

Burkina Faso
Country Assistance Report

Background Paper: Social Sector Analysis
(Urban Infrastructure Development, Health, Education)

May 18, 1999

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Alice Galenson (OED) was the Task Manager for the Burkina Country Assistance Review (CAR). Della McMillan was responsible for the preparation of this background report which was one of three sector review documents that provided the basis for the cross-sector Burkina CAR which is the final product of this exercise. The following consultants prepared background papers for the social sector review: Denise Belemsagha (Urban Infrastructure Development), Issa Diallo (Education), and Paul Stanislaus Nebie (Health). Souleymane Zerbo contributed background information and commentary on urban infrastructure and reviewed the historical chapter. Geri Wise provided administrative support as well as technical assistance with document production.

PREFACE

This is a background paper for the Burkina Faso Country Assistance Review (CAR). The CAR examines the relevance, efficacy, efficiency, sustainability and institutional development impact of IDA's program of assistance to Burkina during the last decade, including lending and non-lending services.

This paper is based on Bank reports, including Country Assistance Strategy papers, economic and sector reports (both formal and informal), Project/Implementation Completion Reports, Performance Audit Reports, and project and general country files. It is also based on interviews with Burkinabè officials, private individuals, and representatives of other donors interviewed during a mission to Burkina in January 1999, and on interviews with Bank staff, in Washington and in the Resident Mission. This particular paper was one of three sector analyses that were prepared as part of the overall multi-sector CAR which is the official document of the exercise.

Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of the historic context of the two most recent World Bank Country Assistance Strategies for Burkina (1992 and 1994). An additional concern is to assess the extent to which the strategy's goals and programs were consonant with the Bank's broader goals for increasing popular participation, reducing poverty, and encouraging gender equity.

Chapters 2-4 critique Bank assistance for urban infrastructure, health, and education including its:

- (1) relevance, taking into account country conditions, the impact of external factors, and the role of other development agencies and financiers; and
- (2) its impact, based on the standard Operations Evaluation Department (OED 1997) criteria for: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, institutional development impact, prospects for sustainability, borrower and Bank performance.

The final Chapter 5 looks at lessons learned from this experience for the forthcoming 1999 Country Assistance Strategy and future Bank lending in Burkina and other countries.

This analysis is based on a series of background papers prepared by Denise Belemsagha (Urban Infrastructure), Issa Diallo (Education) and Paul Stanislaus Nebie (Health) as well as interviews with over 60 persons associated with Bank assistance in Burkina, as well as former and current Bank staff and other donors in Washington, D.C. and Paris. These interviews were conducted over a four month period between October 1998 and February 1999. Souleymane Zerbo provided information and commentary on urban infrastructure as well as valuable insights for the historical chapter. Della McMillan was responsible for the final production of this synthesis report. The Team Leader for the multi-sector analysis into which this sector analysis was incorporated was Alice Galenson (OED).

1. The World Bank CAS Strategy: Background and Relevance to Bank Goals for Participation, Poverty Reduction, and Gender

In 1992, a series of IDA credits were signed which quadrupled the size of the Burkina program and increased IDA's level of investment in the priority sectors of health, education, and urban infrastructure. One goal of the Country Assistance Review (CAR) is to examine the relevance of this revised IDA strategy within the context of Burkina's overall development strategy, taking into account country conditions and the impact of external factors. The same exercise requires an assessment of the extent to which the Country Assistance Strategy was consonant with at least one of the Bank's goals for encouraging broad based participation and reducing poverty and gender inequality through its funded programs.

Section One of this chapter gives a brief overview of the historical context and the evolving goals of the two most recent IDA country assistance strategies (1994 and 1996). This is followed in Section Two by an analysis of the process by which the country team helped to catalyze the first formal national debate on poverty as part of the 1996 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) planning process. The Bank's strong central focus and rigorous enforcement of its poverty guidelines (OD4.15) is then compared with its less rigorous enforcement of the OD4.20 guidelines for reducing gender inequality in Section Three. Section Four examines the potential significance of Burkina's recent enactment of a new decentralization law. The final section extrapolates some of the cross-cutting lessons learned from this analysis for the forthcoming CAS.

1.1. Historic Context of World Bank Country Assistance Strategies (CAS)

1.1.1. Limited Assistance focused on Agriculture and Transportation (1969-1983)

Early IDA assistance to Burkina focused almost exclusively on agriculture, transportation, and vocational literacy (through the *ecoles rurales*, or three year rural schools that were designed to produce modern farmers). This limited vision reflects the historic and continued importance of agriculture as the main economic vehicle of the country, as well as the dominant development paradigm for the Sahel in that era.

One short-term impact of this early IDA assistance was to reinforce the "cotton boom" which transformed Burkina's higher rainfall southwest into the country's main agricultural zone after 1975. The same investment reinforced earlier trends that attracted agricultural immigration from the central Mossi Plateau to the southwest. The impact of this targeted investment was further reinforced by a successful IDA-supported 11 country program to control river blindness disease. This opened up large areas of river basin land in the country's higher rainfall southern zones. The same time period was characterized by a substantial hike in government spending due to the construction of new government buildings and a civil service wage increase.

The thirteen years of relative stability under President Lamizana were interrupted by a series of military coups/government changes that began in November 1980 and continued until August 1983 when Thomas Sankara took power as the head of the National Revolutionary Council (CNR). The principal force driving this wave of political instability was a series of economic shocks, including a sharp rise in oil prices in 1979-1980.¹

1.1.2. "Self-Imposed Adjustment" and the Revolution (1983-1987)

The economic and social policies adopted by the CNR in 1983 were designed to correct the macro-economic imbalances arising from the economic shocks of the late 1970s and early 1980s through a process that many Burkinabe referred to as "self-imposed adjustment" (see Savadogo and Wetta 1991: 19-25). Efforts to reduce the mounting level of government debt included a concerted effort to contain the public sector wage bill by freezing salaries, reducing housing allowances, and demanding that civil servants contribute the equivalent of one-half to one month's salary to the Popular Investment Efforts. A series of measures to raise additional revenues included new taxes on alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages, a salary tax, and duties on certain imported products like kola nuts and tobacco. Road fees were levied on paved roads and a heavy tax was imposed on urban markets. Efforts to develop cheaper sources for imported products and to diversify the country's markets were constrained by the overvalued FCFA currency.

The "self imposed adjustment policies" adopted by the CNR government emphasized the social sector by: (a) promoting a slight increase in expenditures on health and education (as a percentage of the government budget); (b) implementing a series of "commando campaigns" to mobilize the rural population to contribute labor and financial resources to the development of rural health and educational services; (c) expanding the urban people's access to land for construction purposes; and (c) instituting a 50% tax on rents and a 50% tax on civil servant housing allowances to finance low and middle income housing

Although the social consequences of this self-imposed adjustment program were far reaching, especially from 1984 to 1986, the process met little resistance:

...first because the government had a clear policy agenda which it was able to implement and second because the general public accepted the logic of wage and salary cuts and the demand for popular contributions as necessary steps to resurrect the country from backwardness and promote rapid equitable growth (Savadogo and Wetta 1991: 37).

¹The price increase exerted strong inflationary pressures and exacerbated the balance of payment profile. The appreciation of the dollar in the 1980s increased the unit cost of imports, which were determined in dollars relative to export prices that were denominated in their currencies. Fluctuation of the world market prices of the country's two leading agricultural exports, cotton and groundnuts, added to the farmers' uncertainty over production quantities and to problems with the balance of payments.

The short-term effects of the CDR mass mobilization techniques for project planning and execution were dramatic. The "commando" urban campaigns permitted the distribution of some 120,000 parcels and the construction of 2,500 new homes for low and middle income urban households (Savadogo and Wetta 1991: 3). The same program helped narrow the huge rural-urban gap in social services by building hundreds of rural elementary and secondary schools, and brought about a six-fold increase in the total number of village health posts, increasing vaccination rates to a high of 60-70% (vs. 2% in 1981) (MSAS 1988: 18; Soumbie 1990: 20)..

The scale of production under the 1986-1990 Popular Development Plan (PPD) quickly outstripped the capacity of the ministries to provide staff and funds. The financial bottleneck was exacerbated when many donors, under attack as "enemies of the people" and "imperialist," pulled back their development aid which decreased total budgets for key sectors like health and education. The ensuing financial pressure, combined with the government's increasingly erratic economic policies, aggravated middle class resentment of the regime's top-down approach to promoting "popular participation."

1.1.3. Formal Adjustment, Devaluation and Democratization (1987-present)

Initially the new government, which took power after 1987 (headed by current President Blaise Compaore), maintained some of the formal mobilization institutions of the revolution. Within a year, however, the government began to phase out the CDRs. The new regime also returned to the earlier philosophy of working with a variety of aid donors, including IDA, who were not overtly "socialist" in orientation. The return of donor aid was further encouraged by the government's adoption of a new constitution in June 1991 guaranteeing democracy and multiple political parties.

This shift in political regimes coincided with a slow-down in the aggregate growth rate between 1986 and 1991 (GDP increased only 3.25 a year) due to: (a) the saturation of settlement of the river basins (covered by river blindness control) that had provided much of the source of economic growth during the previous 10 years; and (b) reduced remittances from Burkinabe nationals working in neighboring countries, Cote d'Ivoire in particular. The resulting economic slow-down, and the futile government attempts to offset it by increasing public expenditures, precipitated the government's interest in embarking on a formal adjustment program.

