## Technical Appendix to Accompany "Simple Cost sharing Contracts"

## Proof of Lemma 1.

The choice of an optimal LCSCR contract involves the choice of an $x_{L}$ such that the supplier chooses the LCS option when $x \leq x_{L}$ and the CR option when $x>x_{L}$. When he selects the LCS option and his innate cost realization is $x$, the supplier's choice of cost reduction is determined by:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\underset{y}{\operatorname{Maximize}}[1-\alpha] y-\frac{1}{4 k} y^{2} . \tag{L1.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

(L1.1) implies:

$$
\begin{equation*}
y_{L}(x)=2 k[1-\alpha] . \tag{L1.2}
\end{equation*}
$$

(L1.2) implies that when he chooses the LCS option, the supplier's profit under the LCS option at the cut-off value of innate costs, $x_{L}$, is:

$$
\begin{align*}
T\left(x_{L}\right)+\alpha & {\left[x_{L}-y\left(x_{L}\right)\right]-C\left(y\left(x_{L}\right)\right)-\left[x_{L}-y\left(x_{L}\right)\right] } \\
& =T\left(x_{L}\right)-[1-\alpha]\left[x_{L}-2 k(1-\alpha)\right]-\frac{1}{4 k}[2 k(1-\alpha)]^{2} . \tag{L1.3}
\end{align*}
$$

Because the supplier is indifferent between the two options when his innate cost realization is $x_{L}$ and since his profit is always zero under the CR option, (L1.3) implies that:

$$
\begin{equation*}
T\left(x_{L}\right)=[1-\alpha] x_{L}-k[1-\alpha]^{2} . \tag{L1.4}
\end{equation*}
$$

(L1.4) implies that the buyer's procurement cost when $x=x_{L}$ is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
T\left(x_{L}\right)+\alpha\left[x_{L}-y\left(x_{L}\right)\right]=T\left(x_{L}\right)+\alpha x_{L}-\alpha 2 k[1-\alpha]=x_{L}-k\left[1-\alpha^{2}\right] . \tag{L1.5}
\end{equation*}
$$

From (L1.2) and (L1.5), the buyer's procurement cost when $x \leq x_{L}$ :

$$
\begin{align*}
T\left(x_{L}\right)+\alpha[x-y(x)]= & T\left(x_{L}\right)+\alpha x-\alpha 2 k[1-\alpha] \\
& =\alpha x+[1-\alpha] x_{L}-k\left[1-\alpha^{2}\right] . \tag{L1.6}
\end{align*}
$$

The reduction in expected procurement costs from the LCSCR contract with cost reimbursement fraction $\alpha$ relative to the CR contract is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{L[\alpha]}=\int_{\underline{x}}^{x_{L}}\left[(1-\alpha)\left(x-x_{L}\right)+k\left(1-\alpha^{2}\right)\right] d F(x) . \tag{L1.7}
\end{equation*}
$$

From (L1.7):

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial G_{L[\alpha]}}{\partial x_{L}} & =k\left[1-\alpha^{2}\right] f\left(x_{L}\right)-[1-\alpha] \int_{\underline{x}}^{x_{L}} d F(x) \\
& =[1-\alpha]\left[(1+\alpha) k f\left(x_{L}\right)-F\left(x_{L}\right)\right] . \tag{L1.8}
\end{align*}
$$

(L1.8) implies $\frac{\partial G_{L[\alpha]}}{\partial x_{L}} \gtreqless 0 \quad$ as $\frac{F\left(x_{L}\right)}{f\left(x_{L}\right)} \lesseqgtr[1+\alpha] k$.

Because $F(\cdot) / f(\cdot)$ is monotonically increasing, (L1.9) implies the unique value of $x_{L}$ that maximizes $G_{L[\alpha]}$ is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
x_{L}^{*}(\alpha)=\operatorname{minimum}\{\underline{x}+[1+\alpha] k \delta, \bar{x}\} . \tag{L1.10}
\end{equation*}
$$

## Proof of Lemma 2.

The buyer's problem of minimizing the expected cost of securing one unit of the good is:

$$
\begin{gather*}
\underset{T(x), y(x)}{\operatorname{Minimize}} \int_{\underline{x}}^{\bar{x}} T(x) d F(x)  \tag{L2.1}\\
\text { subject to: } u(x \mid x) \geq 0 \quad \text { for all } x \in[\underline{x}, \bar{x}] \quad ; \text { and }  \tag{L2.2}\\
u(x \mid x) \geq u(\hat{x} \mid x) \text { for all } x, \hat{x} \in[\underline{x}, \bar{x}],  \tag{L2.3}\\
\text { where } \quad u(\hat{x} \mid x) \equiv T(\hat{x})-[\hat{x}-y(\hat{x} \mid x)]-C(y(\hat{x} \mid x)),  \tag{L2.4}\\
x-y(\hat{x} \mid x)=\hat{x}-y(\hat{x}), \text { and }  \tag{L2.5}\\
C(y)=\frac{1}{4 k} y^{2} .
\end{gather*}
$$

Differentiating (L2.5) with respect to $x$ provides:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left.\frac{d y}{d x}\right|_{\hat{x}=x}=1 \tag{L2.6}
\end{equation*}
$$

Defining $u(x) \equiv u(x \mid x)$, it follows from (L2.3), (L2.4), and (L2.6) that at the solution to the buyer's problem:

$$
\begin{equation*}
u^{\prime}(x)=-\left.\frac{d C(y(\hat{x} \mid x))}{d x}\right|_{\hat{x}=x}=-C^{\prime}(y(x)) \leq 0 \tag{L2.7}
\end{equation*}
$$

Since (L2.7) implies the supplier's utility declines with $x$, the buyer optimally sets $u(\bar{x})=0$. Therefore:

$$
\begin{equation*}
u(x)=\int_{x}^{\bar{x}} C^{\prime}(y(\tilde{x})) d \tilde{x} \tag{L2.8}
\end{equation*}
$$

(L2.7) and (L2.8) imply that the supplier's expected utility under the optimal contract is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\int_{\underline{x}}^{\bar{x}} u(x) d F(x)=\left.u(x) F(x)\right|_{\underline{x}} ^{\bar{x}}-\int_{\underline{x}}^{\bar{x}} F(x) d u(x)=\int_{\underline{x}}^{\bar{x}} C^{\prime}(y(x)) \frac{F(x)}{f(x)} d F(x) \tag{L2.9}
\end{equation*}
$$

The first equality in (L2.9) follows from integration by parts. The second equality in (L2.9) holds because $\left.u(x) F(x)\right|_{\underline{x}} ^{\bar{x}}=u(\bar{x}) F(\bar{x})-u(\underline{x}) F(\underline{x})=0$.

