

**Technical Appendix to Accompany**  
**“Employing Simple Cost-Sharing Policies to Motivate the**  
**Efficient Implementation of Distributed Energy Resources”**

by David P. Brown and David E. M. Sappington

This Technical Appendix has three sections. Section 1 describes how the numerical solutions to [P] and [PNC] are derived. Section 2 explains how the numerical solutions to [PM] are derived. Section 3 derives the analytic characterization of the solutions to [Pm] and [PR] and describes how the numerical solutions to these problems are derived.

## 1 Numerical Solutions to [P] and [PNC].

We begin by defining two problems, labeled [P1] and [P2].

Problem [P1]

$$\text{Maximize}_{\bar{r}, r_0, s} \quad - \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_n} \left\{ \bar{r} + \left( \frac{s}{\delta} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right\} dG(\delta) - [1 - G(\delta_n)] r_0$$

subject to  $r_0 \geq c_0$ , and

$$\bar{r} - \bar{c} + \left( \frac{1}{\delta_n} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} (s)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right] = r_0 - c_0.$$

$(\delta_{n1}, \bar{r}_1, r_{01}, s_1)$  will denote the solution to [P1].

Problem [P2]

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Maximize}_{\bar{r}, r_0, s} \quad & - \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \{ \underline{c} + \bar{r} - \bar{c} + s [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \} dG(\delta) \\ & - \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left\{ \bar{r} + \left( \frac{s}{\delta} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right\} dG(\delta) - [1 - G(\delta_n)] r_0 \end{aligned}$$

subject to  $r_0 \geq c_0$ , and

$$\bar{r} - \bar{c} + \left( \frac{1}{\delta_n} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} (s)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right] = r_0 - c_0,$$

where  $\delta_1 = s [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]$ .

$(\delta_{12}, \delta_{n2}, \bar{r}_2, r_{02}, s_2)$  will denote the solution to [P2].

**Observation A1.** If  $\delta_{n1} \leq \bar{\delta}$  and  $s_1 \leq \frac{\delta}{\bar{c}-\underline{c}}$  (so  $\frac{s_1}{\delta} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \leq 1$  for all  $\delta \in [\underline{\delta}, \bar{\delta}]$ ), then  $(\delta_{n1}, \bar{r}_1, r_{01}, s_1)$  is the solution to the regulator's problem .

**Observation A2.** If  $\delta_{n1} \leq \bar{\delta}$ ,  $s_1 > \frac{\delta}{\bar{c}-\underline{c}}$ ,  $\delta_{12} > \underline{\delta}$ , and  $\delta_{n2} \leq \bar{\delta}$ , then the solution to [P2] is the solution to the regulator's problem.

Otherwise, the solution to [PNC] is the solution to the regulator's problem. We solve the constrained nonlinear programs [P] and [PNC] using the CONOPT algorithm in GAMS (Ferris and Munson, 2000).

### Calculations for the Numerical Solutions to [P] and [PNC]

Consider any  $\delta_1, \delta_2 \in [\underline{\delta}, \bar{\delta}]$ , with  $\delta_2 \geq \delta_1$ . When  $\delta$  is uniformly distributed on  $[\underline{\delta}, \bar{\delta}]$ :

$$\int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_2} \delta dG(\delta) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{1}{\bar{\delta} - \underline{\delta}} \right] [(\delta_2)^2 - (\delta_1)^2]. \quad (1)$$

When  $\gamma = 2$ :

$$\int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_2} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta) = \left[ \frac{1}{\bar{\delta} - \underline{\delta}} \right] [\ln(\delta_2) - \ln(\delta_1)]. \quad (2)$$

When  $\gamma \neq 2$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_2} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta) &= \left[ \frac{1}{\bar{\delta} - \underline{\delta}} \right] \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_2} (\delta)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} d\delta = \left[ \frac{1}{\bar{\delta} - \underline{\delta}} \right] \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma-2} \right] (\delta)^{\frac{2-\gamma}{1-\gamma}} \Big|_{\delta_1}^{\delta_2} \\ &= \left[ \frac{1}{\bar{\delta} - \underline{\delta}} \right] \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma-2} \right] [(\delta_2)^{\frac{\gamma-2}{\gamma-1}} - (\delta_1)^{\frac{\gamma-2}{\gamma-1}}]. \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Case 1.  $\delta_n \leq \bar{\delta}$ , so the relevant problem is [P].

Expected procurement cost in this case is:

$$\begin{aligned} E\{\text{Proc Cost}\} &= \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \underline{r} dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \{p(\delta) \underline{r} + [1 - p(\delta)] \bar{r}\} dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_n}^{\bar{\delta}} r_0 dG(\delta) \\ &= \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \{\bar{r} + [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]\} dG(\delta) + [1 - G(\delta_n)] c_0 \\ &\quad + \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left\{ \bar{r} + \left( \frac{s}{\delta} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right\} dG(\delta) \\ &= G(\delta_1) \{\bar{r} + [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]\} + \bar{r} [G(\delta_n) - G(\delta_1)] + [1 - G(\delta_n)] c_0 \end{aligned}$$

$$+ (s)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left(\frac{1}{\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta). \quad (4)$$

The firm's expected profit is:

$$\begin{aligned} E\{\pi\} &= \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \left\{ \bar{r} - \bar{c} + s[\bar{c} - \underline{c}] - \frac{\delta}{\gamma} \right\} dG(\delta) \\ &+ \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left\{ \bar{r} - \bar{c} + \left(\frac{1}{\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} (s)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}\right] \right\} dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_n}^{\bar{\delta}} [r_0 - c_0] dG(\delta) \\ &= [\bar{r} - \bar{c} + s(\bar{c} - \underline{c})] G(\delta_1) - \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \delta dG(\delta) + [G(\delta_n) - G(\delta_1)] [\bar{r} - \bar{c}] \\ &+ [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} (s)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}\right] \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left(\frac{1}{\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta) + [1 - G(\delta_n)] [r_0 - c_0]. \quad (5) \end{aligned}$$

The expected success probability is:

$$\begin{aligned} E\{p(\delta)\} &= \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} 1 dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left(\frac{s}{\delta} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta) \\ &= G(\delta_1) + (s)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left(\frac{1}{\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta). \quad (6) \end{aligned}$$

Expected project cost is:

$$\begin{aligned} E\{\text{Cost}\} &= \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \left[\underline{c} + \frac{\delta}{\gamma}\right] dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left\{ \underline{c} p(\delta) + \bar{c} [1 - p(\delta)] + \frac{\delta}{\gamma} [p(\delta)]^\gamma \right\} dG(\delta) \\ &+ \int_{\delta_n}^{\bar{\delta}} c_0 dG(\delta) \\ &= \underline{c} G(\delta_1) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \delta dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left\{ \bar{c} - p(\delta) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] + \frac{\delta}{\gamma} [p(\delta)]^\gamma \right\} dG(\delta) \\ &+ [1 - G(\delta_n)] c_0 \\ &= \underline{c} G(\delta_1) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \delta dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left\{ \bar{c} - \left(\frac{s}{\delta} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] + \frac{\delta}{\gamma} \left(\frac{s}{\delta} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]\right)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \right\} dG(\delta) \\ &+ [1 - G(\delta_n)] c_0 \\ &= \underline{c} G(\delta_1) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \delta dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left\{ \bar{c} - (s)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[1 - \frac{s}{\gamma}\right] \left(\frac{1}{\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \right\} dG(\delta) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& + [1 - G(\delta_n)] c_0 \\
= & \underline{c} G(\delta_1) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \delta dG(\delta) + \bar{c} [G(\delta_n) - G(\delta_1)] \\
& - (s)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\gamma - s}{\gamma} \right] \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta) + [1 - G(\delta_n)] c_0. \tag{7}
\end{aligned}$$

Case 2.  $\delta_n > \bar{\delta}$ , so the relevant problem is [PNC].

