

Technical Appendix to Accompany
“Pricing to Preclude Sabotage in Regulated Industries”

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This Appendix proves the counterpart to Proposition 1 in the paper for the setting where the regulator seeks to maximize expected consumer surplus ($E\{S\}$) and a fraction of the V 's expected profit ($E\{\Pi_0\}$) and E 's expected profit ($E\{\Pi_1\}$). Assumptions 1 and 2 in the paper are maintained throughout the ensuing analysis.

The regulator's problem in this setting is:

$$\text{Maximize}_{w, p_0} E\{S\} + \beta_0 E\{\Pi_0\} + \beta_1 E\{\Pi_1\} \quad \text{subject to } E\{\Pi_0\} \geq 0$$

$$\text{where } \beta_0, \beta_1 \in (0, 1).$$

For a fixed \hat{a} , call this problem $[RP - \beta\hat{a}]$. The associated Lagrangian function is:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L} = & E\{S(w, p_0, c) | \hat{a}\} + \beta_0 E\{\Pi_0(w, p_0, c) | \hat{a}\} + \beta_1 E\{\Pi_1(w, p_0, c) | \hat{a}\} \\ & + \lambda E\{\Pi_0(w, p_0, c) | \hat{a}\}. \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

From Lemma A1 in the paper:

$$E\{S(w, p_0, c) | \hat{a}\} = -w + \frac{B_0 + B_1 \Delta + \Delta^2}{8[t_0 + t_1]} \quad (2)$$

where B_0 is independent of p_0 and w , $\Delta \equiv p_0 - w$, and from (22) in the paper:

$$B_1 = 2[v_1 - v_0] - 2E\{c | \hat{a}\} - 6t_0 - 8t_1. \quad (3)$$

$$\text{Define } R \equiv v_1 - v_0 + t_0 - E\{c | \hat{a}\}. \quad (4)$$

From (13) in the paper:

$$\begin{aligned} x_1 &= \frac{v_1 - v_0 + t_0 - E\{c | \hat{a}\} + p_0 - w}{2[t_0 + t_1]} = \frac{R + \Delta}{2[t_0 + t_1]}, \text{ and} \\ x_0 &= 1 - x_1 = 1 - \frac{R + \Delta}{2[t_0 + t_1]} = \frac{2[t_0 + t_1] - R - \Delta}{2[t_0 + t_1]}. \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

V 's expected profit is:

$$\begin{aligned} E\{\Pi_0(w, p_0, c) | \hat{a}\} &= [w - c_u]x_1 + [p_0 - c_d - c_u]x_0 - F_0 \\ &= [w - c_u][1 - x_0] + [p_0 - c_d - c_u]x_0 - F_0 = [p_0 - c_d - w]x_0 + w - c_u - F_0. \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

Because $\Delta = p_0 - w$, (5) and (6) provide:

$$E \{ \Pi_0(w, p_0, c) | \hat{a} \} = \frac{[\Delta - c_d][2(t_0 + t_1) - R - \Delta]}{2[t_0 + t_1]} + w - c_u - F_0 \quad (7)$$

$$= \frac{-\Delta^2 + c_d \Delta + \Delta[2(t_0 + t_1) - R]}{2[t_0 + t_1]} - \frac{c_d[2(t_0 + t_1) - R]}{2[t_0 + t_1]} + w - c_u - F_0. \quad (8)$$

From (5) in the paper and from (5) above, E 's expected profit is:

$$\begin{aligned} E \{ \Pi_1(w, p_0, c) | \hat{a} \} &= [E \{ p_1 | \hat{a} \} - w - E \{ c | \hat{a} \}] x_1 - F_1 \\ &= \left[p_0 + \frac{v_1 - v_0 - p_0 + t_0 + E \{ c | \hat{a} \} + w}{2} - w - E \{ c | \hat{a} \} \right] x_1 - F_1 \\ &= \frac{1}{2} [p_0 + v_1 - v_0 + t_0 - E \{ c | \hat{a} \} - w] x_1 - F_1 \\ &= \frac{1}{2} [2(t_0 + t_1) x_1] x_1 - F_1 = [t_0 + t_1] (x_1)^2 - F_1 \\ &= [t_0 + t_1] \left[\frac{R + \Delta}{2(t_0 + t_1)} \right]^2 - F_1 = \frac{[R + \Delta]^2}{4[t_0 + t_1]} - F_1. \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

Consider the following values for Δ^* , w^* , and λ^* :

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta^* &= \frac{2c_d + 2R[\beta_1 - \frac{1}{2}]}{3 - 2\beta_1}; \quad \lambda^* = 1 - \beta_0 > 0; \\ w^* &= c_u + F_0 - \frac{[\Delta^* - c_d][2(t_0 + t_1) - R - \Delta^*]}{2[t_0 + t_1]}. \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

We will show that these values constitute a solution to $[RP - \beta \hat{a}]$ by demonstrating that they solve the associated Kuhn-Tucker conditions.