From 1987-1991, IDA concentrated on a series of low-level discussions with the new government leading up to adjustment and the identification of 15 new credits. These discussions were characterized by a concerted attempt:

- (1) to respect and try to build on the "internal adjustment" message of the previous regime; and

Table I. 1. Evolution of CAS Objectives and Priorities, 1992-1996/98.

| Goals: 1992 CAS: Stabilize the Economy; 1994 CAS: manage the post devaluation Adjustment | Burkinabe letter of durable development ¹ (1995) presented at the 3 rd Roundtable in Geneva | Goal 1996 CAS: Increase growth and reduce income and service inequities |
|--|---|--|
| <p>Objectives:</p> <p>(i) support critical actions needed to alleviate long-term constraints to economic and social development</p> <p>(ii) help the Government manage public resources more effectively (for social and economic development)</p> <p>(iii) help the Government create a policy and regulatory environment supportive of the private sector</p> | <p>Objectives:</p> <p>(i) increasing income opportunities and productive capacities</p> <p>(ii) developing the social sectors through more efficient use and better targeting of public expenditures</p> <p>(iii) strengthening the role of the private sector</p> | <p>Objectives:</p> <p>(i) maintain a sound macroeconomic environment in which equitable growth can lead to poverty reduction</p> <p>(ii) improve productive opportunities to raise incomes and increase employment through lending and non-lending activities focused on (a) agriculture, (b) mining, (c) finance, (d) infrastructure, (e) water, and (f) environment.</p> <p>(iii) expand the provision of social services, particularly in health and education to the poorest regions to provide the basis on which all Burkinabe can take advantage of growth opportunities</p> |
| <p>Crosscutting themes:</p> <p>Population growth and movement (particularly internal migration)</p> <p>Human resource development</p> <p>Natural resource management</p> <p>Strengthening institutions for public sector management and private sector development</p> | | <p>Crosscutting themes:</p> <p>Community based participatory approaches</p> <p>Poverty reduction</p> |

1. Source 1996 CAS, page 7; see also Donor roundtable, October 1995

- (2) to integrate "lessons learned" from previous adjustment experiences in Africa by agreeing with the Burkinabe about the critical need to emphasize the social sectors and their protection and strengthening as adjustment proceeded.

The same discussions provided a forum for IDA and the government to resolve some of the disagreements that had hampered progress on 11 projects that were approved before or during the 1983-1987 revolutionary period.

Although the order of objectives in relationship to one another and to the global program has changed, the IDA strategy for Burkina has had three consistent objectives since 1992 (Table 1.1). These include:

- (1) to help the government develop a sound macro-economic environment through major **macro-economic structural reforms** designed to reduce government spending and to help the government prepare for and then recover from the 50% devaluation of the FCFA that took place in January 1994;
- (2) to encourage **economic growth** by: (a) reducing non-performing government expenditures on military² and non-military civil service salaries as a percent of the government's operating budget; (b) increasing opportunities for private sector-sponsored development; and (c) stimulating new economic growth opportunities in agriculture, mining, and the private sector; and
- (3) to expand the provision of **social services** (health and education) and basic **infrastructure** (transportation and urban services) as a basis for all Burkinabe (especially the poorest) to take advantage of these new economic opportunities.

1.2. Steady Increase in Participation and a Poverty-Reduction Focus (1992-1997)

1.2.1. Linked Macro-Micro Linking and PERS (1992-1994)

One innovative feature of World Bank lending in Burkina after 1992 which had major implications for the so-called "priority sectors" (education, health, infrastructure) was the decision to link macro and micro-level investment activities. Specifically each *tranche* (disbursement) of the major Structural Adjustment Credits and the post-adjustment Economic Recovery Credit, as well as subsequent debt reduction instruments, was contingent upon the government's achieving certain budgetary allocations and service improvements for health, education and infrastructure. It was anticipated that a series of

² Under the previous military regime, defense was the most important ministry, receiving 26.7% of the operating budget (before adding total technical assistance, investment and development funds) in 1986 and 24.5% in 1990 (Table B.4, 1993 PER). The ministry was not only responsible for national defense but also performed certain tasks that are normally the responsibility of civil ministries (World Bank, PER, 1993: 13). Even after the initial reduction of the size of the army started in 1990, the defense, health, and education sectors accounted for two-thirds of the wage bill and absorbed 60% of the operating budget (ibid.).

joint Burkina-IDA **Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs)**, combined with **the new computerized expenditure cycle management system** being developed with IDA support under the PID would provide the mechanism for monitoring progress toward these social benchmarks.

The first IDA funded PER (1993) showed an extremely high concentration of government funding for social services in salaries for civil servants who were mostly posted in the urban areas as well as gross inefficiencies in the output of existing investments due to this strong urban bias. It soon became clear, however, that the effectiveness of the PER as a tool for monitoring progress toward the reduction of these rural-urban biases was hampered by the government's perception that the public expenditure reviews were an IDA-imposed exercise. This particular issue came to the fore when the government made no concerted effort to provide high quality data on disbursements for the second PER (1994-95).³

1.2.2. **Linked Macro-Micro Lending and PERS with Increased Participation in the Process (1994-1996)**

New Sector Work: The failure of this second PER exercise coincided with the completion of a case study of institutional issues in participation as part of the Bank Wide Learning Process on Participation (McMillan, Ouedraogo, Sanou, Sombie, Compaore, and Drabo 1994).⁴ The results of this study—which were intended primarily for an international audience—showed the critical role that participatory, open discussion had played in building political consensus on key issues in Burkinabe public policy since independence. One outcome of the study, combined with the broader emphasis on participatory development throughout the Bank, was to galvanize the country team's decision to adopt a more participatory model for the Public Expenditure Reviews and the forthcoming 1996 CAS (MEFP 1995).

The same time period coincided with a series of sector studies that were carried out in response to the World Bank poverty reduction Operational Directive (OD) 4.15. These included:

- (1) three participatory poverty assessments (Walker and Ouedraogo 1993; Konde, et al. 1993; Savadogo, Ouedraogo, Thiombiano 1995); and a

³ This exercise was further hampered by the fact that the new computerized budget system was not fully operational until 1996.

⁴ The Participation study was funded by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) as part of the Learning Process on Participation carried out by the World Bank. The work was carried out in close collaboration with UNDP/Ouagadougou which contributed the participation of Sylvestre Ouedraogo. Cynthia Cook was the initial task manager with follow-up management provided by then World Bank NGO specialist and team member, Abdou Salam Drabo.

Box 1.1. IDA Support for Poverty Alleviation, 1992-present

A. Bank Wide Directives/Supporting actions:

1. OD4.15 on Poverty Reduction (1991)
2. Poverty Reduction Handbook (explains standard to which Poverty assessments should aspire and against which their content should be assessed) (1992)
3. Poverty Assessment: A Progress Review (1996)

B. Burkina Faso: Key IDA Actions in Support of OD4.15

Phase One: Analysis of the Problem

1. *Institutional Reform* (through the IDA-supported PID)
 - a. Budget reform (new computerized expenditure cycle management system in place by early 1996)
 - b. Statistics reform (technical training in the analysis of expenditure surveys for the PER)
2. *Participation Study: Historic Analysis of the Concept of Participation in the Health, Urban Services, Agriculture, and NRM sectors* (1993-1994)
3. *Participatory Poverty Assessments:*
 - a. Photographic Poverty Study (1993) and two participatory poverty assessments completed and discussed (1994-95). Task Manager: Country Economist Ann Doize
 - b. Presentation of results of the photographic poverty assessment (October 1994) to senior civil servants
4. *Poverty Profile*
 - a. Execution of the Living Standards Priority Survey (Dec 1994-Jan 1995) as part of the PID with broad multi-donor support. Task Manager: Elizabeth Morris-Hughes.
 - b. Presentation of the initial results of the Priority Survey at the Geneva roundtable on social issues (Oct 1995)
 - c. INSD team spends three weeks in Washington finalizing the analysis and discussing with Bank staff and counterpart teams from other countries;
 - d. Final version of Poverty Profile and Analysis of Results of the Priority Survey of Living Standards distributed (French) (Feb 1996)
 - e. Workshops (Mar 1996) and National Forum (June 1996) to discuss results organized with potential user groups (government, donors, journalists, representatives of specialized agencies) to discuss the results of the poverty Profile and the Priority Survey on Living Standards
 - f. Summary document Poverty Assessment/CAS Process and findings (English) (June 1997) (World Bank 1997)

Phase Two: Incorporation of Resulting Analysis and Recommendations into CAS (1996)

1. Presentation/discussion of revised poverty profile at Phase I 1996 CAS discussions in Koudougou (before 13 cabinet Ministers plus over 60 others) (Dec 1995)
2. Presentation/discussion of results at more limited Phase II CAS discussions before 8 Ministers
3. Presentation of poverty-focused CAS to board (June 1996)

Phase Three: Better Targeted Investment Lending reinforced by establishing targets within adjustment lending and debt relief programs

1. Increased funding for priority sectors (education, health, infrastructure maintenance) considered to most affect lower income groups
2. Establishing social targets for monitoring progress related to poverty reduction which was strengthened by their being linked to adjustment lending (SAC, ERC) and HIPC initiative for debt relief.
3. Incorporation of information from the poverty profile, monitoring targets, and participatory poverty assessments into design, supervision, and evaluation documents of ongoing and new projects

Phase Four: Link Poverty Analysis to PER to reorient budget allocations in favor of the poor

1. 1993 PER Burkina (identifies lack of information on poverty)
2. Aug 96 and April 1997 two additional training workshops on Public Expenditure Reviews and PEIA (Public Expenditure Incidence Analysis)

(2) “participatory poverty profile” based on the PID-supported “Living Standards Priority Survey”⁵ (INSD 1995a, 199b; 1996a, 1996b; Nioumiou and Coulibaly 1996; Lachaud and Ouedraogo, Zoubga, and Ouedraogo 1997; Lachaud 1997; Kabore, Sanou, and Bankoungou 1997; Ouattara, Kabore, and Nyameogo 1997).

The initial interest of the government in the IDA-mandated (OD4.15) Poverty Assessment exercise was extremely lukewarm. An important turning point was the first presentation of the results of the photographic participatory poverty assessment to a group of senior government officials in October 1994 (Walker and Ouedraogo 1993). Placed on the defensive by the study’s graphic photographic and ethnographic portrayals of poverty through the eyes of people living in the villages (those who took the pictures), the government put its full support behind the implementation of the PID supported “Living Standards Priority Survey” one component of which was intended to develop a “poverty profile.” The Priority Survey was conducted by a team from the government statistics service (INSD) with technical assistance from the Bank.

Linked Technical Assistance for Analysis: One of the best indications of the government’s emerging ownership of the concept of poverty targeting was the extensive use of preliminary data from the poverty profile in the government’s development of a *Lettre d’intention de Politique de Developpement Humain Durable* for the third roundtable on Burkina Faso held at Geneva in October 1995 (MEFP 1995) (Table 1.1) The strong donor interest expressed in the preliminary results of this survey, combined with the weak Burkinabe ability to produce valid statistical analyses to support some of their main conclusions, encouraged the government to request assistance from the Bank for improving the overall quality of the analysis of the Priority Survey. This resulted in the PID project supporting the travel costs of a team of researchers from the INSD statistics institute coming to Washington for technical training in the analysis and interpretation of the survey.