Because the agent's utility is the difference between the payment he receives and the costs he incurs:

$$
\begin{equation*}
T(x)=x-y(x)+C(y(x))+u(x) \tag{L2.10}
\end{equation*}
$$

(L2.10) implies the expected payment to the supplier is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\int_{\underline{x}}^{\bar{x}} T(x) d F(x)=\int_{\underline{x}}^{\bar{x}}[x-y(x)+C(y(x))+u(x)] d F(x) . \tag{L2.11}
\end{equation*}
$$

(L2.9) and (L2.11) imply:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\int_{\underline{x}}^{\bar{x}} T(x) d F(x)=\int_{\underline{x}}^{\bar{x}}\left[x-y(x)+C(y(x))+C^{\prime}(y) \frac{F(x)}{f(x)}\right] d F(x) . \tag{L2.12}
\end{equation*}
$$

The derivative of (L2.12) with respect to $y(x)$ is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
-1+C^{\prime}(y(x))+C^{\prime \prime}(y(x)) \frac{F(x)}{f(x)} \tag{L2.13}
\end{equation*}
$$

Because $C(y)=\frac{1}{4 k} y^{2}$ and $F(x)=\left(\frac{x-\underline{x}}{\bar{x}-\underline{x}}\right)^{\delta},($ L2.13 ) can be written as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
-1+\frac{y(x)}{2 k}+\frac{1}{2 k}\left[\frac{x-\underline{x}}{\delta}\right]=\frac{1}{2 k \delta}[-2 k \delta+\delta y(x)+x-\underline{x}] . \tag{L2.14}
\end{equation*}
$$

Because (L2.14) implies $-1+C^{\prime}(y)+C^{\prime \prime}(y) \frac{F}{f} \geq 0$ when $x \geq \underline{x}+2 k \delta$, it follows that expected procurement costs are minimized when $y(x)=0$ for all $x \geq \underline{x}+2 k \delta$.
(L2.14) implies that when $x \leq \underline{x}+2 k \delta$, expected procurement costs initially decline and then increase with $x$. Therefore, the optimal cost reduction is interior, and is determined by

$$
\begin{equation*}
-2 k \delta+\delta y(x)+x-\underline{x}=0 . \tag{L2.15}
\end{equation*}
$$

(L2.15) implies:

$$
\begin{equation*}
y(x)=2 k-\frac{x-\underline{x}}{\delta} \quad \text { when } x \leq \underline{x}+2 k \delta . \tag{L2.16}
\end{equation*}
$$

## Proof of Lemma 3.

Let $G_{o}$ denote the reduction in the buyer's expected procurement costs under the optimal contract relative to the cost reimbursement contract. To analyze $G_{O}$, it is necessary to consider two cases. In the first case (case I), $\Delta \equiv \bar{x}-\underline{x}$ is relatively large, and so $\underline{x}+2 k \delta<\bar{x}$. Consequently, the supplier is optimally induced to supply strictly positive effort levels for small $x$ 's and to supply no effort for large $x$ 's. In the second case (Case II), $\Delta$ is relatively small, and so the supplier is induced to supply a strictly positive level of effort for all realizations of $\Delta$.

Case I: $\quad \bar{x} \geq \underline{x}+2 k \delta$ (or $T \equiv \frac{\Delta}{2 k \delta} \geq 1$ ).

$$
\begin{align*}
G_{O} & =\int_{\underline{x}}^{x+2 k \delta}\left[y(x)-C(y(x))-C^{\prime}(y) \frac{F(x)}{f(x)}\right] d F(x)  \tag{L3.1}\\
& =\int_{\underline{x}}^{-x+2 k \delta}\left[y(x)-C(y(x))-\frac{y(x)}{2 k}\left[\frac{x-\underline{x}}{\delta}\right]\right] d F(x)  \tag{L3.2}\\
& =\int_{0}^{1}[y(2 k \delta t+\underline{x})-C(y(2 k \delta t+\underline{x}))-y(2 k \delta t+\underline{x}) t] d\left(\frac{2 k \delta t}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}  \tag{L3.3}\\
& =\int_{0}^{1}\left[2 k(1-t)-k(1-t)^{2}-2 k(1-t) t\right] d\left(\frac{2 k \delta t}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}  \tag{L3.4}\\
& =k \delta\left(\frac{2 k \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta} \int_{0}^{1}\left[1-2 t+t^{2}\right] t^{\delta-1} d t \tag{L3.5}
\end{align*}
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& =k \delta\left(\frac{2 k \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}\left(\frac{1}{\delta}-\frac{2}{\delta+1}+\frac{1}{\delta+2}\right)  \tag{L3.6}\\
& =k\left(\frac{2 k \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}\left(\frac{2}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)}\right) . \tag{L3.7}
\end{align*}
$$

(L3.3) follows from (L3.2) above by letting $t=[x-\underline{x}] /(2 k \delta)$. Notice that $t$ varies from 0 to 1 as $x$ varies from $\underline{x}$ to $\underline{x}+2 k \delta$. (L3.4) follows from (L2.16).

Case II: $x<x+2 k \delta$ (or $T<1$ ).

$$
\begin{align*}
G_{O} & =\int_{\underline{x}}^{\bar{x}}\left[y(x)-C(y(x))-C^{\prime}(y) \frac{F(x)}{f(x)}\right] d F(x)  \tag{L3.8}\\
& =\int_{\underline{x}}^{\bar{x}+2 k \delta T}\left[y(x)-C(x)-\frac{y(x)}{2 k}-\left[\frac{x-\underline{x}}{\delta}\right]\right] d F(x)  \tag{L3.9}\\
& =\int_{0}^{T}[y(2 k \delta t+\underline{x})-y(2 k \delta t+\underline{x}) t] d\left(\frac{2 k \delta t}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}  \tag{L3.10}\\
& =\int_{0}^{T}\left[2 k(1-t)-k(1-t)^{2}-2 k(1-t) t\right] d\left(\frac{2 k \delta t}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}  \tag{L3.11}\\
& =k \delta T^{-\delta} \int_{0}^{T}\left[1-2 t+t^{2}\right] t^{\delta-1} d t  \tag{L3.12}\\
& =k \delta T^{-\delta}\left(\frac{T^{\delta}}{\delta}-\frac{2 T^{\delta+1}}{\delta+1}+\frac{T^{\delta+2}}{\delta+2}\right)  \tag{L3.13}\\
& =k \delta\left(\frac{1}{\delta}-\frac{2 T}{\delta+1}+\frac{T^{2}}{\delta+2}\right) . \tag{L3.14}
\end{align*}
$$

Notice again that (L3.10) follows from (L3.9) by letting $t=[x-\underline{x}] /(2 k \delta)$. Also notice that $t$ varies from 0 to $T$ as $x$ varies from $\underline{x}$ to $\bar{x}$. (L3.11) follows from (L2.16).

It follows from (L1.7) and (L1.10) that the expected gain from the optimal FPCR contract relative to the CR contract is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{F}=\int_{\underline{x}}^{x_{F}^{*}}\left[x-x_{F}^{*}+k\right] d F(x) . \tag{L3.15}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $x_{F}^{*}=$ minimum $\{\underline{x}+k \delta, \bar{x}\}$.
To analyze the expected gain in (L3.15), it is convenient to consider two cases. In the first case (Case I), $\Delta \equiv \bar{x}-\underline{x}$ is relatively large, and so $\underline{x}+k \delta<\bar{x}$. Consequently, $x_{F}^{*}$ is interior, and so the agent chooses the fixed price contract for low $x$ 's and the cost reimbursement contract for high $x$ 's. In the second case, $\Delta$ is relatively small, and so the agent chooses the fixed price contract for all realizations of $x$.