Lemma T1. $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial w} \Big|_{w=w^*} = 0$.

Proof. Differentiating (2), (8), and (9) provides:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial E \{ S(w, p_0, c) | \hat{a} \}}{\partial w} &= -1, \quad \frac{\partial E \{ \Pi_0(w, p_0, c) | \hat{a} \}}{\partial w} = 1, \quad \text{and} \\ \frac{\partial E \{ \Pi_1(w, p_0, c) | \hat{a} \}}{\partial w} &= 0. \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

(1), (10), and (11) imply $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial w} \Big|_{w=w^*} = -1 + \beta_0 + \lambda^* = 0$. ■

Lemma T2. $\left. \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \Delta} \right|_{\Delta = \Delta^*} = 0$.

Proof. (2), (8), and (9) imply:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial E \{ S(w, p_0, c) | \hat{a} \}}{\partial \Delta} &= \frac{B_1 + 2\Delta}{8[t_0 + t_1]}, \quad \frac{\partial E \{ \Pi_1(w, p_0, c) | \hat{a} \}}{\partial \Delta} = \frac{R + \Delta}{2[t_0 + t_1]}, \text{ and} \\ \frac{\partial E \{ \Pi_0(w, p_0, c) | \hat{a} \}}{\partial \Delta} &= \frac{-2\Delta + 2[t_0 + t_1] + c_d - R}{2[t_0 + t_1]}. \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

(1), (10), and (12) imply:

$$\begin{aligned} \left. \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \Delta} \right|_{\Delta = \Delta^*} &= \frac{B_1 + 2\Delta^*}{8[t_0 + t_1]} + \frac{\beta_0 + \lambda^*}{2[t_0 + t_1]} [-2\Delta^* + 2(t_0 + t_1) + c_d - R] + \frac{\beta_1 [R + \Delta^*]}{2[t_0 + t_1]} \\ &= \frac{B_1 + 2\Delta^*}{8[t_0 + t_1]} + \frac{-2\Delta^* + 2[t_0 + t_1] + c_d - R}{2[t_0 + t_1]} + \frac{\beta_1 [R + \Delta^*]}{2[t_0 + t_1]} = 0 \\ &\Leftrightarrow B_1 + 2\Delta^* + 4[-2\Delta^* + 2(t_0 + t_1) + c_d - R] + 4\beta_1 [R + \Delta^*] = 0 \\ &\Leftrightarrow B_1 - 6\Delta^* + 8[t_0 + t_1] + 4c_d - 4R + 4\beta_1 [R + \Delta^*] = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

(3) and (13) imply:

$$\begin{aligned} \left. \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \Delta} \right|_{\Delta = \Delta^*} = 0 &\Leftrightarrow 2[v_1 - v_0] - 2E\{c | \hat{a}\} - 6t_0 - 8t_1 - 6\Delta^* \\ &\quad + 8[t_0 + t_1] + 4c_d - 4R + 4\beta_1 [R + \Delta^*] = 0 \\ &\Leftrightarrow 2[v_1 - v_0] - 2E\{c | \hat{a}\} + 2t_0 - 6\Delta^* + 4c_d - 4R + 4\beta_1 R + 4\beta_1 \Delta^* = 0 \\ &\Leftrightarrow [6 - 4\beta_1] \Delta^* = 2[v_1 - v_0] - 2E\{c | \hat{a}\} + 2t_0 + 4c_d - 4R + 4\beta_1 R \\ &\Leftrightarrow [6 - 4\beta_1] \Delta^* = 2[v_1 - v_0 - E\{c | \hat{a}\} + t_0] + 4c_d - 4R + 4\beta_1 R \\ &\Leftrightarrow [6 - 4\beta_1] \Delta^* = 2R + 4c_d - 4R + 4\beta_1 R = 4c_d - 2R + 4\beta_1 R \\ &\Leftrightarrow \Delta^* = \frac{2c_d + 2R[\beta_1 - \frac{1}{2}]}{3 - 2\beta_1}. \quad \blacksquare \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

Lemma T3. $\left. \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda} \right|_{\lambda = \lambda^*} = 0$.

Proof. From (7):

$$\left. \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda} \right|_{\lambda = \lambda^*} = \frac{[\Delta^* - c_d][2(t_0 + t_1) - R - \Delta^*]}{2[t_0 + t_1]} + w^* - c_u - F_0 = 0. \quad (15)$$

The last equality in (15) reflects (10). ■

Lemmas T1 – T3 demonstrate that $(\Delta^*, w^*, \lambda^*)$ solve the Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with $[RP - \beta \hat{a}]$, provided $w^* \geq 0$. It remains to establish that $w^* \geq 0$ and to determine when $\Delta^* \in (0, c_d)$.