Follow-up Presentation and Discussion of Results: This three week INSD-World Bank collaborative analysis of the data produced a much more rigorous report which showed considerable variation between regions, urban, and rural areas in terms of income and food security. The same report included an incidence analysis to determine the extent to which poor households benefited from government expenditures in these sectors. The preliminary results of cross-linking the results of the poverty profile with the results of a partial public expenditure analysis showed considerable rural/urban and regional disparities, suggesting that public expenditure patterns actually tended to reinforce already existing inequities (INSD 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b). There was evidence that (World Bank 1997: 27):

- nearly half of the Ministry of Health personnel was concentrated in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso;

⁵ The Living Standards Priority Survey (1994-1995) was conducted as part of the Public Institutional Development Project (PID) with support from UNDP, the African Development Bank, the European Union, and the World Bank with Norwegian grant support. The survey had three objectives: (1) producing indicators of the social and economic status of households in Burkina Faso; (2) identifying socially and economically vulnerable groups; (3) strengthening the technical capacity of INSD.

- health providers/population ratios varied significantly by area with the highest ratios occurring in the poorest areas (south-east, center north, and north);
- only about half of public education subsidies were going to rural areas, although 84 percent of the population is rural;
- male students received two-thirds of total public education subsidies while rural girls received one-third; and
- the lowest expenditure quintile received 7 percent of total education subsidies versus 56 percent for the highest income quintile.

These results were presented by the INSD researchers at the first planning session for the 1996 CAS in December 1995. This session was attended by a broad representation of ministries and representatives of civil society. A second draft was presented at the second, smaller CAS planning meeting in February 1996.

The quantitative results of the published poverty assessment (INSD 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996c) and the two preliminary CAS discussions (December 1995 and February 1996) were continued in two PID-supported PER training workshops in August 1996 and April 1997 that were designed to strengthen the ability of the national teams to analyze data on public expenditures in relation to some of the priority issues identified in the poverty studies (Box 1.1).⁶

Incorporation into the 1996 CAS.

The 1996 Country Assistance Strategy that emerged from this highly participatory process was solidly focused on poverty and identified social targets for monitoring progress related to poverty reduction that were mutually acceptable to the government and the Bank (World Bank 1996 CAS; World Bank 1997). These poverty reduction objectives were reinforced by the HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) Initiative's commitment to support the release of funds from debt-service in return for evidence of achieving certain mutually agreed upon benchmarks for spending and achievements in the priority sectors (see Monga 1998 and Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances 1998: 1-24).⁷

⁶ Four inter-ministerial Burkinabe teams composed of members of the Primary Education, Post-Primary Education, Health and Water Ministries along with staff from the Ministry of Finances and from INSD (Statistics Institute) participated in the workshop. The teams were introduced to the methodology of Incidence Analysis (IA) for their sectors. The goal of the analysis was to train Ministry staff in new methods for calculating unit costs in ways that facilitate the disaggregation of this data by quintile, urban/rural, regions (clusters of provinces), sex and socio-economic groups. "Unit cost" is defined as budget divided by number of users (Coulombe 1997).

⁷ The Burkinabe authorities issued the first set of HIPC monitoring indicators in the framework of the preparation of SAC II. These indicators were adopted at a January 1998 workshop in Ouagadougou and officially endorsed in a March 25, 1998 cabinet meeting (Monga 1998: 1).

Box 1.2. IDA Support for Poverty Alleviation and Gender Equity Directives in Burkina Faso, 1992-present.

| Poverty Reduction | Gender |
|--|--|
| <p>Bankwide Directives/Supporting actions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. OD4.15 on Poverty Reduction (1991) 2. Poverty Reduction Handbook (1992) 3. Poverty Assessment: A Progress Review (OED 1996) <p>Burkina Faso: Key IDA Actions in Support of OD4.15</p> <p><i>Phase One: Analysis of the Opportunities & Constraints</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Participation Study</i> (1993-4) 2. <i>Three Participatory Poverty Assessments</i> (1993-5) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Poverty Profile</i> (1994-95) 2. Geneva roundtable presentation results (1995) 3. Workshops (Mar 1996) and National Forum (June 1996) 4. Summary document: "Poverty in Burkina Faso: Building Consensus for Action" (1997) <p><i>Phase Two: Incorporation of Resulting Analysis and Recommendations into CAS (1996)</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Presentation/discussion of revised poverty profile at Phase I 1996 CAS discussions in Koudougou (before 13 cabinet Ministers plus over 60 others) 2. Presentation/discussion of results at more limited Phase II CAS discussions before 8 Ministers 3. Presentation of poverty-focused CAS to board (June 1996) <p><i>Phase Three: Better Targeted Investment Lending</i> Increased funding for priority considered to most affect lower income groups</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Poverty alleviation targets incorporated into SAC, ERC and HIPC initiative for debt relief. 2. Incorporation of information from the poverty profile, monitoring targets, and participatory poverty assessments into design, supervision, and evaluation documents of ongoing and new projects <p><i>Phase Four: Link Poverty Analysis to PER to reorient budget allocations in favor of the poor</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Training and analysis focuses on linking public expenditures to poverty | <p>Bankwide Directives/Supporting Actions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. OD4.20 The Gender Dimension of Development 2. BP2.1. Gender Analysis in the CAS Process. 3. Gender Issues in Bank Lending: An Overview (OED 1994) 4. Enhancing Women's Participation in Economic Development: A World Bank Policy Paper (1994). 5. Toward Gender Equality: The Role of Public Policy, Washington, DC (1995) <p>Burkina Faso: Key IDA Actions in support of OD4.20</p> <p><i>Phase One: Analysis of Opportunities and Constraints</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Education: Pilot Study</i>" Promoting Female Participation in Education (Education IV) 2. <i>Regional (AF5AE): Rural Women in the Sahel and their Access to Agricultural Extension (1992-95)</i> (). HQ task manager: Katrine Saito; Regional Coordinator: Daphne Spurling; Burkina task Manager: Ibrahim Nebie (after 1994) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Background Paper & Workshop with UNIFEM and UNSO (1992-3) b. PRSAP participation in regional Sahel study 1994-5 c. Production of regional report and various information papers (1995) 3. <i>Regional (EDI): Women's Management Training and Outreach Program (FEFGA)</i> (1990-6). Task manager: Jerri Dell 4. <i>Poverty Profile</i> (1996): Scarce analysis of gender for subjects other than education. <p><i>Phase Two: Incorporation of Resulting Analysis and Recommendations into CAS (1996)</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Analysis and recommendations limited primarily to education <p><i>Phase Three: Better Targeted Investment Lending</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Targets and special programs to address gender issues given high priority only in education 2. Limited targeting and monitoring of crop extension services to women 3. Major successful effort to target women for nutrition programs under PSA <p><i>Phase Four: Link Poverty Analysis to PER to reorient budget allocations in favor of the poor</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. PER analysis gender issues appears limited to education |

1.3. Weak Emphasis on Gender Equity

The extremely strong central headquarters' support to the country team for poverty contrasts sharply with the weak central support on gender issues. The very different emphasis in program planning and monitoring is graphically illustrated by a comparison of the total financial resources and sector work from headquarters that went into support for the Bank's poverty reduction guidelines versus the support given to address gender issues (Box 1.2). Specifically (in comparison with the poverty reduction initiative):

- **Inadequate background analyses of opportunities and constraints:** There does not appear to have ever been any sort of formal sector survey or national analysis that conforms to World Bank criteria for "gender assessment" or assessing the gender impacts of specific projects as specified in the official World Bank Operational Directive regarding gender (OD4.20 and BP2.11).
- **Inadequate incorporation of gender issues into the CAS:** Although gender was supposed to be a central focus for the analysis in the poverty profile and past and present PER analyses, it was never accorded a separate section or even sub-section in the report except with regard to education (INSD 1995; World Bank 1997).
- **Uneven record for incorporating gender into the design and implementation of sector lending:**

Inadequate awareness of existing World Bank guidelines: Many task managers were unaware of OD4.20 and what if any support they could expect from headquarters to assist them with improving gender assessment and monitoring. We did not find a single project director that was aware of OD4.20 or who knew how they were supposed to respond to the "WID Impact" questions that were part of the routine "project performance ratings."

Routine undervaluing of positive impacts in supervision reports: Only four of the 12 projects (Food Security and Nutrition, Environmental Management [PNGT], Education IV, and PPLS) were listed as having any WID impact on supervision documents. Even the Agricultural Services II and Post-Primary Education Projects—both of which included a significant sub-component that targeted women and have demonstrated measurable impacts on increasing gender equality—had been checked NA/NR (e.g. not applicable or not relevant) for WID impact. Even when the WID impact is indicated as "satisfactory"—as it was for the PPLS (Population and AIDS and PNGT)-- it is not always clear since there is no quantitative data to indicate what these satisfactory impacts have been and none of the indicators listed in the document are broken down by gender.

- **Inadequate documentation at headquarters and the resident mission of World Bank and non-World Bank literature:** Despite the wealth of literature on gender

issues in Burkina Faso, and partial analyses of gender issues in connection with World Bank studies over the decades, we could not find any sort of bibliography on this topic in the resident mission. The most recent review of gender issues in agriculture in relation to World Bank programs appears to be the 1994 review that dealt with the literature at large (Bryson et al. 1994).

- **Good subprograms in Education and Agriculture:** Only two sectors—education (Education IV⁸ and Post-Primary education) and agriculture (crop extension through Ag Services II and micro-credit programs through Nutrition and Food Security)--have included major components or sub-components that targeted some of the specific constraints that women and girls experience
- **Significant impact of regional programs:** It is interesting to note that two of the most successful gender initiatives—one to promote women's access to agricultural extension (World Bank 1995) and one to promote micro-enterprise development by improving women's access to credit, literacy, and accounting skills (the highly innovative Women's Management Training and Outreach Program or FEFGA [*Femmes et formation en gestion appliquee*]) were products of regional programs directed from headquarters. The results of the gender issues in agriculture initiative (which was funded by the regional agriculture office and included the active involvement of the resident mission technician responsible for all IDA agriculture programs) had a major impact on the design of the ongoing and follow-up projects for this sector (World Bank 1995).

In contrast, the EDI-supported FEFGA program—which conducted its research and trials more independently-- did not find a readily defined IDA home at the project's end.⁹ This experience contrasts with a large number of countries (Mauritania, Uganda, Jamaica, Ethiopia, and Angola) where FEFGA training has been incorporated into large World Bank investment loans. It would appear that in the current post-devaluation environment there would be greater emphasis on this type of training in projects such as the forthcoming rural development project (PNGT2) now currently under design.

