.

20. Table D.2 is illustrative of the various methods of data collection that should continue to be used in Burkina Faso, with a rough indication of how they contribute to the different levels of monitoring.

**Table D.2: Typical Methods of Data Collection for Poverty Monitoring**

<b>Level of Monitoring</b>	<b>Method of Data Collection</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Output</b>
Final outcomes (or impacts)	Population Census Demographic and Health Surveys Impact studies	10 years 5 years	Poverty Impact Assessment reports
Intermediate outcomes and processes	Household surveys PPAs Service-Delivery Survey Agricultural, business and labor-market surveys  Semi-formal service delivery evaluation by recipients	Bi-Annually (every two years)  Continuous	Service-delivery survey reports Beneficiary assessment reports PPA thematic reports Survey reports Poverty Status Reports.  Feedback through informal channels (e.g. village meetings) to local authorities.
Outputs	Sectoral Management Information Systems of <i>DEPs</i> Field visits	Annually Quarterly	Quarterly/Annual Sectoral Reports <i>CSLP</i> Progress Reports Budget Framework papers
Inputs	Administrative records Public expenditure tracking studies	Quarterly Annual	Quarterly/Annual Reports

21. There are a number of widely recognized problems with each of the standard methods of data collection. The problems include incomplete data and untimely data production. This PMES should be sensitive to the strengths and limitations of the various data collection methods. Household surveys for example normally capturing only measurable dimensions of poverty are expensive. Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) on the other hand provide more insights into the determinants of poverty for the poor taking part in the assessment but it is not always possible to generalize the information. PPAs should explore “unanswered” questions arising from survey analytical work. In addition, the importance of semi-formal service delivery evaluation by intended recipients, a more or less continuous process, cannot be underestimated in providing local authorities with a feedback channel that can help them to adjust policies and programs during implementation.

#### ***Administrative Data and Special Surveys***

22. A major outstanding problem at the level of intermediate processes, outcomes, and even outputs is the poor quality of most routine or administrative data in Burkina Faso. Sectoral data (generated by the *DEPs* in the various line Ministries) are of questionable value for assessing performance towards improved poverty outcomes. Even their reliability on basic outputs is a problem in many cases. The first set of problems arises from the fact that most routine administrative data are facility-based. Accurate reporting of such data depends on those operating the facility (e.g. health clinic or school). There may be incentives for such workers to misrepresent provision of services. Facility-based data provide information on those already getting access to services, not on those who are for one reason or another outside the reach of current provision. It is partly for this reason that *CSLP* monitoring may have to rely quite heavily

on surveys of different types, that sample whole populations and participatory assessment exercises, that are community, rather than facility based.

***Dissemination of Poverty Monitoring and Evaluation Data***

23. The PEMS should have a communication strategy that includes addressing the needs of the poor people, who are mainly rural dwellers and who may often not be literate. Civil-society networks (*associations collectives*) in Burkina Faso seem to be taking on new roles that have implications for the demand for poverty information. Increasingly, these are important not just as direct interlocutors of government on poverty issues, but also as providers of critical information and analysis to parliament and the mass media. Improved communication is implicit when the challenge of improving capacity in the various organizations concerned with monitoring the *CSLP* was discussed earlier in this report.

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