


# **Evolving Participation**

## **Institutional Issues in Participatory Development**

**Case Study: Burkina Faso**

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADRK	Association pour le développement de la région de Kaya
ADRTOM	Association pour le développement de la région de Toma
AVP	Association Vive le Paysan
AVV	Autorité des Aménagements des Vallées des Volta
ADC	Agent de Développement communautaire
ADCC	Agent de Développement communautaire coordonnateur
ADCS	Agent de Développement communautaire de section
AEFR	Agent d'Economie familiale rurale
AJR	Agent de jeunesse rurale
ALE	Adult Labor Equivalent
AOF	Afrique Occidentale Française
BPPA	Bureau pour le Développement de la Production Agricole
BSONG	Bureau de suivi des ONG
CCCE	Caisse centrale de coopération économique
CCDR	Comité de coordination du Développement Rural
CDR	Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
CESAO	Centre d'études économiques et sociales de l'Afrique de l'ouest
CFA	Currency of the (West) African-French Community
CFDT	Compagnie Française pour le développement des fibres textiles
CFJA	Centre de formation de jeunes agriculteurs
CIDR	Compagnie Internationale de développement rural
CILSS	Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel
CNR	Conseil National de la Révolution
CR	Revolutionary Committees
CRPA	Centre régional de promotion agro-pastorale
CSIV	Intervillage Health Committees
CSP	Comité du Salut du Peuple
CSPS	Centre de Santé et Promotion Social
DAUS	Direction de l'Analyse Statistique Urbaine
DC	Développement communautaire
DIRC	Direction des Institutions Rurale et du Crédit
DPET	Direction provincial de l'environnement et du tourisme
DRET	Direction régional de l'environnement et du tourisme
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FDR	Fonds de développement rural
FED	Fonds Européen de Développement
FEER	Fond de l'eau et de l'équipement rural
FONADES	Fondation nationale pour le développement économique et social
FJA	Formation des Jeunes Agriculteurs
GDP	Gross Domestic Project
GJA	Groupement des Jeunes Agriculteurs
GMP	Gouvernement Militaire Provisoire

GNR	Gouvernement national de renouveau
GTZ	German Office for Technical Cooperation
GV	Groupement villageois (village association)
INADES	Institut Africain pour le développement économique et social
MAE	Ministère de l'agriculture et de l'élevage
MAP	Méthode d'aménagement progressif (Progressive Development Method)
MDR	Ministère de Développement Rural
MEBAM	Ministère de l'éducation de Base et de l'alphabétisation
MET	Ministère de l'environnement et du tourisme
MSAS	Ministère du santé et action sociale
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ONG	Organisation Non-gouvernementale
ORD	Organisme régional de développement
OXFAM	Oxford committee for famine relief
PANE	Plan d'Action National pour l'Environnement
PDA-B	Projet de Développement Agricole-Bougouriba
PDA-BM	Projet de Développement Agricole-Boucle du Mouhoun
PDA-HB	Projet de Développement Agricole-Hauts Bassins
PDA-OV	Projet de Développement Agricole-Ouest-volta
PDA-VN	Projet de Développement Agricole-Volta-noire
PDE-OV	Projet de développement de l'élevage-Ouest-volta
PNGT	Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs
PNGTV	Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs Villageois
PNLCD	Programme National pour la Lutte Contre la Sécheresse
PNUD	Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement
PPD	Popular Development Plan (Plan Populaire du Développement)
PPIK	Plan de Parrainage International Kaya
PRSAP	Agricultural Support Services Project
PSP	Poste de Santé Primaire (Primary Health Post)
RAF	Réforme Agraire et Foncière
SATEC	Société d'Aide Technique et de Coopération
SIP	Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance
RDA	Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
RDP	Révolution Démocratique et Populaire
SMDR	Sociétés Mutuelles de Développement rural
SMPR	Sociétés Mutuelles de Production Rurale
SNV	Association Néerlandaise d'Assistance au Développement
SNVA	Service National des Volontaires Européens
SSP	Soins de Santé Primaire
Six-S	Savoir se Servir de la Saison Séche en Savane et au Sahel
SPONG	Secrétariat Permanent des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales
T&V	Training and Visit Extension Methodology
UDIHV	Union pour la Défense des Intérêts de la Haute Volta
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund  
UNSO United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office  
UP10 Planning Unit (Unité de planification) 10  
WHO World Health Organization





## Executive Summary

Since Independence, Burkina Faso has consistently been ranked among the poorest and least developed countries in the world. The country is landlocked with poor soil, irregular rainfall, and few mineral deposits. In thirty years there have been nine different political regimes, many of them coming into power following coups.

Despite these problems, Burkina Faso has not experienced the severe balance of payments, debt, and financial problems suffered by most African countries during these past two decades (Savadogo and Wetta 1991). In fact, during the last 10 years, the country has made significant progress in the fields of education, health, agriculture, environment, and urban infrastructure.

A number of factors have contributed to this success, including the government's support for innovative "participatory" development models. Although each regime has conceptualized the objectives and strategies for obtaining economic and political development in different ways, each has consistently supported participation at a grassroots level.

It is this strong tradition of participation that led the World Bank's Africa Region Participation Team to propose an intensive assessment of the role of participation in Burkina Faso's development. The objectives of the study were 1) to examine the ways in which high level commitments to a participatory approach were translated into grassroots interventions, 2) to look at the ways these interventions led to revisions in project designs, program policies, and national laws, and 3) to focus on how institutional mechanisms were used to pass participatory messages upwards and downwards from the policy makers to the people, and what happened in the process.

The study was initially designed to look at participation in four sectors: agriculture, natural resource management, health, and urban development. It was carried out by a team consisting of one international consultant and four local consultants, with extensive participation by Bank staff in the Resident Mission and in Washington. During the course of the study it was decided to combine the sector analysis for agriculture and natural resource management. The study also revealed important common themes rooted in the country's historical and cultural background and cross-cutting sectoral distinctions. The organization of the final report reflects these changes.

## Political History

A historic analysis of Burkina Faso shows that the concept of participation was fundamental to the organization of production in each of Burkina's traditional societies. Nevertheless, there were important differences. In traditional state systems, like the Mossi, where one's social status is heavily influenced by birth, the primary motivation is to fulfill one's family's obligation to a political superior or mutual aid to a social ally. In contrast, within the "acephalous" stateless societies that have little tradition of inherited status, the individual is highly motivated to participate in group labor as an avenue for self-promotion.

These two widely varying cultural models have influenced the different Burkinabè groups' responses to outside directives.

In addition to the cultural differences, each successive national political regime has defined "development" and the role of "local participation" in obtaining that development in different ways.

During the time of President Yameogo, the concept of local participation in development was perceived as a political problem. Especially important, his regime attempted to replace the "traditional" systems for mobilizing local participation with a "modern" system of political parties.

Yameogo's six-year regime was followed by a fairly tranquil 13-year period under General Sangoulé Lamizana, during which the country experimented with various participatory models. Under Lamizana, the traditional chiefs' roles were reinstated and the labor unions emerged as the representative of a small but increasingly vocal middle class of salaried workers and civil servants. In contrast to Yameogo's emphasis on political change, Lamizana emphasized the role of local participation in economic development. This commitment was translated into three important sets of policies:

- 1) A series of laws and decentralized state institutions, the Regional Development Organizations (ORD), to reinforce the capacity of the local cooperative and pre-cooperative *groupements* to mobilize local participation in crop and livestock development
- 2) New state institutions to increase national participation in business and industry
- 3) Austerity measures ("patriotic contribution") to decrease government expenditure by reducing civil servant benefits and salaries

Another key turning point was the 1968-1973 drought. At the regional level the drought was characterized by five successive years of below average, irregular rainfall. The key economic impact was to accelerate the existing processes of environmental degradation and migration toward the country's under-serviced urban areas. In addition the drought precipitated a dramatic increase in bilateral and multilateral development aid. The same period coincided with the rapid expansion of international NGOs who were attracted by Burkina Faso's democratic atmosphere and supportive legislation. Of the 45 NGOs that came in this period, 30 came originally for drought aid. In almost every case, the NGOs quickly transformed themselves into development institutions, with the highest concentration being in the Mossi plateau which was the area worst affected by the drought. In 1975 the NGOs created a Permanent Secretary for Non-governmental Organizations (SPONG) to coordinate and harmonize their activities.