A number of inexpensive actions could be undertaken to increase the ability of project directors and task managers to better target gender inequality. These include:

⁸ Although increasing gender equity emerged as one of the most widely cited impacts of Education IV, the pilot study which gave birth to this initiative was only a small \$200,000 component of the original design (World Bank 1991: 17). The participatory manner in which these studies were conducted by the ministry (without, it appears, any technical assistance or support from headquarters in the design) seems to have increased Ministry and Bank ownership of the results and the ability to incorporate a special sub-initiative on gender within the existing project design.

⁹ The Bank invested some \$311,444 US in this very highly evaluated regional program that trained (directly and indirectly) 17,500 persons (at a cost of \$18 per beneficiary) (CAC1997: S1-S3). Even before it was completed, the UNDP-financed credit organization--*Fonds d'appui aux activités remuneratrices des femmes* or FAARF—took it over and FEFGA training became one of their products.

- ensuring the same type of strong support from top management and OED for the guidelines established in OD4.20 for project design, monitoring, supervision and country assistance strategies that was enjoyed by the poverty reduction operational directive (OD4.15);

- facilitating task managers' and project managers' access to OD4.20 and recommendations for how to address gender in specific planning, implementation and monitoring exercises such as BP2.11 regarding Country Assistance Strategies;

- incorporating gender targets into project monitoring matrices and macro-lending;

and

- identifying someone within the mission who can provide projects with the analytical support that they need for conducting gender assessments, establishing gender targets, accessing relevant World Bank, Burkinabe and regional studies, and linking Bank activities with the well-developed network of researchers, NGOs, bilateral, and multilateral agencies working on gender issues in Burkina. Given the large number of projects and their complexity, this is the one recommendation that would require a specialized "recommitment" of time for someone associated with the country team.

Care must also be taken to ensure that any approach to increase gender targeting and monitoring be conducted in a highly participatory manner that enjoys national ownership as well as ownership within the country team. In this regard, the Education IV initiative to promote girls primary education and the regional program to increase access for women in the Sahel to agricultural extension would be considered "best practice."¹⁰

1.4. Potential Impact of Decentralization

It was clear by the mid-1990s that any long-term attempt to sustain the types of participatory, poverty-focused development programs being supported by the Bank in urban infrastructure, health, and education would have to be linked to the government's implementation of a full program of administrative and financial decentralization.

One major impact of World Bank assistance since 1992 has been to give impetus to the decentralization process that was set out in the 1991 constitution. Since 1991, the government has introduced a series of referendums and laws to create the legal, financial, and judicial framework needed to decentralize state financial and administrative systems. With the formal adoption of a new decentralization law on August 5, 1999 that outlines a

¹⁰ Almost all the initial research and policy analysis for the girls primary education initiative was conducted by the Ministry itself. Although the task managers for the regional issues in agriculture research were a Bank staff member and an expatriate consultant, their research in Burkina was coordinated by the resident mission staff member in charge of agriculture. Other factors which help explain the positive impact and spread-effects of this single regional study include: (a) the Sector Study was persuasive rather than prescriptive; (b) the process allowed for a long time frame within on-going activities; (c) the task managers helped to mainstream gender into most Bank activities connected with the projects (for example, supervision, workshops, meetings, dialogue with relevant government agencies); (d) new and ongoing projects provided the operational means of obtaining these results/improvements; and (e) the use of IDA funded projects which enabled gender actions to have national coverage.

highly innovative "bottom-up" approach to rural decentralization, the stage is set for moving forward with decentralization at two levels.

(1) Administrative and Financial Decentralization: The first level refers to the decentralization of the country's administrative and accounting procedures which have historically been highly centralized in the nation's capital. World Bank assistance through the PID has created a basis for a series of increasingly participatory PERs that should strengthen the government's ability to monitor administrative decentralization.

(2) Institutional Decentralization: Parallel to these administrative processes, there is a critical need to define and strengthen the capacity of the new institutions that will be responsible for carrying out these activities.

2.a. Urban Decentralization: The Bank has already made a major contribution to the issue of urban decentralization through its support to the Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso communes through the Second Urban and Urban Environment Projects' support to the Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso communes. These two projects helped create the first institutional model for an urban commune that was empowered to and capable of managing tax revenues and user fees, urban services and infrastructure. It is anticipated that the final phase of the Urban Environment Project will consolidate these gains and analyze "lessons learned" for the next phase of urban decentralization to the provincial capitals in which the Bank is expected to play only a minor role (see Elong Mbassi 1997).

2.b. Rural Decentralization: The institutional issues are far more complex and challenging in the rural areas. The reason is that the new decentralization law recognizes the right of various local entities (hamlets, villages) to come together and apply for the status of operating as a semi-autonomous commune. This in turn creates a whole new set of issues regarding the best means for fostering democratic representation at the village and inter-village level, in clarifying the legal structures by which inter-village groups can manage their own resources and affairs, and identifying the best means for assessing and strengthening the capacity of these local groups to manage tax and grant revenues, basic infrastructure, and natural resources over which they have responsibility.

To date, the major contribution of the Bank to the issue of rural decentralization has been its support for a major sector study on "Rural Decentralization and Local Level Institutions in Burkina Faso." This study, which was coordinated by the CND (the National Decentralization Committee responsible for overseeing decentralization since 1993) collected qualitative and quantitative data on 1000 households in 48 villages in four provinces. The staff associated with the same sector work has provided the main "lightening rod" for the two way exchange of information between Bank initiatives and the many urban and rural decentralization initiatives being coordinated by other donors (i.e. CILSS, Canada, the European Union, the Netherlands).

Box 1.3. Policy Implications of the Rural Decentralization and Local Level Institution ESW Work in Burkina Faso

Policy/Design

Higher performing villages (defined in terms of economic well-being and effective village organization) have more local institutions which reflect a culturally based collective orientation to growth, while poorer performing villages have less. This statistically significant association seems to indicate that the balance between collective oriented indigenous institutions and individually oriented development institutions has an impact on village growth and prosperity.

Contributions made by local institutions to growth and development was not discernible using individual-oriented welfare indicators (measured by mean expenditure per capita). Substance and type of contribution only became apparent when the measurement lens was changed to capture collective orientations to growth (measured by inequality indicators). The change of lens seems to capture a cultural preference for solidarity used for growth and development in higher performing villages.

Operational Guidelines

Inclusion of all groups, from the perspective of rural village research participants, was defined as a critical component for successful rural decentralization.

Definition of the Commune Rurale only as public interlocutor and not as an all-powerful benefactor was also found to be a critical component.

Legitimacy of established or evolving local institutions proved to be strongly dependent upon five factors: (1) how leaders were selected; (2) well-delineated focus on transparency and accountability; (3) access to information and control of decisions affecting local livelihoods and culture; (4) access/use of capacity building mechanisms; and (5) reflections of local values.

Adequate, if minimal, capitalization for rural decentralization was found to be viable only—except for a few cases—when an assembly of villages rather than one sole locality is used to form a Commune Rurale.

Source: Donnelly-Roark 1998: 3.

Based on the initial analysis of the Local Level Institutions Study and research findings from a recent CILSS study on decentralization and local capacity building (Easton 1998), the study developed a number of policy and operational guidelines (Box 1.3). The same Bank-supported ESW provided the first quantitative data with which to illustrate the need to "reinvent" some of the western assumptions that undergird administrative decentralization when dealing with rural decentralization. What remains to be done is to consider the implications of this research for new and ongoing Bank operations.

The next CAS needs to focus squarely on the issue of decentralization at both levels: (1) financial administrative decentralization; and (2) institutional decentralization (rural and urban). Both types of decentralization are necessary, although Western models of decentralization have tended to focus on the first. One major conclusion of the Local Level Institutions ESW was to highlight that these two processes are parallel not linear. They must be undertaken simultaneously in order to facilitate the complementarity of the two processes. Failure to do so runs the risk of giving the impression that the Bank supports

only one decentralization process (i.e., financial and administrative or institutional). Lack of support at this juncture could be critical and set decentralization and the related democratization reforms back at least a decade.

1.5. Lessons Learned for the 1999 CAS

1. Emphasize Participatory PER, Poverty Assessment, and CAS processes

The Bank's experience with developing the 1996 CAS provides clear evidence about the importance of adopting a more participatory approach to project design and evaluation. It was only in 1994-1995, on the basis of the 1994 Participation Study (McMillan et al. 1994) and, more fundamentally, in the wake of the failure of the second Public Expenditure Review effort in the winter and spring of 1995, that the team decided that the only way that national ownership of the PER, the Poverty Profile, and ultimately the 1996 CAS would occur was if these exercises were conducted together with the Burkinabe—not the Bank—taking the lead.

2. Supplement Participatory Approaches with Targeted Assistance to National Teams for: (a) the Conduct of Solid, Quantitative and Qualitative Sector Work and (b) Developing a more Solid Base of Budgetary and Poverty Statistics

The same analysis, however, emphasizes that these types of participatory approaches need to be supplemented by: (a) solid, quantitative and qualitative sector work, and (b) a solid data base of budgetary and poverty statistics IF they are to realize their full impact on public policy dialogue and planning. Despite several years of edicts from the Bank regarding poverty reduction, the effort to seriously direct Bank planning in this direction did not occur until there was some emerging factual basis to get the discussion beyond the subjective—first through the three participatory poverty assessments (1994-1995), then through the quantitative poverty profile (1995-1996). World Bank financial and analytical support was critical to the successful conduct, analysis, and write-up of the widely disseminated 1996 poverty profile. This type of data base is one of the non-negotiable preconditions for any sort of open, public debate on how to use government resources more effectively to achieve public debated goals for alleviating and improving education, health, and water resource development indicators of development.

3. Link poverty reduction and gender equality goals to macro-economic lending and credit eradication

As in the social sectors, the single most important factor that increased government and Bank task managers' interest in attempting to develop the type of poverty-reduction focused Country Assistance Strategy outlined by OD4.15 was the prominence given to poverty benchmarks in the macro-economic lending and debt forgiveness program.

4. Analysis of the report "Poverty in Burkina Faso: Building Consensus for Action" (World Bank 1997) and the five country gender issues in agricultural

extension study (World Bank 1995) for “lessons learned” in increasing ownership and participation for poverty reduction and gender equality objectives.