Expected procurement cost in this case is:

$$\begin{aligned}
E\{\text{Proc Cost}\} & = \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \underline{r} dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \{p(\delta) \underline{r} + [1 - p(\delta)] \bar{r}\} dG(\delta) \\
& = \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \{\bar{r} + [s - 1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]\} dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left\{ \bar{r} + \left( \frac{s}{\delta} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s - 1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right\} dG(\delta) \\
& = G(\delta_1) \{\bar{r} + [s - 1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]\} + \bar{r} [1 - G(\delta_1)] \\
& \quad + (s)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s - 1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta). \tag{8}
\end{aligned}$$

The firm's expected profit is:

$$\begin{aligned}
E\{\pi\} & = \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \left\{ \bar{r} - \bar{c} + s[\bar{c} - \underline{c}] - \frac{\delta}{\gamma} \right\} dG(\delta) \\
& \quad + \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left\{ \bar{r} - \bar{c} + \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} (s)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] \right\} dG(\delta) \\
& = [\bar{r} - \bar{c} + s(\bar{c} - \underline{c})] G(\delta_1) - \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \delta dG(\delta) + [1 - G(\delta_1)] [\bar{r} - \bar{c}] \\
& \quad + [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} (s)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta). \tag{9}
\end{aligned}$$

The expected success probability is:

$$\begin{aligned}
E\{p(\delta)\} & = \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} 1 dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left( \frac{s}{\delta} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta) \\
& = G(\delta_1) + (s)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta). \tag{10}
\end{aligned}$$

Expected project cost is:

$$\begin{aligned}
E \{ \text{Cost} \} &= \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \left[ \underline{c} + \frac{\delta}{\gamma} \right] dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left\{ \underline{c} p(\delta) + \bar{c} [1 - p(\delta)] + \frac{\delta}{\gamma} [p(\delta)]^\gamma \right\} dG(\delta) \\
&= \underline{c} G(\delta_1) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \delta dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left\{ \bar{c} - p(\delta) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] + \frac{\delta}{\gamma} [p(\delta)]^\gamma \right\} dG(\delta) \\
&= \underline{c} G(\delta_1) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \delta dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left\{ \bar{c} - \left( \frac{s}{\delta} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] + \frac{\delta}{\gamma} \left( \frac{s}{\delta} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \right\} dG(\delta) \\
&= \underline{c} G(\delta_1) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \delta dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left\{ \bar{c} - (s)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ 1 - \frac{s}{\gamma} \right] \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \right\} dG(\delta) \\
&= \underline{c} G(\delta_1) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \delta dG(\delta) + \bar{c} [1 - G(\delta_1)] \\
&\quad - (s)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\gamma - s}{\gamma} \right] \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta). \tag{11}
\end{aligned}$$

## 2 Numerical Solutions to [PM].

To characterize the solution to [PM] numerically, we:

1. Solve for  $\delta_1$  and  $\delta_n$ .
2. Draw 250,000 values randomly from a uniform distribution on the support  $[\underline{\delta}, \bar{\delta}]$ .
3. For each  $\delta$  realization, solve for the optimal procurement policy  $(\underline{r}(\delta), \bar{r}(\delta), s(\delta), r_0(\delta))$  and the associated level of procurement cost, profit, project cost, probability of success, and effort cost.
4. Summarize the distribution of values by its minimum, mean, maximum, and standard-deviation.

Observe that for  $a \neq 1$ :

$$\int [2\delta - \underline{\delta}]^{-a} d\delta = \frac{1}{2[1-a]} [2\delta - \underline{\delta}]^{1-a}.$$

Therefore, if  $\gamma = 2$ , then  $\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1} = 2$ , and so for  $\delta_x, \delta_y \in [\underline{\delta}, \bar{\delta}]$  with  $\delta_x \leq \delta_y$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
\int_{\delta_x}^{\delta_y} [2\delta - \underline{\delta}]^{-\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} d\delta &= -\frac{1}{2} [2\delta_y - \underline{\delta}]^{-1} + \frac{1}{2} [2\delta_x - \underline{\delta}]^{-1} \\
&= \frac{1}{2\underline{\delta} - 4\delta_y} - \frac{1}{2\underline{\delta} - 4\delta_x}. \tag{12}
\end{aligned}$$

Furthermore, if  $\gamma = 3$ , then  $\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1} = \frac{3}{2}$ , and so  $\delta_x, \delta_y \in [\underline{\delta}, \bar{\delta}]$  with  $\delta_x \leq \delta_y$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{\delta_x}^{\delta_y} [2\delta - \underline{\delta}]^{-\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} d\delta &= -\frac{1}{2} [2\delta_y - \underline{\delta}]^{-\frac{1}{2}} + \frac{1}{2} [2\delta_x - \underline{\delta}]^{-\frac{1}{2}} \\ &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\delta_x - \underline{\delta}}} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\delta_y - \underline{\delta}}}. \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

Because  $G(\cdot)$  is uniform:

$$\delta_1 + \frac{G(\delta_1)}{g(\delta_1)} = \bar{c} - \underline{c} \Leftrightarrow \delta_1 + \delta_1 - \underline{\delta} = \bar{c} - \underline{c} \Leftrightarrow \delta_1 = \frac{1}{2} [\bar{c} - \underline{c} + \underline{\delta}]. \quad (14)$$

Because  $\delta + \frac{G(\delta)}{g(\delta)} = 2\delta - \underline{\delta}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} 2\delta_1 - \underline{\delta} &= \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right]^{\gamma-1} [\bar{c} - c_0]^{1-\gamma} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^\gamma \\ \Leftrightarrow \delta_1 &= \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right]^{\gamma-1} [\bar{c} - c_0]^{1-\gamma} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^\gamma + \underline{\delta} \right\}. \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