The economic policies adopted by the Revolutionary government, which took power in 1983, were designed to correct the macro-economic trade imbalances that were exacerbated by

the drought and a series of economic shocks in the late 1970s. What distinguishes this regime was its commitment to a "total" model of participation that was both political and economic. This model included the creation of a new institutional structure--Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs)--to mobilize support for the regime's package of radical policy changes. At its base were village, urban sector, and office CDRs who were linked to a hierarchy of provincial and national CDRs. This same "total" mobilization of people was meant to "purify" the country from some of the corrupt influences that had plagued earlier regimes. Communication continued, however, to be top-down, but through the CDR instead of the traditional chiefs.

The new government continued the previous regime's emphasis on rural development. At the same time, however, it emphasized the use of local participation to expand the "social" sectors. Commando campaigns were started to build health facilities and schools. Between 1981 and 1986, over 4,000 village health posts (PSP) were built and school attendance rose from 24% to 32% (Savadogo and Wetta 1991:34). This rapid expansion, however, quickly outstripped the capacity of the government and local populations to maintain the programs. Over 600 of the newly constructed schools never received teachers; within six months the majority of the newly created village health posts were out of medications and abandoned.

After 1987, the government reduced and eventually suppressed the political role of the CDR. This did not, however, slow the continual march toward development of innovative models of participation. Instead, the successful commando campaigns were perceived as having validated what was already a long-established cultural model of participation. The result has been a new generation of post-revolutionary models for participatory development that are built on the previous generation's "lessons learned". Simultaneously, the government has implemented a wide variety of national laws and decrees to support the type of fiscal and administrative decentralization that is necessary to sustain participatory approaches.

## Sector Analyses

The sector analyses show that despite the strong governmental emphasis on local participation, the degree to which these initiatives have been translated into actual institutions and interventions varies widely both by sector and within individual sectors at different times. Moreover, the process has been influenced by a variety of local, national, and international factors.

Agriculture. As early as 1931, the colonial government realized that to be effective, agricultural policies needed to implicate the local population in the execution of their crop development policies. This realization led to the early development of the concept of the cooperative and pre-cooperative *groupements*. Since Independence, the *groupement* concept has been reinforced by a long succession of laws and changes in the national extension service. The World Bank strengthened the *groupement* concept through a series of regional development projects to promote commercial cotton production in the 1970s and 1980s. The success of these projects helped make cotton the main engine for national economic growth in the 1980s.

Unfortunately, there was no similar economic incentive to develop local participation in natural resource management. By 1980, the high productivity of the southwest "cotton" boom area was being threatened by a host of unintended environmental consequences. Moreover, it was increasingly clear that the conventional extension models for promoting popular participation could not reverse the process. To confront this issue, the Burkinabè government embraced a new model of participation that linked short-term incentives, like the realization of basic infrastructure, to a community's pledge to adopt sustainable natural resource management. The institutional mechanisms for coordinating this support were the village land management committees that were created as part of the new National Program for Village Land Management which started in 1986. This is a process that the World Bank is supporting through its current National Environment Management Project (1991) and the Agricultural Support Services Project (PRSAP).

Health. Within the health sector, Burkina Faso's rural population participated as passive beneficiaries of disease vaccination and diagnostic services during the colonial period and the first 20 years of independence. This "passive" participation was in sharp contrast with the traditional healing methods. The primary reason for the persistent top-down focus in Burkina's formal health sector was the crisis conditions of the country's health (epidemics, high infant mortality, droughts and resulting malnutrition, and difficulties in obtaining pharmaceuticals). In addition, the central government had neither the financial nor personnel resources to sustain a more "horizontal" system of decentralized rural health services.

Into this health care vacuum came the first onslaught of international NGOs for drought relief. Starting in 1979, the NGOs created some of the first models for rural community health. The World Bank supported the development of these models through the first health service development project. The implementation of this new decentralized system was accelerated by two mass mobilization campaigns: one to construct village health posts and one to increase the vaccination rate. These commando campaigns had an immediate and dramatic effect on health standards and infrastructure. Neither, however, were sustainable, in large part because the beneficiaries were not able to fully participate in the management of the health care facilities. Even in cases where the beneficiary organizations, NGOs or ministry did succeed in establishing a system of autonomous management to ensure sustainability, the actions of these systems were reduced by the Ministry of Finance laws which necessitated the central management of all financial receipts coming into the clinics, pharmacies, and hospitals. The high levels of rural illiteracy further decreased the efficacy of the rural health committees. Aided by the World Bank, the Burkinabè government has recently enacted new legislation that permits decentralized health management and accounting.

Urban development. The inability to develop agriculture in the lower potential, plateau zones, combined with the drought, resulted in a dramatic increase in immigration to Burkina Faso's urban areas. By 1985, 11% of the country's population was living in the urban areas, primarily in the two largest cities. Most of the settlers moved into squatter zones on the outskirts of the major cities, where living standards were poor, because of the lack of developed land parcels and infrastructure. Early attempts to improve living conditions in the squatter zones

tended to benefit only the wealthier residents and those who could claim large areas of land due to traditional land rights. In 1974, the government, working with Habitat Project, tested a radically new pilot program for eliciting high levels of local participation in squatter upgrading and site and service development.

In 1976 the government proposed a massive tenfold expansion of the Habitat Project model for squatter upgrades through the World Bank-supported First Urban Project. The Dutch-sponsored Progressive Development Model or MAP was able to profit from the lessons learned through the Habitat and First Urban Project. Using the MAP program as their model, the new government embarked on a "commando" subdivision operation to register the squatter areas outside Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. The results were dramatic. In two years the government distributed three times more parcels than in the preceding 23 years. By 1990, the combination of the First Urban Project, the MAP program, and the "commando" subdivision campaign had increased the amount of zoned land from 28.6% of the total land area of Ouagadougou to 72.9%.

The mere process of zoning and registering the squatter areas did not, however, resolve the root problems of primary and secondary infrastructure and sanitation services. To address this issue, the World Bank supported Second Urban Project included targeted support for administrative development as well as basic services and infrastructure. The Third Urban project, which is just beginning, was designed to complement the activities of the Second Urban project by further strengthening the cities' sanitation services and municipal governments. The Faso Baara Project, was designed to promote the use of private contractors and local consulting firms as a "tool" for the execution of small municipal works projects like drainage canals, roads, schools, health facilities.

## Lessons Learned

Based on Burkina Faso's experience of participatory approaches, this study concludes that project planners need to:

- Define the different forms of participation and the objectives in clear, operational terms and whenever possible, to aspire to a "complete" model of participation
- Use operational research (pilot projects) to test a particular model of participation before extending it on a larger scale
- Conceptualize participatory projects within the wider national socio-economic context to ensure sustainability
- Allow a longer-than-average planning phase to associate the local populations and to avoid costly down-stream delays and renegotiations of the project design

- Guard against the tendency to implement well-meaning participatory projects as "top-down" programs with little beneficiary input into their design
- Reinforce local institutional models for participation with appropriate texts and strong political will
- Establish legal texts and coordinating bodies to clarify the role of international and national NGOs in facilitating participatory approaches
- Exercise some degree of regulation to ensure that a broad range of social and income groups profit from participatory approaches
- Provide resources for group activities around which participation can be built
- Identify and include conditions for long-term management and maintenance from the beginning of the project
- Reinforce participatory approaches with basic literacy programs to equip beneficiaries with the necessary skills to contribute to and benefit from collective activities

Perhaps the most important lesson learned from the Burkinabè experience is that development involves many elements and demands a global, multi-sectoral approach. This type of global approach must necessarily involve all ministries and sectors, even though the present study has limited itself to the just four--agriculture, natural resource management, health, and urban development.