Case I: $\bar{x} \geq \underline{x}+k \delta \quad$ (or $T \geq \frac{1}{2}$ ).
It follows from (L3.15) and (L3.16) that:

$$
\begin{align*}
G_{F} & =\int_{\underline{x}}^{\bar{x}+k \delta}[x-\underline{x}+k(1-\delta)] d F(x)  \tag{L3.17}\\
& =\int_{0}^{1}[k \delta t+k(1-\delta)] d\left(\frac{k \delta t}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}  \tag{L3.18}\\
& =k \delta\left(\frac{k \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta} \int_{0}^{1}[\delta t+1-\delta] t^{\delta-1} d t \\
& =k \delta\left(\frac{k \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}\left[\frac{\delta}{\delta+1}+\frac{1-\delta}{\delta}\right]  \tag{L3.19}\\
& =k\left(\frac{k \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}\left[\frac{1}{\delta+1}\right] . \tag{L3.20}
\end{align*}
$$

(L3.18) follows from (L3.17) by letting $t=[x-\underline{x}] /(k \delta)$. Notice that $t$ varies from 0 to 1 as $x$ varies from $\underline{x}$ to $\underline{x}+k \delta$.

Case II: $\bar{x}<\underline{x}+k \delta$ (or $T<\frac{1}{2}$ ).
It follows from (L3.15) and (L3.16) that:

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{F}=\int_{\underline{x}}^{\bar{x}}[x-\bar{x}+k] d F(x) \tag{L3.21}
\end{equation*}
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& =\int_{\underline{x}}^{\bar{x}+k \delta \hat{T}}[x-\underline{x}-k \delta \hat{T}+k] d F(x)  \tag{L3.22}\\
& =\int_{0}^{\hat{T}}[k \delta t-k \delta \hat{T}+k] d\left(\frac{k \delta t}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}  \tag{L3.23}\\
& =k \delta \hat{T}^{-\delta} \int_{0}^{\hat{T}}[\delta t-\delta \hat{T}+1] t^{\delta-1} d t  \tag{L3.24}\\
& =k \delta \hat{T}^{-\delta}\left[\frac{\delta \hat{T}^{\delta+1}}{\delta+1}-\hat{T}^{\delta+1}+\frac{\hat{T}^{\delta}}{\delta}\right]  \tag{L3.25}\\
& =k\left[1-\frac{\delta \hat{T}}{\delta+1}\right], \tag{L3.26}
\end{align*}
$$

where $\hat{T}=[\bar{x}-\underline{x}] /(k \delta)$.
Again, (L3.23) follows from (L3.22) by letting $t=[x-\underline{x}] /(k \delta)$. Notice that $t$ varies from 0 to $\hat{T}$ as $x$ varies from $\underline{x}$ to $\bar{x}$.

To complete the proof, we analyze separately the three cases implied by the analysis immediately above and the analysis in the proof of Lemma 2.

Case 1. $\quad \Delta \geq 2 k \delta$ (or $T \geq 1$ ).
Case 1 here corresponds to Case I in both the analysis of the optimal contract and the analysis of the FPCR contract. Therefore, from (L3.7) and (L3.20):

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{G_{F}}{G_{O}}=\left[\left[\frac{k}{\delta+1}\right]\left(\frac{k \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}\right] /\left[\left(\frac{2 k \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}\left[\frac{2 k}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)}\right]\right]=\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}} \tag{L3.27}
\end{equation*}
$$

Case 2. $\quad \Delta \in[k \delta, 2 k \delta]\left(\right.$ or $T \in\left[\frac{1}{2}, 1\right)$ ).
Case 2 here corresponds to Case II in the analysis of the optimal contract and to Case I in the analysis of the optimal FPCR contract. Therefore, from (L3.14) and (L3.20):

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{G_{F}}{G_{O}}=\left[\left(\frac{k \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta} \frac{k}{\delta+1}\right] /\left[k \delta\left(\frac{1}{\delta}-\frac{2 T}{\delta+1}+\frac{T^{2}}{\delta+2}\right)\right] \tag{L3.28}
\end{equation*}
$$

$$
\begin{equation*}
=\left(\frac{k \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}\left(\frac{1}{\delta+1}\right) /\left[\delta\left(\frac{T^{\delta}}{\delta}-\frac{2 T^{\delta+1}}{\delta+1}+\frac{T^{\delta+2}}{\delta+2}\right)\right] \tag{L3.29}
\end{equation*}
$$

(L3.29) reveals that $G_{F} / G_{O}$ declines with $T$ in this case if $D(T) \equiv \frac{T^{\delta}}{\delta}-\frac{2 T^{\delta+1}}{\delta+1}+\frac{T^{\delta+2}}{\delta+2}$ is an increasing function of $T . D(\cdot)$ is an increasing function of $T$ because:

$$
\begin{equation*}
D^{\prime}(T)=T^{\delta-1}-2 T^{\delta}+T^{\delta+1}=T^{\delta-1}\left[1-2 T+T^{2}\right]=T^{\delta-1}[T-1]^{2} \geq 0 . \tag{L3.30}
\end{equation*}
$$

Case 3. $\quad \Delta \in(0, k \delta) \quad\left(\right.$ or $\left.T \in\left(0, \frac{1}{2}\right)\right)$.
Case 3 here corresponds to Case II in the analysis of both the optimal contract and the FPCR contract. Therefore, from (L3.14) and (L3.26):

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{G_{F}}{G_{O}}=\left[k\left(1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}\right)\right] /\left[k \delta\left(\frac{1}{\delta}-\frac{2 T}{\delta+1}+\frac{T^{2}}{\delta+2}\right)\right]=\left(1+\left[\frac{\delta}{\delta+2}\right] \frac{T^{2}}{\left[1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}\right]}\right)^{-1} . \tag{L3.31}
\end{equation*}
$$

Notice that $T^{2} /\left[1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}\right]$ increases with $T$ because the numerator of this term increases with $T$ while the denominator decreases with $T$. Also notice that since $T \in\left(0, \frac{1}{2}\right)$ in Case 3, $1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}>1-\frac{\delta}{\delta+1}>0$. Therefore, it follows from (L3.31) that $G_{F} / G_{O}$ is a decreasing function of $T$ in this case.

## Proof of Lemma 4.

$T=1$ when $\delta=\Delta /(2 k)$. Therefore, from (L3.27):

$$
\begin{equation*}
\operatorname{limit}_{\delta \rightarrow \infty}^{\lim } \frac{G_{F}}{G_{o}}=\operatorname{limit}_{\delta \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}}=0 \tag{L4.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

The last equality in (L4.1) follows from L'Hopital's Rule.