From Conclusion 6, when  $\delta < \delta_1$ :

$$\psi(\delta) = 1, \quad s(\delta) = \frac{\delta_1}{2\delta_1 - \underline{\delta}}, \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{r}(\delta) = z_1(\delta_1),$$

where:

$$\begin{aligned} z_1(\delta_1) &= \bar{c} + \frac{1}{\gamma} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{1}{2\underline{\delta} - 4\delta_1} - \frac{1}{2\underline{\delta} - 4\delta_1} \right] \\ &\quad - \left( \frac{1}{\delta_1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\delta_1}{2\delta_1 - \underline{\delta}} \right]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \quad \text{when } \gamma = 2; \text{ and} \\ z_1(\delta_1) &= \bar{c} + \frac{1}{\gamma} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\delta_1 - \underline{\delta}}} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\delta_1 - \underline{\delta}}} \right] \\ &\quad - \left( \frac{1}{\delta_1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\delta_1}{2\delta_1 - \underline{\delta}} \right]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \quad \text{when } \gamma = 3. \end{aligned}$$

When  $\delta < \delta_1$ ,  $p(\delta) = 1$ , procurement cost is  $\underline{r}(\delta)$ , effort cost is  $\frac{\delta}{\gamma}$ , total project cost is  $\underline{c} + \frac{\delta}{\gamma}$ , and profit is:

$$\Pi(\delta) = \bar{r}(\delta) - \bar{c} + s(\delta) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] - \frac{\delta}{\gamma}.$$

From Conclusion 6, when  $\delta \in [\delta_1, \delta_1]$ :

$$\psi(\delta) = 1, \quad s(\delta) = \frac{\delta}{2\delta - \underline{\delta}}, \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{r}(\delta) = z_1(\delta),$$

where:

$$z_1(\delta_1) = \bar{c} + \frac{1}{\gamma} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{1}{2\underline{\delta} - 4\delta_1} - \frac{1}{2\underline{\delta} - 4\underline{\delta}} \right] \\ - \left( \frac{1}{\underline{\delta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\delta}{2\underline{\delta} - \underline{\delta}} \right]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \quad \text{when } \gamma = 2; \text{ and}$$

$$z_1(\delta_1) = \bar{c} + \frac{1}{\gamma} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\underline{\delta} - \underline{\delta}}} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\delta_1 - \underline{\delta}}} \right] \\ - \left( \frac{1}{\underline{\delta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\delta}{2\underline{\delta} - \underline{\delta}} \right]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \quad \text{when } \gamma = 3.$$

When  $\delta \in [\delta_1, \delta_1]$ ,  $p(\delta) = \left( \frac{s(\delta)}{\delta} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}}$ , procurement cost is  $\underline{r}(\delta) + p(\delta) [\underline{r}(\delta) - \bar{r}(\delta)]$ , effort cost is  $\frac{\delta}{\gamma} [p(\delta)]^\gamma$ , total project cost is  $\underline{c} p(\delta) + \bar{c} [1 - p(\delta)] + \frac{\delta}{\gamma} [p(\delta)]^\gamma$ , and profit is:

$$\Pi(\delta) = \bar{r}(\delta) - \bar{c} + (s(\delta) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}])^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left( \frac{1}{\underline{\delta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right].$$

Also:

$$\underline{r}(\delta) = \bar{r}(\delta) + [s(\delta) - 1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}].$$

When  $\delta > \delta_n$ , the utility undertakes the core project and receives payment  $r_0(\delta) = c_0$ , so procurement cost and total project cost are  $c_0$ .

### 3 Characterizing the Solutions to [Pm] and [PR].

#### A. Characterizing the Solution to [Pm].

Paralleling the analysis that underlies the solution to [P], it is readily verified that problem [Pm] is:

$$\text{Maximize}_{r_0, s} \quad - \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \{ \underline{c} + m + s [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \} dG(\delta) \\ - \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left\{ \bar{c} + m + \left( \frac{s}{\delta} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s - 1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right\} dG(\delta) - [1 - G(\delta_n)] r_0 \\ \text{subject to} \quad r_0 \geq c_0, \quad \text{and} \tag{16}$$

$$\pi(\delta_n) = r_0 - c_0. \tag{17}$$

To characterize the solution to [Pm], let  $\lambda_0 \geq 0$  and  $\lambda_r$  denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (16) and (17), respectively. Then the Lagrangian function associated with [Pm] is:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L} &= - \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \{ \underline{c} + m + s [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \} dG(\delta) \\
&\quad - \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left\{ \bar{c} + m + \left( \frac{s}{\delta} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right\} dG(\delta) \\
&\quad - [1 - G(\delta_n)] r_0 + \lambda_0 [r_0 - c_0] + \lambda_r [r_0 - c_0 - \pi(\delta_n)].
\end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

The necessary conditions for a solution to [Pm] include:

$$\begin{aligned}
r_0 : \quad & - \frac{\partial \delta_n}{\partial r_0} g(\delta_n) \left[ \bar{c} + m + \left( \frac{s}{\delta_n} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] - r_0 \right] - [1 - G(\delta_n)] \\
& + \lambda_0 + \lambda_r - \lambda_r \frac{\partial \pi(\delta_n)}{\partial r_0} = 0;
\end{aligned} \tag{19}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
s : \quad & \frac{\partial \delta_1}{\partial s} g(\delta_1) \left\{ \bar{c} + m + \left( \frac{s}{\delta_1} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] - (\underline{c} + m + s [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]) \right\} \\
& - \frac{\partial \delta_n}{\partial s} g(\delta_n) \left[ \bar{c} + m + \left( \frac{s}{\delta_n} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] - r_0 \right] \\
& - \lambda_r \frac{\partial \pi(\delta_n)}{\partial s} - [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] G(\delta_1) \\
& - \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ (s)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} + [s-1] \left( \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right) (s)^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \right] dG(\delta) = 0.
\end{aligned} \tag{20}$$

From the definition of  $\delta_n$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
& \bar{c} + m + \left( \frac{s}{\delta_n} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] - r_0 \\
&= \bar{c} + m - r_0 + (\delta_n)^{-\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} (s)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \\
&= \bar{c} + m - r_0 + \left( s [1-s]^{\gamma-1} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^\gamma \left[ \frac{1}{\bar{c} + m - r_0} \right]^{\gamma-1} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} (s)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \\
&= \bar{c} + m - r_0 - s^{-\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [1-s]^{-1} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{-\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{1}{\bar{c} + m - r_0} \right]^{-1} (s)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [1-s] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \\
&= \bar{c} + m - r_0 - (\bar{c} + m - r_0) = 0.
\end{aligned} \tag{21}$$

Because  $\delta_1(s) = s [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]$ :



$$\begin{aligned}
& \bar{c} + m + \left( \frac{s}{\delta_1} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] - (\underline{c} + m + s[\bar{c} - \underline{c}]) \\
&= \bar{c} + m + [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] - (\underline{c} + m + s[\bar{c} - \underline{c}]) \\
&= [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] - (\underline{c} - \bar{c} + s[\bar{c} - \underline{c}]) \\
&= s[\bar{c} - \underline{c}] - s[\bar{c} - \underline{c}] = 0.
\end{aligned} \tag{22}$$

(21) and (22) imply that (19) and (20) can be written as:

$$\lambda_0 + \lambda_r - \lambda_r \frac{\partial \pi(\delta_n)}{\partial r_0} - [1 - G(\delta_n)] = 0; \quad \text{and} \tag{23}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& - \lambda_r \frac{\partial \pi(\delta_n)}{\partial s} - [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] G(\delta_1) \\
& - [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ s^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} + [s-1] \left( \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right) (s)^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \right] H(\delta_1, \delta_n) = 0,
\end{aligned} \tag{24}$$

where  $H(\delta_1, \delta_n) \equiv \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}}$ .