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The present report synthesizes a much larger body of work (See Annexes) which will be revised for future dissemination in Burkina Faso and abroad. We hope that the present document will generate feedback that will assist us with this revision.



## Chapter One

### Introduction

Burkina Faso is widely regarded as a young country with deep historic roots which is seriously engaged in its development effort. In the face of almost insurmountable odds, the country has made remarkable progress in the fields of agriculture, health, education, and urban infrastructure. What is especially surprising is that these gains have been attained without incurring the severe balance of payment, debt, and budget problems that destabilized most African countries in the 1970s and 1980s. The country has also gained a reputation for being relatively peaceful, democratic, and open. A number of factors have contributed to this success, not the least of which is the governments' historic commitment to innovative models for participatory development.

It is this strong tradition of participation that led the World Bank's Africa Subteam to propose an intensive assessment of the role of participation in Burkina Faso's development. The objectives of the study were: 1) to examine the ways in which sustained high level commitment to a participatory approach were translated into grassroots interventions, 2) to look at the ways these interventions led to revisions in project designs, program policies, and national laws, and 3) to focus on how institutional mechanisms were used to pass participatory messages upwards and downwards from the policy makers to the people, and what happened in the process.

The World Bank and other donors have something to learn from the Burkinabe experience. Too many donors and national policy makers have defined participation in overly idealistic, ambiguous terms. In fact, the reality of creating, implementing, and supporting the multiple levels of participation (especially the ideal of "true participation") is exceedingly complex.

The simplest form of participation involves the local population's physical and/or financial contribution to development projects over which, too often, they have little say. Financial contributions may be in the form of pooling funds or paying user fees. A third type of participation corresponds more closely to the World Bank's definition of participation as:

a process by which people, especially disadvantaged people, influence decisions that affect them....[and are not simply involved]... in the implementation or benefits of a development activity. (Bhatnagar and Williams 1992:177):

Each type of participation has its rewards and drawbacks. Perhaps the most important policy lesson that we can derive from Burkina Faso's experience is that it is highly unlikely that any one institutional model of participation will be widely accepted in any one country at different times, or even in different sectors at the same time. Moreover, the successful implementation of one "type" of participation can increase local people's willingness and ability to undertake other types.

Our analysis argues that failure to appreciate the highly dynamic nature of participation can lead donors to dismiss prematurely a participatory approach when the short-term results do not match pre-established institutional or economic goals. More likely to be accepted--and sustainable over the long-term--will be a national approach to participatory development in which the local institutional models are not only allowed but encouraged to evolve. This is an evolutionary process that is invariably influenced by a wide variety of cultural, political, and economic factors.

Donors open "windows" by targeting their assistance. This assistance should therefore be handled with great care. In deciding to support or not to support a specific request, and thus a specific segment of the population (or political agenda), a donor can inadvertently create a disequilibrium and endanger a fragile new dynamism.

Our conclusions are based on an analysis of Burkina Faso's experience with participatory approaches in four sectors: agriculture, natural resource management, health, and urban infrastructure. These sectors were chosen because of the presence of active World Bank-supported projects within each sector. The analysis included a literature review within each sector as well as interviews with administrators, technicians, and beneficiaries involved in specific World Bank projects (Table I.1 and Annex III).

Chapter Two provides a brief overview of the wider economic and political context of participation in Burkina Faso. This analysis of the macro-historical and political context is followed by a brief summary of the sector reports in Chapters Three through Five. Chapters Six and Seven present the global lessons learned and the conclusions of the study.

## Chapter Two

### The Economic and Political Context of Participation in Burkina Faso

Throughout history, the people of Burkina Faso have placed a strong cultural value on participation. Since independence, the authorities have attempted to integrate this inherited cultural value into their approaches to development. The present chapter provides a brief overview of the wider geographical, economic, and political context within which different types of local participation have evolved.

#### Background

With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of \$290 US in 1991 (World Bank, 1993), Burkina Faso (which was known as Upper Volta until 1984) is one of the world's poorest countries. Agriculture is the most important economic activity, employing almost 90% of the population and accounting for one-third of the GDP and virtually all exports. Yet the natural resources on which agricultural output depends are meager and at risk. Soils are generally poor and easily degraded by traditional cultivation methods. Rainfall is scarce and highly variable, ranging from 250 millimeters (mm) per year in the north to 1,200 mm in the extreme south (Figure 2.1). The country has located important mineral deposits, but its land locked position and poorly maintained transportation make it unlikely that minerals will be commercially exploited.

The annual population growth is estimated at 2.8% per year. Over half the population is concentrated on the central plateau region. A small but rapidly increasing share of the population lives in urban areas, accounting for approximately 11% of the total population of about 10 million in 1989. The present urban growth rate is estimated at 8%. By the end of the century, total population is projected to be at least 12.5 million, with 21% of the total (2.4 million) concentrated in urban areas (Figure 2.2). Ouagadougou, the capital and largest area, has a total population of about 500,000 and accounts for 50% of the urban population.

The national frontiers embrace more than 60 linguistically and culturally distinct ethnic groups. The dominant ethnic group is the Mossi, who represent about 50% of the current population. Historians agree that the first Mossi immigrated north from the Mamprussi and Dagomba regions in present day northern Ghana between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries (Fage 1964; Skinner 1964; Zahan 1967). From the fifteenth to the late-nineteenth century, the invading Mossi *nakombse* consolidated a loose confederation of tribal states known as the Mossi Kingdoms.

These diverse ethnic groups were conquered by the French at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1919 the area was regrouped into the colony called Upper Volta (Haute Volta). In 1932 the colony was dismantled and the area subdivided into three portions that were annexed to the neighboring colonies of Mali, Niger, and Côte d'Ivoire.

Figure 2.1 Distribution of average rainfall isohyets in West Africa





Figure 2.2 Percent of total population in urban areas, 1960-2000



Projected based on 1985 figures.  
 Source: World Bank 1991:3

Under pressure from the traditional Mossi chiefs and their political party, the Union for the Defense of the Interests of Upper Volta (UDIHV), and from various Burkinabè intellectuals attached to the French colonial civil services, the colony was reconstituted in 1947. In 1960 Burkina Faso followed the other francophone colonies to independence under the name Haute Volta (Upper Volta).

## Traditional Social Organization

Burkina's 60 ethnic groups and nationalities can be grouped into two large categories: 1) pre-colonial hierarchic states, like the Mossi (about 50% of the population), the Gourmantche, and the Peul; and 2) non-centralized, lineage societies like the Bwa, Bobo, Senoufo, Lobi, and Dagari. The stratified societies tend to be concentrated in the central and north; the lineage societies in the south.