## Proof of Proposition 1.

(L1.7) and (L1.10) imply that, relative to the cost reimbursement contract, the expected gain from the optimal LCSCR contract (given $\alpha$ ), $G_{L[\alpha]}$, is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\int_{\underline{x}}^{x_{L}^{*}}\left[(1-\alpha)\left(x-x_{L}^{*}\right)+k\left(1-\alpha^{2}\right)\right] d F(x) . \tag{P1.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

To analyze this expected gain, we need to consider two cases. In the first case (Case I), $\Delta \equiv \bar{x}-\underline{x}$ is relatively large, and so the supplier chooses the LCS option for low $x$ 's and the CR option for high $x$ 's. In the second case (Case II), $\Delta$ is relatively small, and so the agent chooses the LCS option for all realizations of $x$.

Case I: $\quad \bar{x} \geq \underline{x}+[1+\alpha] k \delta \quad\left(\right.$ or $\left.T^{\prime} \equiv \frac{\Delta}{(1+\alpha) k \delta} \geq 1\right)$.

$$
\begin{align*}
G_{L[\alpha]} & =\int_{\underline{x}}^{x+k(1+\alpha) \delta}\left[(1-\alpha)[x-(1+\alpha) k \delta-\underline{x}]+k\left(1-\alpha^{2}\right)\right] d F(x) .  \tag{P1.2}\\
& =k[1-\alpha] \int_{0}^{1}[(1+\alpha) \delta(t-1)+(1-\alpha)] d\left(\left(\frac{k(1+\alpha) \delta t}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}\right)  \tag{P1.3}\\
& =k\left[1-\alpha^{2}\right] \delta\left(\frac{k(1+\alpha) \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta} \int_{0}^{1}(\delta t+1-\delta) t^{\delta-1} d t  \tag{P1.4}\\
& =k\left[1-\alpha^{2}\right] \delta\left(\frac{k(1+\alpha) \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}\left(\frac{\delta}{\delta+1}+\frac{1-\delta}{\delta}\right)  \tag{P1.5}\\
& =k\left[1-\alpha^{2}\right]\left(\frac{k(1+\alpha) \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta} \frac{1}{\delta+1} . \tag{P1.6}
\end{align*}
$$

(P1.3) follows from (P1.2) by letting $t=[x-\underline{x}] /(k \delta[1+\alpha])$. Notice that $t$ varies from 0 to 1 as $x$ varies from $\underline{x}$ to $\underline{x}+k \delta[1+\alpha]$.

Case II: $\bar{x}<\underline{x}+[1+\alpha] k \delta\left(\right.$ or $\left.T^{\prime}<1\right)$.

$$
\begin{align*}
G_{L[\alpha]} & =\int_{\underline{x}}^{\bar{x}}\left[(1-\alpha)\left(x-x_{F}^{*}\right)+k\left(1-\alpha^{2}\right)\right] d F(x) .  \tag{P1.7}\\
& =[1-\alpha] \int_{\underline{x}}^{\underline{x}+(1+\alpha) k \delta T^{\prime}}\left[x-\underline{x}-(1+\alpha) k \delta T^{\prime}+k(1+\alpha)\right] d F(x)  \tag{P1.8}\\
& =[1-\alpha] \int_{0}^{T^{\prime}}\left[(1+\alpha) k \delta t-(1+\alpha) k \delta T^{\prime}+k(1+\alpha)\right] d\left(\left(\frac{(1+\alpha) k \delta t}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}\right) \tag{P1.9}
\end{align*}
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& =k\left[1-\alpha^{2}\right] \delta\left(T^{\prime}\right)^{-\delta} \int_{0}^{T^{\prime}}\left(\delta t-\delta T^{\prime}+1\right) t^{\delta-1} d t  \tag{P1.10}\\
& =k\left[1-\alpha^{2}\right] \delta\left(T^{\prime}\right)^{-\delta}\left(\frac{\delta\left(T^{\prime}\right)^{\delta+1}}{\delta+1}-\left(T^{\prime}\right)^{\delta+1}+\frac{\left(T^{\prime}\right)^{\delta}}{\delta}\right)  \tag{P1.11}\\
& =k\left[1-\alpha^{2}\right]\left(1-\frac{\delta T^{\prime}}{\delta+1}\right), \tag{P1.12}
\end{align*}
$$

where $T^{\prime}=\Delta /[(1+\alpha) k \delta]$.
Again, (P1.8) follows from (P1.7) by letting $t=[x-\underline{x}] /[k \delta(1+\alpha)]$. Notice that $t$ varies from 0 to $\underline{x}+[k \delta(1+\alpha)] T^{\prime}$ as $x$ varies from $\underline{x}$ to $\bar{x}$.

For given $\underline{x}, \bar{x}$ and $\delta$, the optimal LCSCR contract is derived by choosing $\alpha$ optimally.

Case I: $\quad \Delta \geq 2 k \delta$ (or $T \equiv \frac{\Delta}{2 k \delta} \geq 1$ ).

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{L[\alpha]}=k\left[1-\alpha^{2}\right]\left(\frac{k(1+\alpha) \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta} \frac{1}{\delta+1} . \tag{P1.13}
\end{equation*}
$$

Since $\left(1-\alpha^{2}\right)=(1-\alpha)(1+\alpha)$, the sign of the partial derivative of $G_{L[\alpha]}$ with respect to $\alpha$ has the same sign as the derivative of $(1-\alpha)(1+\alpha)^{\delta+1}$, which is $(1+\alpha)^{\delta}[\delta-(\delta+2) \alpha]$. Setting this derivative equal to zero reveals that the value of $\alpha$ that uniquely maximizes $G_{L[\alpha]}$ is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\alpha^{*}=\frac{\delta}{\delta+2} \tag{P1.14}
\end{equation*}
$$

Substituting ( P 1.14 ) into ( P 1.13 ) provides:

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{L} \equiv G_{L\left[\alpha^{*}\right]}=2 k\left(\frac{2 k \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{\delta+1} \frac{2}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)} . \tag{P1.15}
\end{equation*}
$$

Case II: $\Delta \in\left[\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right) 2 k \delta, 2 k \delta\right]$ (or $T \in\left[\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}, 1\right]$ ).
Case IIA: $\alpha \leq \Delta /(k \delta)-1$.

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{L[\alpha]}=k[1-\alpha]^{2}\left(\frac{k[1+\alpha] \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta} \frac{1}{\delta+1} . \tag{P1.16}
\end{equation*}
$$

Again, the partial derivative with respect to $\alpha$ of the expression in $G_{L[\alpha]}$ has the same sign as the expression $(1-\alpha)^{\delta}[\delta-(\delta+2) \alpha]$.

$$
\begin{align*}
\text { When } \alpha & =\Delta /(k \delta)-1: \\
\delta-(\delta+2) \alpha & =\delta-[\delta+2][\Delta /(k \delta)-1] \\
& \leq \delta-(\delta+2)\left[\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)\left(\frac{2 k \delta}{k \delta}\right)-1\right]=0 . \tag{P1.17}
\end{align*}
$$

The inequality in (P1.17) holds because we are in Case II.
When $\alpha=0, \quad \delta-[\delta+2] \alpha>0$. Therefore, the value of $\alpha$ that uniquely maximizes $G_{L[\alpha]}$ in this range is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\alpha^{*}=\frac{\delta}{\delta+2} . \tag{P1.18}
\end{equation*}
$$

Substituting (P1.18) into (P1.16) provides

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{L}=2 k\left(\frac{2 k \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{\delta+1} \frac{2}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)} \tag{P1.19}
\end{equation*}
$$

Case IIB: $\alpha>\Delta /(k \delta)-1$.

