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State Emergence and International Conflict: Determinants and Effects of New State Behavior, 1816-2010.

The established practice of modern IR scholarship is to implicitly censor the pre-state background when examining state behavior. States enter the analytical microscope free of pre-independence historical legacies and experiences, which are in essence deemed irrelevant and inconsequential. If this approach is indeed valid, then all new states should exhibit perfectly similar behavioral patterns immediately after their emergence. My dissertation, then, addresses a simple, albeit to date ignored, empirical puzzle: if that is the case, why do we observe such great variation in the behavior of new states? To put it differently, why do some new states manage to avoid conflict, while others express, or become the recipients of, bellicose intentions?

I trace the answer to the above questions to the conditions immediately preceding the formation of a state. I argue that the process and means of emergence will have a resonating impact on how a new state will behave towards its neighbors during the first stages of its existence. My theory is structured around a logical mechanism that links pre-state with post-independence domestic dynamics, ultimately leading to an explanation of new state demeanor.

More specifically, through this project I claim that each of the four state emergence processes (secession, decolonization, liberation, and unification) has an independent and empirically distinguishable effect on the future behavior of new states. My theory is structured around four distinct pillars: the value of territory affected, the introduction of new international boundaries and their subsequent institutionalization efforts, the proximity and spatial clustering of the new states emerging by each process, and the ethnic makeup and identity of the new state as opposed to that of its neighbors or predecessor.

In succinctly discussing the hypothetical causal links I argue that the division of a psychologically invaluable territory during a secession (i.e. the homeland), along with the close proximity of the new post-secession states, is expected to positively affect the hazard of territorial claims. However, the presence of established states in the region combined with the quasi-recognized pre-independence boundaries and the ethnic homogeneity of the new political entities are expected to mitigate the likelihood of dispute escalation. Regarding their domestic environments, seceded states should face marginally positive prospects of internal conformity and democratization as an immediate product of a successful independence effort.

Decolonization, on the other hand, posits a different set of structural conditions that affects new state demeanor. Although the value of the territory affected is strategic and economic, thus divisible as opposed to a psychologically invaluable piece of land, decolonized states should experience a greater hazard of territorial claims onset and escalation. The reason lies in the inherited colonial boundaries that were designed to maximize administrative efficiency rather than satisfy ethnic homogenization concerns. As a result, the new boundaries are devoid of any intangible or institutional value rendering them more likely to be contested. The ethnic heterogeneity of the decolonized states – as well as their contemporaneous emergence and tight spatial clustering – also provides them with an incentive to usurp the territorial status quo in an attempt to presumably unite ethnic groups separated by new state borders. Domestically, the abrupt exit of a colonial ruler that enforces stability and security is expected to be followed by widespread unrest as the different ethnic groups are fighting to consolidate access to political power. As such the likelihood of rapid democratization is severely diminished and with it the chances of internal conflict increase exponentially.

The two remaining processes of state emergence, liberation and unification, should in theory reduce the risk of both intrastate and interstate conflict. Liberation from a temporary military occupation carries persistent memories of past defeats. Thus, satisfied by the acquisition of statehood, a new liberated state is expected to avoid actions that may jeopardize its newly found independence. Similarly, unification can be conceptualized as an internal correction process, after which the new state is expected to externalize and signal its satisfaction with the overall outcome, thus increasing its positive peace interactions. That being said, these two processes should be rather inconsequential in regards to domestic stability prospects of the new states.

Notwithstanding the above, perhaps the most important determinant of new state behavior concerns the use of violence during the emergence period. Violent state formations disproportionally influence both the domestic and the international environment. Since the emergence of a new state signifies a de facto territorial change, a violent emergence can be considered a territorial grab by force. Such state formations should bring forth latent irredentism claims, therefore increasing the hazard of both conflict initiation and escalation. Moreover, as the primary means of success, violence and militarism are now acceptable policymaking tools. Leaders of new states are justified in employing violence and threats both internally and towards neighboring states. Established neighbors are also expected to react aggressively in fear of conflict contagion. In short, pre-independence violence negatively affects all aspects of a new state’s life-cycle.

My findings strongly support my claims. Violence, as the means by which a state achieved independence, is the most consistent and persistent determinant of new state behavior. States emerging through the use of force are experiencing a greater hazard of interstate disputes and territorial contestations, while domestically they are more likely to maintain undemocratic or militaristic institutions. A violent emergence also hinders development and international cooperation, promoting isolation and self-reliance instead. The four distinct processes of state formation are also revealed to be of importance. Secession, decolonization, liberation, and unification affect new states in uniquely identifiable ways in an empirical verification of the hypothetically expounded behavioral patterns. Most importantly, the impact of processes and means is shown to fluctuate non-monotonically through time, suggesting the presence of a “maturation” effect that has so far eluded our attention.

Methodologically the dissertation relies on a systemic analysis of relevant data covering all years and all inhabited regions from 1816 to 2010. The primary empirical tests utilize epidemiological methods of inference, while the results are validated via matching techniques for robustness purposes. More specifically, I use a non-parametric survival technique widely known as Cox regression. The final step includes four case studies in an effort to elucidate the presence of the hypothesized causal mechanism.