### Hierarchic States

The Mossi, Gourmantche, and Peul cultures are heavily influenced by the vestiges of their pre-colonial state structure, which linked individual households into a hierarchy of village, district, and provincial chiefs. Within the wider political structure there is a "noble" class with access to the position of chief and a "commoner" class. The Mossi, for example, functioned as a loose empire comprised of a series of smaller kingdoms--the three largest being Yatenga, Ouagadougou, and Ouahigouya. At the head of each kingdom was the *Moro Naba* (king) who had under him a hierarchy of lesser provincial and regional chiefs who "drank the *nam*" or received the authority of their chieftaincy from the *Moro Naba* (Figure 2.3). Each of these lesser chiefs had the power to appoint village chiefs who would inherit or acquire sub-regional power bases for themselves. The interrelationships between different levels of the political hierarchy were loose. Each village chief and his following, for example, owed a certain amount of tribute (usually grain and animals) as well as labor to the regional overlord. The regional overlord, in turn, had obligations to the provincial lord, and on up the hierarchy. A chief was expected to lend military support and to follow his overlord on outside alliances and judicial decisions. In return, the lesser chief and his people received protection and arbitration in inter-village disputes as well as emergency aid. Some of the more powerful chiefs exacted taxes from caravans using the trade routes crossing their jurisdiction.

This "feudal" structure was superimposed on a base lineage structure. The basic unit was the *zaka* (household), comprised of a man, his wife, and children. Clusters of households (or neighborhoods) comprise a *saka*. A residential *saka* often include several *boodoo*, a unit of people related by descent, not by residence. Although the members of a *boodoo* (maximal lineage or clan) generally cannot trace their precise kinship relationship to one other, the relationship is symbolized by a shared totemic object like an animal or tree, which represents their group. For the vast majority of rural and "urban" Mossi, the descendent based clan and the component lineages that comprise it constitute the most meaningful unit of rural social and political organization (Hammond 1966; Skinner 1964).<sup>1</sup> Especially important is the *boodkasma*

(oldest living male member of the *boodoo*) and *zakkasama* (compound head) who perform important rituals on behalf of the groups as well as social duties like arranging marriages and arbitrating disputes.

### **Lineage Based Groups**

The second type of society, typical of the Lobi-Dagari, Senoufou, Gouin, Bwa, and Bobo, is characterized by an absence of a centralized state and social hierarchy beyond the village (for the Bwa-Bobo and Senoufo) or the extended family or clan (the *Yir* among the Lobi-Dagari).

Individual villages are characterized by a limited amount of "vertical" social hierarchy based on when the different lineages arrived in the village. In most lineage societies, the first clan (extended family) to have colonized a site performs important religious functions as the "earth priest;" the second may have important administrative functions as the village political "chief;" and other groups may specialize in specific functions like griots or smiths.


There is also a certain amount of "horizontal" hierarchy based on age. In this case, the oldest members of the lineage constitute the village "notables" who are consulted for decisions within the village. Age within the clan is the primary determinant of political power. This contrasts with the hierarchical societies where age is superseded by political power emanating from the *Moro Naba*.

### **Organization of Collective Work**

The ultimate goal of any traditional society, whether hierarchic or lineage, is to guarantee the material and social maintenance and survival of its members. In Burkina Faso agriculture continues to be the material base of social and material survival. As such, the rhythm of work was and continues to be dictated by the climatic conditions (three months of rainfall) and the farmers' limited technology. These technical and climatic conditions create the need for households to collaborate to carry out crucial agricultural tasks in a timely fashion. In most cases, a brief delay at a key point in the production cycle, like weeding or harvest, can dramatically decrease crop productivity.

*Lineage-Based Societies.* Collective agricultural labor in most lineage-based societies is organized at the level of the village (or at the level of the *yir* [the lineage] for the Dagari-Lobi). An individual family solicits the participation of other families to perform a certain task. The invited families respond to the labor invitation by sending, according to the type of work, their young adults or women who are then organized by age group. In the course of working, the different age groups (older vs. younger) compete against one another in terms of endurance, speed, and efficiency. As such, the group agricultural activities constitute a powerful mechanism for group solidarity.

Figure 2.3. Social and political groups in the "traditional" Mossi system of a typical village near Kaya



(In the Mossi kinship system, kin groups are flexible. There is tremendous variation in the composition and strength of identity within and between groups. This figure is intended to provide only a brief outline.)

Parallel to their role in mobilizing group solidarity, the collective activities of the age groups constitute one of the most important mechanisms for the individual to acquire social prestige by demonstrating their individual competence. Among the Bobo, this competence is symbolized by the number of hoes an individual is awarded (Box 2.1).

### Box 2.1. Collective Labor Among the Bwa

So important is the concept of participation in group agricultural activities, the Bwa cultivators live (and describe) their belonging to the primary unit of production--the unit of agricultural production for the peasant societies--in terms of their participation in group agricultural activities. The terms they use express the nobility that they attach to agriculture and their profound attachment to community activities. This unit, *ho sâBanya*, B ; *ho sôBonyihû*, D, is described as the "head of the hoe," which, as a group, is under the direction of the *sâBanyu niki*, B, "the elders of the head of the hoe" [*sôBonyuhû zodé*, D, *ibidem*]; the individual cultivators are described as, "the people who form the head of the hoe (*ho sâbanyu nityoa* B ; *ba sôBonyuhûni*, D), (Translated excerpt; J. Capron 1973:228).

In Bwa society agriculture is a privileged noble activity; all the great moments of a man's life and the life of his village are linked to agriculture and are the means by which he measures his social prestige and honor....Entering into the adult world, the child of Toukoro...receives, for his first promotion in the association [age grade society] of *do* and his age grade name (*de yêlé base*, name of honor)...his initiation hoe...; several years later, when he has become a strong, hardworking man who deserves promotion to a new age grade, the elders give him a second hoe....And then, if he merits it, *au crepuscule de sa vie*, he may become a *dûso*, head of a household, and, accede to the highest rank in the *do* age grade association and receive his third hoe....At his death, when the villagers come to salute him one last time, they arrive with their age group and sacrifice a chicken on the arm of his hoe of honor (Translated excerpt; J. Capron 1973: 205-206).

*Pre-Colonial Hierarchic States.* Although collective labor is important in hierarchic societies, it does not play the central role in defining an individual's social rank that it does in lineage-based societies. Each Mossi household, for example, owes a certain number of days per year to the households at higher levels of the political hierarchy or clan leaders. These labor obligations are part of the wider category of "tribute" that is rendered to a superior authority in return for judicial, administrative, and military services. These services are in addition to the labor invitations that are organized between households from the same social class. In this second type of *sosoaga* (labor invitation), the objective is to help another household with whom you are allied; the only remuneration is food and drink and the expectation that the household you are helping will return the favor. A third type of labor invitation is a youth work group that is negotiated against a cash or in-kind payment.<sup>2</sup>

In sum, although both lineage and hierarchical societies organize collective work via similar age-related structures, there are important differences between the two types of societies in terms of the motivations behind group participation. In the lineage societies, the primary motivations are to promote group social solidarity and individual social prestige; in the hierarchical societies, the principal motivations are to fulfill one's family obligation to a political superior or social ally.



## The Colonial Period

The French colonial government was impressed by the efficiency of the Mossi political structure. They determined that, given their economic goals for the colony (recruiting labor and soldiers), it would be cheaper and more efficient to build on the established system than to replace it. In the lineage areas of the south and southwest, the French imposed an alien system of *Chefs de Cantons* (district chiefs) as an intermediary between the villages and the colonial administration (Balima 1970:71).

This "compromised" (in the hierarchic areas) and "imposed" (in the areas without an established tradition of hierarchy) system of chiefs was the institutional mechanism by which the colonial government forced the local people to "participate" in what the Minister of the Colonies, Albert Saurraut, described as the "development of the colonial territory". Local participation in the colonial government's development strategy was conceptualized primarily in terms of paying taxes and providing cheap labor for road and railroad construction. The chiefs were also the main institutional mechanism through which the colonial government forcibly introduced the first cotton programs.