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{L[\alpha]}=k[1-\alpha]\left[1+\alpha-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}\right] . \tag{P1.20}
\end{equation*}
$$

The sign of the partial derivative with respect to $\alpha$ of the expression for $G_{L[\alpha]}$ in ( P 1.20 ) is the same as the sign of the derivative of $[1-\alpha]\left[1+\alpha-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}\right]$, which is $-2 \alpha+\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}$. This derivative is negative because:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \quad-2 \alpha+\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}<0  \tag{P1.21}\\
& \Leftrightarrow \quad T<\left[\frac{\delta+1}{\delta}\right] \alpha \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \frac{\Delta}{2 k \delta}<\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta}\right) \alpha \\
& \Leftrightarrow \quad \frac{\Delta}{2 k \delta} \leq\left[\frac{\delta+1}{\delta}\right]\left[\frac{\Delta}{k \delta}-1\right] \tag{P1.22}
\end{align*}
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& \Leftrightarrow \quad \frac{\delta+1}{\delta} \leq\left(2\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta}\right)-1\right) \frac{\Delta}{2 k \delta} \Leftrightarrow \delta+1 \leq(\delta+2) \frac{\Delta}{2 k \delta} \\
& \Leftrightarrow\left[\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right] 2 k \delta \leq \Delta . \tag{P1.23}
\end{align*}
$$

(P1.23) holds because we are in Case II. (P1.22) holds because we are in Case IIB. The negative derivative implies the optimal $\alpha$ will never lie in this range.

Case III: $\Delta \leq\left[\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right] 2 k \delta$ (or $T \in\left[0, \frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right]$ ).
Case IIIA: $\quad \alpha<\Delta /(k \delta)-1$.

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{L[\alpha]}=k\left[1-\alpha^{2}\right]\left(\frac{k(1+\alpha) \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta} \frac{1}{\delta+1} . \tag{P1.24}
\end{equation*}
$$

The partial derivative with respect to $\alpha$ of the expression for $G_{L[\alpha]}$ in (P1.24) has the same sign as the derivative of $(1-\alpha)(1+\alpha)^{\delta+1}$, which is $(1+\alpha)^{\delta}(\delta-(\delta+2) \alpha)$. This derivative is positive because:

$$
\begin{align*}
&(1+\alpha)^{\delta}[\delta-(\delta+2) \alpha]>0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{\delta}{\delta+2}>\alpha  \tag{P1.25}\\
& \Leftrightarrow \frac{2 \delta+2}{\delta+2} \geq \frac{\Delta}{k \delta} \Leftrightarrow \frac{\Delta}{k \delta}-1  \tag{P1.26}\\
& \Leftrightarrow \frac{(\delta+1)}{(\delta+2)} 2 k \delta \geq \Delta
\end{align*}
$$

The last equivalence in (P1.26) holds, given that we are in Case III. The last equivalence in ( P 1.25 ) holds because we are in Case IIIA. The positive derivative implies the optimal $\alpha$ will not lie in the specified range.

Case IIIB: $\quad \alpha \geq \Delta /(k \delta)-1$.

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{L[\alpha]}=k[1-\alpha]\left[1+\alpha-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}\right] \tag{P1.27}
\end{equation*}
$$

The partial derivative of the expression for $G_{L[\alpha]}$ with respect to $\alpha$ in (P1.27) has the same sign as the derivative of $(1-\alpha)\left(1+\alpha-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}\right)$, which is $-2 \alpha+\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}$.

Notice that when $\alpha=\Delta /(k \delta)-1$,

$$
\begin{align*}
-2 \alpha+ & \frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}=-\frac{2 \Delta}{k \delta}+2+\left(\frac{2 \delta}{\delta+1}\right) \frac{\Delta}{k \delta} \\
& =2+\left[\frac{2 \delta}{\delta+1}-4\right] \frac{\Delta}{2 k \delta}=2\left[1-\Delta /\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}[2 k \delta]\right)\right] \geq 0 \tag{P1.28}
\end{align*}
$$

Also notice that $-2 \alpha+\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}<0$ when $\alpha=1$. Consequently, the optimal value of $\alpha$ in this range is the solution to: $-2 \alpha+\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}=0$. Therefore, the unique maximizer of $G_{L[\alpha]}$ in this case is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\alpha^{*}=\Delta /(2 k[\delta+1]) . \tag{P1.29}
\end{equation*}
$$

Substituting (P1.29) into (P1.27) provides:

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{L}=k\left[1-\frac{\Delta}{2 k(\delta+1)}\right]^{2} \tag{P1.30}
\end{equation*}
$$

It is now useful to prove that for given $\delta, \frac{G_{L}}{G_{O}}$ is a non-increasing function of $\Delta$. The proof proceeds by examining three cases:

Case I: $\quad \Delta \geq 2 k \delta($ or $T \geq 1)$.
In this case:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{G_{L}}{G_{O}}=\left(\left(\frac{2 k \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{\delta+1} \frac{4 k}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)}\right) /\left(\left(\frac{2 k \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta} \frac{2 k}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)}\right)=2\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{\delta+1} \tag{P1.31}
\end{equation*}
$$

Case II: $\Delta \in\left[\left[\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right][2 k \delta], 2 k \delta\right]\left(\right.$ or $\left.T \in\left[\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}, 1\right]\right)$.

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{G_{L}}{G_{O}}= & \left(2 k\left(\frac{2 k \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{\delta+1} \frac{2}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)}\right) /\left(k \delta\left(\frac{1}{\delta}-\frac{2 T}{\delta+1}+\frac{T^{2}}{\delta+2}\right)\right) \\
& =\left(2\left(\frac{2 k \delta}{\Delta}\right)^{\delta}\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{\delta+1} \frac{2}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)}\right) /\left(\delta\left(\frac{T^{\delta}}{\delta}-\frac{2 T^{\delta}}{\delta+1}+\frac{T^{\delta+2}}{\delta+2}\right)\right) \tag{P1.32}
\end{align*}
$$

(P1.32) implies it suffices to show that $\frac{T^{\delta}}{\delta}-\frac{2 T^{\delta+1}}{\delta+1}+\frac{T^{\delta+2}}{\delta+2}$ is an increasing function of $T$. This fact follows because the derivative of this function is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
T^{\delta-1}-2 T^{\delta}+T^{\delta+1}=T^{\delta-1}\left[1-2 T+T^{2}\right]=T^{\delta-1}[1-T]^{2} \geq 0 \tag{P1.33}
\end{equation*}
$$

Case III: $\Delta \leq\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right) 2 k \delta\left(\right.$ or $\left.T \in\left[0, \frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right]\right)$.

