{"id":22,"date":"2012-09-05T11:22:33","date_gmt":"2012-09-05T15:22:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/people.clas.ufl.edu\/template\/?page_id=22"},"modified":"2026-05-01T16:45:49","modified_gmt":"2026-05-01T20:45:49","slug":"research","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/people.clas.ufl.edu\/gwitmer\/research\/","title":{"rendered":"Research"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<section class=\"fullwidth-text-block\"><div class=\"container px-0\"><div class=\"row align-items-start\"><div class=\"col-12\">\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Research<\/h1>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Current research projects<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>&#8220;Grounds for a Free Lunch.&#8221;\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Defense of the thesis that full grounds imply a &#8220;free lunch&#8221; status; more precisely, if the fact that P is fully grounded by a collection G of facts, then the fact that P is nothing over and above the facts in G.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><em>Physicalism, Apriority, and Consciousness<\/em>.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Book manuscript in (slow) progress defending a kind of a priori physicalism in a systematic fashion, with attention to phenomenal consciousness as the big troublemaker for physicalism and how an a priori link to such can plausibly be established.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>&#8220;Making Sense of &#8216;Naturalism&#8217;.&#8221;\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Advances a diagnosis of how &#8216;naturalism&#8217; in the metaphysical sense is best understood, discerning a fundamental unity among many seemingly disparate formulations and using this to offer advice for future invocations of the term.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Recent and upcoming publications<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Review of Ross Cameron (2022) <em>Chains of Being: Infinite Regress, Circularity, and Metaphysical Explanation<\/em>. <em>Australasian Journal of Philosophy. <\/em>DOI: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/full\/10.1080\/00048402.2024.2384912\">10.1080\/00048402.2024.2384912<\/a><\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>\u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/doi\/10.1111\/phib.12213\">Dual Carving and Minimal Rationalism.<\/a>\u201d <em>Analytic Philosophy<\/em> 62: 223-234. August 2021.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>\u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/journals\/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association\/article\/full-and-partial-grounding\/1B92B9589B28111A7B3848B9A87C702F\">Full and Partial Grounding<\/a>.\u201d Co-authored with Kelly Trogdon. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (2): 252-270. Summer 2021.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>\u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/journals\/canadian-journal-of-philosophy\/article\/physicalism-unblocked\/C23E89D8BC4578E3DC88C31F553CDB0F\">Physicalism UnBlocked<\/a>.\u201d\u00a0<em>Canadian Journal of Philosophy<\/em> 50 (7): 890-904. October 2020.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>\u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s11245-016-9415-y\">Physicality for Physicalists.<\/a>\u201d\u00a0<em>Topoi <\/em>37 (3): 457-472. September 2018. Special issue \u201cThe Character of Physicalism\u201d edited by Andreas Elpidorou.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>\u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ingentaconnect.com\/contentone\/imp\/jcs\/2017\/00000024\/f0020009\/art00005\">Platonistic Physicalism without Tears<\/a>.\u201d\u00a0<em>Journal of Consciousness Studies <\/em>24 (9-10): 72-90. 2017. Part of a collection of papers responding to Susan Schneider\u2019s \u201cDoes the Mathematical Nature of Physics Undermine Physicalism?\u201d<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/fpr.cah.ucf.edu\/article\/chudnoff-on-the-awareness-of-abstract-objects\/\">\u201cChudnoff on our Awareness of Abstract Objects.\u201d<\/a>\u00a0<em>Florida Philosophical Review<\/em> 16 (1): 105-116. Winter 2016.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>\u201cA Simple Theory of Intrinsicality.\u201d In Robert M. Francescotti, ed., <a href=\"https:\/\/www.degruyter.com\/document\/doi\/10.1515\/9783110292596\/html\"><em>Companion to Intrinsic Properties<\/em>.<\/a> Berlin: DeGruyter, 2014. Pages 111-138.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Recent and upcoming presentations<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>&#8220;The Near Miss Modal Ontological Argument for Atheism.&#8221; Co-authored with Micah Edvension.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>March 26, 2026. Society for Philosophy of Religion. San Antonio, Texas.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>February 6, 2026. Florida Philosophical Association. Ybor City, Florida.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Comments on Evan Welchance&#8217;s &#8220;Consciousness and Composition.&#8221;\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>January 7, 2026, Eastern Division, American Philosophical Association. Baltimore, Maryland.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Comments on Evan Welchance&#8217;s &#8220;The Problem of Referential Adicity for Easy Ontology.&#8221;\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>January 8, 2025. Eastern Division, American Philosophical Association. New York, New York.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Comments on Torrance Fung&#8217;s &#8220;Naive Realism and Color Primitivism.&#8221; \n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>January 15, 2024. Eastern Division, American Philosophical Association. New York, New York.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Comments on Ryan Miller&#8217;s &#8220;Artifacts: Ontology as Easy as it Gets.&#8221;\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>January 6, 2023. Eastern Division, American Philosophical Association. Montreal, Canada.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>&#8220;Now You See It, Now You Don&#8217;t: What Matters in Disputes over Multiple Realization.&#8221;\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Part of an invited symposium &#8220;Multiple Realization in Fact and Theory.&#8221; February 24, 2022. Central Division, American Philosophical Association. Chicago, IL.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Comments on Daniel Giberman and David Kovacs, &#8220;Property Dualism (not?) for Property Nominalists.&#8221;\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>February 26, 2020. Central Division, American Philosophical Association. Chicago, IL.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>&#8220;Grounds for a Free Lunch.&#8221;\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>November 1, 2019. Florida Philosophical Association. Gainesville, FL.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>\u201cGoff\u2019s Insufficiently Minimal Minimal Rationalism.\u201d November 2, 2018.\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Florida Philosophical Association. Pensacola, FL.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>\u201cMetaphysics and A Priori Vindication.\u201d\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>May 10, 2018. Invited talk at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Santa Cruz, CA.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/section>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"author":1199,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"featured_post":"","footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"class_list":["post-22","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/people.clas.ufl.edu\/gwitmer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/22","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/people.clas.ufl.edu\/gwitmer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/people.clas.ufl.edu\/gwitmer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/people.clas.ufl.edu\/gwitmer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1199"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/people.clas.ufl.edu\/gwitmer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=22"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/people.clas.ufl.edu\/gwitmer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/22\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":549,"href":"https:\/\/people.clas.ufl.edu\/gwitmer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/22\/revisions\/549"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/people.clas.ufl.edu\/gwitmer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=22"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}