Observe that:

$$\begin{aligned}
& s^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} + [s-1] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right] (s)^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} = (s)^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ s + \left( \frac{s-1}{\gamma-1} \right) \right] \\
&= (s)^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{s(\gamma-1) + s-1}{\gamma-1} \right] = (s)^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{s\gamma-1}{\gamma-1} \right].
\end{aligned} \tag{25}$$

(25) implies that (24) can be written as:

$$\lambda_r \frac{\partial \pi(\delta_n)}{\partial s} + [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] G(\delta_1) = (s)^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{1-s\gamma}{\gamma-1} \right] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} H(\delta_1, \delta_n). \tag{26}$$

Observe that:

$$\begin{aligned}
\pi(\delta_n) &= m + \left( \frac{1}{\delta_n} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} (s)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right] \\
&= m + \left( \frac{[\bar{c} + m - r_0]^{\gamma-1}}{s[1-s]^{\gamma-1}[\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^\gamma} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} (s)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right] \\
&= m + \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right] [\bar{c} + m - r_0] \left[ \frac{s}{1-s} \right].
\end{aligned} \tag{27}$$

From (27):

$$\frac{\partial \pi(\delta_n)}{\partial r_0} = - \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] \left[ \frac{s}{1 - s} \right] = - \frac{s[\gamma - 1]}{\gamma[1 - s]}; \text{ and} \quad (28)$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi(\delta_n)}{\partial s} = \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] [\bar{c} + m - r_0] \left[ \frac{1}{1 - s} \right]^2. \quad (29)$$

(28) and (29) imply that (23) and (26) can be written as:

$$\lambda_0 + \lambda_r \left[ 1 + \frac{s(\gamma - 1)}{\gamma(1 - s)} \right] = 1 - G(\delta_n); \text{ and} \quad (30)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_r \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] [\bar{c} + m - r_0] \left[ \frac{1}{1 - s} \right]^2 + [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] G(\delta_1) \\ = (s)^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \frac{1 - s\gamma}{\gamma - 1} \right] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} H(\delta_1, \delta_n). \end{aligned} \quad (31)$$

To characterize the solution to the nonlinear mixed complementarity program [Pm], we solve for the values of  $\{s, r_0, \lambda_0, \lambda_r, \delta_1, \delta_n\}$  using the PATH algorithm in GAMS (Ferris and Munson, 2000).

## B. Characterizing the Solution to [PR].

To characterize the solution to [PR], define  $\underline{w} \equiv \underline{r} - \underline{c} = \bar{r} - \bar{c} + s[\bar{c} - \underline{c}]$  and  $\bar{w} \equiv \bar{r} - \bar{c}$ .

**Lemma 1.** *When  $\delta$  is realized and the firm implements the non-core project, it will implement success probability*

$$p(\delta) = \min \left\{ 1, \left( \frac{1}{\delta} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \right\}. \quad (32)$$

Proof. When the firm operates under the non-core project, it will choose  $p$  to

$$\underset{p}{\text{Maximize}} \quad p u(\underline{w}) + [1 - p] u(\bar{w}) - D(p, \delta)$$

When  $p \in (0, 1)$ , the utility's choice of  $p$  is determined by:

$$\begin{aligned} u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w}) = \delta p^{\gamma-1} &\Rightarrow p^{\gamma-1} = \frac{1}{\delta} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \\ \Rightarrow p(\delta) = \left( \frac{1}{\delta} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}}. \end{aligned} \quad (33)$$

The conclusion follows from (33) because  $p(\cdot)$  cannot exceed 1. ■

**Lemma 2.**  $p(\delta) = 1$  for all  $\delta \leq \delta_1(s) \equiv u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})$  when  $\delta$  is realized and the utility implements the non-core project.

Proof. (33) implies that  $p(\delta_1(s)) = 1$ . Therefore, the conclusion follows from (33) because, holding  $\underline{w}$  and  $s$  constant:

$$p'(\delta) \stackrel{s}{=} \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma - 1} \right] \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left( -\frac{1}{\delta^2} \right) < 0. \quad \blacksquare$$

**Lemma 3.** The firm's expected utility under the non-core project when it implements the success probability specified in (32) is:

$$U(\delta) = \begin{cases} u(\bar{w}) + \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right] \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} & \text{if } \delta > \delta_1(s), \\ u(\underline{w}) - \frac{\delta}{\gamma} & \text{if } \delta \leq \delta_1(s). \end{cases} \quad (34)$$

Proof. Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that the utility's expected profit under the specified conditions when  $\delta > \delta_1(s)$  is:

$$\begin{aligned} p(\delta) u(\underline{w}) + [1 - p(\delta)] u(\bar{w}) - D(p, \delta) &= u(\bar{w}) + p(\delta) [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] - \frac{\delta}{\gamma} [p(\delta)]^\gamma \\ &= u(\bar{w}) + \left( \frac{1}{\delta} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] - \frac{\delta}{\gamma} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \\ &= u(\bar{w}) + \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} - \frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \\ &= u(\bar{w}) + \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right] \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}}. \end{aligned}$$

Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that the utility's expected profit under the specified conditions when  $\delta \leq \delta_1(s)$  is:

$$p(\delta) u(\underline{w}) + [1 - p(\delta)] u(\underline{w}) - D(p, \delta) = u(\underline{w}) - \frac{\delta}{\gamma}. \quad \blacksquare$$

**Lemma 4.** Suppose  $\bar{r} > r_0$ . Then the regulator prefers to implement the non-core project rather than the core project for all  $\delta \leq \delta_n(s)$ , where:

$$\delta_n(s) \equiv [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \left( \frac{[1-s][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]}{\bar{r} - r_0} \right)^{\gamma-1}. \quad (35)$$

Furthermore,  $\delta_n(s) \geq \delta_1(s)$  if  $\underline{r} \leq r_0 < \bar{r}$ .