Although the process of conducting the poverty assessment was long (two years), the participatory way in which it was conducted, with input from a wide sample of groups and organizations throughout Burkina, increased the final ownership of the product. This value was further increased by the high level support which the study enjoyed from the Bank country economist, the country officer, and other headquarters staff and its prominent place in the CAS discussions. Although the 1996 OED study argues for greater ownership of poverty assessment results, there are few operational recommendations on how to obtain this. A more detailed analysis of the different phases of the 1996 CAS process in Burkina (which was identified as a best practice within the Bank) would be a useful contribution to other countries and the Burkina country team’s attempts to develop the 1999 CAS and to better incorporate gender issues.

2. Assessment of IDA Sector Assistance for Urban Infrastructure Development

2.1. Outcome

2.1.1. Relevance

Since 1990, the IDA strategy for urban infrastructure in Burkina has concentrated on establishing and developing the capacity of the two largest urban centers (Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso) to generate the resources (taxes, user fees) needed to build and maintain better quality urban infrastructure and services. This was extremely relevant in the late 1980s when Burkina was emerging from a massive "commando" expansion of urban infrastructure that was attempting to deal with more than twenty year's neglect of the country's urban areas.¹ The issue of urban development was seen as having three inter-related components:

- (1) strengthening the basic infrastructure (access roads, sanitation, drainage, garbage collection) needed to serve the vastly expanded base of newly allocated urban parcels;
- (2) strengthening the institutional capacity of the urban communes to: (a) collect user fees and taxes; (b) work with local communities in maintaining and building basic infrastructure; and (c) carry out decentralized decision-making and financial decisions necessary to maintain city services over time; and
- (3) strengthening the capacity of small and medium scale private sector enterprises to design, execute and evaluate urban infrastructure development and services.

IDA's assistance to the sector through the First (FY78) and Second (FY90) Urban Projects focused on (Table 2.1) : (a) strengthening the communes' institutional capacity to collect and manage tax revenue and user fees; and (b) executing smaller scale infrastructure investments through small and medium scale enterprises.² This strategy has been continued through the Urban Environment Project (FY95) with the addition of a sub-component that is designed to strengthen local participation.

Although most major donors (France, Germany, Canada, Switzerland, Denmark) agree that any long-term strategy to build and maintain local infrastructure must deal with all three sets of issues (infrastructure, institutions, local participation), they typically deal with just one or two domains (Table 2.1). IDA's decision to focus their initial assistance for developing the capacity of

¹ The "commando" urban infrastructure campaigns included: (1) mobilizing local neighborhoods to carry out urban zoning; and (b) using revenues generated through a 50% tax on rents and a 50% reduction in civil servant housing allowances to finance low and middle-income housing. These programs resulted in the distribution of 120,000 parcels of land and the construction of 2,500 new homes (see Annex A, Tables 3 and 4).

² The mechanism for this assistance was the Second Urban Project [FY90], and after the creation of an AGETIP Program through the IDA Public Works and Employment Project in 1991, through agency Faso Baara) (Table 2.1).

the communes on the two largest urban centers—Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso--was based on a conscious decision to develop this type of integrated model for the major urban zones before expanding it to the secondary urban centers.

Burkina's pioneering efforts to develop a new concept of urban services was and continues to be highly relevant for the next CAS. The major weakness in the IDA-Burkina strategy for promoting urban services has been the Burkinabe government's decision not to include at least one other urban center in the Urban Environment Project (FY95) as a pilot for the next phase of urban development when this model must be extended to the country's secondary urban centers.³ The need for expanding to Burkina's other towns gains additional urgency in light of the substantial expansion of urban zoning (*lotissement*) and housing that has taken place in recent years (Annex A, Tables 3-4). The next CAS should: (a) continue to provide strong consistent support to the ongoing Urban Environment Project (FY95) but also; (b) encourage the development of a quarterly round-table, bringing together the different ministries, NGOs, bilateral and multilateral donors that intervene in urban development (such as you find for the other sectors) to participate in the formulation of the new expanded strategy for urban decentralization; and (c) analyze the "lessons learned" from the last decade of experience with urban development in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso for the next phase of commune-driven urban site and services development planned for the second and tertiary urban centers. Some provision for this type of reflection is already included in the activity plan of the Urban Environment Project and in for the Public Works and Decentralization Project (under preparation) and should be reinforced. This next phase of intervention would benefit from posting someone in the resident mission and/or in a central location in West Africa (where they could cover other projects as well) who would be authorized to speak for the Bank in donor meetings as well as in dealing with the complex institutional issues associated with the ongoing project.

2.1.2. *Effectiveness and Efficacy*

In general, IDA support to the urban sector since 1988 (when preplanning for the Second Urban Project started) was characterized by an effective, efficient translation of the broad overarching strategy into the Second Urban Project (FY90) and the Urban Environment Project (FY95). Key factors that were cited repeatedly as having contributed to the efficient allocation of

³ At an early stage during the Urban Environment Project (FY95) preparation, the Bank wished to include at least a third town, like Ouahigouya, in the project. At the time, the Burkinabe strategy was to concentrate World Bank activities in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso (because of the size of the financing needed) and the other towns to bilateral donors. It was anticipated that the other cities would be helped through a new program called "*10 Villes Secondaire*" with bilaterals picking these secondary cities. Unfortunately, this parallel project never really got organized.

Table 2.1 : INTERVENTION DES DIFFÉRENTS BAILLEURS DE FONDS DANS LES CATÉGORIES D'ACTIVITÉS DU SECTEUR URBAIN

| INSTITUTIONS | OUAGADOUGOU & BOBO-DIOULASSO | | | | AUTRES VILLES | | | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|------------------|------------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------|------------------|--|
| | Gros investissements Infrastructure | Appui Institutionnel | | | Gros investissement Infrastructure | Recouvrement | Appui institutionnel | | Exécutif Investissement Infrastructure Petites et moyennes entreprises |
| | | Recouvrement | Participation à la base | Décentralisation | | | Participation à la base | Décentralisation | |
| Banque Mondiale 1 ^{er} Projet urbain | X | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Banque Mondiale 2 ^{ème} Projet urbain | X | X | - | X | - | - | - | - | |
| Banque Mondiale 3 ^{ème} Projet urbain | X | X | X | X | - | - | - | - | |
| Banque Mondiale Faso Baara | - | - | - | X | - | - | - | X | |
| France | X | X | X | X | - | X | X | X | |
| Allemagne | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Canada | - | X | X | - | - | X | X | - | |
| Suisse | - | - | - | - | X | X | X | X | |
| Danemark | - | - | - | - | - | X | X | X | |
| Pays-Bas | - | - | - | - | - | X | X | X | |

Source: Belemsagha, D., Background Paper, CAR, Ouagadougou, January 1999.

resources include:

(1) the heavy participation of a strong group of national urbanists whose training had been strengthened in the course of the Habitat, MAP, and IDA First Urban Projects (FY 78) in the preliminary studies, design teams and technical commissions associated with the Second Urban Project (FY90) and the Urban Environment Project (FY95);

(2) the early appointment of strong national directors with professional experience and/or training adapted to the technical and political tasks demanded of them (Second Urban [FY90] Urban Environment [FY95] and Public Works and Employment [Faso Baara] Projects);

(3) the continuous involvement of the national directors in every phase of the Second Urban (FY90) and Urban Environment Projects (FY95) starting with preliminary studies, negotiation, and execution;⁴

(4) high levels of good, continuous communication between the Second Urban, Urban Environment, and Public Works and Employment Project Directors and the two World Bank task managers and sector chiefs overseeing these operations; and

(5) the extensive investment of the Second Urban Project in creating an accounting instruction manual and training large numbers of municipal staff from the municipal budget and finance departments.

Some of the leading factors that caused delays which decreased the effective implementation of the projects were:

(1) the lack of clear understanding and delineation of ministerial responsibility for different projects and key project components which resulted in significant design and disbursement delays (Second and Public Works and Employment Projects);⁵

(2) the fact that other donors that were thought to be key partners in specific projects (such as the Italians who had supposedly agreed to develop a series of urban canals in Ouagadougou) did not always follow through on their commitments (Second Urban and the Public Works and Employment Projects);

(3) an initial unwillingness to use standard World Bank procurement directives and

⁴ The fact that the Director of Faso Baara (AGETIP created by the Public Works and Employment Project) was not named until one month before negotiation contributed to a certain lack of comprehension of the project and design components that might otherwise have been avoided.

⁵ The process of moving the Second project between two Ministry offices and associated problems with staffing (confusion over hiring of a staff engineer) were major factors responsible for delay between design phase, signature of the loan and disbursement. Some of the same ministerial responsibility debates contributed also to a delay in the design studies for the Urban Environment Project.

standard bidding documents (Second Urban, Urban Environment, and Public Works and Employment) until their validity was finally widely accepted after which time the problem became one of insufficient understanding of the rules;

(4) large-scale cost under-estimates for key project components;⁶ and

(5) the government's reluctance to implement Annexe 5 of the Second Urban Project loan agreement which the Burkinabe government signed at the last minute without adequate reflection on its political and social consequences.

2.1.3. Summary Ratings: Outcome

Despite the aforementioned implementation problems which reduced the short-term efficiency and efficacy of particular projects designed to promote urban infrastructure development since 1992 has been very effective in achieving its objectives. The same assistance has helped the government conceptualize and implement the first integrated model for collecting the user fees and taxes needed to sustain urban services over time. This means that the net efficiency of the initial investment should increase over time. In light of these achievements, the summary rating of Bank performance in urban infrastructure and services is rated as highly satisfactory.

2.2. Institutional Development

The three principal urban projects funded by IDA have had a major impact on the major institutions of the urban sector by: (a) providing a forum for the national government to test and decide to fully adopt new, more transparent mechanisms for competitive bidding and accounting; (b) reinforcing the technical capacity of the major municipal services, strengthening the management and financial capacity of the communes to lead urban development; (c) reinforcing the technical capacities of the major municipal services to support this development by overseeing infrastructure development and maintenance; (d) designing, implementing, and revising the first model for fiscal decentralization in the government; and (e) strengthening the capacity of the private sector and local community organizations to engage as active partners in infrastructure construction and maintenance.

Especially important, the new municipal administrative and financial structures that were created under the Second Urban project have become the model for the gradual process of urban decentralization that started with the February 1995 municipal elections--an institutional impact which was not at all foreseen in the design document.