The local populations in the hierarchic ethnic groups tended to respond to the imposition of these policies as they would to a bad chief--they moved. Ouagadougou's population dropped dramatically after 1914 and only regained its former size after the French colonial system was abolished in 1946. Hervouet describes how 191 new villages were created in the isolated Nakambe (ex-White Volta) and Nazinon (ex-Red Volta) valleys between 1905 and 1928 by refugees fleeing the forced labor and taxes that the French imposed in the dense areas of existing settlement (Hervouet 1978).

In general, the pacification process was more violent among the acephalous lineage societies of Burkina Faso's south and west. A series of bloody revolts affected the entire region in 1915, 1916, 1917, and 1942. Recent historical research argues that the colonial government never regarded the Dedogougou region or the areas populated by the Lobi people as "safe." One explanation could be the acephalous lineage-based societies' cultural resistance to top-down, imposed authority. Another possible explanation is that the imposed policies did not pass through an institutional structure that was perceived as historically legitimate.

Some of the measurable results of the local people's involuntary "participation" in colonial policies included laying the country's basic infrastructure for development. This included 7,000 kilometers (km) of roads and 450 km of rails, as well as the initial base of urban (water, electricity, zoning), agricultural, educational, and health infrastructure that the country brought to independence.



## Independence to 1983

### 1960-1966

The structural bottlenecks to economic and social development of Burkina Faso at independence in 1960 were enormous. Average per capita GDP was only 11,400 CFA (about \$50.00 US) (Savadogo and Wetta 1991:2). Agriculture, which employed 95% of the population, contributed only 66% of total GDP and was characterized by poor labor and land productivity. The industrial sector was almost nonexistent. The literacy rate was 2% and the primary school enrollment rate was 8%--one of the lowest in the world. Infant mortality was estimated at 252 per 1,000 live births; life expectancy was 32 years in rural areas and 47 years in urban areas (ibid).

For the new president, Maurice Yameogo, the key to addressing these long-term development issues was to mobilize local participation in support of *l'unité nationale* (Box 2.2). One of his first activities was to suppress the administrative functions (tax collection and adjudication of civil disputes) that the provincial and canton chiefs had carried out under the colonial regime. Yameogo considered recourse to the traditional political system as a handicap to his efforts to mobilize the country in the pursuit of "national" economic and political development. These same policies made the office of the village chief elective. Yameogo attempted to replace this "archaic" institutional structure by creating a single national political party, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA).

The country's precarious economic balance was destroyed by a series of improvident "prestige" expenses to develop Ouagadougou and embellish his presidency. The net result was to create a severe budget deficits (4 billion CFA for a budget of 8 billion in 1965), which were contested by the country's strong labor unions. Yameogo proposed to offset the deficit by reducing civil servant salaries by 20% and family allocations and benefits by 50%. Angered by the president's ostentatious lifestyle, which flew in the face of the austerity measures that he preached, the civil servants led a series of strikes to demand his resignation. In 1966, Yameogo was replaced by the head of the Army, Colonel Lamizana (Box 2.2).

### 1966-1980

Although Lamizana's *coup d'état* bore a superficial resemblance to the other military coups that were starting to transform the political face of newly independent Africa, it was actually quite different. The coup received the strong support of the traditional chiefs, the civil servant middle class (represented by the labor unions), and students. It was non-violent and populist. One of Lamizana's first activities was to reinstate the traditional prerogatives of the chiefs (village, canton, and provincial level as well as the *Moro Naba*). Mirroring the colonial system, the reinstated system of the chieftaincies became a parallel structure to the *arrondissement*, *sous-préfecture*, and *préfecture*.

### Box 2.2. Chronology of Regimes

- 1960-1966: *Parliamentary Presidential Regime and Single Political Party (RDA)* under President Maurice Yameogo.
- 1966-1970: *Gouvernement Militaire Provisoire (GMP)*, (Provisional Military Government) without political parties or public assembly with President Colonel Sangoulé Lamizana who was called to power by disgruntled strikers against the Yameogo regime.
- 1970-1974: Parliamentary regime characterized by multiple political parties and military participation in key government posts in the President's office as well as the Ministries of finance, interior and defense. Head of state: Colonel Sangoulé Lamizana; Prime Minister: Mr. Gérard K. Ouédraogo.
- 1974-1978: *Le Renouveau National*. Semi-military regime with *Gouvernement d'Union Nationale*, without officially authorized political parties; included an advisory counsel (*Conseil pour le Renouveau National*) regrouping the representatives of the major social, political and religious groups. Head of State: Général Sangoulé A. Lamizana.
- 1978-1980: Parliamentary regime with pluralism limited to three parties. Head of State: Sangoulé A. Lamizana, militant PDV-RDA, the majority party.
- 1980-1982: *Redressement pour le Progrès National* (Military regime without political parties). Head of State: Colonel Saye Zerbo; aided by the *Comité Militaire de Redressement pour le Progrès National (CMRPN)*.
- 1982-1983: *Conseil Provisoire du Salut du Peuple (CPSP)* which became the *Comité du Salut du Peuple (CSP)* (military regime). Head of State: Medical Doctor-Commandant Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo.
- 1983-1987: *Révolution Démocratique et Populaire (RDP)* (military regime). Head of State: Capitaine Thomas Sankara and *Conseil National de la Révolution (CNR)*.
- 1987-1991: *Front Populaire* (military regime with limited number of political parties). Head of State: Blaise Compaoré, candidate of ODP/MT, the majority party.

Lamizana's skilled cadre of political advisors drew many lessons from the experience of his predecessor. Most notably, he emphasized restoring the country's economic health. Building on his strong base of political support, Lamizana was able to obtain local support for some unpopular economic measures to increase government revenues. The process of open and free discussion in the press and public forum on why the measures were needed helped them to be accepted by a wide gamut of the society, including civil servants and the rural "masses."

Simultaneously with these actions, Lamizana undertook a number of actions to increase the participation of Burkinabè nationals in the commercial and industrial enterprises that heretofore had been dominated by foreign business people. This process was referred to as *Voltaisation*. The underlying concept was that Voltaic citizens should hold at least 51% of the capital in any business that was considered vital to the economic health of the country and at least 35% of the capital of other enterprises. The institutional mechanism for the *Voltaisation* process was a series of new institutional structures to help entrepreneurs.<sup>3</sup>

It was at that time that the Government of Lamizana decided to put on the market shares in the state-owned banks. By doing so, thousands of nationals were able to participate in the management of banks and financial systems. The Lamizana government also created a Small Business Office (Office de Promotion des Moyens et Petites Entreprises, OPE) to help local entrepreneurs in starting and/or improving their businesses through technical support and access to credit. Kossodo, a new industrial zone, was also created to help entrepreneurs expand their activities. These policies were successful and, by the mid-1970s, resulted in the creation of a "class" of privileged, national economic elites that were associated with the new enterprises.

Throughout this period there was a strong commitment to the need to "modernize" the country's agricultural sector. A national system of Regional Development Organizations (ORD) was created as the state structure for working with the village cooperatives and pre-cooperative *groupements*. In addition, the judicial and legal status of the cooperatives and *groupements* was reinforced by a series of laws and decrees (See Chapter 3).

In 1974, Lamizana reiterated his regime's commitment to the cooperative movement and announced his commitment to the concept of integrated, "community development" as (*Programme d'Action du Gouvernement du Renouveau National*, May 30, 1974; translation by the author):

a means for animating the masses in order to create the sort of motivation that is indispensable to development within the social context of the rural Voltaic people. We are convinced that it is only in the cooperative movement that the rural populations will find the favorable conditions that are essential to success. This is why we are opting for the formula of "community development" as a framework for action.