Proof. Lemma 1 implies that the regulator's expected procurement cost when the utility

undertakes the non-core project and  $p(\delta) \in (0, 1)$  is:

$$\begin{aligned}
\bar{r} + p(\delta) [\underline{r} - \bar{r}] &= \bar{r} + \left( \frac{1}{\delta} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \leq r_0 \\
&\Leftrightarrow \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \leq r_0 - \bar{r} \\
&\Leftrightarrow \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [1-s] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \geq \bar{r} - r_0 \\
&\Leftrightarrow [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \frac{[1-s] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]}{\bar{r} - r_0} \geq (\delta)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \\
&\Leftrightarrow \delta \leq [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \left( \frac{[1-s] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]}{\bar{r} - r_0} \right)^{\gamma-1} \equiv \delta_n(s).
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, Lemma 2 implies that for  $s > 0$  and  $\bar{r} > r_0$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
\delta_n(s) \geq \delta_1(s) &\Leftrightarrow [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \left( \frac{[1-s] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]}{\bar{r} - r_0} \right)^{\gamma-1} \geq u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w}) \\
&\Leftrightarrow \left( \frac{[1-s] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]}{\bar{r} - r_0} \right)^{\gamma-1} \geq 1 \Leftrightarrow [1-s] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \geq \bar{r} - r_0 \\
&\Leftrightarrow \bar{r} - \underline{r} \geq \bar{r} - r_0 \Leftrightarrow \underline{r} \leq r_0. \quad \blacksquare
\end{aligned}$$

**Lemma 5.** When  $\delta_1(s) > \underline{\delta}$ , the regulator's problem, [PR], is:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Maximize}_{\bar{r}, r_0, s} & - \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left\{ \bar{r} + \left( \frac{1}{\delta} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right\} dG(\delta) \\
& - G(\delta_1) \{ \bar{r} + [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \} - [1 - G(\delta_n)] r_0
\end{aligned}$$

$$\text{subject to: } u(r_0 - c_0) \geq \bar{U}, \text{ and} \tag{36}$$

$$U(\delta_n) = u(r_0 - c_0). \tag{37}$$

Proof. Lemmas 1 – 4 imply that the regulator's problem is:

$$\text{Minimize}_{\bar{r}, r_0, s} \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \underline{r} dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \{ \bar{r} + p(\delta) [\underline{r} - \bar{r}] \} dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_n}^{\bar{\delta}} r_0 dG(\delta)$$

$$\text{subject to: } u(r_0 - c_0) \geq \bar{U},$$

$$U(\delta) \geq u(r_0 - c_0) \quad \text{for all } \delta \leq \delta_n, \text{ and}$$

$$u(r_0 - c_0) \geq U(\delta) \quad \text{for all } \delta > \delta_n. \quad (38)$$

It is apparent from (34) that  $U'(\delta) < 0$  for all  $\delta \in [\underline{\delta}, \bar{\delta}]$ . Therefore, the constraints in (38) imply that  $u(r_0 - c_0) = U(\delta_n)$  at the solution to the regulator's problem. Consequently, Lemma 1 implies that the regulator's problem is as specified in [PR]. ■

(34) and (35) imply:

$$\begin{aligned} U(\delta_n) &= u(\bar{w}) + \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] \left( \frac{1}{\delta_n} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \\ &= u(\bar{w}) + \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] \left( \frac{1}{u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})} \left( \frac{\bar{r} - r_0}{[1-s][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]} \right)^{\gamma-1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \\ &= u(\bar{w}) + \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] \left( \frac{1}{u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \frac{\bar{r} - r_0}{[1-s][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]} \\ &= u(\bar{w}) + \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \frac{\bar{r} - r_0}{[1-s][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]} . \end{aligned} \quad (39)$$

Because  $u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w}) = u(\bar{r} - \bar{c} + s[\bar{c} - \underline{c}]) - u(\bar{r} - \bar{c})$ , (39) implies:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial U(\delta_n)}{\partial \bar{r}} &= u'(\bar{w}) \\ &\quad + \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] \frac{1}{[1-s][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w}) + (\bar{r} - r_0)(u'(\underline{w}) - u'(\bar{w}))]; \end{aligned} \quad (40)$$

$$\frac{\partial U(\delta_n)}{\partial r_0} = - \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \frac{1}{[1-s][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]} < 0; \quad \text{and} \quad (41)$$

$$\frac{\partial U(\delta_n)}{\partial s} = \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] \left[ \frac{\bar{r} - r_0}{\bar{c} - \underline{c}} \right] \left[ \frac{(1-s)u'(\underline{w})[\bar{c} - \underline{c}] + u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})}{(1-s)^2} \right] \stackrel{s}{=} \bar{r} - r_0. \quad (42)$$

The inequality in (41) holds because  $s \in (0, 1]$  and  $\underline{w} > \bar{w}$ .

The following definitions are helpful in characterizing the solution to [PR].

$$\varphi \equiv [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w}) - \frac{[1-s][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]}{\gamma-1} u'(\underline{w}) \right]. \quad (43)$$

$$H(\delta_1, \delta_n) \equiv \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta). \quad (44)$$

Let  $\lambda_1 \geq 0$  and  $\lambda_2$  denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (36) and (37), respectively. Then the Lagrangian function associated with [PR] is:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L} = & -\bar{r} [G(\delta_n) - G(\delta_1)] - H(\delta_1, \delta_n) [s - 1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} - [1 - G(\delta_n)] r_0 \\ & - G(\delta_1) \{ \bar{r} + [s - 1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \} + \lambda_1 [u(r_0 - c_0) - \bar{U}] + \lambda_2 [u(r_0 - c_0) - U(\delta_n)]. \end{aligned} \quad (45)$$

$\delta_1 = \delta_1(s, \bar{r})$  and  $\delta_n = \delta_n(\bar{r}, s, r_0)$  from Lemmas 2 and 4. Therefore, the necessary conditions for a solution to [PR] include:

$$\begin{aligned} r_0 : & \left[ r_0 - \bar{r} - [s - 1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left( \frac{1}{\delta_n} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \right] \frac{\partial \delta_n}{\partial r_0} g(\delta_n) \\ & - [1 - G(\delta_n)] + \lambda_1 u'(r_0 - c_0) + \lambda_2 u'(r_0 - c_0) - \lambda_2 \frac{\partial U(\delta_n)}{\partial r_0} = 0; \end{aligned} \quad (46)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{r} : & \left[ r_0 - \bar{r} - [s - 1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left( \frac{1}{\delta_n} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \right] \frac{\partial \delta_n}{\partial \bar{r}} g(\delta_n) \\ & + \left[ \bar{r} - \bar{r} - [s - 1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] + [s - 1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left( \frac{1}{\delta_1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \right] \frac{\partial \delta_1}{\partial \bar{r}} g(\delta_1) \\ & - H(\delta_1, \delta_n) [s - 1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma - 1} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} [u'(\underline{w}) - u'(\bar{w})] \\ & - [G(\delta_n) - G(\delta_1)] - G(\delta_1) - \lambda_2 \frac{\partial U(\delta_n)}{\partial \bar{r}} = 0; \end{aligned} \quad (47)$$

$$\begin{aligned} s : & \left[ r_0 - \bar{r} - [s - 1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left( \frac{1}{\delta_n} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \right] \frac{\partial \delta_n}{\partial s} g(\delta_n) - \lambda_2 \frac{\partial U(\delta_n)}{\partial s} \\ & + \left[ \bar{r} - \bar{r} - [s - 1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] + [s - 1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left( \frac{1}{\delta_1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \right] \frac{\partial \delta_1}{\partial s} g(\delta_1) \\ & - G(\delta_1) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] - H(\delta_1, \delta_n) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \{ [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \\ & \quad + [s - 1] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma - 1} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} u'(\underline{w}) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \} = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (48)$$