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{G_{L}}{G_{O}} & =\left(k\left(1-\frac{\delta T}{\delta+1}\right)^{2}\right) /\left(k \delta\left(\frac{1}{\delta}-\frac{2 T}{\delta+1}+\frac{T^{2}}{\delta+2}\right)\right) \\
& =\frac{\left(1-\frac{\delta}{\delta+1} T\right)^{2}}{\left(1-\frac{\delta}{\delta+1} T\right)^{2}+\frac{\delta}{(\delta+1)^{2}(\delta+2)} T^{2}} . \tag{P1.34}
\end{align*}
$$

Since $\left(1-\frac{\delta}{\delta+1} T\right)$ is a decreasing function of $T$ while $T^{2}$ is an increasing function of $T$, (P1.34) implies $G_{L} / G_{O}$ is a decreasing function of $T$.

The foregoing analysis implies that $G_{L} / G_{O}$ attains its smallest value in Case I immediately above. Consequently, the proof follows if:

$$
\begin{equation*}
2\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{\delta+1}>\frac{2}{e} \tag{P1.35}
\end{equation*}
$$

To show that (P1.35) holds, first recall that $e \equiv \lim _{w \rightarrow \infty}\left(1+\frac{1}{w}\right)^{w}$. Now it will be useful to show that $\ln \left(\left(1+\frac{1}{w}\right)^{w}\right)=w \ln \left(1+\frac{1}{w}\right)$ is an increasing function of $w$ on $(0, \infty)$. To do so, we will show that its derivative is declining with $w$, and is non-negative at $w=\infty$.

$$
\begin{gather*}
\frac{d}{d w}\left\{w \ln \left(1+\frac{1}{w}\right)\right\}=\ln \left(1+\frac{1}{w}\right)+w \frac{1}{1+\frac{1}{w}}\left(-\frac{1}{w^{2}}\right)=\ln \left(1+\frac{1}{w}\right)-\frac{1}{1+w} .  \tag{P1.36}\\
\text { As } w \rightarrow \infty, \ln \left(1+\frac{1}{w}\right)-\frac{1}{1+w} \rightarrow \ln (1)-0=0 . \tag{P1.37}
\end{gather*}
$$

It remains to show that the derivative of $\ln \left(1+\frac{1}{w}\right)-\frac{1}{1+w}$ is negative on $(0, \infty)$. This derivative is:

$$
\begin{align*}
-\left(\frac{1}{w^{2}}\right)\left(\frac{1}{1+\frac{1}{w}}\right)+\frac{1}{(1+w)^{2}} & =-\frac{1}{w(1+w)}+\frac{1}{(1+w)^{2}} \\
& =\frac{w-(1+w)}{w(1+w)^{2}}=-\frac{1}{w(1+w)^{2}}<0 . \tag{P1.38}
\end{align*}
$$

( P 1.38 ) implies $\left(1+\frac{1}{w}\right)^{w}$ is an increasing function of $w$, whose limit as $w \rightarrow \infty$ is $e$. Consequently, $\left(1+\frac{1}{w}\right)^{w}<e$ for $w \in(0, \infty)$. Thus:

$$
\frac{G_{L}}{G_{O}} \geq 2\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{\delta+1}=2\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+1+1}\right)^{\delta+1}=2\left(\frac{1}{[1+1 /(1+\delta)]^{1+\delta}}\right)>\frac{2}{e}
$$

## Proof of Proposition 2.

We first prove that $\left[G_{L}-G_{F}\right] /\left[G_{O}-G_{F}\right]$ is a non-increasing function of $\Delta$. The proof proceeds by analyzing four distinct cases.

Case I: $\quad \Delta \leq k \delta\left(\right.$ or $\left.T \equiv \frac{\Delta}{2 k \delta} \leq 1 / 2\right)$.

From (L3.14), (P1.30), and (L3.26):

$$
\begin{aligned}
G_{O} & =k\left(1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}+\frac{\delta T^{2}}{\delta+2}\right), \quad G_{F}=k\left(1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}\right), \text { and } \\
G_{L} & =k\left[1-\frac{\Delta}{2 k(\delta+1)}\right]^{2}=k\left[1-\frac{\delta T}{\delta+1}\right]^{2}=k\left(1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}+\frac{\delta^{2} T^{2}}{(\delta+1)^{2}}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

Consequently:

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{G_{L}-G_{F}}{G_{O}-G_{F}} & =\left(k\left(1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}+\frac{\delta^{2} T^{2}}{(\delta+1)^{2}}\right)-k\left(1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}\right)\right) /\left(k\left(1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}+\frac{\delta T^{2}}{\delta+2}\right)-k\left(1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}\right)\right) \\
& =\left(\frac{\delta^{2} T^{2}}{(\delta+1)^{2}}\right) /\left(\frac{\delta T^{2}}{\delta+2}\right)=\frac{\delta(\delta+2)}{(\delta+1)^{2}} \tag{P2.1}
\end{align*}
$$

Case II: $\Delta \in\left[k \delta,\left(\frac{2 \delta+2}{\delta+2}\right) k \delta\right]$ (or $T \in\left[\frac{1}{2}, \frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right]$ ).
From (L3.14), (P1.30), and (L3.20):

$$
G_{O}=k\left(1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}+\frac{\delta T^{2}}{\delta+2}\right), G_{L}=k\left(1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}+\frac{\delta^{2} T^{2}}{(\delta+1)^{2}}\right), \text { and } G_{F}=k(2 T)^{-\delta} /(\delta+1)
$$

Consequently:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \frac{G_{L}-G_{F}}{G_{O}-G_{F}}=1-\frac{G_{O}-G_{L}}{G_{O}-G_{F}} \\
& =1-\left(k\left(1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}+\frac{\delta T^{2}}{\delta+2}\right)-k\left(1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}+\frac{\delta^{2} T}{(\delta+1)^{2}}\right)\right) /\left(k\left(1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}+\frac{\delta T^{2}}{\delta+2}\right)-\frac{k(2 T)^{-\delta}}{\delta+1}\right) \\
& =1-\left[\frac{\delta T^{2}}{(\delta+1)^{2}(\delta+2)}\right] /\left[1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}+\frac{\delta T^{2}}{\delta+2}-\frac{(2 T)^{-\delta}}{\delta+1}\right] \\
& =1-\frac{\delta}{(\delta+1)^{2}(\delta+2)}\left(T^{-2}-\frac{2 \delta}{\delta+1} T^{-1}+\frac{\delta}{\delta+2}-\frac{2^{-\delta} T^{-\delta-2}}{\delta+1}\right)^{-1} . \tag{P2.2}
\end{align*}
$$

$\frac{G_{L}-G_{F}}{G_{O}-G_{F}}$ is a decreasing function of $T$ if and only if $\frac{G_{O}-G_{L}}{G_{O}-G_{F}}$ is an increasing function of $T$. This is the case if and only if $R(T)$ is a decreasing function of $T$, where

$$
\begin{equation*}
R(T) \equiv\left(T^{-2}-\frac{2 \delta}{\delta+1} T^{-1}+\frac{\delta}{\delta+2}-\frac{2^{-\delta} T^{-\delta-2}}{\delta+1}\right) \tag{P2.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

(Notice that $R(T)>0$ for all relevant $T$. Otherwise, it would follow from (P2.2) that $E G_{L}>E G_{O}$, which cannot be the case.)