When the AGETIP Faso Baara was created, the concept of a *maitre d'ouvrage delegue* as a

⁶ In the case of the Urban Environment Project (FY95), this under-budgeting was variously attributed to: (a) inadequate use of national experts within the Ministry of Public to assist the municipalities in the development of detailed specifications for rehabilitation and construction projects; and (b) the absence of reliable building and material statistics at the time of design. Since then, the Urban Environment Project (FY95) has taken measures to strengthen private sector and governmental (e.g. *Ministere de Travaux Publique*) capacity to work with the communes in developing strong, viable cost estimates.

tool to facilitate the execution of projects through small and medium sized private entrepreneurs was very new and highly controversial. The special administrative dispensations accorded to this institution, combined with the fact that two of the most important World Bank health and education loans stipulated that some of the contracts for key construction components had to pass through Faso Baara (which required using a national competitive bidding document) created a semblance of "monopoly."⁷ Despite these criticisms (which are elaborated on in more detail in the Supervision Reports for the IDA Health and Nutrition Project PDSN), the project did have a clear institutional impact : (a) by contributing to the development of standard government procedures that make it easier for small and medium sized enterprises to bid on government contracts; and (b) by establishing a legal precedent for the concept of a *maitre d'ouvrage delegue* as a means of speeding up the lengthy, cumbersome process of awarding government contracts. Once the legal statute for *maitre d'oeuvre delegue* is clearly set in place, the institution of Faso Baara--or its institutional successor--will have to compete with another agency or *bureau d'etudes* (consulting firm). The adoption of this legal statute is crucial to the long-term success of the institutional concept established by Faso Baara.

The summary rating for institutional development is substantial.

2.3. Sustainability

Probably the single most important factor that augers well for the long-term sustainability of recent IDA investments in urban development was the government's decision to embark on a gradual process of urban decentralization that started with the organization of municipal elections in February 1995. In the next phase the process of urban decentralization will be expanded to the provinces. This type of decentralized urban growth to support the development of more decentralized economic "growth poles" is critical to the long-term sustainability of other IDA investments in agriculture, health, and education.

It is important to emphasize, however, that many of the institutional changes needed to sustain IDA investments in urban infrastructure, services, administrative systems, and community organizations are still in the early stages of being implemented, tested, and revised. The smooth transition of support for key project components between the Second Urban (FY90) and Urban Environment Projects (FY95) has helped consolidate the gains made under the Second Urban project. A similar transition will be needed to consolidate some of the new initiatives being launched under the Urban Environment Project---especially the new initiatives to encourage higher levels of community support for financing investment and ensuring maintenance.

This transition support will need to be addressed within the broader context of a CAS strategy that consolidates the "lessons learned" from Ouagadougou and Bobo's experiences for the next phase of urban decentralization to the country's secondary urban centers. This transition support will also need to deal with new models for training the next generation of urban administrators. One of the most immediate short-term inputs would be to introduce a course on

⁷ At the time these contracts were awarded, Faso Baara was one of the few mechanisms for implementing fast, efficient contracts for construction. The very success of Faso Baara in awarding contracts to small and medium scale enterprises has created a more competitive private sector construction market.

urban administration issues into the National School of Administration (ENA, *Ecole National d'Administration*) that provides the base and retraining courses for the *prefets* that head up city governments.

More effective collaboration with other donors and NGOs active in different sub-components of urban infrastructure (see Table 2.1) will be crucial to the successful devolution of project support. To date, there is no regular roundtable coordinating session for urban development such as exists in the other sectors.

The summary rating for sustainability is likely.

2.4. Bank Performance

Good sustained communication between the World Bank task managers, their sector chiefs within the Bank, and the national project directors in the government appears to have played a major role in facilitating the directors' ability to effectively implement these projects. The sector seems to have also benefited from a certain "product" oriented engineering and administrative culture that was less politicized than other sectors.

Lack of familiarity with Bank procedures and the resulting delays caused by this were and continue to be a major reason for project delays. Although Bank-supported courses in procurement and accounting procedures helped, they didn't solve the problem since many of the procedures seemed to change or at least be modified annually. Given the critical importance of procurement, past experience with managing World Bank projects or similar sorts of financial systems should be considered as a critical element in the choice of a Project Director. Care must also be taken to verify the individual project SOE (Statement of Expenses) accounts during Bank supervision missions as recommended in Bank documents⁸ so that on-the job training and retraining in procurement procedures can occur in a timely manner and avoid costly delays and procurement errors. Another possible solution that was suggested was to designate one staff member in the Resident Mission to help the Task Managers with SOE control.

Despite their lack of familiarity with the procedures, the Ministries appear to have appreciated the new more transparent competitive bidding and accounting procedures which have now been adopted as routine. One of the best indicators of this is the fact that many of the Bank administrative requirements and procedures have been adopted by the ministries for all their work, not just work done under IDA projects.

The organization of an annual portfolio review meeting to which all project directors were invited after 1992, provided a forum for all project directors, including those associated with the urban projects, to discuss some of the procedural problems they encountered in the administration of

⁸ Although World Bank documents stipulate that the SOE must be verified during supervision missions, this is not usually done due to insufficient staff or consultant time and funds allocated for this purpose. In fact, most SOE reviews are planned and occur only after a certain amount is spent. These reviews are supplemented by an annual audit.

their projects. The Bank's willingness to resolve many of these issue—for example, by increasing the sum that the national Project Directors could keep in "special" accounts--seems to have facilitated the resolution of certain administrative constraints. Future CAS planning needs to be attentive to the issues raised in the Portfolio Review Sessions and actions taken to resolve them.

Bank performance was satisfactory and indeed exemplary in certain areas such as analytical support/sector work, after a rough start (on Urban II) investment supervision. Monitoring and evaluation has been weak across all the IDA projects, which was typical of almost all IDA projects that were designed during this time period. One consequence of this weak evaluation has been to underestimate the project's global impact and its impact on women and lower income groups in particular.

Taken as a whole, the summary rating is "satisfactory."

2.5. Borrower Performance

Despite the reluctance of the government to implement Annex 5 of the Second Urban Project, in general the government has shown strong support for the projects and has chosen, strong, well qualified staff to lead them. The greatest weaknesses in government performance were: (a) substantial delays in the government's provision of counterpart funds;⁹ and (b) the extreme lack of coordination and communication between the different Ministries and agencies (e.g. Ministry of Territorial Administration, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Finance, etc.) that intervene in the urban sector. Taken as a whole, however, the summary rating is satisfactory.

⁹ The mid-term review of the Burkina Faso Urban Environment recommended that the subject of counterpart funding be revisited by the country team and be on the priority topics to be discussed with the government (Quayoro 1998).

3. Assessment of IDA Sector Assistance for Education

3.1. Outcome

3.1.1. *Relevance*

World Bank funding, formal and informal staff training, and analytical and conceptual support for education have already had a highly visible impact on public policy, infrastructure, institutional development, and community participation.

-Public Policy: Analytical support (through development, testing and extension of a computer simulation model for education services as well as site visits and formal and informal training) seems to have catalyzed the Burkinabe Government's willingness to voluntarily embark on a complete reorientation of its national system for primary education. The earlier system (parts of which were supported under the World Bank Education Projects I and II) (FYs 73 and 79) had encouraged the development of a trifurcated system of basic education that included: (a) a national system of three year "rural education" schools for rural areas (Box 3.1) that paralleled (b) the formal system of six year primary education training; and (c) a small division of basic literacy training programs.

From the start, however, the rural people who benefited from the three year rural schools that had been heavily supported by UNESCO, the African Development Bank, and IDA (under the First and Second Education Projects) resented the fact that their children were receiving what they felt to be a second class education. This resentment translated into low attendance and higher per student costs. Initially IDA thought that the secret to straightening out the program lay in trying to make it more relevant to the students' everyday lives.¹ Even with these changes, however, the rural school system continued to be plagued by low enrollments and high costs and Burkina's primary school enrollments remained relatively stagnant at 24 percent in 1985.

These low school attendance rates and the seeming inability of the existing education system to make a dent in them were a source of embarrassment to the regime that took power in 1983. One result was a national attempt to radically expand the Ministry model for basic literacy by channeling it through the CDRs (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution), elementary school teachers, rural schools, extension agents, and any other civil servant or local institution capable of teaching. Although the commando campaigns did increase the number of people able to do basic reading and writing, the training they received was insufficient to allow them to fulfill all of the tasks expected of village communities, such as managing the new village health committees and pharmacy banks that were expanded during the commando *1 Village=1 PSP* (village health post) campaign.

¹ The Bank's involvement in Burkina Faso's education sector started with the First Education Project (C430-UV, signed in FY73 for US\$2.85 million) which succeeded in providing rural youth with basic literacy and agricultural skills through the *Formation des Jeunes Agriculteurs* (FJA). The Second Education Project (C956-UV, signed in FY80 for US \$14.0 million) assisted in consolidating the FJA program. However, the FJA system, which was planned with a view to developing a low-cost alternative to primary education turned out to be the opposite (Box 3.1).

One impact of the World Bank's analytical and financial support under the Third Education Project (FY85) was to reorient the ministry's strategy toward the mainstream system of primary education and reduce the direct involvement of the ministry in basic literacy to one of materials development, training and evaluation of the basic literacy initiatives carried out by other NGO and government programs in

Box 3.1. Early IDA Support for Rural Education

By the late 1960s, the task of developing basic education countrywide came to be seen as increasingly important in Burkina Faso. The government chose the vehicle of non-formal, rural training (FJA) to combine literacy training with basic agricultural training. After several years, the government came to realize that this alternative system is no substitute for widespread primary education, mainly because of the non-replicability of the FJA system on a large scale due to its considerable unit costs amounting to about US\$143 per trainee year, versus US\$38 in primary education. In addition, the government realized that if the stagnation in the education sector, with its extremely low literacy rate and primary school enrollment rate, was allowed to continue, the low level of human resources development would have serious detrimental effects on the country's long-term economic growth prospects. Thus, government requested IDA's assistance in financing a project to expand and improve primary education. **[Bold added] To clarify the overall project objectives for different components and develop a consensus and common understanding—at the planning stage—among all parties involved, a policy workshop was held in October 1983 using the Bank's Education Financial Simulation Model (EDFISIMO).**

Source: World Bank, 1995, Implementation Completion Report. Burkina Faso. Primary Education Development Project (Education III). May 4, 1995. Page 4.

fields as diverse as health, agriculture, and social action.

-Infrastructure and Materials: The same support included a dramatic infusion of resources to improve the quality of basic infrastructure, teacher training, and textbook development.

-Institutional Development: The same succession of IDA projects helped strengthened the capacity of the two ministries they work with. Especially important, the World Bank on-the-job training in IDA procurement and accounting procedures increased the administrative, financial and planning capacity of the Ministry of Basic Education to negotiate for and manage the tax based revenues, donor grants, and user fees that it needs to survive. This institutional impact of IDA support was strengthened by IDA's insistence that targets for educational funding and achievement for educational investments be a conditionality for the negotiation and disbursement on adjustment lending (the SAC and ERC) and debt forgiveness (HIPC Initiative) after 1991.