The expression in (47) reflects the fact that:

$$\frac{d}{d\bar{r}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] = u'(\bar{r} - \bar{c} + s[\bar{c} - \underline{c}]) \frac{d\underline{w}}{d\bar{r}} - u'(\bar{r} - \bar{c}) \frac{d\bar{w}}{d\bar{r}} = u'(\underline{w}) - u'(\bar{w}).$$

The expression in (48) reflects the fact that:

$$\frac{d}{ds} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] = u'(\bar{r} - \bar{c} + s[\bar{c} - \underline{c}]) \frac{d\underline{w}}{ds} - u'(\bar{r} - \bar{c}) \frac{d\bar{w}}{ds} = u'(\underline{w}) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}].$$

(35) implies:

$$\begin{aligned} (\delta_n)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} &\equiv [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \frac{[1-s][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]}{\bar{r} - r_0} \\ \Rightarrow \bar{r} - r_0 &= \left( \frac{1}{\delta_n} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [1-s][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \\ \Rightarrow r_0 - \bar{r} - [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left( \frac{1}{\delta_n} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} &= 0. \end{aligned} \quad (49)$$

Because  $\delta_1 = u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{r} - \bar{r} - [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] + [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left( \frac{1}{\delta_1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \\ = [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \left( -1 + [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left( \frac{1}{u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \right) = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (50)$$

(49) and (50) imply that (46) – (48) can be written as:

$$- [1 - G(\delta_n)] + [\lambda_1 + \lambda_2] u'(r_0 - c_0) - \lambda_2 \frac{\partial U(\delta_n)}{\partial r_0} = 0; \quad (51)$$

$$\begin{aligned} - H(\delta_1, \delta_n) [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} [u'(\underline{w}) - u'(\bar{w})] \\ - G(\delta_n) - \lambda_2 \frac{\partial U(\delta_n)}{\partial \bar{r}} = 0; \text{ and} \end{aligned} \quad (52)$$

$$- \lambda_2 \frac{\partial U(\delta_n)}{\partial s} - G(\delta_1) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] - \varphi H(\delta_1, \delta_n) = 0. \quad (53)$$

Suppose  $\lambda_2 = 0$ . Then (52) implies:

$$\begin{aligned} - H(\delta_1, \delta_n) [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} [u'(\underline{w}) - u'(\bar{w})] = G(\delta_n) \\ \Rightarrow - H(\delta_1, \delta_n) [1-s][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} [u'(\bar{w}) - u'(\underline{w})] = G(\delta_n). \end{aligned} \quad (54)$$

The left-hand side of (54) is non-positive because  $s \in (0, 1]$  and  $\underline{w} > \bar{w}$ . The right-hand side of (54) is strictly positive because  $\delta_n > \underline{\delta}$ , by assumption. This contradiction ensures  $\lambda_2 \neq 0$ . Therefore,  $U(\delta_n) = u(r_0 - c_0)$ , from (37).

(53) implies:

$$\lambda_2 = - \frac{\varphi H(\delta_1, \delta_n) + G(\delta_1) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]}{\frac{\partial U(\delta_n)}{\partial s}}. \quad (55)$$

Problem [PNC-R] where the Risk Averse Firm Always Implements the Non-Core Project

**Lemma 6.** *The regulator's problem, [PNC-R], is:*

$$\begin{aligned} \underset{\bar{r}, s}{\text{Maximize}} \quad & - \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left\{ \bar{r} + \left( \frac{1}{\delta} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right\} dG(\delta) \\ & - G(\delta_1) \{ \bar{r} + [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \} \\ \text{subject to} \quad & U(\bar{\delta}) \geq \bar{U}. \end{aligned} \quad (56)$$

Proof. Lemmas 1 – 3 imply that under the specified conditions, the regulator's problem is:

$$\begin{aligned} \underset{\bar{r}, s}{\text{Minimize}} \quad & \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \underline{r} dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \{ \bar{r} + p(\delta) [\underline{r} - \bar{r}] \} dG(\delta) \\ \text{subject to} \quad & U(\delta) \geq \bar{U} \text{ for all } \delta \in [\underline{\delta}, \bar{\delta}]. \end{aligned} \quad (57)$$

The conclusion follows from Lemma 1 because  $U'(\delta) < 0$ , from (34). ■

Let  $\lambda \geq 0$  denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (56). Define:

$$H(\delta_1) = \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta) \quad (58)$$

where  $\delta_1 = \delta_1(s, \bar{r})$ . Then the Lagrangian function associated with [PNC-R] is:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L} = \quad & - G(\delta_1) \{ \bar{r} + [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \} - [1 - G(\delta_1)] \bar{r} \\ & - H(\delta_1) [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} + \lambda [U(\bar{\delta}) - \bar{U}]. \end{aligned} \quad (59)$$

The necessary conditions for a solution to [PNC-R] include:

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{r} : \quad & \left\{ \bar{r} - \bar{r} - [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] + [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left( \frac{1}{\delta_1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \right\} g(\delta_1) \frac{\partial \delta_1}{\partial \bar{r}} \\ & + \lambda \frac{\partial U(\bar{\delta})}{\partial \bar{r}} - G(\delta_1) - [1 - G(\delta_1)] \\ & - H(\delta_1) [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} [u'(\underline{w}) - u'(\bar{w})] = 0; \end{aligned} \quad (60)$$



$$\begin{aligned}
s : \quad & \left\{ \bar{r} - \bar{r} - [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] + [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}][u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left( \frac{1}{\delta_1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \right\} g(\delta_1) \frac{\partial \delta_1}{\partial s} \\
& + \lambda \frac{\partial U(\bar{\delta})}{\partial s} - G(\delta_1)[\bar{c} - \underline{c}] - H(\delta_1)[\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \{ [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \\
& \quad + [s-1] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} u'(\underline{w}) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \} = 0. \quad (61)
\end{aligned}$$

(50) implies that (60) and (61) can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \lambda \frac{\partial U(\bar{\delta})}{\partial \bar{r}} - 1 \\
& - H(\delta_1) [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} [u'(\underline{w}) - u'(\bar{w})] = 0; \quad (62)
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \lambda \frac{\partial U(\bar{\delta})}{\partial s} - G(\delta_1)[\bar{c} - \underline{c}] - H(\delta_1)[\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \{ [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \\
& \quad + [s-1] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} u'(\underline{w}) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \} = 0. \quad (63)
\end{aligned}$$

(62) implies:

$$\begin{aligned}
\lambda \frac{\partial U(\bar{\delta})}{\partial \bar{r}} & = 1 + H(\delta_1) [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} [u'(\underline{w}) - u'(\bar{w})] \\
& = 1 + H(\delta_1) [1-s][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} [u'(\bar{w}) - u'(\underline{w})] > 0. \quad (64)
\end{aligned}$$

The inequality in (64) holds because  $s \in (0, 1]$  and  $\underline{w} > \bar{w}$ . (64) implies that  $\lambda > 0$ . Therefore,  $U(\bar{\delta}) = \bar{U}$ , from (56).