The derivative of $R(T)$ with respect to $T$ on $\left[1 / 2, \frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right]$ is:

$$
\begin{equation*}
-2 T^{-3}+\frac{2 \delta}{\delta+1} T^{-2}+2^{-\delta} T^{-\delta-3} \frac{\delta+2}{\delta+1}=T^{-3}\left(-2+\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}+2^{-\delta} T^{-\delta} \frac{\delta+2}{\delta+1}\right) \equiv T^{-3} S(T) \tag{P2.4}
\end{equation*}
$$

We will now show that $S(T)<0$ for $T \in\left(1 / 2, \frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)$ by showing that it is strictly convex and the values of its ending points are non-positive. Notice, first, that

$$
\begin{equation*}
S(T)=-2+\frac{\delta}{\delta+1}+\frac{\delta+2}{\delta+1}=0 \text { when } T=1 / 2 . \tag{P2.5}
\end{equation*}
$$

Next observe that $S(T)$ is convex because:

$$
\begin{equation*}
S^{\prime}(T)=\frac{2 \delta}{\delta+1}-\frac{2^{-\delta} \delta(\delta+2)}{\delta+1} T^{-\delta-1}, \text { and so } S^{\prime \prime}(T)=2^{-\delta} \delta(\delta+2) T^{-\delta-2}>0 \tag{P2.6}
\end{equation*}
$$

Now note that when $T=\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}$ :
$S(T)=-2+\frac{2 \delta}{\delta+2}+\left(\frac{2 \delta+2}{\delta+2}\right)^{-\delta} \frac{\delta+2}{\delta+2}=-\left(\frac{4}{\delta+2}\right)+\left(\frac{\delta+2}{2 \delta+2}\right)^{\delta} \frac{\delta+2}{\delta+1}$, which is non-
positive because:

$$
\begin{gather*}
-\left(\frac{4}{\delta+2}\right)+\left(\frac{\delta+2}{2 \delta+2}\right)^{\delta}\left(\frac{\delta+2}{\delta+1}\right) \leq 0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{(\delta+2)^{\delta+2}}{(2 \delta+2)^{\delta+1}} \leq 2 \\
\Leftrightarrow Z(\delta) \equiv[\delta+2] \ln (\delta+2)-[\delta+1] \ln (2 \delta+2) \leq \ln 2 \tag{P2.7}
\end{gather*}
$$

Notice that $Z(0)=2 \ln (2)-\ln (2)=\ln 2$. Therefore, to show that $Z(\delta) \leq \ln 2$ for all $\delta \geq 0$, it suffices to show that $Z^{\prime}(\delta) \leq 0$ for all $\delta \geq 0$. From (P2.7):

$$
\begin{equation*}
Z^{\prime}(\delta)=\ln (\delta+2)+1-\ln (2 \delta+2)-1=\ln (\delta+2)-\ln (2 \delta+2)<0 . \tag{P2.8}
\end{equation*}
$$

(P2.8) implies $\frac{G_{L}-G_{F}}{G_{O}-G_{F}}$ is a decreasing function of $T$ on $\left[\frac{1}{2}, \frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right]$.
Case III: $\quad \Delta \in\left[\left(\frac{2 \delta+2}{\delta+2}\right) k \delta, 2 k \delta\right]$ (or $T \in\left[\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}, 1\right]$ ).
From (L3.14), (P1.19), and (L3.20):

$$
G_{O}=k\left(1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}+\frac{\delta T^{2}}{\delta+2}\right), G_{L}=k T^{-\delta}\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{\delta+1} \frac{4}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)}, \text { and } G_{F}=\frac{k(2 T)^{-\delta}}{\delta+1}
$$

Consequently:

$$
\begin{gather*}
\frac{G_{L}-G_{F}}{G_{O}-G_{F}}=\left(k T^{-\delta}\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{(\delta+1)} \frac{4}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)}-\frac{k(2 T)^{-\delta}}{\delta+1}\right) /\left(k\left(1-\frac{2 \delta T}{\delta+1}+\frac{\delta T^{2}}{\delta+2}\right)-\frac{k(2 T)^{-\delta}}{\delta+1}\right) \\
=\left(\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{(\delta+1)} \frac{4}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)}-\frac{2^{-\delta}}{\delta+1}\right) /\left(T^{\delta}-\left(\frac{2 \delta}{\delta+1}\right) T^{\delta+1}+\left(\frac{\delta}{\delta+2}\right) T^{\delta+2}-\frac{2^{-\delta}}{\delta+1}\right) . \tag{P2.9}
\end{gather*}
$$

To show $\frac{G_{L}-G_{F}}{G_{O}-G_{F}}$ is a decreasing function of $T$, it suffices to show $W(T)$ is an increasing function of $T$, where:

$$
\begin{gather*}
W(T) \equiv T^{\delta}-\left(\frac{2 \delta}{\delta+1}\right) T^{\delta+1}+\left(\frac{\delta}{\delta+2}\right) T^{\delta+2} .  \tag{P2.10}\\
W^{\prime}(T)=\delta\left[T^{\delta-1}-2 T^{\delta}+T^{\delta+1}\right]=\delta T^{\delta-1}\left[1-2 T+T^{2}\right]=\delta T^{\delta-1}[T-1]^{2} \geq 0 . \tag{P2.11}
\end{gather*}
$$

Case IV: $\Delta \geq 2 k \delta$ (or $T \geq 1$ ).
From (L3.7), (P1.15), and (L3.20):

$$
G_{O}=k T^{-\delta} \frac{2}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)}, G_{L}=k T^{-\delta}\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{\delta+1} \frac{4}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)}, \text { and } G_{F}=\frac{k(2 T)^{-\delta}}{\delta+1} .
$$

Consequently:

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{G_{L}-G_{F}}{G_{O}-G_{F}} & =\left(\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{\delta+1} \frac{4 k T^{-\delta}}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)}-\frac{k(2 T)^{-\delta}}{\delta+1}\right) /\left(\frac{2 k T^{-\delta}}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)}-\frac{k(2 T)^{-\delta}}{\delta+1}\right) \\
& =\left(\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{\delta+1} \frac{4}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)}-\frac{2^{-\delta}}{\delta+1}\right) /\left(\frac{2}{(\delta+1)(\delta+2)}-\frac{2^{-\delta}}{\delta+1}\right) \\
& =\left(2\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{\delta+1}-\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}}\right) /\left(1-\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}}\right) . \tag{P2.12}
\end{align*}
$$

Notice that the expression in (P2.12) is independent of $T$.
In summary, we have shown $\frac{G_{L}-G_{F}}{G_{O}-G_{F}}$ is a non-increasing function of $\Delta$ in all four cases.