Lemma T4. $\Delta^* \in (0, c_d)$ if:

$$c_d > -R[\beta_1 - \frac{1}{2}] \quad \text{and} \quad [c_d + R][\beta_1 - \frac{1}{2}] < 0. \quad (16)$$

Proof. $3 - 2\beta_1 > 0$ because $\beta_1 < 1$ by assumption. Therefore, (14) implies:

$$\Delta^* > 0 \Leftrightarrow c_d + R[\beta_1 - \frac{1}{2}] > 0 \Leftrightarrow c_d > -R[\beta_1 - \frac{1}{2}]. \quad (17)$$

From (14):

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta^* - c_d &= \frac{2c_d + 2R[\beta_1 - \frac{1}{2}] - c_d[3 - 2\beta_1]}{3 - 2\beta_1} = \frac{-c_d + 2R[\beta_1 - \frac{1}{2}] + 2\beta_1 c_d}{3 - 2\beta_1} \\ &= \frac{2c_d[\beta_1 - \frac{1}{2}] + 2R[\beta_1 - \frac{1}{2}]}{3 - 2\beta_1} = \frac{2[c_d + R][\beta_1 - \frac{1}{2}]}{3 - 2\beta_1} \\ &\Rightarrow \Delta^* - c_d < 0 \Leftrightarrow [c_d + R][\beta_1 - \frac{1}{2}] < 0. \quad \blacksquare \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

Lemma T5. $\Delta^* \in (0, c_d)$ if $\beta_1 < \frac{1}{2}$ and

$$c_d > \max \left\{ [v_0 - v_1 - t_0 + E\{c|\hat{a}\}][\beta_1 - \frac{1}{2}], v_0 - v_1 - t_0 + E\{c|\hat{a}\} \right\}. \quad (19)$$

Proof. If $\beta_1 < \frac{1}{2}$, then (16) implies that $\Delta^* \in (0, c_d)$ if $c_d > -R[\beta_1 - \frac{1}{2}]$ and $c_d > -R$. Substituting for R from (4) implies that these inequalities hold if (19) holds. ■

Conclusion T1. $\Delta^* \in (0, c_d)$ if $\beta_1 < \frac{1}{2}$.

Proof. From Lemma T5, $\Delta^* \in (0, c_d)$ if $\beta_1 < \frac{1}{2}$,

$$c_d > v_0 - v_1 - t_0 + E\{c|\hat{a}\}, \quad \text{and} \quad (20)$$

$$c_d > [\frac{1}{2} - \beta_1][v_1 - v_0 + t_0 - E\{c|\hat{a}\}]. \quad (21)$$

(20) and (21) hold when $\beta_1 < \frac{1}{2}$ if:

$$c_d > v_0 - v_1 - t_0 + E\{c|\hat{a}\} \quad \text{and} \quad (22)$$

$$c_d > \frac{1}{2} [v_1 - v_0 + t_0 - E\{c|\hat{a}\}]. \quad (23)$$

(22) and (23) hold when Assumption 2 holds, as demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 1 in the paper. ■

Conclusion T2. $w^* > 0$ if $\beta_1 < \frac{1}{2}$.

Proof. Because $E\{\Pi_0(w, p_0, c)|\hat{a}\} \geq 0$ at the solution to $[RP - \beta\hat{a}]$, (7) implies:

$$\frac{[\Delta^* - c_d][2(t_0 + t_1) - R - \Delta^*]}{2[t_0 + t_1]} + w^* - c_u - F_0 \geq 0. \quad (24)$$

If $w^* \leq 0$, then (24) implies:

$$\frac{[\Delta^* - c_d][2(t_0 + t_1) - R - \Delta^*]}{2[t_0 + t_1]} \geq 0. \quad (25)$$

From (4):

$$\begin{aligned} 2[t_0 + t_1] - R - \Delta^* &= 2[t_0 + t_1] - [v_1 - v_0 + t_0 - E\{c|\hat{a}\}] - \Delta^* \\ &= v_0 - v_1 + 2t_1 + t_0 + E\{c|\hat{a}\} - \Delta^* > 0. \end{aligned} \quad (26)$$

The inequality in (26) reflects Assumption 1.

Because $\Delta^* - c_d < 0$ from Conclusion T1, (26) implies:

$$\frac{[\Delta^* - c_d][2(t_0 + t_1) - R - \Delta^*]}{2[t_0 + t_1]} < 0. \quad (27)$$

(27) contradicts (25). Therefore, it cannot be the case that $w^* \leq 0$. ■