(63) implies:

$$\lambda \frac{\partial U(\bar{\delta})}{\partial s} - H(\delta_1) \varphi - G(\delta_1)[\bar{c} - \underline{c}] = 0 \Rightarrow \lambda = \frac{H(\delta_1) \varphi + G(\delta_1)[\bar{c} - \underline{c}]}{\frac{\partial U(\bar{\delta})}{\partial s}}. \quad (65)$$

### Deriving the Numerical Solution to [PR]

(1), (2), and (3), respectively, provide the values of  $\int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_2} \delta dG(\delta)$ ,  $\int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_2} \left(\frac{1}{\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta)$ , and  $\int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_2} \left(\frac{1}{\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta)$  when  $\delta$  is uniformly distributed on  $[\underline{\delta}, \bar{\delta}]$ .

Suppose the firm's utility function for wealth is:

$$u(w) = w^\alpha \Rightarrow u'(w) = \alpha w^{\alpha-1} > 0 \Rightarrow u''(w) = \alpha[\alpha-1]w^{\alpha-2} < 0, \quad (66)$$

where  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$  reflects the degree of risk-aversion.

For this utility function:

$$u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w}) = \underline{w}^\alpha - \bar{w}^\alpha, \text{ and} \quad (67)$$

$$u'(\underline{w}) - u'(\bar{w}) = \alpha \underline{w}^{\alpha-1} - \alpha \bar{w}^{\alpha-1}. \quad (68)$$

The Solution to [PR]

(67) and Lemma 2 imply:

$$\delta_1(s) = \underline{w}^\alpha - \bar{w}^\alpha. \quad (69)$$

(35) and (67) imply:

$$\delta_n(s) = [\underline{w}^\alpha - \bar{w}^\alpha] \left( \frac{[1-s][\bar{c}-\underline{c}]}{\bar{r}-r_0} \right)^{\gamma-1}. \quad (70)$$

(36) and (66) require:

$$[r_0 - c_0]^\alpha \geq \bar{U} \text{ and } \lambda_1 [(r_0 - c_0)^\alpha - \bar{U}] = 0. \quad (71)$$

(39), (66), and (67) imply that (37) can be written as:

$$\bar{w}^\alpha + \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right] [\underline{w}^\alpha - \bar{w}^\alpha] \frac{\bar{r}-r_0}{[1-s][\bar{c}-\underline{c}]} = [r_0 - c_0]^\alpha. \quad (72)$$

(41), (66), and (67) imply that (51) can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} & - \left[ \frac{\bar{\delta} - \delta_n}{\bar{\delta} - \underline{\delta}} \right] + [\lambda_1 + \lambda_2] \alpha [r_0 - c_0]^{\alpha-1} \\ & + \lambda_2 \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right] [\underline{w}^\alpha - \bar{w}^\alpha] \frac{1}{[1-s][\bar{c}-\underline{c}]} = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (73)$$

(40), (66), (67), and (68) imply that (52) can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} & - H(\delta_1, \delta_n) [s-1][\bar{c}-\underline{c}] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right] [\underline{w}^\alpha - \bar{w}^\alpha]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} [\alpha \underline{w}^{\alpha-1} - \alpha \bar{w}^{\alpha-1}] \\ & - \lambda_2 \left[ \alpha \bar{w}^{\alpha-1} + \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right] \frac{1}{[1-s][\bar{c}-\underline{c}]} [\underline{w}^\alpha - \bar{w}^\alpha + (\bar{r}-r_0)(\alpha \underline{w}^{\alpha-1} - \alpha \bar{w}^{\alpha-1})] \right] \\ & - \left( \frac{\delta_n - \underline{\delta}}{\bar{\delta} - \underline{\delta}} \right) = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (74)$$

(42), (66), and (67) imply that (53) can be written as:

$$- \left[ \frac{\delta_1 - \underline{\delta}}{\bar{\delta} - \underline{\delta}} \right] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] - \varphi H(\delta_1, \delta_n)$$

$$= \lambda_2 \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] \left[ \frac{\bar{r} - r_0}{\bar{c} - \underline{c}} \right] \left[ \frac{[1 - s] \alpha \underline{w}^{\alpha-1} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] + \underline{w}^\alpha - \bar{w}^\alpha}{[1 - s]^2} \right]. \quad (75)$$

(66) and (67) imply that (43) can be written as:

$$\varphi \equiv [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] [\underline{w}^\alpha - \bar{w}^\alpha]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \left[ \underline{w}^\alpha - \bar{w}^\alpha - \frac{[1 - s] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]}{\gamma - 1} \alpha \underline{w}^{\alpha-1} \right]. \quad (76)$$

To characterize the solution to [P-R], we need to characterize the values of the variables  $\{\delta_1, \delta_n, \lambda_1, \lambda_2, r_0, \bar{r}, s\}$ . Expressions for these variables are defined in (69) – (75).  $H(\cdot)$  and  $\varphi$  are defined in (44) and (76), respectively. We can solve this nonlinear mixed complementarity program using the PATH algorithm in GAMS.

Lemmas 1 – 5 imply that expected procurement cost is:

$$\begin{aligned} E\{\text{Proc Cost}\} &= \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \underline{r} dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \{p(\delta) \underline{r} + [1 - p(\delta)] \bar{r}\} dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_n}^{\bar{\delta}} r_0 dG(\delta) \\ &= \{\bar{r} + [s - 1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]\} G(\delta_1) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \{\bar{r} + p(\delta)[\underline{r} - \bar{r}]\} dG(\delta) + [1 - G(\delta_n)] r_0 \\ &= \{\bar{r} + [s - 1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]\} G(\delta_1) + [1 - G(\delta_n)] r_0 \\ &\quad + \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left\{ \bar{r} + \left( \frac{1}{\delta} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s - 1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right\} dG(\delta) \\ &= \{\bar{r} + [s - 1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]\} G(\delta_1) + [1 - G(\delta_n)] r_0 \\ &\quad + \bar{r} [G(\delta_n) - G(\delta_1)] + [s - 1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} H(\delta_1, \delta_n). \end{aligned}$$

(34) and Lemmas 1 – 5 imply:

$$\begin{aligned} E\{\pi\} &= \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \left[ u(\underline{w}) - \frac{\delta}{\gamma} \right] dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_n}^{\bar{\delta}} u(r_0 - c_0) dG(\delta) \\ &\quad + \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left\{ u(\bar{w}) + \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \right\} dG(\delta) \\ &= u(\underline{w}) G(\delta_1) - \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \delta dG(\delta) + u(r_0 - c_0) [1 - G(\delta_n)] \\ &\quad + u(\bar{w}) [G(\delta_n) - G(\delta_1)] + \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} H(\delta_1, \delta_n). \end{aligned}$$

Lemma 1 implies:

$$\begin{aligned}
E\{p(\delta)\} &= \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} 1 dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta) \\
&= G(\delta_1) + [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} H(\delta_1, \delta_n).
\end{aligned}$$