-Community Participation: One important impact of IDA support has been to facilitate the government's evolution of a more realistic model for community participation. Although the concept of community participation was central to the design of the Third Education Project (FY85-94), the project saw this participation primarily as a means for reducing construction and maintenance costs, with very little input into the conceptualization of the programs. One result was that local communities felt very little responsibility for maintenance or construction. At the same

time, there was very little sense that the community had any real responsibility for assuring the smooth functioning of the schools. One important shift in orientation, reflected in the more participatory design of Education IV (FY91), was the idea that Ministries had an obligation to work with local communities to ensure that they understood their obligations to and expectations from the school before construction began. There was also a much stronger recognition that earlier concepts of participation had overestimated the financial capacity of some of the poorest communities to contribute to the day-to-day operation of the schools.

- *Gender Issues/Poverty Awareness*: A fifth very important impact of IDA support was to develop an innovative pilot program that developed and successfully extended new methods for increasing girls' enrollment.

The Government is finalizing, with Bank assistance, a Basic Education Ten Year Program (BETYP)—1990-2009—to increase access to quality basic education for the majority of the Burkinabe by promoting cost effective and financially sustainable solutions to the problems that have depressed primary school enrollment and literacy levels. This program was developed in a highly participatory fashion and appears to enjoy a great deal of ownership in both education ministries.

In contrast to the 1994 and 1996 CASs (which focused almost entirely on increasing primary school enrollments, promoting girls education, and strengthening the post-primary system to accommodate the larger number of children being promoted by the lower system) the new CAS needs to emphasize the expanded focus of the new Ten Year Plan. Key elements of the new ten year strategy include: (a) continued support to consolidate the gains in primary education curriculum, teacher training, and infrastructure; (b) strengthening post-primary education to respond to the new opportunities created by the increased primary school enrollments; and (c) strengthening the Ministry's ability to provide instruction and materials for basic literacy programs that are not just aimed at basic training but at maintaining literacy gains.

This renewed focus on literacy education programs is justified and should be emphasized in the CAS. Burkina has long been recognized as having some of the best models for basic literacy training in all of Africa. Unfortunately, the local impact of this widespread training does not appear to be reflected in the current literacy figures which are drawn from the most recent census rather than from a more scientifically based sample survey. The same renewed emphasis on literacy training can be justified on the basis of the striking evidence from IDA supported sector work in Burkina (Donnelly-Roark 1998a, 1998b; Donnelly-Roark 1999) or West Africa (Easton et al. 1998) that the spread of literacy among community leaders is probably the single most important factor influencing their ability to manage the local level institutions needed for rural decentralization. For all these reasons it is important to understand that IDA's exclusion of basic literacy from its programs since the mid-1980s was not by accident but rather a deliberate response to their perception of the need for greater focus in the government's macroeconomic and political support for primary education and the strong political overtones that infused the previous generation of "commando" campaigns.

Table 3.1. Recent Indicators of Educational Performance

| Indicator | 1960 | 1981/83 | 1985 | 1991 | 1994 | 1996 | 1997 |
|--|------|---------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Gross Enrollment Rate | | | | | | | |
| Primary | 5% | | 23% | | | | 40% |
| Secondary | | | 4% | | | | 9% |
| Tertiary | | | 0.5% | | | | 1.3% |
| Girls Share enrollment | | | | | | | |
| Primary-public school only | | | | 31% | | | 39% |
| Primary all | | | | 37% | | | 40% |
| Secondary | | | | | 34% | | 37% |
| Tertiary | | | | | | | 23% |
| % Girls in private schools | | | | | | | |
| Primary | | | | | | | 10% |
| Secondary | | | | | | | 39% |
| Percentage of repeaters | | | | | | | |
| Primary | | | | | | | 17 |
| Secondary | | | | | | 25% | 24.5% |
| Students years per graduate (6 yrs= Normal) | | | 26 | | | | 12 |
| Percentage pass exam | | | | | | | |
| CEPC | | | 25% | | | | 53% |
| Transition to 2nd | | | | | | 27% | 28% |
| BEPC | | | | | | | 38% |
| BAC | | | | | | | 35% |
| Adult Literacy Rate | | | | | | | 81% |
| Male | | | | | | | 72% |
| Female | | | | | | | 91% |
| Annual increase Gvt. Budget devoted to education (all) | | | | 9 | 9 | | 9 |
| to primary education | | | | 9.5 | 9.5 | | 9.5 |
| to post-primary | | | | 8.4 | 8.4 | | 8.4 |

Source: Ndao 1998.

An important challenge for new CAS will be to conceptualize some of the new opportunities being created by these higher rates of primary education schooling and basic literacy for other IDA supported initiatives (past and present). One example, from the single field visit we made to Kaya, was the way increased primary school enrollments were increasing villager's willingness and ability to participate in managing the recurrent costs of the village school (a facility constructed under the closed IDA Project, Education III) and the new CSPA facility in a neighboring village three kilometers away (funded under the still operative IDA Project, PSSN).

3.1.2. *Effectiveness and Efficiency*

The successful evolution of this tightly focused national strategy for primary education resulted in a 17% increase since 1985 in basic school attendance for both girls and boys (Table 3.1).

Especially important in terms of increasing the overall efficiency of the school system, IDA assistance appears to have contributed to a substantial increase in educational quality as indicated by standard measures such as the percentage of students passing the elementary exam and a 33% decrease in the number of person years required per certificate granted (i.e., six years being average).² The percentage of graduates gaining the Certificate of Primary Education (CEPE) has increased from 24 to 53%. To reduce salary costs, the government is piloting (with IDA support) satellite schools where teachers are paid 50% less than the civil service teachers. Other cost savings measures, such as the new combined system of double shift and multi-grade classes, has enabled the primary school system to absorb 80,000 additional children who would not have a chance to go to school without that system.

On average 950 new primary school teachers have been hired each year demonstrating the priority given to primary education by the government as regards provision of teachers. Today the resulting increase in primary school construction is creating new challenges for secondary school and university education that are being addressed through IDA support for the Post Primary Education Project (FY96) and the forthcoming "Basic Education Ten-year Program" (BETYP).

3.1.3. *Factors that Contributed to or Detracted from Effectiveness and Efficacy*

The first two IDA projects (Education I and II, FY73 and FY80) did not achieve their stated goals of increasing rural education levels, although they did increase the total number of classrooms and trained teachers devoted to this effort, and trained a number of core ministry staff. The two more recent projects which concentrated on primary education (Education III and IV, FY 85 and FY 91) have been more effective in achieving their physical, financial, institutional and policy goals.

² In 1986/86 from an initial cohort of 1000, only 690 reached the final grade of primary education as compared with 800 in 1997. During the same time frame 26 pupil years, and 12 were spent respectively.

IDA support for a computer simulation model that enabled the Ministry to model the long-term impacts of continuing its earlier adherence to a parallel system of three year terminal rural education appears to have played a critical role in generating political support for the major paradigm shift needed to develop a more effective strategy for increasing educational participation and literacy (Box 2). One of the best measures showing the high levels of ownership of the simulation model is the fact that a revised version of it is still being used by the government as a basis for the Ministry of Basic Education's strategy analysis and planning. Bank support for two short-term group visits to examine similar experiences in Senegal is another factor that appears to have played a key role in the Ministry's willingness to conceptualize the Basic Education Ten-year Program and various types of teacher employment reforms it is considering in the future.

Another factor that dramatically increased the effectiveness of both the Third and Fourth Education Projects was to make strong consistent budgetary support for education and key policy reforms preconditions for the negotiation and disbursement of the major adjustment loans.

Even then, however, it is possible to see a substantial increase in overall effectiveness between the Third and Fourth Education Projects.

The Third Education Project was plagued by a host of administrative and management problems that delayed execution of the project by three years and necessitated two postponements of the closing date. Many of the problems can be traced to the weak institutional capacity of the Ministry at the time. Other factors can be traced to the initial project design which appears to have been conducted, like many projects designed in that tumultuous time period, with less than full communication between IDA and the relevant national partners.

Efforts to adjust these programs and to redesign specific project components (such as the complex pilot program to promote lower cost construction of schools and the assessment of the FJA system) were complicated by:

- frequent turnover (six) in the project directors between 1986 and 1993;
- an unwieldy administrative structure which required major participation by at least nine departments or agencies belonging to three different ministries;
- irregular supervision missions, with little agreement on the content or priority to be accorded to the resulting recommendations during the early phases of the project; and
- the abrupt decision by the IDA to stop supporting certain project components such as the transition support for the FJAs and the pilot program for promoting low cost class room construction.

Although the pace of project disbursements was extremely slow during the first six years, the tempo increased considerably after 1991 when the Education Projects Bureau was granted a

special dispensation from the government and the Bank from compliance with procurement requirements. This administrative change, combined with a concerted effort by the resident representative, the country economist, and the country director, appears to have stabilized the administrative turnover in the project and improved communication. The result, noted from both sides, was an improvement in implementation during 1993 (almost eight years after signing) (Ministry of Basic Education and General Literacy 1994: 6).³ Despite these substantial delays, the Education III Project (FY85-94) did manage, with considerable effort, to meet most of its principal goals for:

- increased enrollment: a substantial increase in the overall gross enrollment ratio (from 23.9 to 32.8 percent), a 40 percent increase in total intake in first grade, and a very slight increase in total enrollment of girls (2 percentage points);

- lower unit costs: adoption of: (a) a variety of new training programs and civil service grade changes; (b) double-shift teaching (one teacher teaches one group of students in the morning and another in the afternoon) in urban areas and the expansion of multi-grade teaching (one teacher teaching two or more grade levels in the same class room) in rural schools; and (c) new construction methods and bidding procedures that resulted in a 50% reduction in classroom costs between 1987 and 1990;

- increased quality: (a) training 2,400 new teachers; (b) revising the Teacher Training College's curriculum; (c) 1.6 million new books and 70,000 teachers' guides (more than twice the project target of 800,000);

- increased infrastructure: full implementation of the classroom construction program calling for the construction and equipping of 450 classrooms, 450 teachers' houses, 150 canteens, and 150 double latrines in seven provinces;

- more sustainable funding: (a) a 10 percent increase in the share of the government's education budgeted allocated to primary education (from 42.6 to 51.0 percent) and (b) a slight increase in the share of education in the total budget (from 21.7 to 22.3 percent). Especially important in terms of the preparation of the next project was the Third Education Project's impact on the ministry itself through special training, equipment, specialist services, and diagnostic studies.