Because $\frac{G_{L}-G_{F}}{G_{O}-G_{F}}$ declines as $T$ increases, it suffices to show that $\frac{G_{L}-G_{F}}{G_{O}-G_{F}}>\frac{1}{2}$ in Case IV above. Therefore, from ( P 2.12 ), to complete the proof, it suffices to show:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left[2\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{\delta+1}-\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}}\right] /\left[1-\left(\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}}\right)\right]>\frac{1}{2} \quad \text { for } \quad \delta \geq 1 \tag{P2.13}
\end{equation*}
$$

(P2.13) holds if and only if:

$$
\begin{align*}
& 2\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{\delta+1}-\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}}>\frac{1}{2}\left[1-\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}}\right]  \tag{P2.14}\\
& \quad \Leftrightarrow 4\left(\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+2}\right)^{\delta+1}>1+\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}}  \tag{P2.15}\\
& \quad \Leftrightarrow M(\delta) \equiv \frac{1}{4}\left(\frac{\delta+2}{\delta+1}\right)^{\delta+1}\left[1+\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}}\right]<1 \tag{P2.16}
\end{align*}
$$

From the proof of Proposition 1, $\left(\frac{\delta+2}{\delta+1}\right)^{\delta+1}$ is increasing in $\delta$ and is bounded above by $e$. Also notice that:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \frac{\partial}{\partial \delta}\left(\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}}\right)=2^{-2(\delta+1)}\left[2^{\delta+1}-(\delta+2) 2^{\delta+1} \ln 2\right] \\
&=2^{-(\delta+1)}[1-(\delta+2) \ln 2]<2^{-(\delta+1)}[1-(\delta+2)(.69)] \\
&<2^{-(\delta+1)}[1-2(.69)]<0 .  \tag{P2.17}\\
& \text { (P2.17) implies } \frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}} \text { is a decreasing function of } \delta .
\end{align*}
$$

We will now demonstrate that $M(\delta)<1$ over all relevant intervals in which $\delta \leq 1$. Initially, suppose $\delta \geq 2.2$. Because $\left(\frac{\delta+2}{\delta+1}\right)^{\delta+1}<e<2.718$, and because $\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}}$ is decreasing in $\delta$, we know that in this range:

$$
\begin{equation*}
M(\delta)<\frac{1}{4}\left[1+\frac{4.2}{2^{3.2}}\right](2.718)<\frac{1}{4}[1.457][2.718]<\frac{1}{4}[3.96]<1 \tag{P2.18}
\end{equation*}
$$

Now suppose $\delta \in[1.3,2.2)$. Because $\left(\frac{\delta+2}{\delta+1}\right)^{\delta+1}$ is increasing in $\delta,\left(\frac{\delta+2}{\delta+1}\right)^{\delta+1}<$ $\left(\frac{4.2}{3.2}\right)^{3.2}<(1.3125)^{3.2}<2.3874$ in this range. Also, since $\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}}$ is decreasing in $\delta$, $1+\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}} \leq 1+\frac{3.3}{2^{2.3}}<1.67$ in this range. Therefore, $M(\delta)<[1.67][2.3874] / 4<3.99 / 4$ $<1$ in this range.

Now suppose $\delta \in[1.1,1.3)$. Because $\left(\frac{\delta+2}{\delta+1}\right)^{\delta+1}$ is increasing in $\delta,\left(\frac{\delta+2}{\delta+1}\right)^{\delta+1}<$ $\left(\frac{3.3}{2.3}\right)^{2.3}<(1.43478)^{2.3}<2.29407$ in this range. Also, since $\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}}$ is decreasing in $\delta$, $1+\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}} \leq 1+\frac{3.1}{2^{2.1}}<1.7231$ in this range. Therefore, $M(\delta)<[2.29407][1.7231] / 4<$ $(3.953) / 4<1$ in this range.

Finally, suppose $\delta \in[1,1.1)$. Because $\left(\frac{\delta+2}{\delta+1}\right)^{\delta+1}$ is increasing in $\delta,\left(\frac{\delta+2}{\delta+1}\right)^{\delta+1}<$ $\left(\frac{3.1}{2.1}\right)^{2.1}<2.265$ in this range. Also, since $\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}}$ is decreasing in $\delta, 1+\frac{\delta+2}{2^{\delta+1}} \leq 1+3 / 4$ $=1.75$ in this range. Therefore, $M(\delta)<[2.265][1.75] / 4<(3.964) / 4<1$ in this range.

The simulations in Appendix B reflect the following analysis. From (A3) in Appendix A:

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{O}(y(x))=\int_{\underline{x}}^{x_{0}^{*}}\left[y(x)-\frac{1}{4 k}[y(x)]^{2}-\frac{y(x)}{2 k} \frac{F}{f}\right] d F(x) . \tag{B1}
\end{equation*}
$$

Maximizing $G_{O}(y(x))$ with respect to $y(x)$ provides:

$$
\begin{equation*}
y_{o}(x)=2 k-F(x) / f(x) \tag{B2}
\end{equation*}
$$

Substituting $y_{O}(x)$ into $G_{O}(\cdot)$ provides:

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{0}=\frac{1}{4 k} \int_{\underline{x}}^{x_{0}^{*}}\left[2 k-\frac{F(x)}{f(x)}\right]^{2} d F(x), \tag{B3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where, from (B2):

$$
\begin{equation*}
2 k=F\left(x_{O}^{*}\right) / f\left(x_{O}^{*}\right) \tag{B4}
\end{equation*}
$$

From (A6) in Appendix A:

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{F}=\int_{\underline{x}}^{x_{F}^{*}}\left[x-x_{F}^{*}+k\right] d F(x) . \tag{B5}
\end{equation*}
$$

Maximizing $G_{F}$ with respect to $x_{F}^{*}$ provides:

$$
\begin{equation*}
k=F\left(x_{F}^{*}\right) / f\left(x_{F}^{*}\right) \tag{B4}
\end{equation*}
$$

From (A2) in Appendix A:

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{L[\alpha]}=\int_{\underline{x}}^{x_{L}}\left[(1-\alpha)\left(x-x_{L}\right)+k\left(1-\alpha^{2}\right)\right] d F(x) . \tag{B5}
\end{equation*}
$$

Maximizing $G_{L[\alpha]}$ with respect to $x_{L}$ provides:

$$
\begin{equation*}
k[1+\alpha]=F\left(x_{L}\right) / f\left(x_{L}\right) \tag{B6}
\end{equation*}
$$

Solving (B6) for $\alpha$ provides:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\alpha=\frac{F\left(x_{L}\right)}{k f\left(x_{L}\right)}-1 \tag{B7}
\end{equation*}
$$

Maximizing $G_{L[\alpha]}$ with respect to $\alpha$ provides:

$$
\begin{equation*}
2 k \alpha F\left(x_{L}\right)=\int_{\underline{x}}^{x_{L}} F(x) d x \tag{B8}
\end{equation*}
$$

(B8) follows in part from the fact that $\int_{\underline{x}}^{x_{L}}\left[x_{L}-x\right] d F(x)=\int_{\underline{x}}^{x_{L}} F(x) d x$.

Substituting (B7) into (B8) reveals:

$$
\begin{equation*}
k=F\left(x_{L}\right) / f\left(x_{L}\right)-\int_{\underline{x}}^{x_{L}} F(x) d x /\left[2 F\left(x_{L}\right)\right] \tag{B9}
\end{equation*}
$$

The simulations identify the optimal values of $x_{L}$ (from (B9)) and $\alpha$ (from (B7)).