Although the concept of "community development" was presented as a national option, only the Ministry of Agriculture participated. The result was a series of "integrated" development projects attached to the ORDs that continued their programs to promote agricultural development through the cooperatives and pre-cooperative *groupements* (See Chapter 3).

Probably the single most important factor that drove development policy during this time was a fairly sudden and dramatic increase in foreign aid. In the wake of the 1968-1973 drought came an unprecedented inflow of international relief and foreign development assistance for Burkina Faso and the entire Sahel region. This assistance could be measured both in terms of dollars expended and in the number of bilateral, international, and non-governmental organizations (NGO) that were active in the region. Attracted by the relative political stability and strong laws supporting non-governmental enterprises, Burkina Faso quickly became the centerpiece of a vast NGO aid network for the Sahel.

By the mid-1970s, however, the labor unions were increasingly resentful of the fact that the chief beneficiaries of this increased foreign aid and the austerity measures they were being asked to shoulder appeared to the small urban elite that Lamizana's Voltaisation policies had unintentionally created. Lamizana attempted to quell this growing wave of dissatisfaction by creating a single political party, the *Mouvement pour le Renouveau National* (MRN), in 1974. This tentative was vigorously resisted by the labor unions through a series of paralyzing strikes.

### 1980-1983

Burkina Faso experienced extreme political instability between 1981 and 1983. On November 25, 1981, the government, known as the Third Republic, was ousted by the Colonels of the *Comité Militaire de Redressement pour le Progrès National* (Savadogo and Wetta 1991:16).<sup>4</sup> On November 7, 1982, the colonels were in turn overthrown by the commandants in a coup that brought to power the *Conseil de Salut du Peuple*, under the military doctor, Commandant Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo, with Captain Thomas Sankara as a key member of the government. On May 17, 1983, Sankara was arrested and the moderate Ouedraogo and others took over until August 4, 1983, when a coup led by Captain Blaise Compaoré, Jean-Baptiste Lingani, and Henri Zongo returned Thomas Sankara to power as the head of the National Revolutionary Council (CNR) (ibid).

The principal engine driving this wave of political instability was a series of economic shocks, especially a sharp rise in oil prices in 1979-1980. The price increase exerted strong inflationary pressures and exacerbated the balance of payment profile (Savadogo and Wetta 1991:17). The appreciation of the dollar in the early 1980s increased the unit cost of imports, which were denominated in dollars, relative to export prices, which were denominated in other currencies. Fluctuation of the world market prices of the country's two leading agricultural exports, cotton and groundnuts, added to the farmers' uncertainty over production quantities and to problems with the balance of payments.

## 1983-Present

The economic and social policies adopted by the CNR in 1983 were designed to correct the macro-economic imbalances arising from the economic shocks of the late 1970s and early 1980s, accelerate growth, transform the structure of the economy, and promote social equity (see Savadogo and Wetta 1991:19-25). Efforts to reduce government expenditures focused on containing the public sector wage bill by freezing salaries, reducing housing allowances, and demanding that civil servants contribute the equivalent of one-half to one month's salary to the Popular Investment Effort. A series of measures to raise additional revenues included new taxes on alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages, a salary tax, and duties on certain imported products like kola nuts and tobacco. Road fees were levied on paved roads, and a heavy tax was imposed on urban landlords. To reduce the external imbalance, the government sought cheaper sources for imported products and tried to diversify the country's external markets.

The "self-imposed adjustment policies" (Savadogo and Wetta 1991) adopted by the CNR government emphasized the social sector. The combined expenditure on health and education rose from 22.3% of total government expenditures in 1982 to 24.2% in 1987 and from 3.75% of GDP in 1982 to 3.96% in 1987. In addition, the government implemented a series of "commando" campaigns to mobilize the rural population to contribute labor and financial resources to the development of rural health and educational services. This same period was characterized by a massive program to expand the urban peoples' access to land for construction purposes. The revenues generated through a 50% tax on rents and a 50% reduction in civil servant housing allowances was channeled into a housing fund to finance low- and middle-income housing. Although the social consequences of this "self-imposed" adjustment program were far-reaching, especially from 1984 to 1986, the process met little resistance:

first because the government had a clear policy agenda which it was able to implement and second because the general public accepted the logic of wage and salary cuts and the demand for popular contributions as necessary steps to resurrect the country from backwardness and promote rapid and equitable growth. (Savadogo and Wetta 1991:37)

The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) were the chief institutional mechanism for mobilizing support for this radical package of policy reforms. In theory the CDR replaced the traditional chieftaincy, which was dismissed as a "feudal" institution impeding the full participation of the local people. At its base were the village and urban neighborhood CDR linked to a system of provincial and national CDR. In addition, all government offices, public and private businesses had CDRs that were linked into the same hierarchy of provincial and national structures.

This same "total" (e.g. political and economic) mobilization of local participation was intended to "purify" the country from some of the corrupt influences that had plagued earlier regimes. Thus was born the distinction between the "people" and their "enemies" in the *Discours d'Orientation Politique* announced on October 2, 1983. Another dimension of this

"total" mobilization was the creation of an ideology of training and information. In connection with this, the CDR were charged with the diffusion of development slogans and *veillées-debats* (evening debates) in the urban neighborhoods. These "participatory" development slogans (which were usually communicated as top-down development directives) played an important role in the history of each of the sectors examined in this study.

One year after the revolution, the government announced the *Plan Populaire de Développement* (Popular Development Plan, PPD). The PPD was originally conceived as a 15-month pilot activity to test the government's philosophy for mobilizing local participation.<sup>5</sup> The CDR were responsible for working with villagers and the civil administration to identify the area's rural and urban needs and to conceptualize and execute projects to address these needs. The same mass mobilization techniques were used to facilitate a rapid "commando" subdivision of the non-zoned urban areas and to execute housing projects or *cités* for middle class civil servants (see Chapter 5).

Another key turning point was the 1986-1990 Five Year Popular Development Plan (PPD). A government text created the planning structures that included village, departmental, provincial committees, and a national commission. These planning structures were concerned with all sectors. Each village committee was asked to develop a list of development priorities that were regrouped at the departmental level. The recommendations of the departments were then reorganized into a report by a multisectoral, provincial committee. A synthesis of the different identified needs was then submitted to the appropriate ministries. To maintain a high degree of local participation in the process, a General Planning Assembly was organized to explain the contents. Based on feedback from the Assembly, the relevant technical ministries were expected to provide a detailed explanation to each planning structure (village, departmental, and provincial) as to why certain propositions were retained and others were not.

The short-term effects of the CDR mass mobilization techniques for project planning and execution were dramatic. The "commando" urban campaigns permitted the distribution of some 120,000 parcels of land and the construction of 2,500 new homes for low- and middle-income urban households (Savadogo and Wetta 1991:31). The same program helped narrow the huge rural-urban gap in social services by building hundreds of rural elementary and secondary schools in rural towns, as well as rural irrigation projects and wells. The mass mobilization effort to construct health infrastructure (characterized by the slogan "1 village = 1 village health post") built a total of 7,500 primary health care centers, 24 district Health and Social Promotion Centers (CSPS), 6 maternity clinics, 90 pharmacies, 28 dispensaries, and a national medical center. The 1985 "commando vaccination" campaign vaccinated 1.18 million 1- to 6-year-old children against measles, 2.6 million 1- to 14-year-old children against meningitis, and another 2.1 million against yellow fever (Savadogo and Wetta 1991:31).

The scale of production under the PPD, however, quickly outstripped the capacity of the ministries to reinforce the developments with staff and funds. The financial bottleneck was exacerbated when many donors, under attack as "enemies of the people" and "imperialists," pulled back their development aid. The ensuing financial pressure aggravated the middle class's




growing resentment of the regime's top-down attitude, directly contributing to the downfall of the regime on October 15, 1987. Initially, the new government--known as the Popular Front--maintained some of the formal mobilization institutions of the revolution. Within a year, however, the CDRs were transformed into Revolutionary Committees (CRs). The motivation behind the name change was the desire to suppress the committees' role as agents of political and ideological agitation.