The final phase of Education III (closed on March 31, 1994) coincided with the preparation of the Fourth Education Project that was approved in May 1991. In contrast to the previous project, which had been designed with relatively little input from the Ministry staff, this project was designed to reinforce the government's second five-year education plan. The high level of informed Ministry input into the design appears to have contributed to a much more focused and realistic project design and government ownership.

³ As of March 31, 1994, the school building program execution rate had risen from 43 percent (in 1991) to 92 percent in the case of schools and from 16 percent (in 1991) to 85 percent in the case of teachers' houses.

The sense of ownership and commitment to the project seems to have been further enhanced by the Bank's decision to organize a highly participatory mid-term review of the project in 1995 that was chaired by the Minister. The frank discussions of the procurement and accounting problems encountered by the projects, combined with the Resident Mission's attempts to identify staff who could serve as local resource persons for understanding these issues, seems to have substantially reduced the procedural delays which reduced overall effectiveness and efficiency. The high efficiency and impressive results of Education IV, exceeding all expectations,⁴ attest to the long-term effectiveness of the experimental participatory style of project conception, execution and monitoring that IDA and the Ministry of Primary Education have followed since the first policy workshop sixteen years ago (Box 3.2).

3.1.4. *Impact on Gender Issues and Poverty Reduction*

One major impact of the program was to increase the enrollment of girls in public primary schools from 31% to 39% and for all schools from 37% to 40% (Ndao 1998: 2). Small improvements in girls' enrollment in secondary school are already evident (Table 3.1). The stage is set for a similar impact on girls' participation in tertiary education, as 60% of the student's rooms at the university are reserved for girls.

Table 3.2. Gender Issues in Contemporary Education

| Indicator | 1997 |
|---|--|
| Primary Education-Urban | 76% boys 66% girls |
| Primary Education-Rural | 33% boys 21% girls |
| % Adults having attended school-rural | 90% never 8% some primary schooling |
| Gross primary school enrollment ratio variation between provinces | 11-86% |

Source: Ndao 1998.

⁴ The percentage of repetition has been reduced at the primary level to 16% and at the secondary level to 25%. In 1985, out of a cohort of 1000 students, only 690 completed primary school, as compared to 800 students in 1994. Student Years (the average number of student years needed for one student to receive the primary school certificate) have been considerably reduced from 26 to 12, while the success rate on the primary school certificate exam rose from 49 to 62 percent and from 44 to 57 percent for girls. The gross primary school enrollment ratio (GER) has increased to 40 percent from a low of 5 percent in 1960 and 16 percent in 1983 (just before Education III started). Total primary school enrollments have increased on average at a rate of 7 percent and the proportion of girls in the total enrollments has reached 39 percent (Project Status Report, Burkina Faso, Education IV, 11/10/98).

Overtime, one would expect that the project's attempts to increase the "supply" of good quality primary school services would help reduce the gross inequity in access to education that still distinguishes rural and urban areas and differentiates the lowest from the highest income groups (Table 3.2). Any long-term attempt to truly address this issue, however, must grapple with some of the factors that affect "demand." The recent *Enquete Prioritaire* showed that the most frequently cited reason for not sending children to school was the high cost of schooling (24% of all children), followed by parent's refusal to send their kids to school (22%), and the absence of a school or its distant location (15%) (Ndao 1999).⁵ The same study showed wide variation between regions in drop-out rates. Early evidence for the profound impacts of increased education on local capacity building and poverty reduction (Donnelly-Roark et al. 1999; Easton et al. 1998) suggests that future education projects should consider collaborating with other sector initiatives in monitoring education indicators and impacts more closely.

3.1.5. *Summary Rating: Outcome*

In sum, IDA has had a major impact on the education system of Burkina through a combination of benchmarks for adjustment credits and investment lending since the late 1980s. The impact on educational outcomes must also be rated as highly satisfactory having attained or surpassed most of its intended objectives. This same assistance package must receive high marks for increasing the overall efficiency of the system by: (a) helping the government develop a more efficient focused model for basic education and (b) introducing new methods of multiple class scheduling, lower book production costs, and low cost construction to lower the unit costs of this increased supply. Thus the summary rating for outcome is rated as "highly satisfactory."

3.2. **Institutional Development**

The two primary education projects funded by IDA since the early 1980s have had a major impact on the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Primary Education. Especially important, this support has strengthened: (a) total funding for the sector; and (b) the planning, administrative, financial and monitoring capacity of the Ministry. These grants have also increased the capacity of the Ministry to lobby for the types of line government and donor support that it needs to maintain these investments over time. The Ministry's negotiation of two new donor funded projects (from the Netherlands, Belgium and others) represents one of the first fruits of this enhanced institutional capacity. Another achievement has been to stimulate the role of the private sector schools in picking up some of the short-fall in infrastructure capacity.

The high levels of informed government technical and analytical input from the Ministries of Higher Education and Basic Education being put into the Basic Ten Year Education Program

⁵ The same study calculated that, among poor families, children contribute between 5 and 35 percent of total household consumption. For rural areas, the contribution goes from 3% at the poverty line, to 33% for the poorest observed household. In urban areas, it goes from 5% at the poverty line, to 26% for the poorest observed household. For a household that is struggling to survive, a child's contribution of 5-30% of per capita consumption is too high a price to pay for allowing him/her to attend school.

which is now being completed constitute a major step toward sustainability.

The summary rating for impact is rated as “high.”

3.3. Sustainability

In the education sector, sustainability is an issue at two levels. The first revolves around the sustainability of the improvements/gains acquired under the projects. The second issue involves the sustainability of the actual investments in buildings, teaching materials, and teacher education.

Probably the most important factor for maintaining the existing incremental increases in quality, school attendance, and literacy rates will be budget. Traditionally, the Ministries of Education have had a relatively weak bargaining position before the Ministry of Finance. One immediate impact of the Third and Fourth Education projects and the SAC, ERC, and HIPC conditionalities on the share of budget going to education was to stabilize these fluctuating patterns.

Even if participation rates for girls and boys can be maintained with the existing level of resources, it is unlikely, that the existing system will be capable of bringing about further increases in participation or quality without bringing in additional resources even if the unit cost of certain inputs (like teacher salaries) drops. Thus one key issue in sustainability will be for the sector to maintain the types of sustained budgetary support from the state that it has enjoyed thanks to IDA stipulations in the country's adjustment loans. Over time, the wider base of educated people will create the type of lobby needed to demand and maintain this education budget.

A second set of sustainability issues revolve around the maintenance of specific IDA-supported investments. One of the most immediate and visible results of IDA support has been a substantial increase in the total number and quality of school buildings. In addition, both the Third and Fourth Education Projects have attempted to increase the long-term sustainability of these investments by: (a) reducing the unit costs of new construction and books, (b) increasing the Government's resource allocation to primary education; and (c) encouraging community input into the long-term maintenance of classroom buildings and materials (books, chalk, desks, etc.).

One big insight from Education III was that the project's initial conception of participation overestimated the capacity of local communities to contribute financially to these efforts. Any long-term attempt to sustain local investments must try to elicit higher levels of district level support from NGOs and other non-education sector actors in the conception, execution and maintenance of educational infrastructure and services. This is especially important in poorer, drought prone areas of Burkina where parents are hard pressed to pay even the most basic fees for educational materials and fees. For NGOs to be interested, however, they must see a payoff. This payoff should be in the form of more effective and efficient management of NGO investments by the community groups with which they work due to higher education levels and literacy rates.⁶ For

⁶ During the field visit to Kaya, we observed that the key individuals involved in managing the funds of the neighboring CSPS Health facility (being helped under the still active IDA Project PDSN) were elementary school

this payoff to be realized, however, the district and province level officers of NGOs need to be better informed. Future planning under the CAS needs to emphasize the critical importance of this type of regional level cooperation and information-sharing. To date, however, neither IDA nor the Ministry of Basic Education has the simple village or *quartier*-level statistics on school attendance or success rates that would facilitate more detailed regional-level analysis or planning. This type of data will be especially important in the forthcoming Rural Development Project (PNGT2) which foresees reinforcing basic education and health services in the villages where it intervenes. Ideally this more integrated approach will help the project deal more effectively with the cost-constraint issue which was listed as the primary problem restricting school enrollments.

3.4. Bank Performance

The Bank's performance in relation to the Education sector has changed dramatically over the last fifteen years. Especially important, one sees a dramatic improvement in the quality of the dialogue between IDA and the two relevant ministries with a stellar improvement in results. The first important factor that improved the dialogue quality was the improved training and education of the Ministry officials. The second critical factor was a major shift within the Bank that fostered the development of a more participatory style of portfolio management after 1992. Another important shift in the Bank's orientation which affected this project directly was the country team's decision to emphasize sector initiatives as opposed to projects. A good example of this was the decision to expand the focus of the Education IV mid-term review (in November 1994) beyond an analysis of the current program to include reflection on emerging issues.

A fourth factor which improved the quality of the Bank's dialogue with and assistance to the education sector was the Resident Mission's organization of the first participatory country portfolio reviews in January 1995 and 1997. These portfolio review sessions provided a mechanism for the project directors to discuss a variety of problems they were experiencing with Bank regulations for procurement and disbursement. The Resident Mission's willingness to respond by designating key individuals in the mission as experts on procurement and disbursement issues as a backup to the Washington-based staff expertise were a fifth positive initiative that seems to have increased loan effectiveness and efficacy. A fifth factor which improved overall performance in all areas was the Bank's decision to post a senior education headquarters staff member in the resident mission⁷

The summary ranking for analytical support is satisfactory. Although Bank support on design was unsatisfactory on the Education III project, it is considered highly satisfactory since the Education IV project in 1990. High rankings must also be accorded for supervision and for monitoring and evaluation. Thus the overall ranking of bank performance since 1991 is considered

graduates. The same graduates appear to be the most active individuals involved in helping the village women to organize a separate women's groupement under the agricultural NGO ADRK.

⁷ This posting decision: (a) enabled the Education IV Project speed up implementation by shortening the time lag in decision-making; (b) improved the overall coordination between IDA with other sector donors and the Ministry; (c) deepened the participatory process need to develop the Ten Year Basic Education Program; and (d) helped the government have develop more long-term vision for sector planning.