Lemmas 1 – 5 imply:

$$\begin{aligned}
E\{\text{Cost}\} &= \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \left[ \underline{c} + \frac{\delta}{\gamma} \right] dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left\{ \underline{c} p(\delta) + \bar{c} [1 - p(\delta)] + \frac{\delta}{\gamma} [p(\delta)]^\gamma \right\} dG(\delta) \\
&\quad + \int_{\delta_n}^{\bar{\delta}} c_0 dG(\delta) \\
&= \underline{c} G(\delta_1) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \delta dG(\delta) + [1 - G(\delta_n)] c_0 \\
&\quad + \int_{\delta_1}^{\delta_n} \left\{ \bar{c} - \left( \frac{1}{\delta} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] + \frac{\delta}{\gamma} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \right\} dG(\delta) \\
&= \underline{c} G(\delta_1) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \delta dG(\delta) + [1 - G(\delta_n)] c_0 + \bar{c} [G(\delta_n) - G(\delta_1)] \\
&\quad - [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} H(\delta_1, \delta_n) + \frac{1}{\gamma} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} H(\delta_1, \delta_n).
\end{aligned}$$

### The Solution to [PNC-R]

Because  $\lambda > 0$ , (34), (66), and (67) imply that (56) can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned}
U(\bar{\delta}) &= u(\bar{w}) + \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] \left( \frac{1}{\bar{\delta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} = \bar{U} \\
&\Leftrightarrow \bar{w}^\alpha + \left[ \frac{\gamma - 1}{\gamma} \right] \left( \frac{1}{\bar{\delta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\underline{w}^\alpha - \bar{w}^\alpha]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} = \bar{U}. \tag{77}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial U(\bar{\delta})}{\partial \bar{r}} = u'(\bar{w}) + \left( \frac{1}{\bar{\delta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u'(\underline{w}) - u'(\bar{w})]; \tag{78}$$

$$\frac{\partial U(\bar{\delta})}{\partial s} = \left( \frac{1}{\bar{\delta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} u'(\underline{w}) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}]. \tag{79}$$

(67), (68), and (78) imply that (62) can be written as:

$$\lambda \left[ u'(\bar{w}) + \left( \frac{1}{\bar{\delta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u'(\underline{w}) - u'(\bar{w})] \right] - 1$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& -H(\delta_1) [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} [u'(\underline{w}) - u'(\bar{w})] = 0 \\
\Leftrightarrow & \lambda \left[ \alpha \bar{w}^{\alpha-1} + \left( \frac{1}{\bar{\delta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\underline{w}^\alpha - \bar{w}^\alpha]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\alpha \underline{w}^{\alpha-1} - \alpha \bar{w}^{\alpha-1}] \right] - 1 \\
& - H(\delta_1) [s-1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right] [\underline{w}^\alpha - \bar{w}^\alpha]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} [\alpha \underline{w}^{\alpha-1} - \alpha \bar{w}^{\alpha-1}] = 0. \quad (80)
\end{aligned}$$

(66) – (68) and (79) imply that (63) can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \lambda \left[ \left( \frac{1}{\bar{\delta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} u'(\underline{w}) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right] - \left[ \frac{\delta_1 - \bar{\delta}}{\bar{\delta} - \underline{\delta}} \right] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \\
& - H(\delta_1) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \{ [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \\
& \quad + [s-1] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} u'(\underline{w}) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \} = 0 \\
\Leftrightarrow & \lambda \left[ \left( \frac{1}{\bar{\delta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\underline{w}^\alpha - \bar{w}^\alpha]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \alpha \underline{w}^{\alpha-1} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right] - \left[ \frac{\delta_1 - \bar{\delta}}{\bar{\delta} - \underline{\delta}} \right] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \\
& - H(\delta_1) [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \{ [\underline{w}^\alpha - \bar{w}^\alpha]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \\
& \quad + [s-1] \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \right] [\underline{w}^\alpha - \bar{w}^\alpha]^{\frac{2-\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \alpha \underline{w}^{\alpha-1} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \} = 0. \quad (81)
\end{aligned}$$

To characterize the solution to [PNC-R], we need to specify the values of  $\{\delta_1, \lambda, \bar{r}, s\}$ . These variables are specified in the conditions (69), (77), (80), and (81). The variable  $H(\delta_1)$  is defined in (58). We can solve for this nonlinear mixed complementarity program using the PATH algorithm in GAMS.

Lemmas 1 – 3 and 6 imply:

$$\begin{aligned}
E\{\text{Proc Cost}\} &= \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \underline{r} dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \{p(\delta) \underline{r} + [1-p(\delta)] \bar{r}\} dG(\delta) \\
&= \{\bar{r} + [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]\} G(\delta_1) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \{\bar{r} + p(\delta)[\underline{r} - \bar{r}]\} dG(\delta) \\
&= \{\bar{r} + [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]\} G(\delta_1) \\
& \quad + \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left\{ \bar{r} + \left( \frac{1}{\bar{\delta}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}] \right\} dG(\delta) \\
&= \{\bar{r} + [s-1][\bar{c} - \underline{c}]\} G(\delta_1)
\end{aligned}$$

$$+ \bar{r} [1 - G(\delta_1)] + [s - 1] [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} H(\delta_1).$$

(34) and Lemmas 1 – 3 imply:

$$\begin{aligned} E\{\pi\} &= \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \left[ u(\underline{w}) - \frac{\delta}{\gamma} \right] dG(\delta) \\ &\quad + \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left\{ u(\bar{w}) + \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right] \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \right\} dG(\delta) \\ &= u(\underline{w}) G(\delta_1) - \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \delta dG(\delta) \\ &\quad + u(\bar{w}) [1 - G(\delta_1)] + \left[ \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma} \right] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} H(\delta_1). \end{aligned}$$

Lemma 1 implies:

$$\begin{aligned} E\{p(\delta)\} &= \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} 1 dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} dG(\delta) \\ &= G(\delta_1) + [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} H(\delta_1). \end{aligned}$$

Lemmas 1 – 3 imply:

$$\begin{aligned} E\{\text{Cost}\} &= \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \left[ \underline{c} + \frac{\delta}{\gamma} \right] dG(\delta) + \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left\{ \underline{c} p(\delta) + \bar{c} [1 - p(\delta)] + \frac{\delta}{\gamma} [p(\delta)]^\gamma \right\} dG(\delta) \\ &= \underline{c} G(\delta_1) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \delta dG(\delta) \\ &\quad + \int_{\delta_1}^{\bar{\delta}} \left\{ \bar{c} - \left( \frac{1}{\delta} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] + \frac{\delta}{\gamma} \left( \frac{1}{\delta} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})] \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \right\} dG(\delta) \\ &= \underline{c} G(\delta_1) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\underline{\delta}}^{\delta_1} \delta dG(\delta) + \bar{c} [1 - G(\delta_1)] \\ &\quad - [\bar{c} - \underline{c}] [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} H(\delta_1) + \frac{1}{\gamma} [u(\underline{w}) - u(\bar{w})]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} H(\delta_1). \end{aligned}$$

## References

Ferris, Michael and Todd Munson, “Complementarity Problems in GAMS and the PATH Solver,” *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*, 24(2), February 2000, 165-188.