The new regime also returned to the earlier philosophy of working with a variety of aid donors who were not overtly "socialist" or "communist" in their orientation. The move toward a progressive "liberalization" of the country's social and political policies was accelerated by the growth of donor aid for the more "democratic" regime. Since June 1991, Burkina Faso has had a constitution guaranteeing democracy and multiple political parties.

### Current Administrative Structure

The current administrative organization subdivides the country into 30 provinces directed by high commissioners (*haut-commissaires*) nominated by the state to represent the people economically and political (Figure 2.4). Every province is subdivided into departments directed by a *préfet*. The number of departments in each province depends on the demographic and physical size of the province. There are a total of 300 departments. Each department is subdivided into *arrondissements* under the authority of a *chef d'arrondissement*. Each *arrondissement* includes a number of villages, each headed by a village chief. The village chiefs are the modern day heirs to the transformed system of colonial chieftaincies. All the other administrators of the state are civil servants chosen from the territorial administration.

Figure 2.4. Evolution of administrative structure, 1960-1983



The urban cities are organized into *communes* under the responsibility of elected mayors, who are surrounded by elected municipal councilors. The main exception to this is the City of Ouagadougou's mayor, who is also the high commissioner of the province. Unlike in the other cities, the mayor of Ouagadougou is directly answerable to the central state as well as the constituency that elected him or her. Thus the current administrative structure conserves the basic elements of the structure set in place under the RDP with the exception of the abolition of the CDR.

## The Evolving Role of NGOs

A key theme crosscutting all time periods, and all levels of the national administration, is the critical role of non-governmental organizations or NGOs. The aid coming to Burkina via just 26 of the largest NGOs that were active in Burkina during 1985 and 1986 constituted 21.87% and 14.25% of the external aid for development in these years. The relative importance of these figures is in fact much larger if one considers that the vast majority of these funds were spent in-country (versus 50-80% of foreign aid which returns to the donating country through expert salaries and equipment purchases); that the assistance was given, not loaned; and that a much smaller percentage of the funds were spent on administration (the equivalent of 8.62% and 3.8% of the state's budget for administration in 1985 and 1986). This strong tradition of low overhead, in-country investment accounts for the fact that despite their small total budgets and limited personnel, the NGO's have funded a huge percentage of the actual development investment in the country (the equivalent of 181% and 207% of the total state investment budget in 1985 and 1988) (Table 2.1).

The history of NGO activities in Burkina dates largely from the 1968-1974 drought. Of the 45 NGOs registered during this time period, 30 came as part of the initial gear-up of humanitarian relief aid. The international NGO's (Foster Parents Plan, OXFAM, Save the Children, etc.) were attracted by Burkina's democratic, open atmosphere and its strong legal base for NGO operations. These initial activities were assisted by various international voluntary organizations (e.g. Peace Corps, *Association Française des Volontaires du Progrès*, the German, Swiss and Dutch volunteers) who arrived in Burkina during the same time period.

In 1975, the NGOs created their own Permanent Secretary for Non-governmental Organizations (the *Secrétariat Permanent des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales* or SPONG). The goal of the agency was to foster interagency communication and to serve as an intermediary between NGOs, local, and foreign sources of finance. SPONG's current membership includes 63 of Burkina's 165 officially registered NGOs.

After the drought, there was a strong movement by the NGOs to work more closely with the government and vice versa. During the same time period most NGOs converted from drought aid to a broader emphasis on development. This shift was encouraged by the new trend to execute bilateral and multilateral aid projects through NGOs.

Table 2.1. Comparative budgets for investment and administration for NGOs and the State, 1985-1986 (in billions of CFA)

Entity	Budget	1985	1986	1987
NGO	Investment Budget	12,215	10,056	8,932
	Administrative Costs	3,277	1,778	1,053
State	Investment Budget	6,753	4,849	----
	Administrative Costs	37,995	46,796	----
Percentage		181%	207%	
Percentage		8.62%	3.60%	
Number of Employees-NGO		582	445	506
Number of Employees-State			25,437	29,590

Sources: Ministère du Budget; Fiche d'enquête des ONG; ONG et le Cadre du PGD 1986-1990.

Despite their diverse origins, Burkina's NGOs shared certain common characteristics. They were typically small in scale, focused on one region, and shared a common philosophy of "self-help" to develop small micro-projects. In the typical NGO project, the NGO provided the building materials and food for workers. In return, the beneficiaries would contribute some portion of the financial costs (an average of 20%) and all or most of the construction labor.

The peak recognition of NGO work in Burkina was under Sankara. The new government was attracted by the self-help formula that the NGOs developed during the late 1970s and made it the cornerstone of its "commando" self-help campaigns. In 1984 the government created a new Office for NGO Coordination (BSONG, *Bureau de Suivi des ONG*) that was directly responsible to the President. The role of BSONG was: to inform the government on NGO activities; to facilitate the coordination of NGO programs with parallel government programs; to organize periodic meetings between the NGOs and the state; to ensure that all NGOs were registered; and to serve as the official link between the NGO sponsored interagency coordinating body (SPONG) and the state. One reflection of this new policy of close NGO-government collaboration was the NGO's active participation in formulating the regime's first five year development plan (1986-1990).

Today, NGOs continue to play an active role in national development. While most of

Today, NGOs continue to play an active role in national development. While most of the first generation of NGOs remain, their activities have been reinforced--if not eclipsed (in terms of actual numbers of beneficiaries concerned)--by a second generation of dynamic national and local NGOs. Some of the best known examples of these include *6S-Sahel Solidarité*, FONADES, *Association vive le paysan* (AVP). These national NGO's support numerous agricultural, women's, and youth groups that are often regrouped into regional and national federations (the Federation of Groupements NAAM is one example).

One of the chief difficulties encountered by Burkina's national and international NGOs has been a tendency to underestimate the recurrent costs and training needed to maintain investments over time. Other problems which were evoked in the sector analyses include: 1) insufficient funds to satisfy the population's numerous demands; 2) difficulties in the design and coordination of activities within the context of the national and regional development plans; 3) lack of effective, trained extension staff to follow-up on initial investments; 4) insufficient coordination (among NGOs and between NGOs and government programs) in villages and regions; and 5) intra-regional competition between NGOs and between NGO and government-sponsored projects.

## Chapter Three

**Agriculture and Natural Resource Management**

Since the mid-1960s, Burkina Faso has experienced a rapid increase in commercial cotton production and technological change (Table 3.1). This "cotton boom" is the direct result of almost 50 years of government sponsored and co-sponsored research and extension. This process was supported by the World Bank through 11 regional development projects in Burkina Faso's southwest between 1970 and 1988. The core concept for participation in each of these highly successful crop production programs was the cooperative or pre-cooperative *groupement*. Unfortunately, there was no similar economic incentive to develop local participation in natural resource management.

Table 3.1. Cotton production in Burkina Faso, 1961-1987

	61-65	66-70	71-75	76-79	80	82	87
Quantity (m. tons)	10,521	20,980	36,497	61,539	54,248	77,110	177,000
Yield (kg/ha)	158	349	500	758	834	1,050	--

Source: Savadogo and Wetta 1991:10,26.

By 1980, however, the long-term sustainability of these crop productivity increases was being threatened by a host of unintended environmental consequences. Moreover, it was increasingly clear that the conventional extension models for promoting popular participation could not reverse the process, primarily because of the lack of any readily apparent, short-term economic benefit to be gained from adopting more sustainable crop production and grazing practices. To confront this issue, the Burkinabè government embraced a new model of participation that links short-term incentives (like the realization of basic infrastructure, health services, and roads) to a community's pledge to adopt more sustainable natural resource management. The institutional mechanism for coordinating this support is the village land management committee. The World Bank has supported the development of this new participatory model through the Village Land Management Pilot Project (PNGTV) and the Burkina Faso Environmental Management Project. Although the initial results of the World Bank-supported village land management projects have been positive, the program challenges some of the conventional methods for measuring project "success."

## History

### Through 1983

*Agriculture.* As early as 1931 the colonial government recognized the need for local participation in commercial crop production. This participation was organized through the concept of cooperatives or pre-cooperative *groupements*, which were the main contacts for the colonial programs to develop commercial crops, especially cotton. These were reinforced by a series of legislative decrees to define the cooperative or pre-cooperative *groupement's* legal status (Table 3.2). Although *groupements* had the legal status of pre-cooperatives or cooperatives, they did not play a major role in management of group finances until the debut of the farmer-managed markets in the late 1970s.

After independence the government continued the colonial policies to promote commercial agricultural production through the local structures of cooperatives and pre-cooperative *groupements*. From 1960 to 1967 these policies focused on the production of commercial crops (cotton and peanuts) through French commercial enterprises, notably CFDT, SATEC, CIDR, and BDPA. These societies supported the diffusion of new agricultural techniques; organized the sale of fertilizer, insecticides, seeds, and plows; and ensured the marketing and construction of the basic infrastructure (roads, warehouses, wells) that were deemed necessary to the successful implementation of these policies.

The communication between the commercial societies and the farmer organizations was through extension agents trained in extension methods promoted by their respective society. Early evaluations attributed the weak impact of these projects (in terms of technology adoption, total production, and improved living standards) to the poor adaptation of the extension themes to local priorities like increased food production.

Faced with the weak impact of these projects and the government's recognition that any long-term development would necessarily be linked to the development of the country's agricultural potential, the national government created a new structure for extension, the *Organismes Régionaux de Développement* (ORD), in 1965. The early ORDs executed an ambitious program aimed at developing cereal and cash crop production, livestock, and forestry as well as rural infrastructure. Due to financial constraints, however, these ambitious programs were soon reduced to an exclusive focus on crop extension.

The first World Bank-funded agricultural development project, the Upper Volta Cotton Project (1970) (Table 3.3), was typical of this focus. The project was designed to reinforce the infrastructure and increase cotton production in three provinces: Houet, Mouhoun, and Kossi. Like earlier projects, the concept of local participation was defined in terms of participating in a *groupement* for the purpose of acquiring inputs (fertilizer, insecticide, improved seed), credit, and technical information. Evaluations show that the cotton project had a dramatic effect on production, with cotton production increasing from 8,000 tons in 1971 to 25,000-30,000 in 1977.

Table 3.2. Institutional issues affecting *groupement* status, colonial period to 1994

Institutional Issues	Colonial	1960-1970
Beneficiary organizations	"Cooperatives" based on European Model	Continue to follow European cooperative model with little beneficiary understanding of the concept or goals of the cooperative
Laws concerning farmer organizations	1947 Cooperative Statute 1955 Decree concerning application of the cooperative statute 1959 Law concerning associations	
Laws concerning natural resource management	1930 Classification of forests 1935 Decree establishing the forestry policy in French West Africa (AOF) 1935 Law forbidding bush fires 1955 Decree concerning forest protection	
State/NGO structures	1) Association of Colonial Cotton 2) SMDR-SMPR 3) SIP 1931 4) Ministry of the Agricultural Economy 1957 5) Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperation 1958 6) First NGOs: CARITAS (1956) Amitié Africaine (1958)	1960 Creation of Ministry of the National Economy 1960 Introduction of foreign companies to promote cotton production: a) 3 new companies (SATEC/CIDR/BDPA), and b) recruit extension agents for these societies and CFDT 1960 Create 2 new NGOs: a) Christian and Missionary alliance, and b) CESAO 1962 Creation of Rural Education Program 1962 Creation of Water and Forest Services (4 forestry subdirections, 4 inspections, 4 cantons, 71 districts) 1965 Creation first 5 ORD 1966 Creation of Ministry of Rural Development and Tourism
Communications between the organizations	1900 First trials to introduce foreign cotton varieties 1926 Cotton research and trials with little attention to the needs of the population or the need to associate them 1952 First efforts to introduce more diversified production package including rotation and cereals through CFDT with little knowledge of local environment	1) Improved cultivation techniques through CFDT/ORD/SATEC structures 2) Training and Extension activities in 5 ORD
Politics	Introduce commercial cotton production	1) Policy focuses on expanding cotton exports 2) Lack of coherent national agricultural policy

Table 3.2. Institutional issues affecting *groupement* status, colonial period to 1994 (page 2)

Institutional Issues	1970-1980	1980-1994
Beneficiary organizations	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Creation of groupement villageois (GV) as a precondition for acquiring status as a cooperative</li> <li>2) Parallel to the GV, creation of village groups and farmer managed markets in the cotton zone</li> <li>3) Proliferation of GV after 1973</li> <li>4) Creation of Groupements des Jeunes Agriculteurs (GJA)</li> </ol>	<p>Reinforce the GV Structure and their responsibilities through:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) national policy encouraging pre-cooperative groupements to become cooperatives</li> <li>b) coexistence of groupements and village land management committees</li> </ol>
Laws concerning farmer organizations	1973 Law concerning the General Statute of Cooperative Societies	<p>1983 Ordinance concerning the legal status of GV  1990 Zatu concerning the status of GV (negates ordinance 5-13-83)  1991 Zatu concerning the legal status of associations (negates earlier 1959 law)</p>
Laws concerning natural resource management		<p>1984 Ordinance No. 84-050/CNR/PRES concerning Agrarian and Land Tenure Reform (RAF)  1985 Decree No. 85-404/CNR/PRES  1991 Zatu No. An VIII.0039bis/FP/PRES  1991 Kitt No. An VIII-0328TER/FP/PLAN-COOP</p>
State/NGO structures	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Complete national system of ORD</li> <li>2) Complete internal institutional structure of ORD (headquarters, sector, subsector, village)</li> <li>3) Create parallel structures for community development (DC) that intervenes in select villages in each ORD (with hierarchical institutional structure of ADC, ADCC, ADCS, AEFR, AIR) (related to ORD but with independent financing)</li> <li>4) Create Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) in 1976 under influence of donors</li> <li>5) Proliferation of NGOs after 1973</li> <li>6) Creation of the AVV as a semi-autonomous agency to develop the basins covered by river blindness control</li> </ol>	<p>1980 Create DIRC  1984 Create Ministry of Water  1985 Create DPET  1986 Create Ministry of the Peasant Question  1987 Abolish ORD  1988 Create CRPA (ex-ORD) and new internal institutional structure  1990 Create DRET</p>
Communications between the organizations	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Work to develop collective infrastructure (schools, cereal banks, etc.)</li> <li>2) First attempts to promote community development through: (a) encouraging farmer initiatives; (b) giving technical advice in agriculture; (c) facilitating farmer initiatives</li> <li>3) Creation of an extension section in the PDA-OV Project (co-financed by the World Bank)</li> <li>4) Policy to promote community development tends to be top-down with limited coordination with the community development agents (ADC) and the villages</li> </ol>	<p>1979-81 Introduce T&amp;V System  1981-83 Adapt T&amp;V to National Context  1983-84 Operationalize T&amp;V System  1985 Create SNVA (National Extension Service)</p>
Politics	1974 Announce National Policy for Community Development	National Policy for Natural Resource Management and Territorial Development defined by the RAF texts